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1. The terms of reference for the Inquiry 
and the Committee's approach to its task 
1.1 The Government's intention to establish the Committee of Inquiry was 
announced in a press statement issued by the Prime Minister on 16 December 1977. 
The statement mentioned the difficult position in which a Prime Minister finds 
himself when he is called upon to pass judgment on colleagues with whom he 
has worked closely, particularly as the Prime Minister must act as a judge and 
jury when allegations of impropriety are raised. It went on to say that a far more 
satisfactory procedure must be found to resolve these situations which can have 
such an impact on an individual's career and on the life of his family. 
1.2 Continuing, the Prime Minister said: 
A whole new approach is required. I do not regard the Report of the Parliamentary 
Committee on Pecuniary Interests as putting forward adequate solutions.' In my view, 
a statement of pecuniary interests to the Parliament does not provide an adequate 
procedure. 
Because of that view, I intend to appoint a judge or Queen's Counsel, to be assisted 
by a businessman and an accountant, who will need to be familiar with modern commercial 
practice and procedures, to make recommendations to the Government on what interests 
should be disclosed. 
They will also be asked to recommend what procedures should be followed to determine 
whether there has been any breach of the high standards which are properly required of 
those in public office. The Committee will also be asked to recommend the method which 
should be used to determine whether there has been a breach. 
They will be asked to examine whether or not a register under judicial supervision 
should be instituted and maintained in such a way that, in the event of allegations of 
impropriety or on the judge's own initiative, it will allow for expeditious and proper 
judicial examination of such allegations. 
1.3 Formation of the Committee of Inquiry was announced by the Prime Min-
ister in a second press release, on 15 February 1978. 
1.4 In this announcement, the Prime Minister stated that the membership of 
the Committee would comprise the Chief Judge of the Federal Court of Australia, 
the Hon. Sir Nigel Bowen, K.B.E., Sir Cecil Looker, and Sir Edward Cain, 
C.B.E. The Prime Minister said that the Inquiry had been asked to consider 
whether principles and measures can be drawn up to promote the avoidance and, 
if necessary, the resolution of conflict of interest situations. It would have access 
to a large amount of information already available on policies, practices and atti-
tudes in Australia and overseas. 
1.5 As detailed by the Prime Minister, the terms of reference for the Inquiry 
were: 
1. To recommend whether a statement of principles can be drawn up on the 
nature of private interests, pecuniary or otherwise, which could conflict 
with the public duty of any or all persons holding positions of public trust 
in relation to the Commonwealth. 
2. To recommend whether principles can be defined which would promote 
the avoidance and if necessary the resolution of any conflicts of interest 
which the Inquiry may, under paragraph (1) above, find to be possible. 
3. In the event of a finding under paragraph (2) above that principles can be 
defined, to recommend what those principles should be. 
4. Without limiting the scope of paragraph (3) above, to recommend whether or 
not a register under judicial or other supervision should be maintained so 
that, in the event of allegations of impropriety, the allegation may be open 
to judicial investigation and report. 
5. For the purposes of paragraph (1) above, 'persons holding positions of 
public trust in relation to the Commonwealth' to include the following: 
(a) Ministers; 
(b) Senators and Members of the House of Representatives; 
(c) Staff of (a) and (b); 
(d) Members of the Australian Public Service; and 
(e) Such other persons or classes of persons which in the opinion of the 
Committee ought to be included. 
Expansion of the terms of reference 
1.6 Subsequently, in different ways, these terms of reference were given greater 
precision and, to a degree, expanded by the Prime Minister. 
1.7 In the House of Representatives on 7 March 1978, dealing with the 
resignation of a senior officer of the Department of Social Security to take 
up employment with Facom Australia Ltd, the Prime Minister referred to the 
practice under which the British Government requires that, save with express 
permission, no senior public servant may take up certain positions within two 
years of leaving the British Civil Service. He said that the Government had 
decided that the question of post-separation employment should be one of the 
matters expressly referred to the inquiry on conflicts between public duty and 
private interests.2 Subsequently in a letter dated 14 March 1978 to the Chairman 
of the Committee, he confirmed the Government's wish to have the question 
examined by the Committee. 
1.8 On 8 March 1978, the Prime Minister wrote to the Chairman of the 
Committee on the interpretation of item (e) of paragraph 5 of the terms of 
reference, relating to 'Such other persons or classes of persons which in the 
opinion of the Committee ought to be included'. In his letter, the Prime Minister 
stated: 
The Government envisaged that, in dealing with part (e) of that paragraph, the Inquiry 
might appropriately consider and report on the case for inclusion within its recommen-
dations of each of the classes of persons who have been mentioned in recent literature 
and discussion on the subject. In particular, we imagined that you might wish to look at 
the case for including within your Inquiry each of the classes of persons dealt with in the 
Report of the Joint Committee on Pecuniary Interests of Members of Parliament. 
The question whether to make specific recommendations relating to each of these classes 
is, of course, a matter for your judgment. But we felt that the question of inclusion of the 
various classes of persons would warrant consideration and report, and therefore framed 
the terms of reference accordingly. 
As the only classes of persons considered by the Joint Parliamentary Committee 
2 	 on Pecuniary Interests of Members of Parliament and not specifically mentioned 
in the terms of reference for the Inquiry were statutory officeholders and mem-
bers of statutory bodies and their staffs, and directors, executives, editors and 
journalists of media organisations, the Committee interpreted the Prime Minister's 
letter as requiring it to consider the desirability of including these within the 
scope of its investigations. 
1.9 In an electorate talk on the integrity and honesty of Government on 12 
March 1978, the Prime Minister again referred to the action taken to call for 
fresh tenders in the computer contract involving Facom Australia Ltd. He 
explained that 'The Government, in this case, was not convinced that justice 
had been done. We were sure that justice had not been seen to be done. Accord-
ingly, we took the only proper course—the course we would take again in the 
same circumstances—we recalled tenders.' He then added: 'At the same time, 
we referred this whole question of Government employees working in the tender-
ing process to Sir Nigel Bowen's inquiry into public duty and private interest.' 
1.10 Further elaboration of the Government's views of the scope of the terms 
of reference for the Inquiry appeared in the response given by the Prime Minister 
on 5 April 1978, to a Parliamentary Question in the House of Representatives, 
when he indicated that the situation of persons such as one who was a director 
of a foreign-owned company both while he was a Minister of the Crown and 
while he was an Ambassador would be considered by the Inquiry.3  
1.11 The Prime Minister's expectations of the Committee in the matter of 
post-separation employment of public servants were detailed further in his reply 
to another Parliamentary Question on 2 May 1978, when he said that the issues 
which formed the basis of Recommendation 24 of the Committee of Inquiry 
into Government Procurement Policy, under Sir Walter Scott, in which that 
Committee proposed an investigation into acceptance by government officers 
of employment with firms which have contractual relations with the Government, 
would be examined by the present Committee of Inquiry.4 
Preliminary consideration of the persons or classes of persons 
to be covered by the Inquiry 
1.12 When framing an advertisement in the press inviting submissions from 
the public on the matters covered by the terms of reference for the Inquiry, 
the Committee gave preliminary attention to the persons or classes of persons 
to be covered by item (e) of paragraph 5 of the terms of reference. 
1.13 It was decided that, in the advertisement, the Committee should state its 
position publicly that, under item (e), it would need to consider whether all or 
any of the following persons or classes of persons ought to be covered by the 
Inquiry: 
• Members of the Legislative Assembly of the Northern Territory; 
• Members of the Legislative Assembly of the Australian Capital Territory; 
• Members and staff of statutory bodies established by the Commonwealth; 
• Members of the Defence Services; 
• Directors, executives, editors and journalists of media organisations. 
This decision was taken on the basis that, notwithstanding what appeared in the 
advertisement, other categories of persons considered to hold positions of trust 
in relation to the Commonwealth might be added to the list if this was thought 
desirable. Advertisements were placed in the metropolitan and provincial news-
papers during the latter part of April 1978. 
Evidence presented to the Inquiry 
1.14 The evidence presented to the Inquiry came from a number of sources. Com-
paratively few written submissions were received as a result of the April 1978 
advertisements. The majority of written submissions were received in response to 
letters of invitation to present views extended to a wide range of persons who the 
Committee considered might be in a position to assist with comment on the matters 
covered by the terms of reference. Apart from written submissions, evidence was 
received in oral form from those persons who appeared as witnesses before the 
Committee. 
1.15 The various classes of persons or organisations who contributed to the 
work of the Committee by presenting evidence either in writing or orally may be 
summarised as follows: 
Members of the Commonwealth Parliament 
Ministers 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 7 
	
Other Senators and Members of House of Representatives . 	 . 	 26 
	
Staff of Commonwealth Ministers . 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 2 
Permanent Heads of the Australian Public Service, Chiefs of Defence 
	
Force Staff, or their representatives . 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 28 
	
Members of the Northern Territory Legislative Assembly . 	 . 	 . 	 3 
	
Members of the Australian Capital Territory Legislative Assembly . 
	 5 
Holders of statutory offices and representatives of statutory authorities 
	
established under Commonwealth legislation 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 27 
	
Representatives of non-government media organisations . 	 . 	 . 	 12 
Members of State Parliaments and representatives of State Govern- 
ment departments or authorities 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 13 
	
Staff of academic institutions . 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 5 
Representatives of staff organisation peak councils and of staff 
organisations 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 4 
Other persons or organisations 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 18 
1.16 As previously indicated, oral evidence was received in hearings before the 
Committee. This was taken in both public and private sessions and, although 
usually in elaboration of written submissions, sometimes without the background 
of a submission. Hearings were held in: Canberra, over the period 12 to 29 Sep-
tember 1978, on 23 and 24 November 1978, and on 8 December 1978; Sydney, 
19 October and 14 to 15 November 1978; Melbourne, 23 to 27 October 1978; 
Perth, 6 November 1978; Adelaide, 8 November 1978. 
1.17 Appendix 1 contains a list of persons and organisations lodging written sub-
missions with the Committee. Appendix 2 lists the persons who gave oral evidence. 
1.18 Apart from the material contained in the written and oral evidence pre-
sented to it, the Committee was able to draw on information and comment in 
reports published in a number of inquiries on matters covered by the terms of 
reference. Additionally, it was assisted by studies of legislation and procedures 
either in force or in prospect both in Australia and elsewhere. References to these 
sources are given at appropriate points in the report, and in Appendixes 3 to 6. 
A short bibliography of published material on the subject of conflict between 
4 	 public duty and private interest appears at Appendix 7. 
The Committee's approach to its terms of reference 
1.19 The Committee has not felt required to address itself to the facts of any 
particular case except in so far as these provided a basis for testing proposals con-
sidered or advanced in this report. Certainly it has not regarded itself as having an 
inquisitorial role, one for which it has not been equipped nor for which it has 
been sufficiently empowered. Rather, its concern has been with principles and the 
machinery by which those principles may be translated into practice and given 
proper protection. 
1.20 In developing its response to the first of the items listed in its original terms 
of reference, the Committee found it necessary to proceed in stages—firstly, by 
identifying those categories of persons who may be regarded as holding positions 
of public trust in relation to the Commonwealth; secondly, by making some broad 
generalisations concerning the public duty of those persons; and thirdly, by deter-
mining those private interests which could be regarded as at least having the poten-
tial to give rise to conflict with public duty. Chapter 2 of the report deals with 
these questions. 
1.21 From this consideration of what might be regarded as the parameters within 
which it was required to work, the Committee moved to the particular tasks allo-
cated to it by the second, third and fourth items of the original terms of reference. 
It found that, while it was able to discuss in general terms the principles involved 
in measures to avoid or to resolve conflict of interest situations, the application of 
those principles to particular categories of persons required more detailed treat-
ment. Accordingly, Chapters 3 to 6 of the report deal with principles and options, 
whilst Chapters 7 to 11 relate to the application of those principles to the various 
categories of persons. 
1.22 The possible introduction of a register of officeholders' interests is raised for 
consideration in the fourth item of the Committee's terms of reference. While ac-
knowledging that this is a device which in certain quarters has received a wide 
measure of support as a means of combating conflict of interest situations, the 
Committee, as a result of its work, found itself unable to recommend its general 
adoption for Commonwealth purposes at this stage. It has, however, taken the 
course of setting out in Chapter 6 and in the associated Appendix 6 its views on 
the type of register which it would regard as most effective for the purpose—
given its views on the limited value of registers—and the administrative arrange-
ments necessary for the maintenance of such a register, should it be decided to 
introduce one. 
1.23 Arising from its consideration of principles and options and their appli-
cation to the various categories of officeholders, dealt with in Chapters 2 to 11, 
the Committee found it necessary to consider the question of enforcement mach-
inery to ensure that measures which it was proposing would be observed. The 
results of its deliberations on the matter are incorporated in Chapter 12. 
124 Because it involved considerations somewhat different from those involved 
in the other topics with which it was concerned, the Committee made the post-
separation employment of officeholders the subject of special investigation. The 
findings and recommendations on the matter are set out in Chapter 13. The re-
maining topics on which the Committee's views were sought by the Prime Minister, 
additional to those contained in the original terms of reference, have been dealt 
with in appropriate places in Chapters 7 to 10. 
1.25 During the course of its work, the Committee met with a number of 
questions of criminal law which it did not regard as falling within its terms 
of reference. Accordingly, apart from two particular matters, there is no discus-
sion of them in the report. The exceptions concern the provisions in the Crimes 
Act 1914 relating to bribery of Commonwealth officers, and the misuse of 
official information. These are subjects which the Committee believes are of 
sufficient relevance to the matters on which it has been called upon to report 
to require comment. Chapter 13 contains these comments. 
1.26 The Committee's conclusions concerning the matters covered by its terms 
of reference and the recommendations it sees as flowing from them are incor-
porated at the appropriate places in the chapters which follow. Bold type in 
the printing has been used to point out where recommendations have been made. 
However, for ease of reference, the conclusions and recommendations have been 
brought together in Chapter 15, with an indication of where the conclusion 
or recommendation is to be found in the main body of the text. 
1. Australia, Parliament, Declaration of Interests: Report of the Joint Committee on Pecuniary 
Interests of Members of Parliament Q. M. Riordan, Chairman), AGPS, Canberra, 1975. 
2. Australia, House of Representatives, Debates 1978, no. 3, p.  462. 
3. Australia, House of Representatives, Debates 1978, no. 5, pp.  1078-9. 
4. Australia, House of Representatives, Debates 1978, no. 7, p.  1678. 
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2. Public duty and private interests 
of officeholders 
2.1 The Committee's terms of reference require a recommendation 'whether 
a statement of principles can be drawn up on the nature of private interests, 
pecuniary or otherwise, which could conflict with the public duty of any or all 
persons holding positions of public trust in relation to the Commonwealth'. 
It appeared to the Committee that it should begin by identifying those persons 
who could properly be thought to be holding 'positions of trust in relation to 
the Commonwealth'. This, in turn, would lead to a consideration of their public 
duty, and thence to the topic of conflict with private interests. 
Categories of persons 
2.2 The terms of reference specify certain categories of persons holding positions 
of trust in relation to the Commonwealth: Ministers; Senators and Members 
of the House of Representatives (who are collectively referred to in this report 
as Members of Parliament); the staffs of Ministers and Members of Parliament; 
members of the Australian Public Service (referred to in this report as public 
servants); and such other persons or classes of persons as the Committee was 
of the opinion should be included. 
2.3 The terms of reference draw a distinction between Ministers and Members 
of Parliament. Obviously there is a degree of overlap between the two groups 
in that, except in the most unusual circumstances, Ministers must be Senators 
or Members of the House of Representatives. The Committee has found, however, 
that, for reasons discussed later in this report, there is advantage in maintaining 
the distinction. 
2.4 As stated in the previous chapter (para. 1.12), the Committee determined 
to specify certain other classes of persons in its advertisement inviting submis-
sions. One of these classes, statutory officeholders, is, in the Committee's opinion, 
of sufficient significance in respect of conflict of interest to require attention 
in this report on the same scale as is given to the three major categories identified 
in the terms of reference—Ministers, Members of Parliament and public servants. 
2.5 The members of statutory bodies established by the Commonwealth, and 
their staffs, play an important part in Australian government. As a group, 
statutory bodies comprise a large and significant element in the machinery of 
government, with their position complicated by the fact that their members 
may serve on a full-time or a part-time basis, with different channels of responsi-
bility to the Parliament or to the executive.' For purposes of discussing the 
broad areas of potential conflict between public duty and private interest, the 
Committee has, therefore, had regard to the duties of statutory officeholders 
and members of statutory bodies as well as persons falling within the three 
main categories designated in the terms of reference. 
2.6 The Committee will call the four categories collectively 'officeholders', a 
briefer term than 'persons holding positions of trust in relation to the 
Commonwealth'. 	 7 
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2.7 The exclusion of other categories of persons frcni consideration at this point 
in the repor. does iiot, of course, mean that the four groups named are the only 
ones holding positions of public trust in relation to the Commonwealth. There are 
others in this situation and their roles and responsibilities are discussed in Chapter 
11. In addition, there is the special case of the media, whose representatives have 
somewhat different conflict of interest problems and whose relationship to the 
Commonwealth is markedly different. The discussion in Chapter 11 also covers 
their position. 
Public duty 
Members of Parliament and Ministers 
2.8 Statements of public duty tend to display diversity around a common theme. 
The public duty of a Member of Parliament has been the most fully elaborated, 
commencing over a century ago with a judicial statement (which referred to a 
member of the House of Lords): 
In the framing of laws it is his duty to act according to the deliberate result of his judgment 
and conscience, uninfluenced, as far as possible, by other considerations, and least of all 
by those of a pecuniary nature.2 
In Australia, the duty of a Member of Parliament to be independent was extended 
to 'watching on behalf of the public all the acts of the Executive'. It was stated 
that he 'must be free to exercise those powers and discretions [entrusted to him] 
• . . in the interests of the public unfettered by considerations of personal gain 
or profit. 13  Finally, the Member's duty to preserve his independence of judgment 
was carried into a third sphere, the representation of constituents in dealings with 
the executive.4 
2.9 Notwithstanding the constraints of party, in the last resort the Member of 
Parliament must retain his own judgment, and his duty to exercise that judgment 
independently. If he cannot in conscience follow the dictates of his party in a par-
ticular matter, he must decide whether it is better, perhaps for other reasons, for 
him to remain in the party and endeavour to effect changes in party attitude from 
within, whether to vote against party policy in the Parliament, to resign from the 
party to allow himself freedom of action in the matter or even, in the extreme 
case, whether to resign from the Parliament. 
2.10 The important point is that the constraints of party have to be recognised 
because they arise inevitably from the nature of modern politics. Mass electorates 
are most effectively represented through democratic political parties. But the con-
straints of private interest may be avoided and should be. 
2.11 The Qualifications Committee of the Victorian Parliament, after considering 
the problem of a Code of Conduct for Members of Parliament, concluded: 
As long as Members continue to conduct and involve themselves in community, business 
and professional activities whilst holding public office, there must always be the risk that 
their private and public activities may become intermingled. However, it must be recog-
nised that the knowledge and experience gained by Members in these activities may very 
well assist and, in some cases, make them better equipped to perform their duties as 
Members of Parliament. 
The Committee is of the opinion that Members could not be expected to completely 
divorce themselves from outside activities, but that there should exist some guidelines to 
prevent any possible conflict of interest.' 
The Committee is in broad agreement with this statement. 
2.12 Members of Parliament who are not Ministers exercise influence. They do 
so—in theory at least—by their speeches and votes in the Parliament and its com-
mittees. In practice, they exercise influence by their activities in the party room 
and party committees, and by their representations to Ministers and their advisers. 
Ministers, in sharp contrast, can exercise power. Individually they do this by 
directing the activities of their departments, and collectively through the decisions 
of Cabinet. Because they have direct access to the means of power—the prepar-
ation of legislation, the allocation of funds in the budget, and the application of 
general policies to particular cases—Ministers' public duty makes demands upon 
them of a higher order than is the case with Members. This difference is such as 
to justify a distinction being made between Members and Ministers. 
Public servants 
2.13 The Minister and the Member of Parliament have public duties in which 
independence is crucial, but the duty of public servants is complicated by a con-
flicting element of subordination—subordination both to the elected government 
and to superiors within a hierarchical service. The Draft Guidelines on Official 
Conduct of Commonwealth Public Servants prepared by the Public Service Board 
refer to a public servant's primary responsibility to the executive.6 The public 
servant's duty, just like that of the elected Minister or Member of Parliament, is 
to preserve his independence of judgment and action from improper influence 
coming from his personal interests, pecuniary or otherwise, direct or indirect. 
2.14 Most aspects of the duty of public servants are set out in statute, much 
more so than for Ministers or Members of Parliament. The Public Service Act 
1922, the Crimes Act 1914 and Secret Commissions Act 1905 are examples. More 
recently the Public Service Board has begun setting down the duties of public ser-
vants in their Draft Guidelines. (For further details, see Appendix 4.) 
Statutory officeholders 
2.15 Statutory officeholders are likely to be constrained by formulation of 
their duties in very specific terms. Their offices may well have been created by 
the Parliament to enable certain responsibilities to be discharged with some degree 
of independence of the political executive. Many are not subject to the same 
controls, powers of direction or accountability to Ministers as are public servants. 
In some cases they have been appointed to represent the views and interests of 
certain groups. Their position is often more comparable to the situation of 
Members of Parliament than that of Ministers or public servants. 
Private interest 
2.16 Against the obligations of public duty may be set the claims of private 
interest. Both pecuniary and non-pecuniary private interests may conflict with 
public duty. 
2.17 The Joint Committee on Pecuniary Interests of Members of Parliament 
defined pecuniary interest as 'any direct or indirect financial concern, stake or 
right in, or title to, any real or personal property or anything entailing an actual 
or potential benefit17, and made such interests the object of its recommendations. 
But other, non-pecuniary, interests may also conflict with public duty. The City 
of New York Bar Association Special Committee on Ethics in the Executive 
Branch in 1960 noted that 'man is driven by many motivations', and asked 
why should 'simple economic ties' be singled out for study and regulation.8 In 	 9 
what follows, the Committee makes a preliminary examination of which private 
interests, pecuniary or not, are likely to create conflicts and when it is appro-
priate to attempt to regulate such interests. 
Non-pecuniary interests 
2.18 Many demands directed to government do not seek to advance pecuniary 
interests. The concerned citizen may want a threatened species of wildlife to 
be saved or an historic building to be preserved. He may want the courts to 
punish offenders more rigorously, and so on. 
2.19 The benefit sought may go, not directly to the person seeking to influence 
the decision or to his immediate dependants, but perhaps to some person or 
group with whom he has, to use the City of New York Bar Association Com-
mittee's example, 'religious or family affiliations'. The officeholder who would 
find it abhorrent to feather his own nest by improper gifts or dubious decisions 
may be tempted to assist a co-religionist or a product of his old school. At 
the very least, the suspicion that he had done so might exist. 
2.20 Which such interests should be regulated? Earlier inquiries facing this 
problem have tended to look to practicality rather than to theoretical purity. 
The City of New York Bar Association Committee, contemplating a statute 
to prevent abuses, wrote: 
Restrictions on outside economic affiliations can be written with reasonable particularity 
and enforced with moderate predictability; no one has yet devised a method of sorting 
out acquaintances, friends, relations, and lovers for purposes of a rule permitting official 
dealings with some and not with others.9 
The British Royal Commission on Standards of Conduct in Public Life (the 
Salmon Commission) also doubted that it would be practicable to employ a 
statute to compel disclosure of non-pecuniary interests because 'they are too 
nebulous to be legally codified and made subject to a criminal sanction'.10 
2.21 This Committee believes that a wide range of non-pecuniary interests 
could conflict with the public duty of officeholders. At least they might raise a 
presumption or a reasonable suspicion that they were doing so. Indeed any 
private interest could in some circumstances cause conflict. Therefore some 
device is necessary to decide which private interests should be regulated because 
of the probability that they will, in some circumstances, cause conflicts. The 
problem of identifying interests which should be regulated is made more difficult 
because often it is the context which determines whether an interest is likely 
to create conflict. Absolute rules may not be possible. 
2.22 Other bodies which have attempted to lay down rules in the area of 
conflict of interest have seen appearance, or, put differently, public acceptability, 
as the criterion in deciding which interests should be regulated. Is it thought 
likely that possession of any amount of that sort of pecuniary interest will be 
suspect? Or an amount in excess of a certain figure of cash value? If so, that 
measure becomes the threshold. Frequently the answers to such questions have 
been arbitrary and appear to be such. 
2.23 Attempts to lay down rules in relation to non-pecuniary interests have 
floundered because of the problem of defining adequately an interest which may 
be regarded as creating an actual or potential conflict with duty. This problem 
10 	 of definition creates difficulties for both the officeholder bound by such rules and 
the authority responsible for his conduct. In the absence of any clear guidance, 
an officeholder may well be uncertain about his obligation to his public duty 
in respect of an interest. Those responsible for enforcing proper conduct in 
respect of that obligation may equally be uncertain as to what is proper in 
the circumstances. 
2.24 However, there is a test which the Committee believes is likely to be 
applied in practice by such officeholders, or those responsible for their conduct, 
in judging what is proper in particular circumstances: the test of appearance. 
Does that interest look to the reasonable person the sort of interest that may 
influence? 
2.25 It may well be that the inherent difficulties of definition will make any 
rules in respect of non-pecuniary interests less satisfactory than those in respect 
of pecuniary interests. Those responsible for making or enforcing rules may have 
to be prepared to counsel or caution rather than reprimand or punish, at least 
until precedent and familiarity have built up some consensus on how such rules 
should operate in a 'grey' area. The precedents initially may draw quite arbitrary 
lines through the original uncertainty. Eventually its area is likely to be reduced. 
2.26 The Committee believes that, in judging whether a particular non-pecuniary 
interest could create conflict in certain situations, or whether rules should be laid 
down in relation to a certain type of non-pecuniary interest, the test is the likeli-
hood that the person possessing the interest could be influenced in the independent 
judgment which his public duty requires be applied to the matter in hand, or that 
a reasonable person would believe that he could be so influenced. 
Pecuniary interests 
2.27 With pecuniary interests, it is possible to be more exact. Here the Com-
mittee sees three areas requiring consideration—assets and liabilities, 'outside' 
income, and gifts, hospitality and sponsored travel. 
2.28 As regards assets, at the one extreme are those that are particularly per-
sonal in their use: residence, furniture, means of personal transport, perhaps a 
holiday home and recreational transport such as a boat. Such assets might be 
termed domestic assets. Most systems for the regulation of conflicts of interests 
exclude domestic assets, either because they are unlikely to engender conflicts of 
interest or because regulation of them would be particularly intrusive of privacy. 
Only in exceptional circumstances do they create significant conflicts of interest. 
Nevertheless, for most persons in public life their home is the largest asset they 
ever acquire and a mortgage on it the largest liability they ever assume. The motor 
car may be the next most substantial asset or occasion for indebtedness. Further, 
for the substantial group of persons in public life who are also engaged in primary 
production, private residence and source of income may be directly connected. 
Thus a blanket exclusion of domestic assets from any system of regulation would 
leave a great many problems unresolved. 
2.29 At the other extreme are those assets which have a particularly close 
relationship with the duties of the officeholder in question. The case for regulating 
these is clearest. These might be termed sensitive assets and are of especial im-
portance when the possibility of requiring divestment of interests has to be 
considered. 	 11 
2.30 In between these two fairly restricted categories are most of the forms 
which personal and real property may take in a complex modern economy, and 
it is here that there is most room for debate as to when regulation is appropriate 
and what form it should take. The Committee's judgments on these matters will 
become clear in later chapters. 
2.31 The Committee does not believe that there is any significant demand in 
Australia at the present time for limits to be placed on the total amount of private 
wealth which a Member or a public servant or other officeholder may possess. 
The focus of Australian public concern is, it believes, on conflicts of interest, not 
on the possession of private property per Se. The recommendations of this report 
are directed to the prevention and control of conflicts of interest, and not to the 
creation of a class of public officeholders whose commitment to the common good 
is sought to be assured by their being forbidden any significant amount of 
personal wealth. 
2.32. The Committee's impression of Australian political life is that few very 
wealthy persons choose to offer for election. By comparison, political life in 
the United States contains some persons of very considerable personal wealth. 
The size and complexity of their fortunes frustrate attempts to avoid or regulate 
conflict of interest. Such personal fortunes create problems of conflicts of interest 
on a scale unknown to Australia, and may require remedies not needed here.1' 
2.33 As to liabilities, the Committee believes that these should be treated in 
the same way as corresponding assets. So, for example, a mortgage on the home 
should be treated as would be the ownership of the home—disclosed only when 
giving rise to a conflict of interest or giving the appearance of so doing. Similarly, 
a liability that touched closely on the officeholder's duties, for example a loan 
from a firm, whose profitability was influenced by his department, should be 
regarded as any sensitive asset would be—a matter for concern which might 
require action to regulate the conflict. 
2.34 It is sometimes suggested that future assets and liabilities could be a 
subject for regulation. Perhaps an officeholder could be influenced by the expecta-
tion that at some future time he would possess a certain interest. Predictability 
should be the determining factor here. An interest which is being purchased 
or otherwise acquired may very well qualify for regulation, even though title 
to the asset itself has not yet formally passed. But an expectation that an elderly 
relative will not alter a testamentary disposition and will predecease the office-
holder, who will then be possessed of a certain asset, may be too remote to 
worry about. Common sense suggests that, as long as there is a real possibility 
of the acquisition of the interest not being completed, it would be inappropriate 
to treat such an interest in the same way as those already possessed. Once that 
possibility has passed, then it would be as well to bring the interest within the 
ambit of whatever controls are imposed. One witness raised the problem of 
contingent liabilities, such as guarantees afforded to other people or organisations, 
which might have influence on an individual's conduct. The Committee noted 
that just such a matter had figured in the inquiries of the British House of 
Commons Select Committee on Conduct of Members 1976_77.12 As in the case 
of assets, it would appear unnecessary to regulate a liability until it is certain 
that it will become operative. 
2.35 Another major type of pecuniary interest which may give rise to conflict 
with public duty is 'outside' income. For most public officeholders, their duties 
12 	 are full time and they have no legitimate opportunity to earn income over and 
above the salaries paid by virtue of their offices. There are some exceptions to 
this: authorisation may be granted to public servants for part-time employment 
outside the public service provided their official duties are not adversely affected; 
officeholders may be entitled to retain earnings from writing or broadcasting, 
and the like. Private payment for carrying out official duties may constitute 
bribery. It may be caught by the criminal law, and, in respect of public servants, 
by Public Service Regulation 38, whilst the Australian Constitution by s. 45 (iii) 
prohibits Members of Parliament taking any fee or honorarium for 'services 
rendered to the Commonwealth, or for services rendered in the Parliament to 
any person or State'. 
2.36 There are two separate issues involved in the question of 'outside' income. 
One is the demand made on the officeholder's time and energy by extramural 
activities. The other is the conflict of interest which may result from misuse of 
confidential information received in an official capacity so as to further the source 
of that income, or from the influencing of government activity so as to benefit 
the source of income. Regard must also be had to the possibility that the appear-
ance of misuse of information or improper influence may be created. The principal 
thrust of the Committee's recommendations is to the second issue: regulating 
conflict of interest. Nevertheless it should be recognised that the first issue, 
intrusion by private interests on the officeholder's time and energy, is also a 
legitimate concern which should be dealt with firmly as it is in the Code of 
Conduct proposed in this report. The Remuneration Tribunal fixes ministerial 
and parliamentary salaries on the basis of a full-time commitment to official 
duties. 
2.37 It may be argued that it is not only the type of pecuniary interest but 
the amount or size of the interest held which is relevant in drawing up rules in 
relation to pecuniary interests. Other bodies considering this matter have been 
prepared to set thresholds at which temptation might be thought to begin, or 
to fix levels of interest below which the rules should not apply on grounds of 
administrative practicability. Others have supposed that possession of an interest, 
however small—the single share or the first dollar—should be sufficient to 
invoke regulation. It has been argued that setting thresholds avoids both trivialising 
the whole question of conflicts of interest and swamping the machinery which 
administers any rules. At the same time an undue burden is not imposed on office-
holders who might otherwise be required to compile a great deal of detail about 
their affairs. The Committee is reluctant to accept the use of thresholds in rules 
relating to conflicts of interest except, as will be discussed later, in respect of 
token gifts. The arbitrariness of any decision as to what threshold to set is evident. 
One need only compare the cash limits on gifts which may be accepted that 
have been set in different countries at different times or the differences in the 
rules governing acceptance of gifts by Ministers and by public servants in 
Australia (see Appendixes 3, 4 and 6). The intention of such cash limits is to 
identify the gift that may influence, or may appear likely to influence, but the 
answer given has varied widely in different circumstances. 
2.38 As a starting point, the Committee believes it preferable to suppose that 
any pecuniary interest, whatever its cash value, may be sufficient to create a 
conflict of interest. In practice the susceptibility of different persons will vary. 
No threshold can be set on the basis of an immutable calibration of human nature, 
although attempting to fix some limits may be warranted by administrative 
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2.39 The question of thresholds does have some relevance in relation to another 
category of pecuniary interests, gifts,  hospitality and sponsored travel. These 
interests raise different issues from either assets or earned income, even though 
there is some obvious overlap. There is also some overlap between the issues 
raised by the receipt of gifts, and bribery which is a subject discussed in Chapter 
14. Conflict of interest generally differs from bribery because it does not require 
a transaction between two parties. It needs only one person, the officeholder 
possessing the interest in point. The distinction between bribery and this third 
category of pecuniary interests is that, whilst a benefit conferred as a bribe is 
directed to a particular transaction or series of transactions, gifts, hospitality 
or travel may be provided to create a general climate of goodwill on the part 
of the beneficiary. The 'debt' might not be called in for years or ever. 
2.40 The concern here is very much with appearances, and the possibility that 
undue influence could be suspected. Yet it is also a fact of life that the giving 
and receiving of favours, some small but some not so small, is common. A 
total prohibition on all such exchanges where public officeholders were involved 
might produce difficulties. For example, the working lunch needs to be separated 
from hospitality on a more extravagant scale. Seasonal token gifts have to be 
distinguished from costly presents. The case for an arbitrary threshold in this 
area becomes more convincing. 
Family interests 
2.41 One final question that complicates any attempt to avoid or regulate con-
flict of interest situations is whether the interest must be possessed directly by 
the officeholder. Will possession by some other person to whom he is linked be 
sufficient to establish a conflict? In particular, does the officeholder have so close 
a coincidence with the interests of his spouse and dependent children that any 
system of control and regulation, to be effective, must extend over their affairs 
as well? Such coincidence of interests might exist because of a legal obligation to 
support or an affection for family members, or because of the ease with which 
interests could be formally transferred to family whilst remaining effectively under 
the control of, or at least operating for the benefit of, the officeholder himself or his 
family group. These considerations can also extend beyond the nuclear family to 
other relatives and even to persons in 'de facto' relationships. 
2.42 The affairs of persons who have not chosen to enter public life with its in-
herent vulnerability to public scrutiny may nevertheless be brought before the 
public gaze by reason of their connections with someone who has opted for office. 
There is the possibility that partners in a profession or business associates may be 
affected, perhaps adversely, by the extent to which their enterprises have to be 
revealed to the public bcause they are intertwined with the past or present interests 
of a public figure. An officeholder's professional association with a client may have 
to be made a matter of public record because that past association (if the office-
holder has been obliged to give up such activities) or present association (if he has 
not) could influence him in the discharge of his public duty. 
2.43 The Committee has been very conscious of the need to preserve, as far as 
possible, the privacy of persons whose interests are intermingled with the interests 
of officeholders. But it was also well aware of the ease by which scrutiny of the 
affairs of officeholders could be avoided through the transfer or concealment of 
such interests. Such evasion of proper scrutiny could discredit any system estab- 
14 	 lished to regulate conflicts of interest. 
2.44 On balance, the Committee has concluded that it would be proper to require 
officeholders themselves to disclose such of the affairs of other persons as were 
relevant to the scrutiny and regulation of their own interests in respect of conflict 
of interest and of which they had knowledge. A Member of Parliament would be 
required to disclose during a parliamentary debate interests of close associates of 
which he had knowledge and which might be thought likely to influence his con-
tribution to the debate. A public servant would be required to disclose to his 
superiors any similar interests which could be regarded as influencing the decision 
he was taking or the recommendations he was making. But in both cases every 
effort should be made to ensure that the intrusion into the privacy of other persons 
is minimised. This opinion differs from that of the Joint Committee on Pecuniary 
Interests of Members of Parliament, which decided against requiring Members to 
disclose the interests of their immediate families of which they were aware. Wider 
aspects of privacy are discussed in Chapter 3. 
Committee's conclusion on Item I of terms of reference 
2.45 The Committee has concluded that it would not be possible to draw up a 
completely comprehensive and satisfactory statement of principles on the nature 
of private interests, pecuniary or otherwise, which could conflict with the public 
duty of any or all persons holding positions of public trust in relation to the Com-
monwealth. The difficulties of so doing are especially great as regards non-
pecuniary private interests. As regards pecuniary private interests, definition of 
principles poses fewer problems, although, as discussed, some of those remaining 
present difficulties of a substantial kind; practical considerations suggest that, even 
where pecuniary private interests which could give rise to conflict with public duty 
are capable of satisfactory definition, it may be desirable to limit the coverage. 
1. cf. Australia, Parliament, Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Government Opera-
tions, Statutory Authorities of the Commonwealth, First Report (P. E. Rae, Chairman), 
Canberra, 1978, Chapter 2. 
2. Egerton V. Brownlow (1853) 4HLC 1; 10 ER 359 at p.  423, per Lord Lyndhurst. But Members 
of Parliament also bear in mind the fate of Edmund Burke, who, having adopted the position 
that, in his Parliamentary duties, a Member should be guided by the general good, not by 
local purposes nor local prejudices, found himself at odds with his electors. 
3. Wilkinson v. Osborne (1915) 21 CLR 89 at pp.  98-9, per Isaacs, J; Home v. Barber (1920) 
27 CLR 494 at pp.  500-1, per Isaacs J, and pp.  501-2 per Rich J. 
4. R. v. Boston (1923) 33 CLR 386 at pp.  400-3, per Isaacs and Rich JJ. 
5. Victoria, Parliament, Progress Report from the Qualifications  Committee upon the Question 
of Conflicts of Interest of Members of Parliament and Ministers of the Crown (V. F. Wilcox, 
Chairman), Government Printer, Melbourne, 1974, p. 3. 
6. Public Service Board, Discussion Paper: Draft Guidelines on Official Conduct for Common-
wealth Public Servants, Public Service Board, Canberra, 1978. 
7. Australia, Parliament, Declaration of Interests: Report of the Joint Committee on Pecuniary 
Interests of Members of Parliament (J. M. Riordan, Chairman), AGPS, Canberra, 1975, p.  2. 
8. Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Special Committee on the Federal Conflict 
of Interest Laws, Conflict of Interest and Federal Service, Harvard University Press, Cam-
bridge, Mass., 1960, p.  17. 
9. ibid. 
10. Great Britain, Royal Commission on Standards of Conduct in Public Life 1974-1976 
(Lord Salmon, Chairman), Report, Cmnd. 6254, HMSO, London, 1976, pp.  40, 64. 
11. See Appendix 3, paras 61-2. 
12. Great Britain, House of Commons, Report from the Select Committee on Conduct of Members 
(M. Stewart, Chairman), 1976-77 H.C. 490, HMSO, London, 1977. 
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3. General observations on the regulation 
of conflicts of interest 
3.11 It seems desirable to raise at this stage some general issues on which views 
formed have influenced subsequent conclusions and recommendations. This chapter 
therefore considers five topics. The first concerns the need for additional measures 
for the regulation of conflicts of interest. The second is what can be learned from 
the ideas and experience of other countries. Third is a comparison of self-
regulation by the various categories of officeholders with a general, all-embracing 
system of regulation. Fourth is a review of the suitability of different sanctions 
for the enforcement of particular solutions. Fifth is the problem of privacy in 
relation to the disclosure of private interests. 
The need for additional measures for the regulation 
of conflicts of interest 
3.2 One of the questions to which the Committee addressed itself early in its 
work was the need for additional measures for the regulation of conflicts of interest 
involving officeholders. Assessment of this called for a listing of existing measures 
for the regulation of conflict of interest situations, study of past experience in 
individual cases involving allegations of conflicts of interest, consideration of 
evidence given to the Committee orally and in writing, review of comments and 
proposals made in newspaper and other published sources, and a weighing of the 
effectiveness of the presently available regulatory arrangements in situations of 
conflict such as have occurred in the past or might conceivably occur in the 
future. 
3.3 The importance of the results of this assessment for the Committee's work 
may be shortly stated. If it were found that honesty and integrity amongst office-
holders were at such a low ebb that public duty was being regularly disregarded 
in favour of private interests, then clearly strong additional regulatory measures 
would be required. If, on the other hand, the finding was that few cases of 
conflict of interest escaped the regulatory net, lesser additional measures would 
be necessary. A finding that existing arrangements were sufficient to meet all 
conflict situations would lead to the conclusion that no changes were necessary. 
3.4 Appendixes 4 and 5 summarise the measures presently in force in Australia 
for the regulation of conflicts at the various levels of government. They contain 
detailed information on those measures directly applicable to the categories of 
officeholders dealt with in this report, and reference is made to them at points 
throughout the report, but especially in Chapters 7 to 10. 
3.5 As explained in paragraph 1.19, the Committee has not attempted to 
investigate in any detail individual cases. It has, however, used information on a 
number of these cases for testing, amongst other things, the adequacy of the 
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3.6 The impression gained from the Committee's studies of individual cases is 
that there is a good deal of uncertainty about what is expected of officeholders 
and former officeholders. Such formal rules as exist provide only partial guidance. 
Convention is often more important and here there is opportunity for misunder-
standings and misinterpretations. In the older cases, the issue has frequently 
centred around the post-separation employment of officeholders and the associated 
possibility for misuse of information. More recently the questions have concerned-
investments by officeholders, and even of their families, as the practice of 
investment in family companies and family trusts has developed; outside employ-
ment, especially amongst elected officeholders; and the acceptance of favours in 
the form of gifts, hospitality and concessional travel. Clearly in these areas 
there is a need for greater guidance to be provided to officeholders and for a 
strengthening of the regulatory machinery available to enforce whatever require-
ments are laid down. 
3.7 Much of the evidence presented to the Committee, and, indeed, much of the 
contemporary writing on the subject of regulation of conflicts of interest, has 
been directed towards the advancement of proposals designed to further one or 
both of two objectives, summarised in the New South Wales Parliament's 1978 
Report from the Joint Committee of the Legislative Assembly upon Pecuniary 
Interests as: 
[to] ensure that not only is the institution of Parliament, [and] the Public Service... 
upheld in the highest traditions, but those who are entrusted with the administration of 
the public domain will be capable of being seen by the electorate at large to maintain 
conduct of an unimpeachable order.' 
But there has been no real agreement on what would be the most effective 
measures to achieve those objectives. 
3.8 The Committee's overall conclusion regarding the need for additional 
measures for the regulation of conflicts of interest is that there is an established 
need and that this is accepted by the community. It remains, therefore, to 
consider what action should be taken. 
The experience of other countries 
3.9 The Committee has devoted a substantial part of its efforts to examining 
the experience (summarised in Appendix 3) of other countries, such as Britain, 
Canada and the United States of America, with measures designed to regulate con-
flicts of interest in officeholders. It has concluded that three lessons may be drawn: 
• Many of the remedies introduced to stop abuses in the conflict of interest 
area have come in response to particular incidents or scandals even though 
their effect did not match the problem disclosed by that incident or scandal. 
Even when the main elements in the conflict were pecuniary, there was 
no close correspondence between the defects revealed in existing machinery 
and procedures and the remedy brought forward. 
• Rarely has there been any attempt to bring the various remedies together 
in a comprehensive system which deals with all aspects of conflict of interest 
problems and regulates the affairs of all categories of officeholders. This 
has been in part due to the problem of identifying interests that do or 
may give rise to conflicts of interest—it is much easier to draw up rules 
governing pecuniary interests. In part it has been a consequence of constitu- 
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legislative branches—and the judiciary as well—are separate and the legis-
lature enjoys a certain paramountcy in principle and experiences a degree 
of subordination in practice. In the United States they are separate and 
co-equal by design and the upper levels of the executive branch are manned 
by relatively short-term political appointees. In the Westminster model 
Ministers have the characteristics of the elected Members of Parliament 
from whose ranks they are selected, and some of the characteristics of 
public servants who form the peak of a party-neutral, career public service 
pyramid. Therefore:, it has been difficult to lay down common measures 
for all categories of officeholders. It is not surprising that, given these consti-
tutional difficulties, the regulatory machinery and procedures, even when 
related only to pecuniary interests, are often patched together and offer 
at best incomplete solutions. 
• There appears to have been a continuing escalation in the extent of dis-
closure and in the severity of penalties being introduced. At an early stage 
in the latest American cycle of reform Professor Bayless Manning wrote of 
'the purity potlatch' in which a public duel took place in the sphere of 
morality: 
All such duel systems are inflation-prone. They tend to escalate. 
The general improvement in government fiscal responsibility poses something 
of a problem to American political practitioners. How can the Outs convincingly 
demonstrate the perfidy of the Ins when thieves, grafters, and suborners stubbornly 
refuse to reveal themselves to be actively at work in the In-administration? 
There are only two avenues open. One is to blow up isolated instances of 
impropriety so that they appear as illustrations of massive, pervasive hidden 
corruption. This is attempted regularly. The other avenue is more subtle. If the facts 
will not make out a case of moral deficiency by accepted standards, the standards 
must be escalated to a point where facts can be found that will make out a deficiency; 
and the public must be educated to be horrified by the resulting new sins in sub-
stantially the same degree that they were horrified by the old. The process is constantly 
going on about us.2 
3.10 The Committee believes that there are dangers to good government in 
such a process of moral escalation. Intrusion into the privacy of those in public 
life and those connected with them grows. Censorial authorities are created with 
ever wider powers to ensure that the rules are being obeyed. Increasingly 
draconian penalties are imposed to deter anyone who might consider breaching 
those rules. Yet whenever a violation of the rules is uncovered, there is a further 
diminution in the respect the public feels for those in public life, who, it is likely 
to believe, must be so dishonest that no system of controls however fierce can 
prevent their wrongdoing. In such circumstances, not only are the individuals 
engaged in public office affected, but public institutions as well. The Committee 
holds that there is little wrong today with Australian public life. The country 
has been fortunate in the probity of the men and women who become office-
holders. The exceptions to their high standards have been isolated. They have 
been conspicuous because they have been exceptional. 
Self-regulation 
3.11 This fortunate situation has been brought about in the main in the absence 
of formal regulation of conflict of interest, at least for elected officeholders. It is 
true that Commonwealth public servants are subject to provisions of the 
Public Service Act 1922 and to Regulations made under that Act and that statutory 
officeholders in some cases are covered by provisions in their own Acts which go 
	 19 
part of the way towards formal regulation. But the high standards of conduct in 
Australian public life depend in essence upon understandings evolved in our 
society concerning the service to the community expected of a public officeholder. 
3.12 Traditionally in Australia responsibility for standards of conduct in public 
officeholders has been vested in those responsible for their management. The 
Salmon Commission, writing in the British context where the traditions of public 
service are similar to our own, said: 
one of the main safeguards against corruption in any institution is the standard set and 
required by the management from the top downwards. This depends on esprit de corps 
which can be seriously damaged by systems of regulation and scrutiny so rigorous that 
they inhibit leadership by management and imply that people working in the organisation 
are unworthy to trust.3  
The Committee agrees, and believes that the point is valid whether the office-
holders concerned are elected or appointed. It would go further and say that if a 
group of officeholders is incapable of ensuring that its members adhere to a set 
of prescribed or clearly understood standards of right conduct, there is little likeli-
hood that an alien authority can successfully impose those standards on them. 
3.13 If required to express a preference as between the two basic alternatives of 
self-regulation with non-criminal sanctions and external regulation with criminal 
sanctions, the Committee would have no hesitation in preferring the first. It does 
recognise that some uniformity is appropriate for all officeholders. All groups 
should aspire to the highest standards of probity. How that is to be demonstrated 
in practice will, however, depend to a considerable extent on the nature of the 
public duty of the category of officeholder or even the group within a single 
category. The 'black' area of bribery and corruption is, experience shows, amen-
able to the exact definitions, strict procedures and the heavy penalties of the crim-
inal law. The 'grey' area of conflict of interest is not. Frequently it is a question 
not of proscribing conduct, 'thou shalt not', but rather of requiring conduct of a 
certain sort: for example, avoiding a situation in which it might reasonably be 
thought that a conflict existed. 
3.14 Accordingly the regulatory process should be one in which: 
• the desired standard is set in general terms; 
• performance against that standard is ordinarily assessed by those familiar 
with the context because they work there themselves; and 
• to the extent that performance falls below the desired standard, they decide 
whether a penalty is appropriate and what the penalty should be. 
3.15 The Committee has noted that this is the approach underlying the provis-
ions of the 1978 amendments of the Public Service Act 1922 which define 'mis-
conduct' as 'a failure of the officer to fulfil his duty as an officer', a concept which 
is elaborated subsequently in s. 56 into seven categories of behaviour. These pro-
visions leave considerable scope for the informed judgment of colleagues. 
3.16 This degree of flexibility is, the Committee believes, desirable in an area 
where no legislative draftsman could hope to anticipate all possible circumstances. 
That point was made effectively in a Circular Letter issued by the Canadian Treas-
ury Board on standards of conduct for Public Service employees: 
Any attempt to identify the totality of potential areas of conflict would be a task of great 
magnitude, could never be totally comprehensive and would require constant review and 
interpretation. Instead a more workable approach has been taken to identify certain 
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3.17 This approach has its dangers. Self-regulation may be abused to the point 
that there is no regulation at all. Undoubtedly one of the factors encouraging the 
the move for imposition of statutory obligations enforced by the court on Members 
of Congress in the United States was a belief that in the past Congress was not 
prepared to discipline its own members.5 This was so even when facts showing 
serious misconduct were widely publicised. 
3.18 The Committee recognises that among elected officeholders there will be 
loyalties, political loyalties to a colleague of the same party, and personal friend-
ships and loyalties to Parliament or a particular chamber, which will discourage 
taking up or pursuing investigation or discipline. The very fact that political 
hostilities can generate and sustain accusations of misconduct may induce a 
reaction in which the conflict of interest question is swamped by partisan point 
scoring. Similarly within the public service generally, or in a department or 
statutory body, there will be organisational and personal loyalties or enmities 
which may impair commitment to the principles setting out the highest standards 
of conduct. 
3.19 Further, there is the important matter of the extent to which the public is 
prepared to place its confidence in self-regulation. Traditionally there have been 
two approaches to dealing with conflict situations: 
• definition of a conflict situation in a criminal statute which identifies the 
behaviour in question as repugnant, and provides appropriate sanctions of 
fines or imprisonment; 
• because of the limitations of the first approach, adoption of a code of 
conduct, formally or informally, possibly carrying sanctions, possibly not, 
but involving the notion that each situation will have to be considered on 
its merits, and requiring some sort of enforcement system which is closely 
involved with the area of activity in which the conflict arises. 
The Committee is aware of the defects inherent in the first approach, but notes 
that this is what some are now demanding in Australia. It believes that the 
second approach is in practice more effective in avoiding and resolving conflicts 
of interest. It also believes that the public is more likely to put its trust in a 
system where there is independent, back-up machinery which can be invoked 
to ensure that the second approach is applied with the same firmness and 
independence as could be expected of the processes of the criminal law. In 
Chapter 12 the Committee spells out the procedures and machinery which, in 
its opinion, are best suited for this back-up role. 
3.20 If self-regulation is tried, and does not work satisfactorily, no doubt 
demands will grow for imposition of external regulation. This would entail the 
creation of machinery to deal directly with conflicts of interest and to bring 
those who violate the rules before the criminal courts. Some witnesses advised 
the Committee that the time had already come when such machinery was 
necessary. The Committee does not think that the case has been proved. It 
believes that adoption of the proposals made in this report can remove the 
threat of escalation leading to external regulation. 
Sanctions 
3.21 As has been said earlier, the Committee believes that responsibility for 
the operation of any new rules relating to conflicts of interest should, in the 
first instance, be given to the bodies already charged with disciplinary respon- 
sibilities for their particular category of officeholders. There may be a small 
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class of matters involving allegations of conflict of interest which are of such 
public importance that special investigatory machinery is called for. This subject 
is discusssed in Chapter 12. The Committee also believes that the nature and 
scale of sanctions available for the enforcement of the new rules should be the 
same as those previously applying to the particular category of officeholders. 
3.22 This would involve: 
• A Minister would be liable to private or public reprimand by the Prime 
Minister, to demotion to a less important portfolio, or, in the last resort, 
to a request that he resign or else his commission will be terminated by the 
Governor-General. 
• A Member of Parliament would be liable to censure by the chamber to 
which he belonged, or in the last resort to expulsion. 
• A public servant would be liable to the sanctions provided by the Public 
Service Act 1922, as amended in 1978, namely admonition, transfer or 
dismissal, and, for officers other than those in the First Division, to a 
salary deduction, or reduction of salary for a period not exceeding twelve 
months. 
• A statutory officeholder would be liable to either private or public reprimand 
by the chairman of the statutory body or the responsible Minister, or to 
removal from office by the appropriate procedure. 
3.23 Sanctions should be discretionary rather than automatic. The constitutional 
or statutory provisions which provide for automatic vacation of an office by reason 
of a disqualification are, in the Committee's opinion, unsuitable for conflict of 
interest situations because they fail to allow for the varying degrees of seriousness 
of the conflict or the intent of the officeholder. Apart from the possibility of with-
holding a modest sum from the salary of a public servant, which already exists 
by statute, the Committee does not contemplate imposition of pecuniary penalties 
as such. Obviously dismissal or expulsion from an office will entail a pecuniary 
loss, indeed quite a substantial loss, but the prime purpose is to remove an 
unsuitable person from an office and deter others. If the offence is not sufficiently 
serious to warrant dismissal or expulsion then reprimand or admonition should 
be a sufficient warning to the offender and an adequate reaffirmation for other 
officeholders of the standard of conduct in issue. 
3.24 Because the ultimate sanction against elected officeholders lies in the hands 
of the electorate, it is necessary to require public disclosure of any proved trans-
gression to allow the electors to have the final say. Such a requirement is not 
so necessary for appointed officeholders who are subject to dismissal, as well 
as other sanctions, at the hands of superiors, according to clearly defined rules. 
3.25 The Committee has noted with interest a comment by an Assistant 
Attorney-General of the United States that statistics on federal prosecutions of 
public officials in that country over the period 1970-76 showed 'that one of the 
more common reasons for declining to prosecute conflict cases was the lack 
of criminal intent and the resulting concern that a jury would refuse to convict'. 
The penalties were too severe, and prosecutions might have been pursued had 
milder penalties been available." The Committee believes that it is essential, if a 
system of regulation of conflicts of interest is to be effective, that the range of 
available sanctions is sufficiently wide to encompass the many forms conflict 
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Privacy 
3.26 The final topic to be considered is the need to strike a proper balance 
between the public accountability of officeholders and their right to privacy in 
respect of their private interests, including pecuniary interests. One witness put 
the problem in a broad context: 
(W)hen I read the history of the evolution of parliamentary democracy, it seems to me that 
the recognition of a right to privacy, a right to personal property and freedom of opinion 
have been an essential part of the solution of this broad problem. In recognising and, 
indeed, in protecting these rights, we have developed a faith that civilised man, who 
necessarily lives in society as one of the essential conditions of civilisation, will observe his 
obligations to society and will act honourably and show consideration for his neighbours. 
The corollary is that his neighbours and any authority acting in the name of the whole 
society will only intervene in his private affairs if and when it appears he is deliberately 
acting otherwise. 
3.27 The benefits from any requirement for the disclosure of private interests 
which conflict with public duties must be weighed against the harm resulting 
from the intrusion upon the privacy of those whose interests would be disclosed. 
In recent years privacy as a human right has been given increasing recognition, 
as evidenced by its inclusion in codified lists of human rights and freedoms and 
by the development of remedies for breach of privacy under common law systems. 
But it is never an unequivocal declaration of privacy as the highest value. There 
are always qualifications. When a privacy right has been stated in a declaratory 
list, it has been subjected to qualifications so extensive as virtually to destroy 
its effectiveness save as an aspiration. 
3.28 Although the idea of a right to privacy has been gathering strength in 
Australia, the bases on which such a right might rest have, perhaps, not been 
sufficiently considered by many of those who affirm its existence. One writer 
recently has identified two bases which would be relevant to the Committee's 
concerns: 
The first is related to the conception of moral personality and individuality, to a person's 
need for freedom from intrusion in order to manage and cultivate his relations with other 
persons. The second relates to freedom, to the fact that someone able to assemble a great 
deal of information about another person almost certainly acquires a measure of power 
over him.7 
The Committee would be most reluctant to recommend new measures which would 
invade the privacy of any category of officeholder without having sufficient justifi-
cation for them. 
3.29 But, on the other side of the balance, what of public accountability? If 
officeholders are to be accountable to the public, it has been argued, members 
of the public will require information about the interests of the officeholders. 
The public need to 'be able to form independent judgments as to the integrity 
of government officials'. They have 'an interest in assuring that conflicts of interest 
are fully avoided by public officials'.8  
3.30 If one wishes to recognise the principle of public accountability while at 
the same time minimising the intrusion upon the privacy of those involved, what 
information should be disclosed and how? The first criterion should be that 
private interests should be disclosed if they are relevant to the officeholder's 
suitability for office or to the decision he makes. But some information potentially 
relevant on this criterion may still be especially sensitive. The interest may not 
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be pecuniary. It may, for example, involve religious or political affiliations. Recently 
the Victorian Government's Members of Parliament (Registers of Interests) Act 
1978 introduced a requirement for the registration of membership in such bodies 
as political parties, trade unions, professional bodies and various non-profit 
organisations such as hospital boards and charities. The Committee doubts whether 
registration is the appropriate means of regulating conflicts of interest in such 
cases. It recognises that there may be occasions when a conflict of interest is 
real and immediate, in which case declaration would be necessary. But to hold 
that any and all organisational connections which an officeholder has are relevant 
to his suitability for office and should be made known in a publicly accessible 
register seems to the Committee an unnecessary and alarming invasion of his 
privacy. It may be significant that in the United States, where there are consti-
tutional guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of association, provisions 
for the registration of interests have carefully avoided intruding on such areas 
unless they generate a pecuniary interest as well. 
3.31 Disclosure of some pecuniary information may have consequences outside 
the sphere of public duty. Disclosure of liabilities may affect credit worthiness. 
Again, the extent of the intrusion upon privacy will depend on who has access 
to the information, what use can be made of it, and what degree of security 
is maintained against unauthorised access to, or misuse of, the information. 
3.32 The Committe expects that the interests to be disclosed will be mainly 
pecuniary interests. It recognises that there is need for adequate protection of 
privacy in provisions requiring disclosure. Three means of reconciling a general 
entitlement to privacy with the requirements of public accountability have been 
noted. 
'Public life' 
3.33 One is to distinguish the case of persons who have entered 'public life' 
and argue that as a result their privacy has been diminished relatively. Thus a 
Member of Parliament stated in his submission: 
Politicians live in a goldfish bowl because they choose to do so. Electors have a right to 
expect certain standards from their elected representatives, and I believe that full public 
disclosure is simply an institutional safeguard which allows the public to have some 
confidence that politicians are not simply looking after their own interests. 
The same point was made by the Joint Committee on Pecuniary Interests of 
Members of Parliament.9 Against this point of view it could be argued that 
although politicians have been subject to public scrutiny for a long time, this 
has not involved the consequences that they have been required to make public 
their assets and liabilities. What is now in question is whether they are to be 
made subject to a different kind of scrutiny from the one to which they have 
been accustomed. 
3.34 Much depends on what is meant by 'public life'. Some officeholders can 
be described as being in the public eye, which means in practice that the media 
pay attention to what they say and do and identify them publicly. Others hold 
offices on behalf of the public without such exposure being a natural or 
inevitable consequence. For example, senior officers in the public service give 
advice to and act on the direction of elected Ministers. Thus there is less reason 
for the media discussing their personal attributes or interests as a determinant 
24 	 of government policy. 
3.35 Fashions change in this regard. There is more attention in the media 
today to a few top public servants than there was ten or twenty years ago. But 
the media-worthy public servant, the officer who is truly in the public eye, is 
still the exception. The overwhelming majority remain anonymous, and they 
would be placed 'in a glass bowl' only to their surprise and, possibly, to their 
indignation. The tradition of public service neutrality is still jealously guarded. 
Neutrality is closely connected with anonymity; reducing the latter might well 
bring the former into question. 
3.36 The Law Reform Commission, in its paper on Privacy and Publication, 
considered the distinction drawn in the United States law as to defamation of 
'public figures' in contrast with the rest of the population, but was not persuaded: 
A public man will necessarily have less private life than an ordinary citizen simply because 
so many of his activities are in the public realm. Anything that relates to his public life, 
his suitability for public office or the position he may take on a public issue is a legitimate 
matter of public discussion; his relationship with his family and friends, his home or 
sexual activities and his minor illnesses will normally be no business of the community 
at large.'° 
3.37 The Law Reform Commission's comments do not dispose of our problem, 
although perhaps they narrow its scope. It appears that information relating to 
conflicts of interest would lie outside the protected sphere. Such information 
relates to positions taken on public issues and it relates to suitability for office. 
But must the conflict be real and immediate, or would it be sufficient to override 
privacy considerations if the conflict were no more than hypothetical or possible? 
That question is at the heart of this inquiry. 
Financial interests 
3.38 The second means is to distinguish financial interests and activities from 
other, more personal, interests and activities which would fall within the protected 
area whilst the financial did not. As the right of privacy has been developed in 
the United States courts following the decision in Griswold v. Connecticut 
(1965)11, the tendency has been to restrict the protection to intimate personal 
and family relationships. 
3.39 A series of cases involving challenges to state legislation or local govern-
ment ordinances requiring financial disclosure on the part of public officials for 
themselves and their immediate families has upheld such requirements on the 
ground of a 'compelling state interest' in avoidance of conflict of interest sufficient 
to override the right to privacy: Stein v. Howlett (1972)12,  Fritz v. Gorton 
(1974)13, and Montgomery County v. Walsh (1975) 14  However, alongside those 
cases should be noted two others: City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young (1970, )1 , 
when a requirement of disclosure in respect of spouse and dependents was struck 
down as over-broad, and Lehrhaupt v. Flynn (1974)16,  which held that dismissal 
or other punishment of an official for non-disclosure of information which he 
did not control (relating to his spouse's assets) was excessively harsh. 
3.40 Australian courts are not faced with the problem of defending a constitu-
tionally guaranteed right to privacy. Nevertheless the Committee believes that 
the extent to which the American courts have been able to accommodate financial 
disclosure requirements alongside protection of privacy suggests privacy is not 
an absolute bar to the development of a system for disclosure of pecuniary 
interests, but rather a matter for concern in shaping such a system. It will be 
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appreciated that the American cases concerned disclosure of financial interests. 
Requirements for disclosure of non-pecuniary interests might well have met with 
a different response on the basis of other constitutional guarantees of civil liberties, 
just as in Australia the absence of such provisions from the Constitution still 
leaves the law-maker with equivalent problems of legal and political philosophy. 
Controlled access 
3.41 The third means of resolving the clash between freedom of information and 
privacy is by controlling access to the information which intrudes upon privacy. 
The Joint Committee on Pecuniary Interests of Members of Parliament, in 
advancing proposals for the registration of Members' interests, commented: 
the Committee . . . considers the real aim of any register is to be a means of reassuring 
the people that public decisions are made in the public interest. If the people are to be so 
assured they must be permitted a degree of access to the information to be registered.17 
(emphasis added) 
3.42 The mechanics of this compromise were to require anyone seeking access 
to make written application to the Registrar having custody of the information, 
showing that 'a bona fide reason exists for such access'. The Registrar would then 
notify the Member of Parliament to whose entry access has been sought, and the 
Member might oppose the application. In that event the matter would be decided 
by the Registrar 'with the approval of the President or Speaker'. 
3.43 The Judiciary Committee of the United States House of Representatives, 
considering a comparable arrangement, commented that the solution to the dil-
emma was a balance which furnished 'some assurance to reporting individuals that 
there will be some control over the dissemination of sensitive information while 
avoiding the possible chill of overregulation."' 
3.44 The Committee will deal with restricted access in a later chapter, when the 
possible institution of registers of interests for various categories of officeholders 
will be discussed, but it should be said at once that the Committee has not been 
convinced that this would be a satisfactory solution. 
Family interests 
3.45 Requirements for the disclosure of interests held by members of the office-
holder's family cause particular concern. It might be asked whether any mechan-
ism for accountability through disclosure of private interests can ever be really 
effective if it excludes 'family' interests. The Committee has already considered in 
Chapter 2 whether officeholders have so close a coincidence with the interests of 
their spouses and dependent children that any system of control and regulation 
must extend over their affairs as well. There are considerations which move in 
the other direction. The nature of matrimonial property has changed. Women in 
contemporary Australia have greater economic independence. There is the apparent 
unfairness of subjecting to public scrutiny a person who has not chosen to enter 
public life and accept public duties. 
3.46 On balance, the Committee favours ad hoc disclosure of certain family and 
other analogous interests as necessary to the effectiveness of public accountability. 
It believes that such information should be given a degree of privacy protection at 
least equal to that provided for the officeholder. One could accept the view of the 
Joint Committee on Pecuniary Interests of Members of Parliament that inclusion 
of the pecuniary interests of members of the immediate family, even in a restricted 
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justify than with respect to Members of Parliament themselves'.19 As far as is 
possible, an extra degree of care should be displayed in protecting the privacy of 
persons other than the officeholders who are brought under requirements for the 
disclosure of interests. 
3.47 The Committee noted the provision of the Victorian Members of Parliament 
(Register of Interests) Act 1978, s. 6 (2) (i), requiring each Member to register 
'any other substantial interest whether of a pecuniary nature or not . . . of a 
member of his family of which the Member is aware and which the Member con-
siders might appear to raise a material conflict between his private interest and his 
public duty as a Member' (emphasis added). Such a formulation appears to the 
Committee to open too wide a discretion for Members in an area of some sensi-
tivity. If some family interests are to be disclosed, the rules for disclosure should 
not provide what could be to many Members an unwelcome degree of discretion 
as to whether a particular interest should be registered or not. It should be an 
accepted rule that when a member of his family possesses a private interest which 
conflicts or might reasonably be thought to conflict with a Member's public duty, 
and the Member is aware of it, he has a duty to disclose that interest in relevant 
circumstances. 
Amounts 
3.48 Requirements for disclosure of the mere fact that interests exist, rather than 
their quantity or monetary value, provide further examples of compromise. The 
Committee finds doubtful the employment of such devices to mitigate intrusion 
upon privacy. Far more important, in the Committee's opinion, is establishing the 
relevance to the officeholder's public duties of the interest and of its disclosure. 
Records 
3.49 Privacy as an issue does not end when a decision has been taken that there 
should be declaration or registration of interests. If there is to be disclosure, then 
there will be records of the disclosures made. Systems will have to be designed 
with privacy criteria in mind, and at this point guidance may be sought from the 
many contemporary policy statements on the protection of privacy in official 
records. Because of the wide variation in the circumstances in which disclosure 
systems should operate for different classes of officeholder, most of this discussion 
can best be left to Chapters 7 to 10. 
3.50 The Committee records at this point its recognition of the merits of criteria 
identified by the New South Wales Privacy Committee as seven basic principles: 
1. A personal data system should exist only if it has a general purpose and specific 
uses which are socially acceptable. 
2. Personal data should only The used when it is relevant to the particular decision 
being made, and its use for this decision is socially acceptable. 
3. The minimum necessary data should be collected, using fair collection methods, 
and from appropriate sources. 
4. Standards should be established and maintained regarding data integrity, data 
security and the period for which identified personal data is retained. 
5. Personal data should only be accessed consistently with the system's socially 
acceptable uses, and for additional uses by consent or by law. 
6. The interested public should be able to know of the existence, purpose, uses and 
methods of operation of personal data systems; to object to any feature of a sys-
tem; and where appropriate to have change enforced. 
7. Every person would be able to know of the existence and of the content of data 
which relates to himself; to complain about any feature of that data or its use; 
and where appropriate to have changes enforced.20 	 27 
Although devised for different questions than have faced this Committee, these 
basic principles are a useful guide. 
Conclusion 
3.51 The Committee does not think that the right to privacy forms a complete 
and automatic bar to the imposition of any disclosure requirements, provided 
that a sufficient case can be established for obtaining the information. But that 
case should rest on a real and substantial need and on an adequate probability 
that disclosure of the information will match that need. The Committee recognises 
that disclosure may impose costs. In addition to the emotional response to the 
intrusion, which may range from irritation to outrage, there may be the expendi-
ture of time and money in compiling the information to be disclosed. It was put to 
the Committee that there could be heightened risk of verbal abuse, or even the risk 
of physical violence, consequent upon the public exposure of financial affairs. 
Several witnesses expressed their concern at the possibility that criminals could use 
information about wealth from a publicly accessible register to identify office-
holders who might be targets for kidnapping or extortion. The Committee will try 
to follow a course which recognises both objectives, public accountability and 
protection of privacy. It assigns both considerable weight, but it does not regard 
either one as paramount over the other. 
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4. Principles for the avoidance and 
resolution of conflicts of interest: 
a Code of Conduct 
4.1 The Committee's terms of reference require it: 
2. To recommend whether principles can be defined which would promote the 
avoidance and if necessary the resolution of any conflicts of interest which 
the Inquiry may . . . find to be possible. 
3. In the event of a finding under paragraph (2) above that principles can be 
defined, to recommend what those principles should be. 
4.2 In Chapter 2 the problems of defining the nature of private interests which 
could conflict with the public duty of Commonwealth officeholders were discussed. 
It was concluded that there were major difficulties in the way of providing a 
completely satisfactory definition. Despite this, the Committee believes that 
it is possible to define principles that comply with the requirements of items 2 
and 3 of the terms of reference in the sense that their adoption would promote 
the avoidance of conflicts of interest and would provide a basis for their resolution 
where necessary. A statement of such principles would constitute a Code of 
Conduct for all persons holding positions of public trust in relation to the 
Commonwealth, having special reference to their obligations in respect of conflicts 
of interest. The principles which the Committee considers should be included in 
such a Code are set out later in this chapter. 
4.3 The case for having such a collection of rules of conduct was made, with 
a necessary qualification, by the Prime Minister's Committee on Local Govern-
ment Rules of Conduct (the Redcliffe-Maud Committee) in Britain: 
Rules of conduct cannot create honesty; nor can they prevent deliberate dishonest or 
corrupt behaviour. Rather, they are a framework of reference embodying uniform 
minimum standards. Their special value is in situations which are intrinsically complicated, 
or are new to the individual concerned, where they provide a substitute for working out 
the right course of action from first principles on each occasion.' 
This view of the nature and purpose of a Code of Conduct has the Committee's 
endorsement. Here it may be noted that the Joint Committee on Pecuniary 
Interests of Members of Parliament, although commenting in a somewhat different 
context, expressed the opinion that: 
a precise and meaningful code of conduct should exist . . . By specifying a set of 
basic principles which Members of Parliament should observe, Members would be 
reminded that their ethical obligations to the community do not cease merely by declaring 
their interests.2 
4.4 Given its terms of reference, the Committee has been concerned with the 
formulation of principles, that is, fundamental sources from which more detailed 
rules and guidelines may be developed. Because conflict of interest has been 
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a 'grey area' of uncertainty, largely unregulated by statute law previously, there 
has been relatively little overlap with existing legal provisions. When there has 
been such an overlap, the Committee has not regarded it as a bar to including 
appropriate items in the Code of Conduct which it proposes for adoption. 
4.5 Paragraph 4.9 recommends adoption of a Code of Conduct which the 
Committee considers would be generally appropriate to deal with conflict of 
interest situations involving officeholders. A brief explanation as to the procedure 
by which the Code was compiled might be helpful. The Committee examined a 
substantial number of statements coming from Australia and other countries 
(including Britain, Canada, India, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the United 
States and West Germany) going back in time more than fifty years, although 
the great majority were the products of approximately the last ten years. The 
Committee found one proposed code particularly helpful, even though it related 
to a category of officeholders outside its sphere of inquiry: that produced by 
the Redcliffe-Maud Committee in Britain in 1974. It also derived considerable 
assistance from the investigations of various committees such as the Salmon 
Royal Commission on Standards of Conduct in Public Life and the 1977 Select 
Committee on Conduct of Members in Britain, and the various Congressional 
Committees considering codes of conduct and analogous legislation in the United 
States. Appendix 3 to this Report sets out a brief history of the development 
of codes of conduct in a number of overseas countries and Appendix 5 the code 
of conduct recently adopted in Victoria. 
4.6 An annotated text of the Code of Conduct proposed in this chapter could 
point to numerous precedents, drawn principally from the experience of the 
countries mentioned above, for each of the items it contains. But, in selecting 
and shaping particular portions of the Code, the Committee has tried to remain 
conscious of Australian traditions and Australian practices and procedures. It 
has also looked at what the record suggests have been the Australian malpractices 
and defects in procedure which it is hoped the Code would assist in curing. 
The contents of a code of conduct 
4.7 The Code formulated in this report concerns itself with matters relating to 
conflicts of interest, pecuniary or otherwise, and only with such matters. There 
are, of course, many 'other matters which might suitably be included in a code 
of official conduct. For example, the Draft Guidelines on Official Conduct of 
Commonwealth Public Servants prepared by the Public Service Board cover a 
range of other matters not discussed in this report. 
4.8 The Committee's concern has been with those private interests which are 
not widely shared. Many of these are likely to have a pecuniary component. 
Several of the items in the Code are therefore intended to deal primarily with 
conflicts of interest that concern a direct pecuniary benefit for the officeholder 
and his immediate connections. However, guidance is also provided for those 
conflict of interest situations which are analogous, even though the pecuniary 
benefit may not be conferred upon the officeholder but goes instead to some 
30 	 wider group or organisation with which he has a close involvement. 
4.9 The Committee recommends that the following Code of Conduct be adopted for 
general application to all officeholders: 
CODE OF CONDUCT 
Under the system of government which operates in Australia the main legislative 
and executive functions of government are carried out by Ministers, Members 
of Parliament, public servants and statutory officeholders. Each category of 
officeholder has a duty to discharge responsibilities entrusted by the Constitution 
and the laws made under the Constitution according to the highest standards of 
conduct. The public is entitled to have confidence in the integrity of its govern-
ment. Officeholders may be required by the nature of public office to accept 
restrictions on certain areas of their private conduct beyond those imposed on 
ordinary citizens. 
The following Code of Conduct embodies principles which should be observed 
by all four categories of officeholders. 
1. An officeholder  should perform the duties of his office  impartially, unin-
fluenced by fear or favour. 
2. An officeholder  should be frank and honest in official dealings with 
colleagues. 
3. An officeholder should avoid situations in which his private interest, 
whether pecuniary or otherwise, conflicts or might reasonably be thought 
to conflict with his public duty. 
4. When an officeholder possesses, directly or indirectly, an interest which 
conflicts or might reasonably be thought to conflict with his public duty, 
or improperly to influence his conduct in the discharge of his responsibilities 
in respect of some matter with which he is concerned, he should disclose 
that interest according to the prescribed procedures. Should circumstances 
change after  an initial disclosure has been made, so that new or additional 
facts become material, the officeholder  should disclose the further 
information. 
5. When the interests of members of his immediate family are involved, the 
officeholder should disclose those interests, to the extent that they are 
known to him. Members of the immediate family will ordinarily comprise 
only the officeholder's spouse and dependent children, but may include 
other members of his household or family when their interests are closely 
connected with his. 
6. When an officeholder (other than a Member of Parliament) possesses an 
interest which conflicts or might reasonably be thought to conflict with 
the duties of his office and such interest is not prescribed as a qualification 
for that office,  he should forthwith divest himself of that interest, secure 
his removal from the duties in question, or obtain the authorisation: of 
his superior or colleagues to continue to discharge the duties. Transfer 
to a trustee or to a member of the officeholder's family is not a sufficient 
divestment for the purpose. If immediate divestment would work sig-
nificant hardship on the officeholder, possession of the interest should 
be disclosed to colleagues or superiors and authorisation obtained for 
temporary retention pending divestment. 
7. An officeholder should not use information  obtained in the course of 
official duties to gain directly or indirectly a pecuniary advantage for 
himself or for any other person. In particular, an officeholder should 
scrupulously avoid investments or other transactions about which he 
has, or might reasonably be thought to have, early or confidential informa-
tion which might confer on him an unfair or improper advantage over 
other persons. 
8. An officeholder should not: 
(a) solicit or accept from any person any remuneration or benefit for 
the discharge of the duties of his office  over and above the official 
remuneration; 
(b) solicit or accept any benefit, advantage or promise of future advan-
tage whether for himself, his immediate family or any business con-
cern or trust with which he is associated from persons who are in, or 
seek to be in, any contractual or special relationship with government; 
(c) except as may be permitted under the rules applicable to his office, 
accept any gift,  hospitality or concessional travel offered in connec-
tion with the discharge of the duties of his office. 
The impression should be avoided that any person can improperly influence 
the officeholder or unduly enjoy his favour. 
9. An officeholder should be scrupulous in his use of public property and ser-
vices, and should not permit their misuse by other persons. 
10. An officeholder should not allow the pursuit of his private interest to 
interfere with the proper discharge of his public duties. 
Introducing and enforcing a Code of Conduct 
4.10 The Committee considered the means by which a Code of Conduct might 
be brought into effect and how it might be enforced. One  possibility was to recom-
mend the inclusion of equivalent provisions in a single statute. Such a statute 
might impose on various categories of officeholders the sorts of obligations to dis-
close or divest already contained in a number of statutes which create statutory 
bodies and require their members to disclose or divest specified classes of interests. 
Enforcement of these obligations could be the responsibility of the ordinary courts, 
or else a special quasi-judicial body such as the Ombudsman Commission of 
Papua New Guinea or the Integrity Commission of Jamaica. 
4.11 The Committee would not wish to see the ordinary courts brought into a 
regulatory role in the conflict of interest field. It believes that, for the great 
majority of cases, an instrument as flexible as possible is required. The maximum 
degree of flexibility will be provided if provisions for the avoidance and resolution 
of conflicts of interest, and for the enforcement of the Code of Conduct generally, 
are built into the existing disciplinary procedures of the various categories of 
officeholders. These provisions will be explained in detail in later chapters. 
4.12 Broadly, the Committee expects statements of principle, such as are em-
bodied in a draft Code of Conduct applicable to officeholders, to be manifest in 
such forms as the Standing Orders, resolutions and conventions of a legislative 
body, or the staff rules and guidelines of an executive body. They may require sup-
plementing by additional rules, sometimes reflecting minimum standards more 
onerous or restrictive than the general principle, sometimes explaining or enlarging 
upon a qualification to the general principles already incorporated in the Code of 
Conduct, to make them fit more satisfactorily the cases of particular groups of 
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4.13 The Committee believes that the Code of Conduct which it has drawn up is 
expressed in sufficiently broad terms to stand the test of time. Without trying to 
make unjustified claims for the merit of this particular text, the Committee would 
argue that any Code of Conduct should remain constant in its main provisions for 
substantial periods of time. It should recognise and embody values about which there 
is a high and enduring degree of consensus, both within society at large and within 
the particular organisations to the members of which it applies. The Committee 
recommends that when decisions have been taken on the final text of the Code of Conduct 
to be adopted for each particular category of officeholder, every effort be made to secure 
the widest possible familiarity with and observance of the Code and the ancillary rules 
and guidelines which are necessary to expand and apply its basic provisions. 
1. Great Britain, Prime Minister's Committee on Local Government Rules of Conduct (Lord 
Redcliffe-Maud, Chairman), Report, Cmnd. 5636, London, HMSO, 1974, p. 6. 
2. Australia, Parliament, Declaration of Interests: Report of the Joint Committee on Pecuniary 
Interests of Members of Parliament (J. M. Riordan, Chairman), AGPS, Canberra, 1975, p. 12 
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5. Measures available for buttressing 
the proposed Code of Conduct 
5.1 The Code of Conduct set out in the previous chapter is basic to the recom-
mendations contained in this report. 
5.2 As a preliminary to making recommendations on the measures to supplement 
the Code, the Committee decided to examine in some detail the procedures and 
mechanisms adopted elsewhere, but particularly in overseas countries, for the 
avoidance and resolution of conflicts of interest. The present chapter summarises 
the results of the Committee's investigations and expresses some views on the 
measures adopted. 
5.3 The countries whose experience the Committee found most helpful have 
governmental institutions resembling Australia's—in other words the Westminster 
model comprising parliament, cabinet, and a neutral, career public service. In 
addition, the Committee found the United States record relevant, although, because 
of the differences between the United States political system and those of countries 
cast in the Westminster mould, that record must be interpreted with caution. For 
example, in Washington the Ministers, that is, the heads of the major adminis-
trative departments, are not members of the Congress. The executive can continue 
to govern for the President's full term, whether or not the party he represents 
has a majority in the Congress. One consequence of this is that it often happens 
that when an item of legislation is before the Congress, efforts are made by the 
executive or its opponents to 'persuade' members to vote for or against it. Since 
the executive's continuance in office is not affected by defeat on the floor of 
Congress, there is considerable scope for 'persuasion'. In Canberra, by contrast, 
if there is an important piece of legislation put before the Parliament by the 
Government and sufficient supporters of the Government vote to defeat it, the 
Government commonly resigns and an election follows. The Member who is 
persuaded to vote against the measure finds himself immediately fighting for his 
political life in an election. It is clear that the American phenomenon of 'per-
suasion' and inducement is not reflected in the Canberra scene, and therefore 
argument from the American experience on conflicts of interest and duty can be 
misleading. 
5.4 Much of the comparative overseas material, summarised in Appendix 3, 
derives from the past decade. In some instances it has been necessary to look 
further back in time to trace the antecedents of arrangements which are still 
operative, and in some cases have been adopted in Australia. Recently five of the 
Australian States and the Northern Territory have given public consideration to 
conflict of interest problems. The Committee studied the proposals put forward 
by their governments and by parliamentary or other committees. Details of 
Australian experience in relation to the regulation of conflict of interest at the 
Commonwealth and State levels are set out in Appendixes 4 and 5. 	 35 
5.5 At an early stage the Committee recognised the distinction between the 
'black' area of conduct traditionally illegal and generally subsumed under the 
label of bribery and corruption, and the 'grey' area of conflict of interest where 
the line between legality and illegality is much less certain and standards of 
proper conduct are controversial. The Committee directed its inquiries almost 
entirely to the second area. It does not have any reason to think that the 
criminal law is defective to any significant extent. Consequently it makes few 
recommendations in respect of the 'black' area (see Chapter 14). 
5.6 Within the 'grey' area, conflict situations may be avoided or they may be 
resolved. The principle that a person should avoid situations where his personal 
interest may conflict, or may reasonably be thought to conflict, with his duty is 
a sound one. It is well known in the law of equity, particularly in its application 
to trustees, and in company law in its application to directors, who are regarded 
as occupying fiduciary positions. Its main application is in relation to the owner-
ship or administration of property. It should also be mentioned that in these 
areas of the law the principle applies also where there is a conflict of duty and 
duty. Indeed, the view is taken that in some cases this may be a more intractable 
conflict. Although a person may be able and willing to waive a personal interest 
which he has in favour of a conflicting duty, he has no right to waive the interest 
of a beneficiary for whom he is a trustee in favour of another conflicting duty, 
at least without the consent of his beneficiary. 
5.7 The Committee believes it appropriate by analogy to apply similar prin-
ciples to conflict situations in which the various categories of officeholder find 
themselves. The principle is based upon the view that the pursuit of self-interest 
is a powerful motivation for human beings, and needs to be guarded against 
where it may conflict with some duty. 
5.8 Conflicts of interest can be avoided by action taken by the officeholder, 
perhaps encouraged by exhortations contained in a code of conduct or deterred 
by the possibility of punishment for improper conduct. The officeholder may 
avoid acquisition of interests which engender conflict or assuming duties or offices 
which will conflict with his private interests. He may disqualify himself from duties 
which conflict with his private interests. The responsible authority may cause the 
conflict situation to be avoided by specific prohibitions, disqualifications or 
refusals to authorise the officeholder to continue to act in the situation. Or it may 
issue rules which constitute standing prohibitions, expressed absolutely or requiring 
authorisation if action is to be permitted. 
5.9 Conflicts of interest, once they have emerged, can be resolved either by re-
moving the source of the conflict situation or by neutralising it. The conflict may 
be removed either by removing the interest through divestment, or by removing 
the officeholder from particular duties or from a particular office by disqualifi-
cation. It may be neutralised by the declaration or registration of the interest so 
that it is no longer secret, or by a specific act of authorisation. Moreover declara-
tion or registration of the interest can alert the officeholder or the responsible 
authority to the need for further action to avoid or resolve conflict situations. 
5.10 The Committee's studies suggest that the diversity of ways in which con-
flicts of interest can be avoided or resolved comes down in the end to six principal 
options—prohibition, declaration, registration, authorisation, divestment and dis- 
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either separately or in combination. Indeed reliance on a single option by itself 
can give rise to a piecemeal approach that fails to resolve or avoid conflicts 
adequately. For example, it may not always be enough to disclose an interest and 
the conflict it creates—authorisation or disqualification may also be necessary. 
Prohibition 
5.11 Prohibition involves the avoidance by forbidding, for example, a certain 
sort of officeholder from possessing a particular type of interest, or forbidding his 
acting in his official duty if he does possess it. 
5.12 It can occur in a number of forms, ranging from automatic disqualification 
from office occasioned by possession of some interest to an item in a code of con-
duct without sanctions, which merely cautions against holding such an interest. An 
associated possibility may be that actions undertaken by an officeholder who holds 
a prohibited interest would be rendered void or voidable. Examples of absolute 
prohibition are the Constitutional provisions relating to Members of the Com-
monwealth Parliament holding offices of profit (s. 44 (iv)), being government 
contractors (s. 44 (v)), or taking fees or honoraria for services rendered to the 
Commonwealth or in the Parliament (s. 45 (iii)). 
5.13 Comparable prohibitions affect certain statutory officeholders. They may 
forbid appointment, for example the Insurance Acts 1973, s. 12 (2). There have 
also been prohibitions against acquiring an interest while in office, for example 
the Public Service Act 1922, s. 15 (2). 
5.14 Generally prohibitions, when expressed in absolute terms, are inconveni-
ently rigid. Because of this, they tend to receive excessively narrow interpretations 
which often nullify their effectiveness. Automatic disqualification from office may 
be too severe a sanction for an innocent oversight or a misreading of obscure law. 
Antiquated provisions relating to offices of profit and government contractors 
are notoriously pits into which the most upright may stumble. 
5.15 There may, however, be instances where it is necessary to retain an absolute 
prohibition against holding certain types of interest in respect of appointment to 
certain specialised statutory offices. Perhaps the strongest case would be that of 
adjudicatory or regulatory bodies, where the appearance of fairness between com-
peting applicants or the absence of private interest is essential, for example the 
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal, which must choose between competing appli-
cants for a licence, and the Australian Film Commission, which must choose be-
tween competing applicants for financial support. 
5.16 There is also the reverse situation when a statutory officeholder is required 
to possess an interest as a qualification for appointment, and is disqualified from 
holding office if he fails to retain it. For example, the Honey Industry Act 1962, 
s. 11 (2A), requires members who represent honey producers to own at least two 
hundred hives of bees, otherwise they shall be removed from office. This is a case 
in which the wish to have expert and representative members of the statutory body 
overrides the potential conflict of interest. It does not, of course, obviate the need 
for the member to act without regard to his personal interests. The fact that the 
private interest is public knowledge helps to make it acceptable. 
5.17 In addition to the Constitutional and legislative provisions already men- 
tioned, there is one form of prohibition to be noted which, on the face of it at least, 
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would appear significant. Standing Order 196 of the House of Representatives 
provides: 
No Member shall be entitled to vote in any division upon a question (not being a matter 
of public policy) in which he has a direct pecuniary interest not held in common with the 
rest of the subjects of the Crown. The vote of a Member may not be challenged except on 
a substantive motion moved immediately after the division is completed, and the vote of 
a Member determined to be so interested shall be disallowed. 
There is no equivalent in the Senate Standing Orders. 
Declaration 
5.18 Declaration is the written or oral disclosure of a relevant interest at the 
relevant time, and for this reason may be conveniently called ad hoc declaration. 
5.19 Declaration of an interest is a statement that the officeholder has an 
interest which might, or might be thought likely to, influence his actions or advice. 
It is made to his colleagues, in respect of a decision they are currently making 
jointly, or to other officeholders to whom he is providing advice. It discloses 
to them information with which they can assess his motives in relation to that 
decision or advice. There may be occasions when an officeholder's interests 
are patent and formal declaration is unnecessary. Similarly, the officeholder in 
whom is vested the power to make a decision in his own right should disclose 
to the relevant authority any private interests by which his motives in arriving 
at the decision might be affected. In each case the purpose is to allow informed 
judgment as to whether personal interests might have conflicted with and prevailed 
over public duty. 
5.20 The Committee believes that there is a widespread expectation of open-
ness and honesty in government. Those who carry the burden of public office 
should be able to rely on their colleagues' arguments and representations as 
being honest and free of bias induced by personal interests. Where there is a 
possibility that personal interests might influence advice and decisions, those 
involved in the decision-making process need to know that possibility and be 
able to weigh its likelihood. 
5.21 The advantage of ad hoc declaration of interests is that the information 
is available when it is required. It is made available to those who need to know. 
The value of the information is correspondingly enhanced, for there is no need 
to search for one meaningful item in a register containing a general disclosure 
of all interests. What might matter is immediately to hand. Unlike registration, 
declarations of interest do not require additional staff and expense. They are 
dealt with by the ordinary processes of recording the advice and decisions with 
which they are connected. The responsibility for dealing with the conflict of 
interest is placed where it belongs, with the officeholder. It trusts him to do 
the proper thing. When the ultimate goal is the encouragement of mutual trust 
and honesty within an organisation, that is the best way to go about it. Because 
only so much information as is relevant to a real and immediate question is 
disclosed, the invasion of privacy is minimised. 
5.22 It is frequently alleged that a requirement for the ad hoc declaration of 
interests is too easy to ignore or to avoid. It is argued that declarations would 
be so limited in their scope and so infrequently made that, even were the 
practice followed conscientiously, little would be done to increase public con- 
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If a requirement for declaration was introduced for all categories of officeholders, 
this should result in a widespread awareness that interests have to be disclosed, 
especially if such a requirement was reinforced by the opportunity to know what 
interests had been disclosed by Members of Parliament. Particularly when asso-
ciated with a strong system of investigation of allegations of conflict of interest, 
such a requirement should go a long way towards assuring the public that govern-
ment decisions are free from the taint of self-seeking personal interests. 
Registration 
5.23 Registration is the written disclosure of specified interests at regular inter-
vals, without the regard to the immediate circumstances of the officeholder which 
characterises declaration. 
5.24 Registration of interests is another form of disclosure, but registration and 
a requirement for declaration are by no means mutually exclusive. Any require-
ment for registration of interests would, in the opinion of the Committee, still 
require ad hoc declaration of interest because of its relevance and immediacy. 
Even in the case of Ministers and Ministerial staff, for whom there is already a 
registration procedure and in respect of whose interests it recommends continued 
registration, the Committee believes that there should also be an obligation to 
declare interests at the time when any conflict of interest situation arises or might 
reasonably be thought to be present. The existence of a register somewhere else, 
one that may have been consulted weeks or months earlier, if at all, is no sub-
stitute for the reminder at the moment when an officeholder is speaking or acting 
that he has an interest which may conflict with his public duty. 
5.25 The forms of a register and the way it operates can vary. At one extreme, 
if ad hoc declarations of interest were recorded as they were made and the resulting 
records accumulated at some central point, they could be said to constitute a par-
tial register of the interests of those who had been making the declarations. Regis-
ters of this type are kept by boards of company directors and by certain statutory 
authorities. At the other extreme would be a comprehensive register of all mem-
bers of an organisation, showing the widest possible list of both pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary interests they possessed, frequently updated, and with the monetary 
values of all pecuniary interests expressed. 
5.26 A register may be open to the public, perhaps even turned into a govern-
ment publication for ease of dissemination, but it may also be a confidential docu-
ment, accessible in respect of each entry only to the superior or colleagues of the 
officeholder disclosing his interests, or to the small group or single official respon-
sible for maintaining the register. 
5.27 Arguments for and against the principle of registration have been set down 
many times, with numerous variations on the basic propositions. Most of the debate 
has taken place with reference to elected officeholders, primarily Members of Par-
liament. Considerable interest in registration as the principal, and quite possibly 
the only, means for resolving conflicts of interest was exhibited in the evidence 
placed before the Committee. Where the matter of conflict between public duty 
and private interest has been subject to legislative proposals in the Australian 
States, the main thrust has been towards registration. 
5.28 The Committee's terms of reference require it to recommend whether or 
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in the event of allegations of impropriety, the allegation may be open to judicial 
investigation and report. Accordingly the Committee decided to provide at an 
early point in this report a comprehensive account of the arguments for and against 
a register, and a statement of the conclusions reached by the Committee as to 
whether or not a register should be maintained. This is done in the next chapter. 
Authorisation 
5.29 Authorisation, as a means of resolving conflict of interest situations, is 
usually tied to disclosure and involves the agreement of parties, colleagues or 
superiors to allow an officeholder to act or to retain an interest in a situation where 
there is conflict. 
5.30 Thus, the officeholder with an interest which might, or might be thought 
likely to, engender conflict discloses that interest to the appropriate person(s), and 
then is authorised to continue to act in the matter in question and to retain an 
interest—or else is advised to stand aside from it or divest the interest. For ex-
ample, in the case of a Cabinet meeting, a Minister may explain the interest which 
he thinks might disqualify him from taking part in a particular discussion and the 
decision is then taken whether or not he should participate. In the public service, 
an officer may refer the matter to his superior, who decides whether he may prop-
erly continue or not. Authorisation may also be given so as to operate continuously 
within certain bounds; for example to accept gifts up to a fixed limit but not 
beyond it. 
5.31 This option leaves the initiative with the officeholder and usually operates 
only when the interest is relevant. But because it is usually handled fairly inform-
ally, there may be a lack of established precedents and unwarranted differences in 
practice. Arrangements for authorisation may or may not be accompanied by pro-
vision of sanctions to be applied when the person seeking authorisation fails to 
accept the judgment of his colleagues or superiors. Even if it is formal, a legal re-
quirement to secure permission may operate arbitrarily. If there is a rule, there 
should be adequate criteria for its exercise. 
Divestment 
5.32 Divestment is the disposal by an officeholder, either permanently or tem-
porarily, of an interest which creates or may be thought to create conflict with his 
public duty. 
5.33 The practice of using the option of divestment as a means of avoiding or 
resolving conflict of interest situations has been developed mainly in North Am-
erica. There the drastic remedy of complete divestment has been supplemented by 
the use of blind trusts and frozen trusts, which seek to spare the officeholder the 
costs of divesting at what might be an inopportune time, whilst removing the im-
mediate cause of conflict of interest. 
5.34 Under a blind trust, the assets in question are transferred to a trustee who, 
without consulting the officeholder and indeed being explicitly precluded from 
doing so, deals with them and may dispose Of them. The officeholder, so the theory 
goes, cannot know whether he is still beneficially interested in this block of shares 
or that parcel of land, and therefore has no incentive to misuse his public respon-
sibilities to advantage those assets. Neither does he have power to trade in them, 
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A compromise version of the blind trust can be constituted where there is an 
official trustee who does not accept directions from the beneficiary, but regularly 
renders accounts which would indicate the assets subject to the trust at those times. 
5.35 Under a frozen trust, the trustee is forbidden to buy or sell, and consequently 
the officeholder has no opportunity to misuse information. However he does know 
that his beneficial interest remains and therefore that an advantaging of those assets 
will accrue to him. 
5.36 The Committee believes that such trusts could be a facade behind which 
the conflict of interest would survive, for it can see no effective way by which 
a trust could be rendered completely 'blind'. Unless the assets were diversified 
the officeholder could easily ascertain whether the trustee still retained them and, 
in practice, might find it nearly impossible to avoid knowing. If a public official 
were designated the trustee for such purposes, there might be greater confidence 
in the 'blindness' of the arrangement than if the officeholder were allowed to 
select a relative or former business associate. On the other hand, an officeholder 
obliged to transfer assets to an official trustee might be doubtful whether the 
trustee's commercial acumen would guarantee the income or capital growth 
which his own or commercial management might have produced over the same 
period. As for the frozen trust, its impact on a conflict of interest situation is so 
limited that the Committee doubts that it would have the effect on public con-
fidence which has been claimed for it. 
5.37 The Committee does not regard either the blind trust or the frozen trust 
as a satisfactory alternative to complete divestment when sensitive assets are 
involved. Further, there would be significant administrative difficulties in operating 
blind trusts if it was accepted that the attempt was worthwhile. For example, 
special income taxation provisions would probably be required to maintain the 
confidentiality of the trust operations from the officeholder who was its beneficiary 
and at the same time ensure that the trust income bore its appropriate rate of 
tax. 
5.38 The Committee believes that divestment is appropriate in the Australian 
context only for certain types of interest. Where there is so close an association 
between the interests and the officeholder's responsibilities that the other options 
of disclosure and avoidance are not appropriate, divestment may be required. 
Ministers administering their own departments often act by themselves without 
convenient opportunity to disclose and seek authorisation such as would be 
available to them in Cabinet. Those public servants who have to make frequent, 
perhaps daily, decisions in a particular area may find it impractical to arrange 
for someone else to act for them when a conflict of interest arises, or to have 
the authorisation of a superior on each occasion. In both cases, it is better to 
divest the interest which causes the difficulty and get on with the job. 
Disqualification 
5.39 Disqualification is the avoidance by breaking, permanently or temporarily, 
the connection between the officeholder and the interest which creates conflict by 
removing him from his office or the duties in the conflict situation. 
5.40 Disqualification is an option primarily for public servants and occasionally 
for Ministers and statutory officeholders. It supposes that personnel are inter- 
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the change. The arrangement may be quite informal, simply a matter of assigning 
duties differently once or for a brief period. It may have to be formal if the 
duty is imposed by statute upon a designated officeholder, so that it is necessary 
to make an acting appointment to the post. A number of witnesses before the 
Committee saw it as preferable to divestment as a means of resolving conflicts 
of interest within the public service. Transfers and reallocation of duties are a 
daily occurrence with which everyone is familiar. A power given to a senior 
officer to require a public servant to divest himself of a private interest would 
be novel and probably unpalatable. 
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6. Registration of interests 
6.1 The Committee's terms of reference require it to recommend 'whether or 
not a register under judicial supervision should be maintained so that, in the 
event of allegations of impropriety, the allegation may be open to judicial 
investigation and report'. 
6.2 A strict reading would suggest that the Committee is required to consider 
whether one register should be established to cover the interests of all office-
holders. The practical problems of maintaining such a register would be enormous. 
The Committee has taken the view that this was not the intention. Rather, so 
it appeared to the Committee, the intention was that consideration was required 
of the question whether the principle of registration of their private interests 
should be extended to all categories of officeholders, and, if the conclusion was 
in the affirmative, the nature of the registers to be adopted, the form of super-
vision and the machinery for investigation and report in the event of allegations 
of impropriety. 
6.3 The soundness of this view was reinforced as the Committee's work pro-
ceeded. There were, it was found, differences in the roles of the various cat-
egories of officeholder which would justify differences of approach as to how the 
registration principle should be applied to each and, in particular, as to the form 
of supervision and the machinery for investigation and report in the event of 
allegations of impropriety. Reference to some of the issues involved is to be 
found in Chapter 3. The proposals in Appendix 6 reflect the Committee's atti-
tudes to them. 
6.4 The question whether registration of interests should be introduced has 
proved to be one of the most difficult questions with which the Committee has 
had to grapple. A great deal has been written on the subject and a good deal 
has been done, in other countries and in Australia. After lengthy study, and 
after considering the written submissions and the oral evidence, the Committee 
has concluded that it should recommend against a register for officeholders as 
a general requirement. As will appear later, this conclusion is subject to some 
qualification. 
6.5 It should be stressed that the Committee's conclusions regarding registration 
do not reflect any fundamental objection to disclosure of interests. Items 4 and 
5 of the Code of Conduct recommended in Chapter 4 call for disclosure when 
an officeholder possesses, directly or indirectly, an interest which conflicts, or 
might reasonably be thought to conflict, with his public duty or when known 
interests of members of his immediate family are involved. But there are im-
portant differences between ad hoc disclosure and the registration of interests, 
hinging on the two factors of relevance and immediacy. How much importance 
the Committee attaches to these two factors will be apparent in later paragraphs. 
6.6 In considering the arguments for and against the registration of interests, 
it is well to bear in mind what has been done in other countries and in Australia. 
The fact that there has been widespread support for registration is in itself a: 
reason for giving the closest consideration to this question. Appendixes 3, 4 
and 5, which deal with overseas and Australian practice and experience generally, 
set out in brief the extent to which registers of interests are used to govern con-
flict situations in the countries for which details are given. 
6.7 Likewise, it is well to bear in mind the different types of register which 
have been discussed. They vary according to what is required to be disclosed and 
the degree of public access (if any) which is to be afforded. It is convenient 
to divide them into three classes: limited registers, middle-range registers and 
extensive registers. In Appendix 6, paragraphs 3 to 14, there are set out what 
are seen as the characteristics of each of these three classes of register. 
6.8 While consideration of the information to be registered and the access to be 
granted to it is necessary for intelligent discussion of the question whether registers. 
should be introduced for persons in positions of public trust in relation to the 
Commonwealth, it has been felt that to set forth the comments upon them in 
the body of this chapter would unduly interrupt the discussion. 
6.9 Most of the public debate on the registration of private interests has related" 
to Members of Parliament. Accordingly, a deal of emphasis is given in this 
chapter to the position of Members. In other chapters, some additional questions 
relating to registration by other categories of officeholder are raised. 
Arguments for and against compulsory registration 
The arguments for 
6.10 It is said that democratic institutions are under attack and that there is a 
loss of public confidence  in Members of Parliament. It is then argued that it is 
necessary to remedy this situation and finally  that the introduction of a register 
would remedy it or, at least, go some way towards remedying it. 
6.11 The Committee has no quarrel with the proposition that democratic insti-
tutions are under attack. Modern advances in literacy, education and means of 
communication have produced an era when all forms of political institutions 
are under critical appraisal. It sees no reason to attempt to reverse this process. 
6.12 The proposition that there is a loss of confidence in Members of Parliament 
is difficult to assess. Although some: witnesses discussed this matter, the Com-
mittee finds it impossible to say whether confidence in Members of Federal-
Parliament is higher or lower today than it was in, say, the 1920s or the 1930s 
or any other decade. There are so many factors involved. It believes that the 
Federal Government is expected to enter into a far wider range of public affairs 
affecting private citizens than ever before. In so far as it falls short of meeting 
the wishes and aspirations of the people there is, no doubt, a degree of' 
disillusionment. 
6.13 As for the regard in which Members of Parliament are held, this presents. 
two aspects. As individuals, there are many politicians, perhaps most, regardless 
of party, who are regarded by people in their own electorates, who actually meet 
them, with respect and even affection. As a group, 'politicians' are regarded with 
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6.14 The fact appears to be that the reputation of Members of Parliament, 
the view which the community has of them, depends upon the standard of their 
actual performance from time to time. It is not something which in the long 
term can be manipulated by the introduction of some device or some form of 
window dressing. Politicians as a group, like any other substantial group in 
the community, will in the ordinary course of human affairs have their small 
quota of black sheep. When a scandal occurs, confidence drops. All politicians 
suffer a loss of regard. When there is a period free from scandal, confidence 
uses. 
6.15 It appears to be part of the conventional wisdom in federal politics in 
Australia that if what is called the 'credibility' of an opponent can be damaged 
or destroyed, this is worth votes. A consequence of this is that there is on both 
sides of Federal Parliament a search for ammunition to be fired at this target 
and an almost constant barrage of denigration proceeding both ways. Members 
of Parliament appear to spend a good deal of time denigrating other Members 
of Parliament. Perhaps this has always been so, but because the Committee 
has spent upwards of a year looking at the question of loss of confidence in 
politicians, it was constantly forced upon its attention. Furthermore, when such 
allegations are made, the media naturally enough report the progress of the 
debate. Perhaps, fifty years ago, such news would have permeated the community 
more slowly. Today, through newspapers, radio and television, the whole Aus-
tralian community is bombarded with it almost instantly as it occurs. It is not 
to be thought that Members are uniformly unsuccessful in denigrating each other. 
They are, in fact, pretty successful. Any suggestion that a device such as the 
introduction of a register will restore the confidence of the public requires to 
be weighed in the light of this and in the knowledge that the process of deni-
gration will doubtless continue. Indeed, it seems plain enough that a register 
might well be treated by some as a welcome additional source of ammunition, 
not only as regards the information disclosed in the register, but as a basis for 
allegations of culpable deficiencies in the disclosures. 
6.16 Another matter which has troubled the Committee is that even those who 
advocate the introduction of a register of interests as a means of restoring 
public confidence do not seriously suggest that, had such a register been in 
force, it would have had any relevance to the alleged scandals which have 
occurred. From the studies made, it believes that in most cases information 
contained in a register, however extensive, would have had little or no relevance 
to the matters forming the basis for the allegations. 
6.17 The Code of Conduct which the Committee has recommended in Chapter 
4 recognises the need to guard against the situation where private interests 
conflict with public duty. However, it is necessary to keep matters in perspective. 
Important though the principle is, there are public requirements at least as 
important. Many of the political affairs of the nation are basically material 
matters. It may well be an advantage to the nation to be able to attract into 
the Parliament persons having experience and knowledge of such matters. If 
they are attracted to enter Parliament it is almost inevitable, if they are com-
petent successful people, that they will have present or residual interests in 
those areas. It would be foolish to assume the affairs of the nation would be 
better looked after by persons having no interest, knowledge or experience in 
these fields, notwithstanding it might be said of them that there was no likelihood 
of a conflict of interest and duty arising. Indeed, if the principle is treated as 
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paramount, it would lead to the conclusion that the affairs of the nation should 
be placed in the hands of persons with no assets and with no connections with 
any area in which the government might be concerned. Such persons at least 
might be said to be free of any taint of conflict of interest. On the other hand, 
it might then be said that such people, elected only for a three-year term in 
the House of Representatives, would be vulnerable to every sort of influence. 
There is something to be said for having in Parliament some persons who: have 
already demonstrated, in the world of practical affairs corresponding with politics, 
their intelligence, competence and imaginative grasp. 
6.18 It would be an error to make a general assumption that Members have 
entered Parliament in order to feather their own nests and then to conclude 
that, in order to protect the public against their depredations, they should be 
required to register their interests. 
6.19 Witnesses did not suggest a register would be relevant to any except a 
very limited number of cases which might arise. Rather, the case for a register 
was put on the basis of reassuring the public so they could regain their confidence 
in Members of Parliament. One Member, who gave evidence, has expressed 
this thought as follows: 
personal duty cannot override public duty. It is only by full financial disclosure that 
Members can demonstrate that they are motivated by public duty and not by private gain. 
Some witnesses spoke of the register as being not so much a practical as a 'sym-
bolic' act; others spoke of it as having 'cosmetic' value. These latter suggestions, 
although put forward in good faith, appear to the Committee to reveal an attitude 
which would assert that there was value in giving the public a sense of security or 
assurance which could well prove to be unwarranted. The Committee's view is 
that, if a register was introduced for this reason and had this effect, then, if and 
when the next scandal occurred, the sense of being let down by the Members and 
by the institution of Parliament would be even greater. 
6.20 In taking oral evidence, the Committee sought the views of witnesses on 
the extent to which the alleged loss of public confidence in Members of Parliament 
and in the democratic institutions extended to the public service and to statu-
tory bodies. The evidence regarding the latter was small, but, as far as the public 
service was concerned, it was uniformly accepted that the integrity of the public 
service is of high repute. The introduction of a system of registration of private 
interests would be unlikely to change the level of community esteem in which the 
public service is held. 
6.21 It is argued in favour of a register that it would enable the public to attach 
proper weight to the arguments put forward in debate by a Member of Parliament. 
This argument echoes material advanced in the United States in favour of a register. 
In the United States there is more scope for a member of Congress to be persuaded, 
or induced, to speak or vote in a particular way. Party lines are more loosely drawn 
and the sanctions against crossing them are slighter. The executive may suffer 
defeat in Congress without being compelled, as a result, to resign. The position 
in Australia is different. 
6.22 In practice there is smaller scope for influence of the type suggested upon 
an individual Member's arguments in the Federal Parliament, or his vote. The 
influence of party and the consequences of defeat of the Government on the floor 
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the disclosed assets or liabilities of a Member against his arguments or his votes 
recorded in Hansard over a period of, say, a year would be likely to get little return 
for his time spent on it. This is not to say a case could not occur where a Member 
had a personal pecuniary interest in the subject matter of debate. But this would 
be much more pointedly and efficiently dealt with from everyone's point of view 
by ad hoc declaration of interest at the time. A register prepared simply for general 
disclosure, containing information which everyone may have forgotten, would be 
a clumsy form of machinery to deal with such a situation. 
6.23 If a Member has an independent point of view to put, he has the oppor-
tunity and often the duty to put it in the party room, where it may well have some 
influence. However, it is idle to speak of the public being enabled by a register 
to weigh those arguments, because the party room is private and the public will 
not know of his arguments. His fellow Members will obviously be more effectively 
warned by an ad hoc declaration tailored to the circumstances. 
6.24 Likewise it may be suggested a Member may be influenced by private 
interest in making representations to a Minister, but this is private between them. 
Even if there were a register, the public could do no weighing in relation to it. 
The proper way to deal with the matter between the Member and the Minister 
would appear to be for the Member specifically to direct the Minister's attention 
to the interest, that is ad hoc declaration. To rely upon the Minister's having 
noticed or remembered some item in a public register would be clumsy and in 
many cases ineffective. 
6.25 It is argued that the potentially dishonest Member of Parliament would 
tend to be deterred from misconduct by the requirement of disclosing his assets 
and liabilities in a register. The Committee is unable to accept this argument. A 
Member who is prepared to act dishonourably in order to serve his own financial 
interests, provided he can get away with it, is simply not going to be deterred by 
the requirement for registration. The Committee has not yet seen a register pro-
posed which could not quite easily and even lawfully be circumvented. It would 
regard a register as having virtually no deterrent effect. 
6.26 It is argued that a register would 'remove the innuendo surrounding poli-
tical debate'. Innuendo is a method of making allegations by way of oblique hint 
or insinuation. It is a method often used in the past in politics, when it has been 
considered likely to be effective. It is obvious it will continue to be used in the 
future, when it is thought to be appropriate. It is used occasionally in relation to 
assets and liabilities of a Member, but this is only part of a much wider ranging use. 
The statement that the introduction of a register will 'remove the innuendo sur-
rounding political debate', if taken in an absolute sense, is plainly ridiculous. 
Clearly it will not. Perhaps what is meant is that, in so far as innuendo has been 
directed at the possession of particular assets or liabilities by a Member, his dis-
closure of them in a register will place them outside the realm of innuendo. This 
may be so, though the extent of innuendo so removed would appear to be minimal. 
Indeed, the register would clearly furnish a fishing ground for those minded to 
employ innuendo, both as to what is disclosed and what it may be alleged is not 
disclosed. On balance, it seems likely the use of innuendo would not only continue 
to flourish but could well, in the net result, increase. 
6.27 It is argued that the conscientious Member would be spared much 
anxiety by publication of his assets and liabilities in a register. It appears to the 
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register to shed his anxieties. He might do so by frank disclosure at the appropriate 
time in terms appropriate to the circumstances, that is ad hoc declaration, and 
rightly feel he had discharged his obligation of frankness and that he was pro-
tected. But this would mean the register was not only unnecessary for the purpose 
of relieving the Member of anxiety but actually somewhat dangerous in giving him 
a false sense of security. Disclosure in general terms in a register could well prove 
to be insufficient to afford any protection to the particular Member concerned in 
the particular circumstances. 
6.28 It is argued that the public have a 'right to know' those influences  which 
operate upon Members in the discharge of their public duties. So expressed, the. 
proposition seems unexceptionable. However, clearly that would be met by a 
requirement of public ad hoc disclosure of relevant interests at the precise time 
when it is material for the public to have and assess the relevant information. The 
Committee's recommendations regarding the Code of Conduct are directed t& 
ensuring the public will have this right. 
6.29 What troubles the Committee is that some witnesses regarded this 'right to 
know' as supporting the need for a register. But a register, in its compilation, has 
no reference to any specific conflict situation. It is a procedure which would re-
quire all Members periodically to disclose assets and liabilities. Many Members 
who would be required to register would come in and out of Parliament without 
a situation ever having arisen where there was any relevant connection between 
their assets and liabilities and the discharge of their duties. Those Members staying 
in Parliament for several terms would be required by a registration procedure to 
disclose their assets and liabilities regularly when, for most of them, no relevant 
situation would arise when the public had any interest in knowing those facts be-
yond the pleasure of satisfying a lively curiosity. So far, the public has had no right, 
where no relevant situation has arisen, to know the assets and liabilities of Mem-
bers. The question before us is whether the public should now have it conferred 
upon them. It is obviously of no assistance in deciding whether the public should 
be given this right, to assert that they should be given the right to know because 
they have the right to know. 
6.30 It is argued that the introduction of a register would constitute protection 
for Members against what is said to be the operation of a principle of the common 
law relating to persons in public office invalidating what they do in conflict situa-
tions. Reference is made to the legal cases Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal (1852) 
(voidable) and Home v. Barber (1920) (void) •2  No case where this had occurred 
in the last fifty years was suggested to the Committee; indeed, no case where it 
had ever occurred in relation to Members of the federal Parliament was raised. 
For this reason alone, to suggest federal Members require protection in this area 
is a flimsy argument. But more than that, supposing such cases had occurred, or-
it was thought they might occur, a general disclosure of assets and liabilities, even 
in a register fully accessible to the public, would appear to be a clumsy and pos-
sibly wholly inadequate form of protection. It is not in all circumstances that a 
Member could validate the transaction involving conflict by disclosing to the other 
party and gaining his consent to proceed. Assume, however, that he could. The 
Member could only be assured of protection if he disclosed all information about 
his interest relevant to the impugned transaction directly to the relevant persons 
concerned at the relevant time. Assuming disclosure of any kind would protect the 
Member in the circumstances, it is clear that an ad hoc declaration would be his 
only sure way of making that disclosure effectively. Clearly, this is not an argument- 
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6.31 The arguments for the registration of private interests set out above do not, 
of course, have the same degree of application to registration by public servants 
and statutory officeholders. It could be argued that the public would be more re-
assured of the integrity of persons in these categories of officeholders and of the 
impartiality of the decisions they make if they were required to register their in-
terests. But the Committee has not been convinced of a need for this, nor has it 
been persuaded that there are such deficiencies in the present system of control 
over the public service and statutory bodies that drastic action in the form of com-
pulsory registration of interests is warranted. 
The arguments against 
6.32 It is argued that a requirement placed upon Members to disclose their per-
sonal assets and liabilities would be an unjustifiable invasion of privacy. If the sys-
tem, as it would need to do if it were to be at all effective, imposed an obligation 
to disclose information relating to the Member's family or other persons, the in-
trusion into privacy would be even greater. 
6.33 The Committee has discussed the question of privacy in general terms in 
paragraphs 3.26 to 3.51. But there are two arguments advanced against the attach-
ment of much weight to the notion of privacy for Members which should be noted. 
The first is that this requirement is justifiable because no Member will object to it 
unless he has something to hide and, therefore, little account should be taken of any 
such objection. The Committee considers this argument misconceives the nature of 
privacy. It could equally be argued that the public had a right to know everything 
about its elected representatives and, therefore, their telephones should be tapped, 
-and that no Member will object unless he has something to hide, so little account 
should be taken of any such objection. The fact is that privacy is greatly and quite 
properly valued by all citizens, including Members of Parliament, not because they 
have something to hide, but because it relates to the conception of personality and 
individuality, to a person's need for freedom from intrusion in order to manage 
his own affairs and to manage and cultivate his relations with other persons. 
6.34 The second argument is that Members by seeking election to public 
office have already waived their right to privacy. There is some substance in this 
argument. Certainly they have subjected themselves and their affairs to close 
scrutiny by those who are responsible for deciding upon their pre-selection as 
the endorsed candidate of a particular party, by the voters in the electorate in 
which they are candidates, and, if elected, by their opponents in the Parliament, 
by the press and by the public generally. Thus, it is said, they have chosen to 
live in a 'goldfish bowl'. But the truth is that this subjection to public scrutiny 
has not in the past involved them in the necessity of making an annual disclosure 
of their assets and liabilities. The question is whether they should now be required 
to make this disclosure. The answer must depend upon whether any good which 
may be seen as flowing from such a disclosure should be regarded as outweighing 
-what in federal politics would be a novel intrusion. Clearly this must be a matter 
of judgment. The Committee would not regard considerations of privacy as suffi-
-cient of themselves to lead to the rejection of a register, if it were persuaded a 
register was required by the public interest. It has not hesitated to recommend 
ad hoc disclosure when it is relevant to a particular conflict situation. 
6.35 It is argued that a requirement of registration will deter suitable persons 
who might otherwise have entered public life.  This argument is difficult to assess. 
The persons who enter public life have a wide range of backgrounds and, no 
doubt, a wide range of differing motivations. For some, who have no assets and 
nothing but their Parliamentary salary to support them, the requirement of 
registration would not constitute a deterrent at all; unless they were sensitive 
about disclosing their impecuniosity, which may be regarded as unlikely. For 
others, who have been successful in the material aspects of life and who have 
wide experience in practical affairs, the position may be different. Many of them, 
by entering Parliament and accepting the salary paid to Members, may well 
be making a substantial financial sacrifice. It is possible that a requirement of 
registration of the assets and liabilities of such a person and of his family might 
act to some degree as a deterrent to his entry into Parliament. 
6.36 It is likely, more likely than cynics would expect, that a substantial 
number of all classes of persons who seek election have as one of their major 
motivations a desire to serve their community. The community needs them. 
It needs both the Chifleys and the Menzies. 
6.37 It is difficult to judge whether the requirement of registration would deter 
anyone from entering politics. It should be added that this matter has to be 
considered upon the assumption that a system of registration can be devised 
which will be successful in ensuring a full and accurate disclosure, which is 
something which cannot be said of systems so far introduced or advocated. But 
on this assumption would anyone be deterred? The disadvantages suffered by 
those who enter politics are well known. They include dislocation of family 
life, intense scrutiny of one's affairs, constant subjection to criticism whether 
well founded or not, the requirement of being constantly available to hear and to 
serve the interest of one's constituents, substantial pressure of work, and 
severe limitation of material rewards. As things stand, only the stout-hearted 
will offer themselves for election. It may be argued that the requirement of 
registration would be insignificant as a factor in this situation. 
6.38 In the result, the Committee finds itself unable to form any confident opinion 
whether registration would operate to deter anyone. It can only say that, if it 
did, it would, in its view, be a heavy price for the community to pay for some-
thing which might well prove to be of little practical value to them. 
6.39 it is argued that registration should not be introduced because it would 
be too easy to avoid the requirements of disclosure by lawful rearrangement of 
a Member's affairs.  The Committee agrees with the view expressed in the Report 
of the Joint Committee on Pecuniary Interests of Members of Parliament that 
a register of interests would not be effective to expose fraud by Members of 
Parliament. It also agrees with the view expressed in that Report that the dis-
covery and elimination of dishonesty is not the principal aim, if an aim at all, 
of the introduction of a register. It is, however, unable to follow the argument 
adopted in that Report that, because the discovery and elimination of dishonesty 
is not the purpose of introducing a register, ease of avoidance is not a factor to 
be seriously considered in deciding whether a register should be introduced.3  
6.40 Existing registers which have been introduced appear to us to be open 
to fairly simple avoidance by lawful rearrangement of the affairs of Members. 
It may be noted that in the last published register in Great Britain more than 
seventy Members made a 'nil' return and, in the case of many who made some 
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that provided for by the Victorian Members of Parliament (Register of Interests) 
Act 1978, though tighter in its provisions than the register in Great Britain, 
could still fairly easily be avoided by lawful rearrangement of Members' affairs. 
6.41 The Committee is of the opinion that to introduce a register which could 
easily be avoided would fail to achieve any useful objective. It would constitute 
little more than political 'window dressing' and would, indeed, be somewhat 
misleading if it suggested to the public that objectives were being achieved 
which in fact the register was inadequate to bring about. 
6.42 The Committee has grave doubts whether it would be possible to devise 
a register so as to eliminate lawful avoidance. Such a register would need to be 
more far reaching than any register so far devised or suggested. For example, 
it would be necessary to cover not only the interests of Members and their 
families, but also, trusts and family companies and details of the operations of 
trusts and family companies. Even if such a register could be devised, there can 
be no doubt that those who were so disposed could still resort to evasion. 
6.43 It is argued that to introduce registration for Members would impugn 
their honour and integrity. Registration has become a familiar phenomenon 
overseas and appears likely to become so in Australia at State and local govern-
ment levels in the future. Although undoubtedly its introduction might be seen 
as based on the assumption that it is necessary to introduce safeguards against 
Members feathering their own nests, the Committee considers any effect of 
impugning the honour and integrity of Members is so slight as not to constitute 
a reason for not introducing it, if otherwise it is considered to be in the public 
interest to do so. 
6.44 It is argued that registration should not be introduced because it would 
be used to denigrate the parliamentary institution or to denigrate individual 
Members. A register would no doubt be explored to see if it could provide 
ammunition to be used in an attempt to denigrate Members. Nevertheless, the 
Committee is of the opinion that, if it was considered to be otherwise in the public 
interest to introduce a register, this argument would not be sufficiently weighty 
to persuade it that it should not be introduced. 
6.45 it is argued that a register should not be introduced because it would 
furnish information which might be used by kidnappers, extortionists or terrorists 
against the Member or his family. It has been put to the Committee that kid-
nappers or extortionists would already be able to obtain this information so that 
the register would add nothing to any risks to which a Member may at present 
be subject. If this is true, it seems to furnish an argument against the introduction 
of a register on the basis that it would furnish no information which was not 
already available. However, the Committee does not think this is true. The hypo-
thetical case of a Member who owned a Tom Roberts painting worth, say, 
$30 000 was instanced by a Member. If he had to disclose this in a register, 
it was suggested that while he was in Canberra it was likely his wife might well 
suffer a visit from thieves wishing to steal the painting. 
6.46 As far as terrorism is concerned, evidence was given to the Committee 
that activities of terrorist groups were directed rather to political objectives 
than to action on the basis of assets held by political figures. No evidence was 
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given on the likelihood of activities being engaged in by terrorists, such as bank 
robberies or kidnapping to finance the organisation of their terrorist activities, 
as it has been suggested has occurred abroad. 
6.47 The Committee is unable to arrive at firm opinions on these matters. 
Fortunately, Australia has so far been relatively free of these types of activity. 
It sees no reason to suggest that, if otherwise it was considered to be in the public 
interest to introduce a register, a decision to introduce it should be rejected 
upon these grounds. 
6.48 It is argued that there is no demand on the part of the public for the 
introduction of registration and that it represents a suggestion made by political 
parties in order to gain what is seen to be some political advantage and that the 
suggestion is naturally supported by the media, whose business it is to supply 
information and who naturally favour any procedure which will produce more 
information for them. This argument is difficult to assess. The response to the 
Committee's public advertisement for submissions tends to support it. Further, 
no Member who gave evidence was prepared to say there was any demand 
for it by his constituents. It is true one or two Members said that, having raised 
the matter with constituents, they received an affirmative answer. But this would 
appear to be almost as inevitable as if they had asked their constituents whether 
Members of Parliament should receive a salary rise and received a negative 
answer. 
The Committee's assessment 
6.49 The Committee is of the view that, in much of the public debate on the 
disclosure of interests, there has been confusion between declaration and regis-
tration. As a consequence, in the public mind, the advantages of registration have 
been overvalued and the benefits of declaration not sufficiently appreciated. It 
is not sufficiently recognised, as the Strauss Committee did in relation to Members 
of Parliament, that a general register is directed to the contingency that an 
interest might affect an officeholder's actions.4 The proper practice should be 
aimed at revealing an interest when it does so. 
6.50 A second cause of confusion in the debate is a failure to relate a mischief 
to the proposed cure. Where a matter involving an officeholder has given rise 
to public concern, it has sometimes been asserted that, had a system of registra-
tion of officeholders' interests been in operation, the mischief would not have 
occurred or at least would have been more readily foreseen. Such an assertion 
is, however, often open to question. Frequently, the mischief has not been asso-
ciated with what would ordinarily be a registrable interest; even if it had been 
registrable, an officeholder bent on perpetrating the mischief would most likely 
have evaded registration of the interest involved. 
6.51 The arguments for and against the institution of a system of registration 
of private interests show many weaknesses. The Committee finds itself convinced 
by neither. It has therefore been forced to a position where it has had to decide 
its attitude towards registration on the basis of personal judgment, by individual 
assessment of the relative strengths of the claims of public accountability and 
personal privacy. On such matters of judgment, the Committee makes no claim 
to a monopoly of wisdom. 
6.52 In forming its judgment it has been influenced by two particular con- 
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that, however tightly the specifications for a register might be drawn, it would 
be impossible to list all private interests which could give rise to conflict situations; 
in consequence, in many of these situations an officeholder and the public which 
he serves would need to rely upon the Code of Conduct, with its provision for 
ad hoc disclosure of interests, for reassurance rather than upon any list of 
interests that may have been set down in a register. The other consideration is 
the longer term consequences for officeholders' privacy which the Committee can 
foresee. 
6.53 The Committee has given careful consideration to the arguments for 
registration but it is not convinced that they outweigh those against it. It believes 
that, if registers of pecuniary interests of officeholders are instituted, the first 
step has been taken on a slippery slope that is likely to lead to a much wider 
system of disclosure and unjustified invasions of privacy than its first proponents 
contemplated. The deficiencies of a limited register would be quickly exposed 
by media probing and by the opportunity for political advantage that might be 
derived from allegations suggesting particular conflicts of interest not disclosed 
by the register. Restricted access to disclosed information, if that were the pro- 
cedure adopted, would come under attack as it did in the United States during 
the 1970s. Unless provision was made for the public to have access to the ijifor- 
mation in the register, registration would be likely to become immediately un- 
acceptable. Once the discrediting process started, the alternatives would be to 
leave the existing rules, accept that they were imperfect and did not cover all 
possible conflict situations, or else begin 'tightening up' by extending the interests 
to be disclosed and opening the register to public scrutiny. If the first course 
were followed, the supposed symbolic value of a register would dissipate; if 
the second, privacy would suffer. 
6.54 This view is reinforced by what the Committee considers would be the 
practicalities of the situation. Even were there to be rules purporting to test 
the bona fides of persons seeking access, as was suggested by some witnesses, 
they would be likely to be ineffective in practice. Suggestions that the custodians 
of a register could effectively test bona fides and prevent misuse are unrealistic. 
Those who wished to obtain access would have little difficulty in setting up reasons 
or getting access through others who could set up reasons why they should have 
access. Those who had legitimate claim to access could not be sufficiently bound 
by any restriction intended to prevent them from disseminating information from 
the register once they were possessed of it. 
6.55 The Committee has therefore found itself in substantial agreement with 
the position reached by the Salmon Committee in the United Kingdom, which 
said: 
In our view, registers of interests can do little more than present a general picture of a 
person's background against which his attitude to the issues of the day can be assessed. 
They can also, we accept, have a part to play in isolating specific interests from an 
individual's participation in official business and in keeping people with improper interests 
out of public life, but too much should not be built on this. The main sanction against 
specific conflicts of interest must be disclosure at the relevant time, and a register cannot 
perform this function. An individual who was determined to exploit public office for his 
own ends would probably be able to find ways round any registration requirements that 
were not of such complexity that they would be generally unacceptable and unenforceable. 
Apart from any other consideration, registers can be expected to cover only major 
continuing interests; it would be impracticable to require the registration of each and 
every business transaction.5 	 53 
It has concluded that there is insufficient justification at the present time to introduce a 
system of compulsory registration of Commonwealth officeholder's interests. Instead, 
reliance should be placed on the Code of Conduct recommended in Chapter 4 of 
of this report, which includes a requirement for ad hoc declarations of interest, and 
on the other measures proposed. The effectiveness of this should be kept under 
review. The Committee recommends that, subject to what is said in Chapters 8 to 10 
no system of compulsory registration of officeholders' interests be instituted. 
A compulsory register of private interests 
6.56 In making its recommendation in paragraph 6.55 the Committee is con-
scious of the fact that it is based on personal judgment. Some may disagree. Some 
witnesses argued that the time was ripe for the introduction of registration along 
the lines of the recent Canadian proposals.6 It is desirable, therefore, to place 
on record the Committee's views on the type of register which would be necessary 
should it be decided, contrary to the Committee's recommendation, to introduce 
registration. 
6.57 In Chapter 2 the conclusion was drawn that it would not be possible to 
prepare a completely comprehensive and satisfactory statement of principles on 
the nature of private interests, pecuniary or otherwise, which could conflict with 
the public duty of officeholders. It was pointed out that there are special diffi-
culties of definition with non-pecuniary private interests and lesser, but nevertheless 
substantial, difficulties of definition and/or practice with pecuniary interests. 
These findings have influenced the Committee in the comments which follow. 
6.58 The Committee has noted that there are precedents for the inclusion of 
non-pecuniary interests amongst the items which may be subject to registration 
requirements. The Victorian Members of Parliament (Register of Interests) Act 
1978, for example, requires a Member of the Victorian Parliament to register 
information as to the name of any political party, body or association or trade 
or professional organisation of which the Member is or has been a member 
during the return period. But clearly it would be impracticable to frame a require-
ment which would cover all non-pecuniary interests which may give rise to con-
flicts of interest amongst officeholders or may give the appearance of doing so. 
6.59 Apart from reasons of practicality, there are other reasons which the 
Committee considers should cause hesitation before any decision is made to 
include non-pecuniary interests amongst the registrable items. Many of these 
interests are highly personal and any requirement to register them would raise 
serious privacy issues. Religion is one such interest and a requirement to register 
it would cut sharply across a longstanding and well-entrenched convention within 
the Australian community that religious affiliation, if any, is to be regarded as 
a personal affair, to be divulged only at the discretion of the individual. Yet 
religious affiliation has the potential to give rise to conflict between private interest 
and public duty. Similar considerations apply with respect to political leanings. 
There is no problem here as regards Members of Parliament and Ministers, whose 
political affiliations are publicly known, but a requirement for public servants and 
statutory officeholders to register political interests which may be regarded as 
likely to influence their attitudes and decisions would run counter to all our 
Australian understandings about politically neutral executives and could introduce 
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6.60 Here, in passing, it might be mentioned that religious affiliation or belief 
occupies a special status amongst non-pecuniary interests in that, not only would 
any attempt to compel disclosure raise privacy and civil liberties issues, but in 
Australia may raise Constitutional questions as well.7 
6.61 For these and other reasons, the Committee could not recommend adoption 
of a register which would require the disclosure of non-pecuniary interests. It 
believes that any disclosures of interests of this kind are best made in conformity 
with an accepted Code of Conduct such as has been recommended in Chapter 4 
of this report. What is said in the balance of this section therefore deals only 
with pecuniary interests. 
6.62 It has already been said that the Committee regards registers of interests 
as no more than one means of buttressing the requirements and expectations in 
a Code of Conduct. For the reasons already given, it cannot be a sufficient means 
in itself and, indeed, there are grave dangers should it become so regarded. 
6.63 It should be repeated that no register, however comprehensive, can be 
fully proof against action by officeholders to avoid or evade its requirements. This 
needs to be clearly understood and accepted. There is a danger, if a register is 
introduced, that the very fact that a register is in existence may induce a degree 
of public confidence in the protection it can afford against the possibility of 
conflicts of interest in officeholders which is not justified. 
6.64 Should a decision be taken to require officeholders to register their pecuniary 
interests, the register should be as comprehensive as practicable. The Committee 
is not impressed by the coverage or the registrable interests provided in the more 
limited registers described in Appendix 6 and regards them as beieg so ineffective 
as likely to be misleading to the public. To provide guidance to the Committee's 
thinking on the matter, there is included in Appendix 6, paragraph 15, a state-
ment setting out items which it believes should be essential ingredients of a 
register for all categories of officeholder. In Chapters 7 to 10 there are some 
comments on the application of this type of register to particular categories of 
officeholder. 
Registers of interests now established 
6.65 The previous two sections of this chapter have been concerned with the 
compulsory registration of private interests for all officeholders. A brief mention 
should be made of those registers of interests now in force. 
6.66 The registration of private interests is practised in a number of areas of 
Commonwealth administration. The best known example is in the Ministry, 
where there are, and have been for some time, requirements for Ministers to 
disclose shareholdings and directorships to the Prime Minister. A form of regis-
tration of interests applies to ministerial staff. Amongst the statutory bodies there 
are examples and certain Permanent Heads of departments file statements of 
their private interests with their Ministers. In one department, senior officers are 
encouraged to declare their financial interests to the Permanent Head. 
6.67 These arrangements are largely the products of self-regulation and the 
registers are not publicly accessible. They appear to have a degree of acceptability 
amongst the officeholders concerned and the Committee does not propose that 	 55 
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there should be any substantial changes in the way in which they operate. Should 
a decision be taken at the government level to introduce compulsory registration 
of private interests, these existing registers would, of course, be superseded. 
Conclusions 
6.68 The Committee's conclusions regarding the registration of private interests 
may therefore be summarised: 
(a) the advantages of compulsory registration of the private interests of office-
holders are insufficient to outweigh the disadvantages; 
(b) subject to some qualifications made in later chapters, the existing arrange-
ments for the registration of private interests of certain groups of office-
holders should be permitted to continue; 
(c) in the event of a decision by the Government to require compulsory 
registration: 
(i) comprehensive registers embodying the ingredients set out in 
Appendix 6, paragraph 15, should be established; and 
(ii) the existing registers should be superseded. 
1. Australia, House of Representatives, Debates, no. 15, 1978, p. 1151. 
2. Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal (1852) 3 HLC 759; Home v. Barber (1920) 27 CLR 494. 
3. Australia, Parliament, Declaration of Interests: Report of the Joint Committee on Pecuniary 
Interests of Members of Parliament, AGPS, Canberra, 1975, p.  16. 
4. Great Britain, House of Commons, Select Committee on Members' Interests (Declaration) 
(G. R. Strauss, Chairman), Report, 1969-70 H.C. 57, HMSO, London, 1976, p.  xxiii. 
5. Great Britain, Royal Commission on Standards of Conduct in Public Life 1974-1976 (Lord 
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7. Measures for Members of 
Parliament and their staffs 
7.1 While the Committee considers that the Code of Conduct set out in Chapter 
4 should be the principal means by which the conduct of all four major categories 
of officeholder should be guided and regulated, the procedures by which the 
Code of Conduct is implemented will differ between the categories of officeholder. 
In part the differences will be procedural, consequential upon the different con-
stitutional or legal basis on which each category holds office. In addition, there 
will be variations in the importance and relevance of specific items of the Code 
of Conduct as they apply to particular categories. This chapter and the following 
three chapters set out the measures which the Committee believes should be taken 
in order to implement or supplement the Code of Conduct for the four major 
categories of officeholders and certain associated subsidiary categories. 
The Code of Conduct and its application to Members 
7.2 The nature of the public duty of Members of Parliament, as it has evolved, 
was set out in Chapter 2. Two features of the role of the ordinary Member 
appear particularly relevant to the implementation of the Code of Conduct: 
• because of the role of Members of the House of Representatives as the 
elected representatives of a particular division, or, in the case of Senators, 
a particular State, disqualification of a Member of Parliament from voting 
or participating in a debate on a matter is rarely an option as this would 
effectively disfranchise his electors on that matter; 
• because backbenchers do not have executive power, and have limited access 
to confidential information, there is rarely any necessity for divestment. 
7.3 With these qualifications in mind, the Committee recommends that the Senate 
and the House of Representatives be invited to consider: 
(a) amending their Standing Orders to include new Standing Orders requiring, 
respectively, Senators and Members of the House of Representatives to conform 
to the Code of Conduct; or 
(b) passing a resolution adopting the Code of Conduct; and 
(c) providing that a subsequent breach of the Code of Conduct should constitute 
misconduct and a breach of the privileges of the Parliament. 
Prohibition 
7.4 Although prohibition in the form of the exclusion of holders of offices of 
profit and government contractors from Parliament has been one of the oldest 
methods of regulating conflicts of interest, for many years it has been apparent 
that, at the parliamentary level, it deals with only a small, and increasingly 
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7.5 The principal matter here is the existence of three provisions of the Aus-
tralian Constitution which purport to avoid conflicts of interest by disqualifying 
persons who hold offices of profit or government contracts, or receive a fee or 
honorarium for services rendered to the Commonwealth or in the Parliament 
to any person or State. The relevant sections are ss. 44 (iv), 44 (v) and 45 (iii). 
7.6 The Joint Committee on Pecuniary Interests of Members of Parliament 
concentrated its attention on ss. 44 (v), and 45 (iii), substantially disregarding 
s. 44 (iv), which has tended to be more a matter of State concern, although the 
problem is easier to resolve there because the State Parliaments have capacity to 
amend their Constitutions and indemnify Members found to have breached existing 
provisions. The Constitutional provisions, the Joint Committee found, did not 'give 
the necessary assurance that decisions affecting the public will be taken in the 
public interest'.' The Committee agrees. 
Offices of 
 profit 
7.7 The rule on offices of profit evolved in the seventeenth century as the House 
of Commons attempted to assert its independent privileges by excluding those, 
such as judges, who were associated with the House of Lords. 
7.8 From the time of the Restoration, however, the office of profit rule was 
used to exclude from the Parliament those who might be subservient to the Crown, 
which was attempting to use the considerable patronage at its disposal to win 
political support. The office of profit disqualification has been justified subse-
quently on other grounds: 
• to insulate certain offices (for example, posts in the civil service, membership 
of public authorities) from being held by Members of Parliament; 
• to maintain the principle of ministerial responsibility by preventing civil 
servants, for whose decisions a Minister is responsible, from becoming 
Members of Parliament themselves; 
• to eliminate the opportunity which might tempt Members of Parliament to 
pursue self-interest; 
• to ensure that Members devote their time to their parliamentary duties. 
7.9 Various office of profit cases have arisen in Britain, although the matter 
has never been considered by the courts but has been left to the House of Com-
mons itself. Statutory provision was made over the years to exclude certain 
officeholders from the disqualification, while specific Acts of Indemity were 
necessary to save particular Members of Parliament from possibly ruinous con-
sequences, because common informers could sue Members in breach of the 
disqualification. To reduce uncertainty and to avoid catching trivial appointments, 
Britain eventually enacted the House of Commons Disqualification Act, which 
lists all disqualifying offices by name in a Schedule (alterable by Order in 
Council) 2 
 Thus Members of Parliament can know with certainty whether an 
office can be accepted without disqualification. In addition, the Act abolished 
monetary penalties and empowered the Commons to declare that a particular 
disqualification be disregarded. 
7.10 There have been several court cases at the State level in Australia involving 
offices of profit. There the doctrine has operated to disqualify Members of Par- 
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has been raised in at least one State of specifying the disqualifying offices in the 
State Constitution.4 Section 44 (iv) of the Commonwealth Constitution has never 
been considered by the courts although there has been some academic discussion.5  
The recent Common Informer (Parliamentary Disqualifications)  Act 1975 
reduced the monetary penalties which a common informer can obtain from a 
Member of Parliament in breach of the provision. This had previously been set 
by s. 46 of the Constitution at $200 for each day the Member sat whilst dis-
qualified. 
Government contractors 
7.11 The decision in the Webster case, coupled with the associated change to 
the law concerning common informers, leaves s. 44 (v) of the Constitution 
relating to government contracts with very little substance.6 In that case, a Senator 
held an interest in a family company which had certain contracts with the Aus-
tralian public service. The Court of Disputed Returns, comprising Barwick CJ, 
held that the section does not apply to casual and transient contracts. To be 
covered, a contract must be one where the government could conceivably influence 
the contractor in relation to his parliamentary duties. The decision is consistent 
with the interpretation placed by the English courts on a corresponding provision 
which existed in British legislation until its repeal in 1957. 
7.12 The Committee is aware of the argument that the purpose of s. 44 (v) 
was not simply to prevent the independence of Members of Parliament from 
being undermined by the Crown's allocating them government business—the 
clear design of the British provision. The Convention debates of the 1890s also 
demonstrate a concern regarding Members of Parliament using their elected 
office for personal gain. 
Fees and honoraria for services to the Commonwealth and in the Parliament 
7.13 Section 45 (iii) apparently was intended to catch lawyers, by analogy 
with government contractors. Its effect is much wider, but its full ambit is a matter 
of uncertainty in the absence of authority. The section does not seem to extend 
to such things as gifts and sponsored travel, which in practical terms might be 
more serious than the payment of fees and honoraria. However, it may be that 
the existence of this provision has prevented the development of the consultancy 
arrangements which so concerned the British House of Commons and contributed 
to the decision to introduce a register of Members' interests. That register in-
cludes remunerated employments or offices and requires disclosure of the names 
of clients when the interest involves 'personal services by the Member which arise 
out of or are related in any manner to his membership of the House'.8 Such 
arrangements would, to a large extent, be precluded by s. 45 (iii), with its 
severe penalty of disqualification. Certainly the section inhibits barrister Members 
of Parliament who might otherwise have taken Crown briefs, but what other 
effect it has can only be a matter for speculation. 
7.14 By themselves, these Constitutional provisions are inadequate to cope with the 
many conflict of interest situations which arise in the federal government. Although 
it will be difficult to amend them, the Committee recommends that ss. 44 (iv), (v), and 
45 (iii) of the Constitution be reviewed. The Committee wouid call attention to s.4 
of the Canadian Independence of Parliament Bill 1978, which allows certain govern- 
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It notes that a private member's Bill has been proposed to the Senate to seek amend-
ment of s. 44 (iv). It further notes that the desirability of amending s. 44 (iv) and 
changing other provisions relating to the qualification and disqualification of Members 
of Parliament has been referred to the Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional 
and Legal Affairs.9 
7.15 The other significant prohibition applying to Members is House of Repre-
sentatives Standing Order 196, the text of which was set out at para. 5.17. This 
prohibits Members from voting on certain types of question in which they have 
a pecuniary interest. In brief, the operation of this provision has been extremely 
restricted, due both to the qualifications contained in its wording and the inter-
pretations placed on it by successive Speakers. These have limited its application 
to private Bill legislation dealing with special interests. However, because the 
legislative powers of the Commonwealth Parliament do not lend themselves to 
these, such Bills have been absent from its business.10 (For a more detailed 
discussion, see Appendix 4.) The resulting ineffectiveness of this Standing Order 
was indicated by the Joint Committee on Pecuniary Interests of Members of 
Parliament, which, commenting on the absence of a comparable Standing Order 
for the Senate, stated that 'it would seem that the public interest would be no 
more adequately safeguarded, even if such a Standing Order were in existence'.'1  
7.16 The Committee recommends that the House of Representatives, in considering 
the Committee's later recommendations about declaration by Members, be invited to 
consider the desirability of strengthening Standing Order 196. 
Declaration 
7.17 The Committee is of the view that only in exceptional circumstances of an 
immediate and substantial conflict of interest should a Member of Parliament be 
required to abstain from voting or speaking. To require otherwise would effectively 
disfranchise his electors in relation to the matter under debate. Normally, a dec-
laration of interest at the earliest opportunity when speaking in debate, or taking 
part in committee proceedings, should be sufficient. 
7.18 The practice of declaration should go beyond formal proceedings in the Par-
liament or a committee of the Parliament to other occasions when the Member of 
Parliament, discharging his official duties, seeks to influence some other office-
holder. That objective was clearly identified in the resolution adopted by the British 
House of Commons on 22 May 1974.12  The same language was employed in the 
resolution proposed to the House of Representatives on 1 August 1974 by the then 
Special Minister of State. 13 
7.19 The Committee recommends that the Senate and the House of Representatives 
should be invited to consider adopting, whether by Standing Order or resolution, 
requirements along the lines of the resolution of the British House of Commons of 
22 May 1974: 
That, in any debate or proceedings of the House or its committees or transactions or com-
munications which a Member may have with other Members or with Ministers or servants 
of the Crown, he shall disclose any relevant pecuniary interest or benefit of whatever nature, 
whether direct or indirect, that he may have had, may have or may be expecting to have. 
7.20 The Committee considered whether the terms of such a resolution might go 
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declaration of interest by a Member of Parliament when dealing with, say, repre-
sentatives of pressure groups or members of the public, and concluded that this 
would not be appropriate. Whilst undoubtedly Members should seek to be frank 
and open in their contacts with anyone, any formal rules or requirements should 
be confined to those situations when they are dealing with other officeholders. 
721 Each House might, however, wish to consider two points. One is the prac-
ticability of requiring a Member or Senator to disclose an interest 'he may be ex-
pecting to have'. Whilst it would be reasonable to disclose an interest currently 
being transferred to the Member or Senator, or over which he had an option to 
purchase or the like, it might be stretching relevance too far and require too much 
prescience of the declarant to require disclosure of an expectation (see para. 2.34). 
The other is the limiting of the obligation to declare to 'pecuniary' interests only. 
The Committee has argued that non-pecuniary interests can, and do, create con-
flicts of interest, and declaration of such interests would appear an appropriate 
extension of the effect of a requirement such as that suggested here. 
7.22 The Committee further recommends that the Senate and the House of 
Representatives should be invited to consider including in such Standing Order or 
resolution provisions: 
(a) that a declaration of interest should be made at the earliest opportunity when 
speaking in debate or taking part in committee proceedings; 
(b) that such declarations should be automatically recorded as part of the official 
record and indexed in Hansard for convenience of reference. 
Registration 
7.23 Chapter 6 of this report dealt in some detail with the arguments for and 
against the registration of officeholders' interests, and set out the Committee's views 
on the question of introducing registers of the interests of the principal categories 
of officeholders. The Committee's conclusion was that adoption of a requirement 
for the registration of the interests of Members and other officeholders was not 
warranted—the situation could be met by the introduction of the other measures 
recommended. The point was made, however, that should the Government insti-
tute registration of officeholders' interests, the Committee thought it would be 
preferable to proceed forthwith to the introduction of a comprehensive register. 
7.24 The Committee recommends that, if the Government of the day should find it 
necessary to introduce measures for registration of Members' interests, then it would be 
preferable to proceed forthwith to a comprehensive register. While the administration 
of such a register would be a matter for the appropriate Houses of the Parliament to 
determine, the Committee suggests that consideration might be given to the matters 
raised in Appendix 6, paras 15 to 16. 
Parliamentary candidates 
7.25 If, contrary to the Committee's recommendation, compulsory registration of 
interests is introduced for Members, it would become necessary to consider whether 
the requirement should extend to parliamentary candidates. It was put to the 
Committee, as it was to the Joint Committee on Pecuniary Interests of Members 
of Parliament, that candidates for election to the Parliament should be subject to 
the same registration requirements as Members. The Joint Committee recorded 
its view that legislation could be validly enacted to require candidates to disclose 
their interests, but did not make a recommendation on the subject. The arguments 
for requiring registration of their interests have been: 
• it would inform the electors, who could make better choices as a 
consequence; 
• it would ensure fair competition between incumbents and new candidates—
assuming that disclosing is a handicap; 
• it would treat new candidates equally with incumbents. 
Against these arguments it could be claimed that disclosure will not operate as an 
electoral handicap. It may be an advantage, and so, if incumbents have to register 
their interests, challengers are likely to disclose their interests voluntarily. 
7.26 In the United States, candidates are required to disclose interests as soon 
as they become avowed candidates. The South Australian Members of Parliament 
(Disclosure of Interests) Bill, which had been passed by the House of Assembly in 
1978, and was subsequently laid aside in February 1979 after consideration by 
the Legislative Council, would require an electoral candidate to lodge a return on 
the same day as he is nominated. The returns would go to the Registrar of Mem-
bers' Interests and be available to the public. 
7.27 The Committee has been informed that it is unlikely there would be 
substantial administrative problems created by a requirement for parliamentary 
candidates to register their private pecuniary interests. There are, however, some 
practical considerations arising out of existing legislation which may impinge 
upon the feasibility of adoption of such a requirement, and reference is made 
to these in Appendix 6. 
7.28 Any proposal to require registration of candidates' interests would raise 
questions about the consequences of non-compliance. If a return was required, 
should failure to lodge an acceptable return have any effect on the result of 
the election in that division? Should a successful candidate be unseated for his 
own defective return, or should his election be imperilled by a defective return 
from some other candidate? Yet if the only sanction was a fine, some candidates 
might choose to risk a small fine for a better chance of winning, if they thought 
disclosure was a handicap. 
7.29 Answers could perhaps be found to these questions, but the Committee does 
not believe it necessary to take the matter further. It has already expressed in Chapter 
6 its scepticism concerning the use to which information disclosed by registration 
would be put. It is even more doubtful about the contribution such information 
would make to the assessment of candidates in the middle of a campaign. With the 
party system as it operates in Australia, electors at general elections commonly vote 
for the party they wish to have governing the country rather than vote for or against 
particular candidates. The Committee recommends that registration of interests not be 
extended to parliamentary candidates. 
Authorisation 
7.30 The openness of parliamentary proceedings renders unnecessary any 
authorisation following a declaration of interest where Members of Parliament 
are concerned. The requirement for a declaration implies automatic authorisation 
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Divestment 
7.31 Divestment is hardly an option for Members whose public duty is unlikely 
to have the sustained and substantial conflict with a private interest which might 
require divestment. It is possible to imagine exceptional circumstances in which 
it might be appropriate. For example, the Chairman, and perhaps other members, 
of a Standing or Select Committee ought not to have personal pecuniary interests 
in business concerns which might be directly advantaged by their activities. 
Divestment might be the appropriate solution in such cases, and should be 
considered together with disqualification from committee service (see para. 7.34 
below). 
Disqualification 
7.32 For Members of Parliament, disqualification is not generally available 
as an option. However, it should be noted that both Houses of the Common-
wealth Parliament have Standing Orders dealing with the committee service of 
Members who have a 'personal interest' in the committee's work. For the Senate, 
the relevant Standing Order, 292, reads: 
No Senator shall sit on a Select Committee who shall be personally interested in the 
inquiry before such Committee. 
Its application was considered in 1970 in connection with the Senate Select 
Committee on Securities and Exchange, when the question was raised whether 
members of that Committee should sell any shares they might hold and refrain 
from dealing in shares throughout the life of the Committee.14 The Attorney-
General advised that the matter was one of parliamentary practice rather than 
law, and should be left to the Senate and to the individual Senators on the 
Committee. 
7.33 For the House of Representatives, the relevant Standing Order is 326, 
the terms of which are almost identical to Senate Standing Order 292. Three 
House precedents are known. In 1955, a member of the Committee of Privileges 
took no active part in an inquiry which arose from a published attack upon him 
that was subsequently held a breach of privilege.15 In 1963, a member of the 
Select Committee on Grievances of Yirrkala Aborigines was challenged because 
he was a litigant in proceedings related to the subject matter into which the 
Select Committee was inquiring. He declined to stand down and the point was not 
pursued.16 In 1975, a member of the Joint Committee on Pecuniary Interests 
of Members of Parliament resigned from the Joint Committee when it was alleged 
to the Committee that he had breached s. 44 (v) of the Constitution.17 
7.34 Another problem is that of how great an interest a Member should have 
in a matter for him to be prevented from voting under these Standing Orders. 
Similarly, it would be difficult to identify a threshold of 'personal' interest appro-
priate to the intention of Senate Standing Order 292 and House of Representa-
tives Standing Order 326. The matter, as the Attorney-General advised in 1970, 
is really one for the Senator or Member concerned and his colleagues in the 
chamber to which he belongs. They alone can assess the circumstances of the 
individual case in sufficient detail. The infrequency with which the problem has 
been raised in the past suggests that reasonable care is already exercised in 
avoiding potential conflict of interest situations when the composition of com-
mittees is being considered. 
7.35 The Committee recommends that the Senate be invited to consider its Standing 
Order 292 and that the House of Representatives be invited to consider its Standing 
Order 326 to determine whether any amendment is required to avoid conflicts of interest 
in respect of committee members. 
The Presiding Officers 
7.36 In the following chapter, the Committee recommends certain restrictions on 
the interests which Ministers may retain on taking office (paras 8.23-8). It be-
lieves that similar rules should extend to the Presiding Officers of the Common-
wealth Parliament as well as to Ministers. The need for the appearance of impar-
tiality in the conduct of their offices, and the heavy duties which these entail, make 
it undesirable that the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives should continue with interests which might detract from the 
appearance of impartiality or from their application to their official duties. 
7.37 Accordingly the Committee recommends that each House consider the adoption 
of a practice that its Presiding Officer: 
(a) should resign all directorships in public companies and private companies which 
engage in significant trading operations, but may retain directorships in private 
companies which operate family farms, or pastoral holdings or investments, but 
not otherwise; 
(b) should cease to engage in professional practice; and 
(c) should cease to be involved in the daily routine work of any business. 
Staffs of Members of Parliament 
7.38 The staffs of the five Parliamentary Departments are considered in para. 
9.32. The staff who are recruited by individual Members of Parliament or en bloc 
by the Opposition leaders, or by the Opposition collectively, are in a different posi-
tion. At the present time—the Committee understands that the matter is under 
review—those who are members of the Australian Public Service become un-
attached officers on leave without pay during the period of their appointment as 
staff of Members, while persons specially recruited for the purpose do not come 
under the Public Service Act. Thus, the sanctions available against public servants 
are not applicable, and it would appear that the only disciplinary sanctions which 
could be used would be admonition, or, in more extreme cases, dismissal in respect 
of those staff who were not public servants, and return to their original departments 
for those who were public servants. However, the nature of their duties does raise 
the possibility of their being involved in conflict of interest situations, for example 
when making representations to officeholders on the instruction of the Member 
whom they serve, when the Member's interests would require a declaration of 
interest if the representation had been made by the Member personally, or when 
the staff members have personal interests of their own which ought to be declared. 
7.39 The Committee recommends that: 
(a) responsibility for the proper conduct of the staff of Members of Parliament 
should remain with the Member they have been appointed to assist; 
(b) Members of Parliament should ensure that their staff are familiar with the Code 
of Conduct and conform to it; 
(c) such staff should disclose to their Members any interests which they have that 
64 	 are likely, or might reasonably appear likely, to cause conflicts of interest; 
(d) when dealing with officeholders the staff of Members of Parliament should 
declare personal interests according to the same rules as apply to their Members; 
and 
(e) a Member of Parliament instructing a member of his staff to make representations 
on his behalf to an officeholder should acquaint the member of staff with the 
substance of any declaration of interest he would have been required to make 
had he made the representation himself, and direct that the information be 
communicated to the officeholder when the representation is being made. 
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8. Measures for Ministers 
and their staffs 
8.1 The highest standards of conduct are demanded of Ministers, going beyond 
those which apply to them as Members of Parliament. These higher standards 
are a consequence of the unique role of Ministers as members of Cabinet, as 
the officeholders ultimately responsible for administering departments, and as 
the holders of various statutory powers. 
8.2 For Ministers, certain parts of the Code of Conduct take on extra signifi-
cance, and must be enforced more stringently. Being a member of the Ministry 
is a full-time task. The commitment owed to his ministerial responsibilities will 
require a Minister to abstain from outside employment, including the practice 
of a profession. Because of his executive role, which may involve allocating 
benefits between competing interests, and because his position may give him 
privileged access to confidential information, a Minister must avoid acquiring 
any interests connected with the duties of his portfolio and divest any which 
may have been acquired. While there is no general agreement that registration 
of interests should be required of all officeholders, there appears to be a consensus 
that a Prime Minister should maintain a private register for his Ministers because 
of the need to be assured that proper standards of conduct are being observed 
by this especially powerful category of officeholders. 
8.3 Details of how the Code of Conduct should be implemented for Ministers 
and of the measures which are desirable to supplement the Code are set out 
in the remainder of this chapter. 
Introduction of the Code of Conduct 
8.4 Should the Houses of the Parliament, either by amendment of their Standing 
Orders or by resolution, adopt the Code of Conduct for general application to Senators 
and Members, Ministers would be subject to its provisions. But notwithstanding any 
action taken within the Parliament, the Committee recommends that, for application to 
Ministers, the Code of Conduct be recognised by a letter from the Prime Minister to 
each of his Ministers. Both in Australia and in Canada, Prime Ministers have used 
such letters to prescribe rules of conduct relating to conflicts of interest. Alternatively, 
adoption of the Code of Conduct might be a matter for a collective decision by 
the Ministry, and thereafter by each new Ministry. 
Prohibition 
8.5 One of the three Constitutional prohibitions which apply to Members of 
Parliament—that relating to offices of profit—is removed for Ministers by virtue 
of the provisions of the Constitution (ss. 44 and 66) and successive Ministers 
of State Acts. But Ministers are covered qua Members of Parliament by the 
other two prohibitions relating to government contracts and receipt of fees or 
honoraria for services rendered in the Parliament. As a consequence of being Com-
monwealth officers under the Crimes Act 1914, Ministers are covered by its 
provisions relating to bribery. The Committee has recommended in Chapter 14 
that a new offence of misuse of official information cover all Commonwealth 
officers. 
Declaration 
8.6 Apart from his parliamentary duties, a Minister works in two different situations, 
namely in the Cabinet and as the officer responsible for the administration of his 
department. There is already a well-established practice in the Cabinet, whatever its 
political complexion, that Ministers declare to their colleagues their interests in 
matters coming forward for Cabinet consideration. It is a practice which relies for 
its authority on convention rather than rule, and the Committee believes that the 
time has come when it should be formalised. The Committee recommends that: 
(a) at meetings of Cabinet and its committees, a Minister should disclose to his 
colleagues when he has an interest which does, or might reasonably be thought 
likely to, conflict with his public duty as a Minister; 
(b) his declaration should be noted in the Cabinet records; and 
(c) the Minister should then either indicate that he will not take part in the discussion 
in question or else he should secure the explicit authorisation of his colleagues 
for taking part. 
8.7 The Committee believes that the same principles should now be formally adopted 
with respect to a Minister's conduct when administering his department. It therefore 
recommends that: 
(a) when directing the business of the department he administers a Minister should 
inform the Prime Minister of any real or apparent conflict of interest that arises; 
(b) the Prime Minister, unless he asks the Minister to divest himself of the interest, 
should either arrange for another Minister to deal with the matter or else give 
explicit authorisation to the original Minister to proceed with it; and 
(c) in any event, the Prime Minister should have the matter recorded. 
In exceptional circumstances, when discharge of a statutory responsibility is involved, 
it might be necessary to swear in a new Minister temporarily. Ordinarily it should be 
sufficient for a different Minister to deal with the matter. 
8.8 Ministers are required to observe guidelines which require that significant gifts 
received by them or their families in the course of their official duties are disclosed 
and valued. Where a gift presented by another government is valued at $250 or more, 
or a gift from any other source is valued at more than $100, the gift is surrendered 
unless the recipient pays the determined valuation. The guidelines governing the 
acceptance of gifts by Ministers and their families do not specifically mention offers 
of concessional overseas travel. Ministers are expected not to accept, for themselves 
or their families, offers of concessional overseas travel from commercial sources, 
whether the commercial activities are connected directly with the Ministers' responsi-
bilities or not. The Committee recommends that: 
(a) existing guidelines concerning gifts received by Ministers or their families be 
continued; 
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Registration 
8.9 If the Committee's recommendation against a register for Members is not 
accepted and the decision were to be made to require extensive registration of their 
interests, little need be added on the subject of Ministers. Introduction of a 'limited' 
register of interests resembling that adopted by the British House of Commons or 
that recommended by the Joint Committee on Pecuniary Interests of Members of 
Parliament would, of course, leave open the possibility of more extensive require-
ments for Ministers. The Committee would hope that its criticisms of the substan-
tial deficiencies of registers of interests, particularly registers of a 'limited' kind, 
do not leave this as a serious possibility. As the Committee's first preference would 
be to rely on the Code of Conduct, which includes a requirement for ad hoc dec-
laration of interests, and would not require registration of Members' interests at 
all, it is necessary to make separate recommendations concerning registration of 
interests by Ministers. 
8.10 There is, in fact, already a system of self-regulation through the registration 
of Ministers' interests. An extensive set of requirements was prescribed by the 
Prime Minister shortly after his first full Ministry took office. In a letter to all 
Ministers dated 13 January 1976, subsequently tabled in the House of Represen-
tatives on 16 August 1977, he wrote: 
I should like you to provide me with a written statement setting out any relevant 
pecuniary interest or benefit of whatever nature, whether direct or indirect, that you may 
have or may be expecting to have. 
In particular the statement should include: 
• the names of all companies in which you have a beneficial interest in shareholdings, no 
matter how insignificant, whether as an individual, member of another company, or 
partnership or through a trust, where that beneficial interest is in a public company or 
a private company which is akin to a public company; 
• the approximate value of any such beneficial interest; 
• the location of any realty in which you have a beneficial interest and the purpose for 
which the realty is held; 
• the names of all companies of which you remain a director even if the directorship is 
unremunerated; 
• any sponsored travel. 
I emphasise that it is the responsibility of each Minister to avoid any conflict of interest 
arising and to inform me of any significant changes in the information provided in response 
to this letter. 
The information provided will of course be kept on a strictly personal and confidential 
basis. 
8.11 Evidence given to the Committee indicates that previous Prime Ministers 
required Ministers to disclose certain interests, although the particulars of what 
had to be disclosed are somewhat uncertain. (See Appendix 4, paras 41-9, for a 
review of past practice in this area.) 
8.12 Ministers, as a consequence of the nature of their public duties, are particu-
larly liable to be placed in conflict of interest situations. The range of government 
affairs passing under Cabinet consideration is virtually coextensive with the total 
responsibilities of government. Nevertheless, only a small proportion of govern-
ment decisions is taken collectively at the Cabinet level, and the individual Min-
ister acts on his own responsibility in respect of many important matters involving 
his own department. Moreover, many government decisions must, by their nature, 
be taken secretly without the fact that they have been taken, or the circumstances 
in which they were taken, being revealed. It is particularly important that adequate 
procedures for avoiding and resolving conflicts of interest be available to Ministers. 
8.13 Declarations of interests are an important element of the system, and in 
the previous section of this chapter the Committee has recommended that rules 
governing the practice should be formally adopted for Ministers. The Committee 
believes that it is necessary to go further. Disclosure should include registration 
as well. 
8.14 In recommending that Ministers should be subject to a compulsory system 
of registration with limited access, the Committee is conscious that it has come 
down strongly against such a requirement in the case of the ordinary Member or 
other officeholder. It sees no inconsistency in this. 
8.15 The argument that such a requirement is an undue invasion of privacy does 
not seem to the Committee to carry the same force in the case of a person occu-
pying ministerial office, nor does the argument that disclosure of an interest is best 
made only when a particular matter is under consideration. Ministers, through 
their place in the Cabinet, may be faced at any time during their tenure, and often 
at very short notice, with any one of a multiplicity of matters, none of which can 
be predicted beforehand. The Committee does not see that its criticism of com-
pulsory registration, on the grounds of ease of avoidance or evasion, applies with 
equal force to Ministers. What they do in the discharge of their office, whether in 
the administration of their own department or in their Cabinet work, has a degree 
of immediacy and exposure about it which is likely to focus public attention upon 
their actions much more closely and much more quickly than is the case with the 
ordinary Member or officeholder. They are a much smaller group and may so much 
more readily be watched and exposed. Their violation of the registration rules 
would be tempered also by a knowledge that the penalty for discovery would be 
so much more severe, so much more prompt. It is relevant also to mention that 
divestment of sensitive assets is to be a prerequisite to the appointment of Minis-
ters. As with compulsory registration of interests, this is a requirement that the 
Committee does not recommend for ordinary Members. 
8.16 There is, of course, the further consideration that the Committee's sugges-
tion in respect of Ministers is nothing novel. It is something which has been re-
quired of them in the past, and to insist on registration would not in their case 
involve any additional intrusion into their privacy as it would in the case of 
ordinary Members. 
8.17 The Committee considers that the current practice of registration, as set out in 
the Prime Minister's letter, is satisfactory, subject to two extensions. First, it would 
appear that disclosures are accessible only to the Prime Minister. The Committee 
believes that they should be accessible to some other members of the Cabinet as well. 
The Committee recommends that: 
(a) the returns of Ministers' disclosures of interests be kept, on a confidential basis, 
by the Secretary to Cabinet; 
(b) consideration be given to determining whether a small committee of senior 
Ministers, appointed by the Prime Minister or by Cabinet, should be established 
to have immediate responsibility for the register of Ministers' interests, but with 
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8.18 Second, the list of items currently required to be disclosed needs expansion in 
line with the proposal for a register set out in Appendix 6, paragraph 15. The Com-
mittee recommends that Ministers should disclose in their register of interests the 
following additional information: 
(a) the beneficial interest of the Minister, or a member of his immediate family, 
under any trust, and in any nominee company, with a statement of the nature of 
operations of the trust or company; 
(b) any trust of which the Minister is a trustee, with a statement of the beneficiaries 
and the nature of the operations of the trust; 
(c) partnership and joint venture interests with a statement of the nature of their 
operations; 
(d) liabilities; 
(e) shareholdings, under procedures which will disclose the ultimate interests in 
circumstances where private companies are used as a screen to mask holdings 
directly or indirectly in other companies. 
Authorisation 
8.19 A Minister who declares an interest ad hoc in a Cabinet or Cabinet committee 
meeting may be authorised by the Prime Minister or his colleagues to participate in 
the discussion where it appears that the interest is trivial or irrelevant, or where the 
Minister's continued presence or participation is essential. The Committee notes that 
this practice is one of long standing, and appears to work satisfactorily. It has already 
recommended that declarations of interest by Ministers should be noted in the 
Cabinet records. The Committee recommends that, when the Prime Minister or the 
Cabinet authorises a Minister to continue to carry out his Cabinet or ministerial duties 
in relation to a matter in which he has declared an interest, a record of that authorisation 
should be made. 
Divestment 
8.20 Divestment is relevant to the executive work of a Minister in relation to 
his department and to his duties in Cabinet. In Australia the first known rules 
on the holding of directorships date back to a statement in Parliament by the 
then Prime Minister, in 1938, in which he indicated that, prima facie, Ministers 
should not be directors of companies which had direct dealings with the govern-
ment but that there was no objection to the holding of directorships in companies 
with no business dealings with the government.' 
8.21 Since 1949, the practice has been to require Ministers to divest any 
directorships in public companies but to allow them to retain directorships in 
private family companies. In recent years Ministers have also been required to 
resign directorships in private companies where these were akin to public com-
panies. (For an account of the evolution of practice in this area see Appendix 4, 
paras 18-34.) 
8.22 The present Prime Minister requires Ministers to resign directorshis in 
public companies. Directorships in private companies which are principally family 
companies may be retained, but directorships in private companies which may be 
akin to public companies in their operations should be given up. The Committee 
endorses both requirements. 
8.23 On similar grounds, Ministers, on assuming office, should not carry on the 
daily routine work of or take an active part in professional practice. There is no 
objection to a Minister's continuing to hold a practising certificate if this is neces-
sary to protect his right to return at a later date to his profession. 
8.24 A Minister who, prior to appointment, was engaged in business, whether 
alone, in partnership, or otherwise, should cease to carry on the daily routine 
work of the business or to take an active part in its day-to-day management. 
Although such connections should be severed, there is generally no need for a 
Minister to divest himself of ownership in such circumstances. 
8.25 The Committee recommends that Ministers: 
(a) should resign directorships in public companies; 
(b) may retain directorships in private companies provided that: 
(I) they make full disclosure under the rules relating to registration of interests 
concerning the assets, liabilities and activities of such companies, 
(ii) such companies operate family farms, pastoral holdings or investments, 
but not otherwise; 
(c) should cease to engage in professional practice; and 
(d) should cease to be involved in the daily routine work of any business. 
8.26 The Committee recommends that a Minister should divest his shares and similar 
interests in any company or business involved with his department. For example, he 
should divest where the company in which he has shares has dealings with or could 
directly benefit, or might reasonably be thought to benefit, from the department or 
its activities. The Committee does not consider that this is too harsh an imposition 
on Ministers. Public life, as stated previously, involves some sacrifices. Many Ministers 
will not be affected by the rule, either because they have no interests in such companies 
or because they administer a department which is not involved with such companies. 
Ministers who are affected by the rule, and wish to retain their interests, can always 
ask the Prime Minister to allocate them to another portfolio. In a small number of 
cases, Ministers may have a range of shareholdings and be allocated a department 
which is involved with many companies. For such cases, the Committee can do no 
better than to cite the example given to it in evidence by several witnesses of a former 
Minister who, when he was appointed as Minister for National Development, a 
department which dealt extensively with mining companies, divested himself of his 
shares in such companies, thereby suffering a significant financial loss. 
8.27 Divestment, as the Committee has used the term, means complete divestment.2 
The Committee recommends that it should be unacceptable for a Minister who is 
required to divest to transfer his interests to certain other persons or bodies, for example 
to his spouse, to another member of his family, or to a nominee company or trust. 
8.28 The Committee does not wish to suggest any rule regarding divestment 
by a Minister's spouse or family of interests held independently. However, prudence 
may so demand. In this regard, the Committee was told by a former Minister 
that during a period when he had responsibility for the granting of various land 
and mineral rights, he asked his wife, who managed her own investments, to 
sell any shares she held in companies concerned with such activities in this area, 
and to abstain from acquiring any new interest in such companies. He received 
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Disqualification 
8.29 Disqualification is the other side of divestment. This involves the breaking, 
permanently or temporarily, of the connection between the officeholder and the 
duty which creates conflict (see para. 5.39). The Prime Minister, having 
responsibility for the allocation of the duties of Ministers, may deal with this 
situation either at the time of appointment of a Minister or, subsequently, if and 
when a conflict arises. 
Staffs of Ministers 
8.30 Ministerial staff comprise: 
• officers of the Australian Public Service seconded to work in Ministers' 
offices, who usually have the status of unattached officers; and 
• persons employed from outside the Service, who are exempt employees 
under s. 8A of the Public Service Act 1922. 
In theory ministerial staff are subject to the normal disciplinary provisions of the 
Public Service Act. Amendments to the Public Service Act in 1978 made special 
provision for unattached officers, such as those working for Ministers, to be 
disciplined for improper conduct committed either before the officer became an 
unattached officer or while an unattached officer, where the improper conduct was 
conduct 'which brings the Service into disrepute'. However, in practice ministerial 
staff, whether officers seconded from departments or specially recruited, are 
under the direct control of their Minister and are responsible to him alone. Thus 
it is that Minister's responsibility to ensure their good conduct. 
8.31 Since the beginning of 1976 ministerial staff have been required to disclose 
to their Minister their pecuniary interests in terms not less rigid than those 
applying to the Ministers themselves. Copies of the disclosures they make to their 
Minister are kept by the Secretary of the Department of Administrative Services, 
which department is responsible for the appointment and payment of ministerial 
staff. 
8.32 Ministerial staff are like public servants in that they are employed on 
the same terms and conditions and technically are subject to the same obligations. 
They also resemble public servants in that their duties are essentially supportive 
rather than decision making. They mainly undertake liaison with the Public 
Service, general office administration, and, to a lesser extent, advise the Minister 
on policy and related matters. However, they differ from public servants in that 
they are under the direct control of the Minister, and they may have access 
to confidential information to an extent far greater than most public servants. 
8.33 The Committee noted that since 1973 the Canadian Prime Minister has 
required his Ministers to apply the same standards of conduct to their Executive 
Assistants as applied to the Ministers themselves, unless a specific decision to 
the contrary is taken. All exempt staff employed by Canadian federal Ministers 
are under an obligation to disclose actual or potential conflicts of interest to 
their Ministers. 
8.34 The Committee concluded that, since ministerial staff have access to sub-
stantially the same official papers and information as the Ministers to whom they are 
responsible, they should be subject to requirements no less stringent concerning 
conflicts of interest. The Committee recommends that a ministerial staff member should 
be subject to requirements similar to those applying to Ministers concerning conflicts of 
interest, namely he should be: 
(a) subject to the Code of Conduct; 
(b) required to register similar interests as required for Ministers; 
(c) required to declare his interests when dealing with officeholders, and, on instruc-
tion by his Minister, to disclose the Minister's interests in situations involving 
other officeholders where the Minister himself would have been obliged to declare 
an interest; and 
(d) required to divest interests if necessary. 
The sanction for non-observance of these requirements would be admonition 
by the Minister, the application of the disciplinary provisions of the Public 
Service Act 1922 in so far as these were applicable, and dismissal in other cases 
where the Act was not applicable. 
1. Australia, House of Representatives, Debates 1938, vol. 157, pp. 13734. 
2. The Committee's views concerning the efficacy of using blind or frozen trusts as alter-
natives to divestment have already been expressed in Chapter 5, paras 5.33-7. 
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9. Measures for public servants 
9.1 Public servants differ from other categories of officeholders because of their 
legal status as servants of the Crown and as employees. As was stated in para-
graph 2.14, they also differ in that their duties are more extensively set down in 
statute. 
9.2 The Permanent Head of a department is in a special position by virtue of 
his responsibility under the Public Service Act 1922 for the administration of 
his department, and, in some cases, because of statutory powers which are vested 
in him. The Permanent Head is also at the peak of the departmental hierarchy, 
and so enjoys a degree of independence not available to other officers within 
the department. 
9.3 The power and influence, and access to confidential information, of other 
public servants varies. They may provide advice, make decisions under delegation 
within the framework of established policy, carry out research, implement govern-
ment decisions, provide services to the public, or act as support staff. But because 
they operate within a hierarchy, it is often difficult to identify who was responsible 
for a particular action or piece of advice, and so whose interests were relevant 
to the matter. On the other hand, there are more checks and balances and pro-
cedural safeguards against the possibility that a particular action or decision may 
have been tainted by conflict of interest. 
Introduction of a Code of Conduct 
9.4 In the case of the Australian Public Service, the Code of Conduct, when 
adopted, would have to be integrated into an already extensive and detailed set 
of obligations and duties. Its application would have to take account of the 
degree of sensitivity of the particular post occupied by the individual public 
servant, perhaps of the particular duties currently assigned to him, and of the 
degree of independent responsibility he exercises. For example, the general obli-
gation to be frank with colleagues may have to be modified by the fact that a 
public servant often has to give advice within the framework of agreed govern-
ment policy. 
9.5 The Committee recommends that the Public Service Board issue the Code of 
Conduct as a General Order or such other form of instruction as the Board sees fit. 
Public Service Regulation 32 (e) provides that every officer shall comply with 'all 
enactments, regulations, and authoritative instructions made or issued for his 
guidance in the performance of his duties'. Although a General Order does not have 
the same legal status as a provision in the Public Service Regulations, adoption of the 
Code of Conduct by this method would give it authority such that a breach would 
constitute improper conduct within the meaning of s. 56 of the Public Service Act. 
This course was recently followed in the Northern Territory (see para. 11.8). 
9.6 The Committee recommends that the Public Service Board review the Public 
Service Act 1922 and Regulations to ensure that existing provisions dealing with 
conflicts of interest are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Code of Conduct, and 
seek any necessary amendments. 
Prohibition 
9.7 Public servants are subject to certain prohibitions contained in the Public 
Service Act and Regulations, for example against taking outside employment without 
authorisation. The Committee recommends that the review of the Public Service Act 
1922 and Regulations include examination of any prohibitions in the legislation to ensure 
that they are compatible with the Code of Conduct. 
9.8 There are two matters under this heading on which the Committee wishes to 
make specific recommendations. Both concern the operation of Public Service 
Regulation 37, which prohibits the solicitation or acceptance of gifts connected with 
the duties of an officer, and which, the Committee has been informed, is currently 
under consideration by the Public Service Board. 
9.9 The first concerns the acceptance of gifts by members of a public servant's 
family. In keeping with its previously expressed views on the need for officeholders to 
avoid any appearance of conflict of interest, the Committee recommends that the Public 
Service Board include in its Guidelines on Official Conduct advice that it is undesirable 
that members of a public servant's immediate family accept gifts which would give the 
appearance of a conflict of interest with his public duty. 
9.10 Secondly, the Committee considers that acceptance of hospitality beyond what 
might be considered normal is open to abuse. In an extreme case, provision of 
hospitality could constitute bribery. The Committee recommends that the Public 
Service Board give consideration to identifying permissible hospitality and laying down. 
a requirement to seek authorisation in doubtful cases. 
Declaration 
9.11 When a public servant has an interest, whether pecuniary or otherwise, which 
conflicts, or might be thought likely to conflict, with his public duty, he should declare 
that interest to the officer designated for that purpose. The Committee recommends 
that: 
(a) the obligation to declare and the procedures by which a declaration is recorded: 
should be set out in Regulations made under the Public Service Act 1922; 
(b) the particulars of that declaration should be noted on the file(s) relating to the 
matter in respect of which the conflict exists, and also centrally recorded in the 
department. The designated officer may then arrange for another officer to 
undertake the responsibility in question, or else shall authorise the officer who 
had disclosed the interest to continue to deal with the matter. 
9.12 The Committee recommends that a Permanent Head should disclose to his 
Minister when he has such an interest, and procedures comparable to those for other 
public servants should then be followed. 
9.13 The Committee considered whether applicants for positions should be required 
to declare all relevant interests at the time of interview or prior to their selection being. 
confirmed. The Committee recommends that it should be the obligation of the appointing 
authority to question applicants for positions on any potentially conflicting interests, 
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Registration 
9.14 The Committee noted that the Joint Committee on Pecuniary Interests 
of Members of Parliament had put forward the 'general principle' that public 
servants should have no less obligation to disclose their interests than other persons 
'located in other key constituent parts of the decision-making process of parlia-
mentary democracy'. The Joint Committee had also noted that there had been 
'a custom' that a Permanent Head should make some form of disclosure of his 
interests to his Minister, and recommended that 'this commendable custom 
be formalised'.1  
9.15 However, in general the Joint Committee deferred to the Royal Com-
mission on Australian Government Administration, which was then at work. 
Subsequently the Royal Commission recommended that a system of registration 
be developed by the Public Service Board which would take the form of depart-
mental registers with access restricted to the Permanent Head and the Minister. 
The Royal Commission also proposed that registration be made a statutory duty 
for public servants within the designated levels unless specifically exempted by 
the Minister.2 
9.16 The Committee is of the opinion that the strongest justification for regis-
tration of the interests of certain public servants is the important part which 
senior public servants play in government decision making, and the possibility 
that conflicts of interest might influence their advice and decisions. The argument 
that, if Members of Parliament were required to register their interests, then 
public servants should do the same, did not persuade the Committee. For one 
thing, it fails to distinguish between those public servants who could properly 
be called powerful or influential and those who carry out routine duties and 
have no opportunity to take significant decisions or to influence those who do. 
Nor does the security of tenure, or otherwise, of a particular officeholder appear 
a major consideration in determining whether his interests should be disclosed 
and in what circumstances. 
9.17 In addition to the general arguments against registration set out in Chapter 
6, two arguments which have been advanced against registration by public servants 
seek to distinguish the position of public servants from that of elected officeholders. 
The first claims that there are basic differences: 
• public servants did not choose to enter 'public life' with its attendant public 
attention and invasions of privacy, but expected to be anonymous in their 
official duties and private in their non-official lives; 
• public servants advise on and implement decisions, rather than make them, 
the making of decisions being the responsibility of Ministers individually 
and collectively, just as legislation is the responsibility of Members of 
Parliament; 
• individual public servants rarely make final decisions, for the government 
decision-making process is diffuse; 
• the Public Service has numerous procedural checks and balances which 
reduce the likelihood of improper conduct. 
The second argument points to the much larger number of public servants which 
a registration system would have to cover, even if this was restricted only to 
• those who make or influence decisions, so that maintaining and scrutinising their 
registered disclosures would be prohibitively expensive and time consuming. 
9.18 The Committee believes that the difference between public servants and 
elected officeholders is not as clear cut as these arguments would suggest. It is 
well aware that a substantial number of public servants are in a position effectively 
to make decisions, or to influence the decisions of others, so as to confer pecuniary 
or other benefits on individuals, business enterprises or other bodies. As a con-
sequence, their own interests, and possibly those of their immediate families, 
could conflict, or appear to conflict, with their public duties. 
9.19 Officers in the First and Second Divisions are especially likely to find 
themselves in this position because of the breadth and importance of their duties. 
An unknown number of Third (and in certain cases Fourth) Division officers 
discharge responsibilities in 'sensitive' areas such as purchasing, so that their 
inclusion in any system applied to First and Second Division officers would be 
appropriate. Many public servants in practice do exercise considerable respon-
sibility. While it is true that procedural constraints reduce the likelihood of 
abuses, sufficient scope for the appearance of conflict of interest remains to warrant 
additional precautions. 
9.20 Moreover, the Committee is not persuaded that, because public servants 
do not enter public life in the same sense as elected officeholders, they should 
necessarily expect to be anonymous in their official duties. The appearance, as 
well as the fact, of integrity in public administration is essential to public confi-
dence in government, and public servants who accept certain responsibilities, 
for which they are compensated by way of remuneration, must also accept any 
attendant disabilities. 
9.21 Nevertheless, on balance, and for reasons broadly the same as those which 
influenced its judgment in the case of Members of Parliament, the Committee 
recommends that a requirement for the registration of the interests of public servants 
should not be introduced. If, contrary to the Committee's recommendation, a decision 
is taken to introduce a register for public servants, the Committee recommends that it 
be along the lines set out in Appendix 6 (paras 15 and 20-8) to this report. 
Authorisation 
9.22 To ensure greater certainty and evenhandedness, there will be need for formal 
rules relating to authorisation in respect of public servants. The Committee recommends 
that: 
(a) the Public Service Board should draw up general guidelines on authorisation; 
(b) authorisation should always be in writing and filed so as to be retrievable in the 
event of dispute as to whether it has been granted; 
(c) there should be provision for withdrawal of authorisation granted, for example 
where the nature of the interest or the officer's duties changes, or when new facts 
emerge; 
(d) where the obligation rests on the public servant with the interest to obtain 
authorisation, failure to seek it should be a breach of discipline. 
Divestment 
9.23 The Committee recommends that: 
(a) Public servants should not possess 'sensitive' interests which are likely to conflict 
seriously with their official duties. Possibly the duty statement for positions 
78 	 should stipulate when divestment may be required. 
(b) Permanent Heads should examine all ad hoc disclosures of interests by officers 
of their departments to identify those which are 'sensitive' and may require 
divestment. 
9.24 Divestment is one means whereby conflict situations may be resolved. 
Other methods would include the transfer to another post of the person con-
cerned or, where an appointment to a position was being considered, a decision 
not to proceed with it. The responsibility of the appointing authority to question 
applicants on any potentially conflicting interests, and to counsel them as to 
the possible need for divestment if their application was successful, was men-
tioned at para. 9.14 above. It should be emphasised that the situation in which 
divestment is necessary will emerge where there is a continuing or frequently 
recurring conflict of interest. The exceptional or occasional instance in which 
private interest and public duty would clash can usually be disposed of by 
temporarily replacing the public servant with another or authonising him to 
continue to act. But when the conflict would require constant switching of per-
sonnel back and forth, or authorisation would have to be given frequently, 
with the consequent appearance that the principle involved had been effectively 
abandoned, then divestment or permanent transfer must be the choice. 
9.25 A requirement that public servants must avoid having interests which 
might conflict, or appear to conflict, with their official duties or else act to 
neutralise the conflict would be unexceptionable. For example, the Public Service 
Board's Draft Guidelines speak of a 'clear responsibility' for an officer to inform 
his Permanent Head (or in the case of a Permanent Head, his Minister) of any 
pecuniary interest that might conflict, or appear to conflict, with his public 
duty in a matter he has under consideration, or which is likely to come, under his 
consideration. 
9.26 A power to compel divestment would be a very serious responsibility. It might 
be open to abuse if vested in a person too close to the officer to whom the direction 
was issued. Accordingly, the Committee recommends that the power to require divest-
ment as a condition of holding certain offices should be given only to the Public Service 
Board, which would consider an application from the Permanent Head of the officer 
concerned and have a discretion whether to issue the direction or not. Were the officer 
himself a Permanent Head, then the Board, when apprised of the situation by a Minister, 
should be empowered to act on its own initiative. 
9.27 In respect of shareholding, a slight problem is created by s. 91 of the 
Public Service Act 1922. After prohibiting the performance of work outside the 
Service without the express permission of the Public Service Board, it continues: 
(2) Nothing herein contained shall be deemed to prevent an officer from becoming 
a member or shareholder only of any incorporated company, or of any company 
or society of persons registered under any law in any State or elsewhere. 
The Committee recommends consideration should be given to the extent to which s. 91 (2) 
of the Public Service Act 1922 might be modified to allow divestment to be compulsory, 
with penalties for non-compliance, as a condition of holding certain offices. 
9.28 The Committee recommends that compensation should not be payable for losses 
suffered as a result of a requirement to divest. Divestment is a consequence of public 
office and the Commonwealth has no obligation to compensate. 
9.29 Where the interest was held by a person other than the officeholder him-
self, for example his spouse, a member of his family or a trustee not subject 
to his direction, a direction to divest under pain of disciplinary proceedings in 
the event of non-compliance could not be effective. In such a case, the only 
remedy would be transfer of the officer to other duties or, where an appointment 
has yet to be made, not to proceed with it. 
Disqualification 
9.30 The Public Service Board or a Permanent Head has extensive powers to 
direct the temporary or permanent transfer of officers to other positions. This 
is, the Committee thinks, a sufficient power to deal with problems of disquali-
fication when they arise. Transfer also provides an alternative to requiring divest-
ment, and the Committee would suggest that, as a matter of practice, departments 
should offer staff who would otherwise be compelled to divest the option of 
transfer to arother positi3ii of equal or lower status, wherever practicable. 
Special categories 
Members of the Defence Force 
9.31 The Committee recommends that: 
(a) Members of the Defence Force, including members of the Reserve Forces, should 
be required to observe requirements regulating conflict of interest similar to those 
proposed for public servants. 
(b) The Department of Defence should ensure that there be as much uniformity as 
possible with the Australian Public Service in the application of the Defence 
Force regulations and orders relating to conflict of interest. The Committee 
recognises that there may be a need for variations to take account of the 
requirements and circumstances of a particular Service. It would be a matter for 
the Chief of Defence Force Staff to determine which categories of officer-
below, say, the ranks of Brigadier and equivalent should be required to disclose 
interests, having regard to other guidelines that may be established in govern-
ment service. 
(c) Application of the proposed Code of Conduct to the Defence Force should be a 
matter for the Chief of the Defence Force Staff in consultation with the Secretary 
of the Department of Defence. The Committee is aware that some differences 
exist among the Services as to their regulations and orders. 
(d) The regulations and orders applicable to the Defence Force should be reviewed 
to ensure that those dealing with conflict of interest conform with the provisions 
of the Code of Conduct, and existing regulations should be amended or new 
regulations introduced where this is necessary. 
(e) Breaches of conflict of interest requirements should be investigated and penalties 
determined by the disciplinary machinery already existing for the Defence Force. 
The Parliamentary Departments 
9.32 The staff of the five Parliamentary Departments are for most purposes equivalent 
to other public servants. They are covered by the Public Service Act, although there 
are special provisions resulting from their responsibility to the Presiding Officers of 
the Commonwealth Parliament rather than to Ministers. The Committee recommends 
that those of its recommendations which refer to public servants should apply to the 
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Consultants 
9.33 The Committee noted the revised edition (May 1978) of the Public Service 
Board's Consultants and Contractors for Services: Guidelines for Departments 
and Authorities.3 The Committee recommends: 
(a) that the Public Service Board's Consultants and Contractors for Services: 
Guidelines for Departments and Authorities be amended to include provisions 
that departments and authorities proposing to employ consultants should examine 
the likelihood of any significant conflict of interest concerning each consultant, 
and, where appropriate, should require any consultant to disclose any information 
which might be material to an actual or potential conflict of interest; 
'(b) when a consultancy is likely to operate for some time, it should be made a 
condition of the consultancy that the consultant disclose any conflicts of interest 
which might arise during its term. 
The Committee would add that it would expect disclosure to be sufficient means 
of regulating any conflict in respect of consultants. If the conflict appears likely 
to be serious, the department or authority would presumably refrain from pur-
suing the matter further and employing the consultant in question. 
Non-career Heads of Overseas Missions 
9.34 The measures proposed for public servants would apply generally to non-
career Heads of Overseas Missions. They would be required to observe the Code 
of Conduct and to make all necessary disclosures. Any decision which might be 
taken to require registration of interests by public servants should in logic apply 
equally to non-career Ambassadors. 
9.35 The Committee has been informed that consideration is being given to the 
inclusion in the directive sent to all Heads of Mission upon their appointment of 
a paragraph drawing attention to the issue of conflict between public duty and 
private interest. Adoption of the Code of Conduct in respect of all Head of Mission 
appointees would obviate the need for such action. 
Trade Commissioners 
9.36 Many trade commissioners are appointed from industry and commerce and 
frequently return to private business life after a period with the Trade Com-
missioner Service. Their position is akin to that of non-career Heads of Mission 
and similar provisions to govern conflict of interest situations would need to be 
applied to them. 
Procurement 
9.37 In his electorate talk on 12 March 1978, the Prime Minister stated that the 
question of government employees working in the tendering process had been re-
ferred to the Inquiry for examination. The Committee has not seen this as reflect-
.ing an expectation that it would examine the tendering process in great detail but 
rather that, in considering measures to promote the avoidance and, if necessary, 
the resolution of conflicts of interest, it would have particular regard to the possi-
bility of conflict of interest arising in the course of government procurement. 
9.38 In the evidence presented to the Committee, some examples were given of 
instances where conflicts of interest may have arisen during the procurement pro- 
cess. In keeping with the general approach to its work, the Committee has not 
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sought to investigate allegations of this kind, but has treated them as background 
information against which it could judge the adequacy of its proposals in circum-
stances such as those involved in the particular cases. 
9.39 Through the Secretary of the Department of Administrative Services, the 
Purchasing Division of that Department provided a detailed submission on con-
flicts of public duty and private interest as they relate to the government purchas-
ing function. That submission made the point that, in public procurement, as in 
other areas, it is necessary to take into account both the avoidance of situations 
where conflicts can occur and the need to ensure that the absence of conflict 
involving impropriety can be publicly demonstrated, so that public confidence in 
the integrity of the system is preserved. It suggested that there appear to be several 
areas relevant to procurement where conflicts of interest might occur, or be seen 
to occur, by observers of the government procurement process, for example: 
(a) an officer's private interest (such as financial interest in a company, pros-
pect of employment in the company, friendship or kinship with company 
owners or management) might cause him to favour that company in the 
allocation of a government contract or contracts; 
(b) private interests of the kind mentioned in (a) above might lead an officer 
to provide information to a particular company which is not available to 
the company's competitors and which would give that company an advan-
tage in competing for a government contract; 
(c) a former government officer who has left to join a company interested in 
Commonwealth business might provide that company with information de-
rived from his former Commonwealth employer which confers advantages 
on the company similar to those in point (b) above; 
(d) a former government officer may, after joining a company supplying gov-
ernment requirements, seek to negotiate business relevant to his former 
Commonwealth function with his former department. 
9.40 The conclusion of the Purchasing Division was, however, that the problems 
arising from apparent conflicts of interest in the government procurement field 
arise as much from gaps in the general institutional arrangements in the procure-
ment area itself as from lack of rules in relation to individual officers. In regard 
to individual officers, the problems are generally those met throughout the breadth 
of the Australian Public Service, and officers in the procurement area are in a 
similar position to officers in several other areas of the Service which handle com-
mercially sensitive information. 
9.41 Problems of the type mentioned in examples (c) and (d) above are discussed 
at Chapter 13. As regards problems of the kind covered in examples (a) and (b), 
the Committee agrees that, in essence, government employees in the procurement 
area are placed in positions which, while 'sensitive', are not different from 'sensi-
tive' positions in many other areas. The Committee notes that such employees will 
be subject to the same requirements directed towards the avoidance and resolution 
of conflicts of interest as other public servants. For this reason, the Committee 
makes no special recommendations concerning them. 
9.42 The Purchasing Division submitted that propriety and impartiality could 
be publicly demonstrated in this area to better effect if all major Commonwealth 
contracts were handled by a single central Contracts Board clearly independent 
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if, in addition, a high level, independent Procurement Review Board was available 
to sift facts and provide advice to the Government upon claims and charges of 
the kind relating to conflicts of interests that are sometimes met in the area. It 
would require a study more detailed than the Committee has been able to make 
to determine whether this would be so. The Committee noted that the Joint 
Parliamentary Committee on Public Accounts, in its 174th Report, recently re-
ported to the Parliament on proposed guidelines for computer purchases and 
use in the Australian Public Service.4 The Committee also noted that a sub-
ommittee of the House of Representatives Expenditure Committee is currently 
examining Commonwealth Government purchasing, and that a subcommittee of 
the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence is inquiring 
into, inter alia, the implementation and effectiveness of Australia's announced 
defence programs, with particular reference to procurement policy. 
9.43 The Committee concludes, in relation to the question of government em-
ployees working in the tendering process, that: 
(a) no special requirements beyond those proposed elsewhere in this report 
for public servants are necessary to deal with government employees 
working in the tendering process; but 
(b) should it be considered that additional measures are needed to demon-
strate the propriety and impartiality of the operations of government in 
this area, the question of the desirability of establishing a single central 
Contracts Board, independent of the departments or authorities directly 
concerned, to handle major Commonwealth contracts could be one of 
those measures to be examined. 
1. Australia, Parliament, Declaration of Interests. Report of the Joint Committee on Pecuniary 
Interests of Members of Parliament (J. M. Riordan, Chairman), AGPS, Canberra, 1975, 
pp. 37-8. 
2. Australia, Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration (Dr H. C. Coombs, 
Chairman), Report, AGPS, Canberra, 1976, pp. 234-5: the quotation from Sir Frederick 
Wheeler's evidence is at Joint Committee on Pecuniary Interests of Members of Parliament, 
Official Hansard Report, vol. 2, AGPS, Canberra, 1975, p. 1272. 
3. Public Service Board, Consultants and Contractors for Services: Guidelines for Departments 
and Authorities, Public Service Board (mimeo), Canberra, 1978. 
4. Australia, Parliament, Joint Committee of Public Accounts, One Hundred and Seventy-
fourth Report: Use of ADP in the Commonwealth Public Sector—Acquisition of Systems in 
the Public Service, AGPS, Canberra, 1978. 
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10. Measures for statutory officeholders and 
the staffs of statutory bodies 
10.1 Statutory authorities play a variety of roles. They range from bodies the 
essence of whose functions requires that members be, and be seen to be, impartial 
and disinterested, to advisory and representative bodies part of whose function 
is to provide the Government with access to expert advice or representative 
opinion within a particular industry or subject area. The latter, by their nature, 
are likely to include members with private interests in the relevant area. Even 
in the case of those bodies whose functions require impartiality, some bodies 
have a broad-ranging focus where one particular interest may arise only infre-
quently, for example the Industries Assistance Commission. Others have a 
relatively narrow focus, such as the commodity boards. 
10.2 Another crucial distinction is between full-time and part-time statutory 
officeholders. Part-time officeholders are likely to have been selected for a par-
ticular contribution they can make, which can often be associated with the 
possession of a relevant interest. They also must rely on other sources for the 
greater part of their income. 
The Code of Conduct in its application to statutory officeholders 
and staffs of statutory authorities 
10.3 Because of the diversity among authorities, the Code of Conduct will have 
to be implemented in different ways for different kinds of authority and office-
hcder. Fc' instarce, some statutory officeholders have the status of a Permanent 
Head. Again, in the case of a tribunal with a wide range of subject matter, 
it is probably sufficient that a member with an interest in a specific matter 
declares that interest and disqualifies himself from deliberations on it. But in the 
case of a tribunal allocating benefits within a single industry, there may be a 
case for requiring divestment or prohibition of interests in that industry. Pro-
hibitions on outside employment, while not unreasonable in the case of a full-
time chairman, are obviously inappropriate in the case of part-time officeholders, 
for whom the only requirement can be that they devote proper effort to the 
duties of their office. 
10.4 The offices of statutory officeholders being constituted by particular statutes, an 
element of autonomy and separateness is implied. But it is important that both the 
Government and individual statutory officeholders should be seen to be committed 
to the obligations of the Code of Conduct. The Committee believes that this division 
of responsibility might best be recognised by three steps. The Committee recommends 
that: 
(a) the Cabinet should consider recommending to statutory authorities that the Code 
of Conduct be adopted as the standard to guide the conduct of the members of 
such bodies; 
(b) each statutory authority examine for itself, in consultation with the responsible 
Minister, how the Code of Conduct should be adapted by it for its members and 
for its staff, and what form measures supplementary to the Code should take; and 
(c) each statutory authority should resolve formally upon its own implementation of 
the Code. 
Prohibition 
10.5 The Committee, as was stated at paragraph 5.14, does not regard prohibition as 
a satisfactory means of avoiding or resolving conflicts of interest in the great majority 
of situations. The Committee accepts that in some cases it will be desirable that there 
should be total prohibition of certain forms of interest before an appointment is made, 
for example in regulatory bodies dealing with a particular industry where it is import-
ant that there be an appearance of impartiality as between sectors of the industry or 
firms involved in it. 
10.6 Several Acts which establish statutory authorities contain prohibitions regarding 
the interests which members may hold (see Appendix 4, paras 75, 86, 88, for examples). 
The Committee recommends that there should be a review of provisions in relevant 
legislation establishing statutory authorities to determine whether any existing statutory 
prohibitions, together with any prohibitions that might have been adopted by resolution 
of the body concerned, require alteration in the light of the Committee's views expressed 
in this report. 
Declaration 
10.7 The legislation establishing statutory authorities with more than one mem-
ber generally contains a clause requiring the disclosure by members, at meetings, 
of certain sorts of interest in any matter under consideration by the authority, and 
the recording of such disclosures in the minutes of the authority. A member 
possessing such an interest is generally precluded from taking part in deliberations 
or voting on the relevant matter. Failure to comply with these obligations usually 
leads to automatic termination of the member's appointment. A recent example 
of such a clause is the Commonwealth Legal Aid Commission Act 1977, s. 18. 
10.8 The Committee was given evidence of several unsatisfactory features of 
the current statutory clauses requiring disclosure of interest: 
• They are not universal. For instance, several of the Acts establishing com-
modity boards have no such provisions. 
• They are not uniform. Although uniformity is not necessarily desirable 
for its own sake, it is arguable that many of the differences between such 
clauses are unwarranted because they appear to be arbitrary and unrelated 
to any special functions of the authority. For example, the older clauses 
generally require only disclosure of a direct or indirect interest in a contract 
made or proposed to be made by the authority, as in the Australian Tourist 
Commission Act 1967, s. 12 (4), whereas the more recently drafted clauses 
require declaration of any 'direct or indirect pecuniary interest in a matter 
being considered or about to be considered by the authority', as in the 
Commonwealth Legal Aid Commission Act 1977, s. 18. On the other hand, 
the Committee was informed that some of the lack of uniformity between 
existing clauses was because departments had sought variations at the time 
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• Even those features of the clauses that are uniform do not necessarily make 
the best provision for conflicts of interest. For example, it is standard 
practice that such clauses exempt a member from disclosure where the mem-
ber has a private interest 'as a member of, and in common with other 
members of, an incorporated company consisting of more than 25 persons', 
except that more recent legislation may nonetheless require a member to 
disclose interests in a company of which he is director. Such an exemption 
appears to have no rationale, as the number of shareholders in a company 
is not a reliable guide to the extent of the interest or degree of control of 
this particular shareholder in the company. In the Committee's view, this 
exemption is an anachronism. 
• The Committee notes that failure to comply with such a disclosure require-
ment generally brings about automatic termination of office. However, some 
recent Bills, such as the Casey University-Australian Defence Force Academy 
Bill 1978, clause 14 (1) (d), qualify this to apply only to failure 'without 
reasonable excuse'. It was suggested to the Committee by one witness that, 
because of the possibility that a member could, without impropriety, find 
himself infringing the section, removal from office for non-disclosure should 
be discretionary, not automatic. The Committee agrees that forfeiture of 
office should be required only where officeholders fail to declare without 
reasonable excuse. 
• Other points of detail were that the situation of acting members, and 
situations where decisions were made under delegation between meetings, 
for example by the full-time chairman, were not adequately covered. 
The part of such disclosure clauses which relates to disqualification is discussed 
below at paras 10.21-6. 
10.9 The standard formula clause discussed above applies only to the situation of those 
statutory authorities which conduct meetings. It does not cover authorities which have 
only a single officeholder. The Committee notes that the Acts constituting such 
authorities may require the officeholder to declare all pecuniary interests relevant to 
his office to the responsible Minister, for example the Insurance Acts 1973, s. 12 (3). 
The Committee recommenis that a provision requiring declaration of all relevant 
pecuniary interests to the responsible Minister should be standard in all legislation 
establishing single-member authorities. 
10.10 In addition, the Committee recommends that where a full-time chairman of a 
statutory authority frequently must make decisions under delegations on behalf of the 
authority, he should be required to declare all pecuniary interests relevant to his office 
to the Minister. 
10.11 There exist other forms of statutory disclosure of interest clauses, for ex-
ample the Trade Practices Act 1974, s. 17 (2), which requires disclosure to the 
public of any interest in a business or body corporate which is the subject of an 
inquiry held by a member participating in the inquiry. The Committee expects 
that these would also be examined in the review of disclosure clauses recommen-
ded above. 
10.12 The Committee believes that, in view of the lack of uniformity and generally 
unsatisfactory nature of the existing forms of disclosure clauses, improvements are 
desirable. It was put to the Committee that one solution might be to enact a single 
statute applying to all Commonwealth officers which would override existing declar- 
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statute would need to be considered closely in relation to each statutory body before 
such action could be taken. On balance, the Committee recommends that existing 
disclosure provisions in statutory authority legislation (including Australian Capital 
Territory Ordinances) should be reviewed, with a view to adopting a standard drafting 
formula which would take into account the points made in para. 10.8. This could then be 
incorporated into the existing statutory authority legislation by amendment, with any 
necessary modifications of the standard formula to meet the circumstances of specific 
authorities. 
10.13 The Committee notes that statutory disclosure provisions such as those above 
may not always be sufficient, especially as they relate only to pecuniary interests. 
The Committee recommends that, where relevant, each statutory authority should 
supplement any statutory disclosure requirements by its own rules, adopted by resolution 
or otherwise, covering such matters as disclosure of relevant non-pecuniary interests. 
The Committee notes that some authorities, for example the Australia Council, have 
already followed such a course. 
10.14 The question whether disclosure should always be accompanied by dis-
qualification is discussed below (paras 10.21-6). 
Registration 
10.15 Several statutory authorities indicated to the Committee that they kept, or 
were in the process of establishing, registers of relevant pecuniary interests of 
their members. Such registers were described in several cases as analogous to the 
registers of interests of company directors required to be kept under the uniform 
Companies Act. The interests registered generally correspond to the limited range 
required to be disclosed ad hoc at meetings of the relevant statutory authority under 
the legislation by which it was established. However, in one case, members are 
required to record shares held, debenture interests, rights or options, and the de-
tails of any contracts to or from which a member is a party or is entitled to receive 
benefits. The same authority has also invited members 'to volunteer information 
about their personal investments or activities, family trusts etc. that might be rele-
vant to the performance of their duties'. Some witnesses were anxious about the 
possibility that registration requirements would discourage suitable persons from 
accepting appointment as part-time statutory officeholders. The Committee be-
lieves that some of this concern may arise from an expectation that registration 
entails public access to the information disclosed, and that, when registration is 
thought appropriate, suitable restriction of access should make it acceptable to 
appointees to such positions. 
10.16 The wide range of functions which they undertake would rule out the 
imposition of a uniform requirement for registration on all statutory authorities. 
Some authorities have a field of responsibility so wide that general registration 
of interests would be appropriate, if a decision for registration was taken. There 
are others, with narrower trading or regulatory functions, where this would not 
be necessary. Where a statutory authority decides to adopt a form of registration, 
it would be a matter for the statutory authority itself to identify those interests 
which might conflict with the official duties of members and should, as a con-
sequence, be registered. 
10.17 The Committee recommends that, if a decision is taken to require registration 
of interests by the members of a statutory authority, the matters referred to in 
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Authorisation 
10.18 Where an absolute statutory prohibition or disqualification does not 
apply, authorisation can play a useful part in the smooth functioning of statutory 
authorities. For instance, it can allow the participation of an interested person 
where it is considered that, on balance, the particular public interest which the 
statutory authority was set up to promote is better served by that person's partici-
pation, despite the possibility of real or apparent conflict of interest. (The Com-
mittee's views on statutory prohibitions and disqualifications, and whether such 
provisions should allow for the making of exceptions, are set out elsewhere in 
this chapter). 
10.19 The Committee recommends that: 
(a) statutory officeholders should have any authorisations recorded in the minutes 
of meetings or other appropriate records of the bodies to which they belong; 
(b) when authorisation relates to suspension of a requirement relating to conflict of 
interest which requires divestment or prohibits holding an interest, the responsible 
Minister should be notified forthwith. 
Divestment 
10.20 The Committee believes that statutory officeholders can be in a position of 
potential conflict analogous to that of Ministers in respect of interests directly related 
to their duties. It recommends that: 
(a) a Minister responsible for the appointment of a statutory officeholder should, 
prior to the appointment, carefully investigate any personal interests likely to 
create, or appear to create, conflicts of interest with the duties of the office; 
(b) subject to any legislative provision requiring a statutory officeholder to possess 
specified interests as part of his qualifications for appointment, the Minister 
should obtain from the proposed appointee explicit confirmation that he does not 
currently hold such interests and an undertaking to divest himself of such interests 
should he subsequently come into possession of them; 
(c) when an undertaking has been given to the responsible Minister by a statutory 
officeholder that he will divest himself of certain sorts of interests, a sanction 
should be provided in the event of a breach of such an undertaking. 
Disqualification 
10.21 Under the existig statutory provisions in relation to the declaration at 
meetings by members of statutory authorities, declaration is normally accom-
panied by disqualification from deliberations or voting on the matter in which 
the member is interested. The exact form of the disqualification varies. The most 
common form requires that the member shall not take part in any relevant 
deliberations or decisions of the body and shall not be counted as part of the 
quorum. Recent legislation generally requires simply that the member not be 
present at any relevant deliberations. The objects of requiring a member to with-
draw from a meeting were stated in the Redcliffe-Maud Report as 'that the 
member should not hear his colleagues discuss the issue in which his interest 
arises; and secondly that his presence should not inhibit them from speaking 
freely'.' 
10.22 However, a general requirement that a member not be present when an 
item in which he is interested is being debated can cause problems. It may deny 
the body the benefit of the expertise of the only member who has knowledge or 
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experience of that particular subject and, indeed, for the sake of which expertise 
he may have been appointed. Where a high proportion of members of an 
authority have interests of a certain kind, for example all have interests in the 
industry regulated by the authority, situations could arise where there might be 
difficulty in obtaining a quorum if a strict legal interpretation of such disqualifi-
cations was applied. 
10.23 The Committee believes that to require the disqualification of members 
with interests is not always appropriate and that in certain cases, the public 
interest may be better served if a member declares an interest in a matter under 
consideration but is not precluded from contributing to deliberations on that 
matter. 
10.24 There have been several attempts to meet this difficulty, some more 
successful than others. First, some legislation copes with the situation of members 
directly involved in the industry with which the authority is concerned by 
exempting from the ambit of the disclosure provisions interests held by members 
in that industry. For example, the Wheat Industry Stabilisation Act 1974, 
s. 12 (2), excludes from the ambit of the disclosure provision any interest that 
a member of the Australian Wheat Board has in common with other wheat 
growers or in most contracts made by the Board in respect of wheat or wheat 
products. As a consequence of the breadth of this exemption, members of the 
Wheat Board are not required, under the relevant legislation, to declare many 
interests which might conflict with their official duties. 
10.25 A more satisfactory solution is adopted in certain statutory authority legis-
lation which allows the disinterested members to determine whether a member with 
an interest should be authorised to be present, or to take part in discussions and vote, 
when the matter in which he is interested is under discussion, for example the 
Australian Meat and Livestock Corporation Act 1977, s. 29 (5), and the Australian 
Science and Technology Act 1978, s. 17 (2). The New South Wales Local Government 
Act, 1919 adopts an alternative solution in that s. 30A (8) provides that the Minister 
may remove a disqualification from voting or speaking applying to a council member, 
'subject to such conditions as he may think fit to impose', where the number of 
members disqualified at a particular time would be so great a proportion of the 
council 'as to impede the transaction of business, or in any other case in which it 
appears to the Minister that it is in the interests of the electors of the area' that the 
disqualification be removed. This appears to be a sensible approach. The Committee 
recommends the adoption, in suitable cases, of an approach which would allow either 
the Minister or the disinterested members of an authority to determine whether a 
member should be authorised to take part in discussions or vote on a matter in which 
he has an interest. 
10.26 Where a statutory officeholder has been elected or nominated to represent 
a particular group in a body, disqualification has the effect of disfranchising those 
persons or groups whom he is supposed to represent. The Committee has stated its 
opinion that Members of Parliament should not be prevented from voting by reason 
of their possessing an interest which conflicts with their public duty in a particular 
situation. Declaration of the interest is sufficient to neutralise the conflict. The 
Committee believes that the same principle should apply to those statutory bodies 
which contain representatives of persons or groups. It recommends that consideration 
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prevent a member of a statutory authority who is a representative of a particular group 
or particular persons from taking part in deliberations or voting, provided always that 
a declaration of interest is made before speaking. 
Staff 
10.27 Statutory authorities fall into three broad groupings with respect to the 
rules which lay down the duties of staff: 
• Those authorities which are staffed under the Public Service Act, to which 
the provisions relating to public servants apply, for example the Industries 
Assistance Commission. 
• Those for which the Public Service Board has some statutory responsibility 
in relation to the terms and conditions of employment of their staff, for 
example the Australian Honey Board. These have their own staff rules, but 
they tend to follow the pattern of the relevant Public Service Regulations. 
• Those authorities which have independent staffing powers, and whose staff 
rules or regulations may therefore vary more from the public service pattern. 
Most of these have simple staffing provisions which give them power to 
determine terms and conditions of staff, for example the Australian Shipping 
Commission. The legislation for some authorities has more detailed pro-
visions, providing for many of the staffing arrangements and protections 
afforded by the Public Service Act, including detailed disciplinary machinery. 
Such authorities include the Commonwealth Banking Corporation, the 
Reserve Bank of Australia, the Australian Telecommunications Commission 
and the Australian Postal Commission. 
10.28 The range of functions undertaken by statutory authorities is such that it 
cannot be assumed that the Committee's recommendations for public servants 
could automatically be applied in all cases. For example, the staff of certain 
statutory authorities carrying out activities in direct and substantial commercial 
competition with private sector enterprises, such as Australian National Airlines, 
the Australian National Line and the component banks of the Commwealth 
Banking Corporation, are perhaps more analogous to the staff of their commercial 
competitors than to public servants. 
10.29 The Committee recommends that: 
(a) those statutory authorities in statutory relationship with the Public Service 
Board should consider adopting those recommendations in this report which 
apply to public servants, with any necessary modification to fit the circumstances 
of the authority; 
(b) those authorities which have independent staffing powers should examine the 
position with respect to their staff, with a view to adopting, by way of staff rules 
or regulations, or otherwise, such of the Committee's recommendations as are 
appropriate to the public duties of their staff and the likelihood of conflicts of 
interests occurring in respect of such duties, and which are not already adequately 
covered in existing staff rules or regulations; 
(c) each such statutory authority should consider how to ensure that its staff disclose 
any actual or potential conflicts of interest to their superiors or, in the case of 
senior staff, to the members of the statutory authority. 
10.30 The Committee recommends that, if registration of interests is adopted for the 
Australian Public Service, then equivalent registration practices should be adopted by 
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responsibilities made it desirable that they register their interests, and specifying 
which interests of the officer and his immediate family should be registered. It would 
not be necessary to set out any such requirements in the authority's statute. But 
neither should they be kept as confidential between the members and staff concerned. 
The Committee recommends that the details of any registration practices concerning 
the staffs of statutory authorities, but not the contents of any registers which may be 
established, should be made public. 
Other categories 
10.31 In addition to the statutory officeholders and staffs of Commonwealth 
statutory authorities, there are certain similar categories of persons who fall within 
the list of 'persons holding positions of public trust in relation to the Common-
wealth'. These are dealt with in the following paragraphs. 
Directors and staffs of Commonwealth-owned or controlled companies 
10.32 Sometimes the Commonwealth Government chooses to use the company 
form to carry out some public purpose, either by establishing a Commonwealth-
owned or controlled company, such as Aboriginal Hostels Ltd or Qantas Airways 
Ltd. or by holding shares in an ordinary company such as Mary Kathleen 
Uranium Ltd. The Committee believes that the obligations of the Commonwealth-
appointed members of the boards of directors of such companies are, and should 
be, the normal obligations of company directors under the applicable Companies 
Act. A public servant chosen as a director of such a company as a representative 
of the Commonwealth or his Minister or department or authority may encounter 
conflicts between his duties as an officer and his fiduciary duties as director. 
10.33 Such companies will no doubt develop their own staff rules setting out stan-
dards of conduct applicable to their staff. The Committee recommends that the attention 
of the managements of Commonwealth-owned or controlled companies be drawn to the 
proposed Code of Conduct for possible incorporation in their staff rules, in a modified 
form if necessary. 
Staffs of joint Commonwealth—State bodies and bodies established under 
international agreements 
10.34 Examples of joint Commonwealth-State bodies include the Advisory Council 
for Inter-government Relations, the River Murray Commission and the Joint Coal 
Board. Examples of bodies established under international agreement include the Anglo-
Australian Telescope Board and the Christmas Island Phosphate Commission, both 
statutory bodies, and the British Phosphate Commissioners, a non-statutory body. 
The Committee sees no difference in principle between the public duty of the staff of 
such joint bodies and that of the staff of wholly Commonwealth bodies. Accordingly 
it recommends that the attention of joint Commonwealth-State bodies and of bodies 
established under international agreements be drawn to the proposed Code of Conduct 
for consideration, in consultation with the relevant governments, whether the Code 
should be incorporated in their staff rules, in a modified form if necessary. 
Tribunals 
10.35 The Commonwealth Government is responsible for a large number of 
statutory and non-statutory tribunals, some of which have a quasi-judicial 
character, together with the potential for conflict of interest problems. They 
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primarily as tribunals but which act as tribunals, that is bodies which make 
decisions or recommendations affecting the rights and entitlements of individuals, 
in the course of carrying out one or more of their functions. For example, the 
Public Service Board is a tribunal in so far as it determines various types of 
appeal by public servants. The various primary industry commodity boards act 
as tribunals in so far as they make decisions or recommendations in relation to 
the allocation of export licences. 
10.36 The legislation establishing statutory tribunals may contain requirements 
for divestment, or disclosure combined with disqualification. To give two examples, 
divestment is required of members of the Australian Broadcasting Tribunal 
under the Broadcasting and Television Act 1942, s. 9. Disclosure is required by 
the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, s. 14. In addition, the legislation 
establishing statutory bodies which act as tribunals in performing one or more 
of their range of functions usually contains a clause requiring disclosure to the 
other members of an interest in a matter under consideration and disqualification 
from deliberations upon that matter, except where the interest is held as a 
member of a company with more than twenty-five members (see para. 10.8 for 
further details). 
10.37 Either provision, whether for divestment or for disclosure, may be appropriate 
for particular sorts of tribunal: divestment when the responsibility is narrowly focused 
and a class of 'sensitive' assets can be identified as always likely to create conflict or 
the appearance of conflict; disclosure to the chairman or the parties when the work 
of the tribunal is more wide ranging and conflicts are more difficult to anticipate. 
The Committee recommends that: 
(a) there should not be an omnibus prohibition embodied in a single statute to avoid 
bias in tribunals; but 
(b) there should be as much uniformity as possible through adherence to general 
rules. 
10.38 Accordingly, it recommends that an examination be made of the conflict of 
interest provisions regarding disclosure applying to existing statutory and non-statutory 
tribunals when exercising quasi-judicial functions, with a view to introducing provisions 
along the lines of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, s. 14, or bringing 
existing provisions up to this standard where appropriate. Given that so many tribunals 
are also statutory authorities with a variety of other functions, this examination should 
be co-ordinated with the general review of declaration of interest clauses in statutory 
authority legislation, suggested at para. 10.12. 
10.39 The Committee notes the qualification contained in some existing provisions 
applying to disclosures by members of tribunals, that the interest arises from a 
'business carried on in Australia'. It records its doubt that such a qualification is 
appropriate in a time when so many economic concerns are organised on an inter-
national or multinational basis. It recommends that consideration be given to deleting 
the qaaliflcation contained in some statutes which restricts interests which must be 
disclosed to those arising from a 'business carried on in Australia'. 
1. Great Britain, Prime Minister's Committee on Local Government Rules of Conduct (Lord 
Redcliffe-Maud, Chairman), Report, Cmnd. 5636, HMSO, London, 1974, p. 13. 
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11. Measures for other categories of persons 
11.1 The greater part of this report is concerned with four categories of office-
holders: Ministers, Members of Parliament, public servants and statutory office-
holders. However, there are certain other categories of persons to whom briefer 
reference must be made. 
11.2 The first, holders of judicial office under the Commonwealth, was not 
included in the Committee's terms of reference nor in the list published in its 
advertisement for submissions. The Committee believes that the omission of judges 
from its recommendations should be explained. The second and third categories, 
Members of the Legislative Assembly of the Northern Territory and Members of 
the Legislative Assembly of the Australian Capital Territory, were not included 
in the terms of reference but were added by the Committee when it advertised for 
submissions. The fourth category, members of the Commonwealth and Australian 
Capital Territory Police Forces, was identified at a later stage as requiring mention. 
The fifth category, identified in the Committee's subsequent list when advertising 
for submissions as 'directors, executives, editors and journalists of media organis-
ations'--dealt with below under the heading 'The media'—came to be considered 
as a result of the Prime Minister's letter of 8 March 1978 (see para. 1.8). The 
sixth category, lobbyists, was identified at a later stage as requiring mention. 
11.3 Other categories, which either were mentioned in the terms of reference 
(such as the staff of Ministers and of Members of Parliament, who were dealt with 
in Chapters 8 and 7 respectively) or were included in the Committee's list when 
advertising for submissions (such as members of the Defence Force, who were 
dealt with in Chapter 9), were bracketed with the most appropriate and closely 
related major category of officeholders. 
Holders of judicial office 
11.4 Conflict of interest situations involving members of the federal judiciary 
are currently regulated by the criminal law, by legal doctrine and by convention. 
11.5 The Crimes Act 1914, s. 34 (b), provides that 'any person who 
being a judge or magistrate, wilfully and perversely exercises Federal jurisdiction 
in any matter in which he has a personal interest, shall be guilty of an offence'. 
The penalty for a breach is imprisonment for two years. 
11.6 It is now accepted that judges should not engage in business or in any way 
be associated with business institutions, for example as director, trustee or adviser. 
The law disqualifies a judge who has a pecuniary interest in one of the parties 
before the court, although it is accepted that the parties to a case can waive the 
disqualification. For example, a judge is disqualified if one of the parties is a 
company and he is a shareholder in it.' In England, it has been assumed that the 
disqualification applies whether the shares are the judge's personal holdings or 
those of his spouse. However, in the Bank Nationalisation case, where the wife of 
one judge held shares in one of the parties and another judge was joint holder of 
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shares as a bare trustee for someone else, the judges were not disqualified.2 Judges 
tend to disqualify themselves in other cases, besides those involving financial 
interest, for example if as counsel they acted for one of the parties over a long 
period, or if, as parliamentarians, they were intimately involved with a matter 
which is now before the court and where embarrassment might be felt by the 
judge or objection taken by any party. 
11.7 The Committee considered whether there was need for further rules, such 
as are contained in the Code of Judicial Conduct for United States judges, which 
was adopted in 1973, or those adopted in the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 
which require disclosure of income from non-judicial sources, receipt of gifts, and 
so forth. It concluded that there was no discernible need for such extension of 
the existing rules, which, in the Committee's opinion, render extremely unlikely 
the possibility that a conflict of interest involving a member of the federal 
judiciary might develop and would provide for resolution of the situation if it did. 
Members of the Legislative Assembly, public servants and 
statutory officeholders of the Northern Territory 
11.8 The achievement of self-government by the Northern Territory on 1 July 
1978 and the continuing evolution of the institutions of government in the Terri-
tory render inappropriate any attempt by this Committee to prescribe practices or 
rules for the Members of its Legislative Assembly. Moreover, the Committee is 
aware that a system of disclosure has been introduced for Members of the Legis-
lative Assembly of the Northern Territory which parallels those suggested in 
several of the States. In addition, in October 1978, the Public Service Commission 
for the Northern Territory issued a General Order, Declaration of Pecuniary 
Interests, which imposed on employees a series of obligations in relation to the 
avoidance or resolution of conflicts of interests. Details of these measures are set 
out at Appendix 5. 
11.9 In the circumstances, the Committee does not wish to make any recom-
mendations in respect of the Northern Territory, whether relating to Ministers, 
Members of the Legislative Assembly, public servants or statutory officeholders. 
Members of the House of Assembly of the 
Australian Capital Territory 
11.10 Up to the present, the Legislative Assembly of the Australian Capital 
Territory has operated under Standing Orders similar to those of the Common-
wealth and the State Parliaments. In particular, Standing Order 162 is the 
equivalent of Standing Order 196 of the House of Representatives. The side 
note to the Order states 'No Member to vote if pecuniarily interested', but the 
actual language of the Standing Order is the same as in the House of Represent-
atives Standing Order. The Task Force on Self-government for the Australian 
Capital Territory in March 1976 recommended that, where applicable, the 
recommendations by the Joint Committee on Pecuniary Interests of Members of 
Parliament should be applied to Members of the Assembly in legislation which 
the Task Force proposed for conferring legislative power on the Assembly. 
Adoption of this recommendation would have involved registration of Members' 
interests with an Assembly Registrar and a right of access to the registered 
information by bona fide inquirers. The Registrar, the Task Force suggested, 
might be the Clerk of the Legislative Assembly.3 The Task Force's recommen-
dations were not pursued. 
11.11 Although Members of the Legislative Assembly have been part time and 
the powers of the Assembly itself have been restricted, the Committee believes 
that the rules regarding conduct of Members of the Assembly should approximate 
those for the conduct of Members of the Commonwealth Parliament. Both groups 
are elected representatives of the community. Indeed, two differences might be 
thought likely to increase the risk of conflict of interest for Members of the 
Legislative Assembly. One has been the practice of appointing Members of the 
Assembly to various statutory bodies operating in the Australian Capital 
Territory, as a consequence of which they are involved in quasi-executive 
responsibilities. The other is that their part-time status and modest salary makes 
it very likely that Members will have employment or business interests to which 
they have to devote a high proportion of their time and effort and upon which 
they will depend financially. 
11.12 The Committee considers that, when any outstanding questions about 
its future status and responsibilities have been determined, the Legislative 
Assembly (soon to be known as the House of Assembly) should review its position 
in respect of conflicts of interest. It might consider whether the Code of Conduct 
proposed in Chapter 4, or some modified version of it, would be appropriate to 
the Assembly's circumstances and should be adopted by resolution or in Standing 
Orders. 
Members of the Commonwealth and the 
Australian Capital Territory Police Forces 
11.13 Police officers fall within the provisions of the Crimes Act 1914 relating 
to disclosure of information and official corruption by reason of the definition 
of 'Commonwealth officer' within that Act. The Committee is also aware that 
various proposals for codes of ethics for police officers have been drawn up, for 
example the Law Enforcement Code of Ethics of the International Association 
of Chiefs of Police, and the draft Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials 
proposed by the General Assembly of the United Nations in Resolution 3452 
(XXX). It believes that adoption of any comparable code of conduct is a matter 
best left to those responsible for the Police Forces in question. It may be that 
this Committee's report, as it deals with such topics in respect of public servants 
and other categories of officeholders, can be of assistance to them. Amalgamation 
of the two Forces into the Australian Federal Police has been announced by 
the Government. This provides an immediate occasion for considering the 
matter. But the Committee does not consider that it has the specialised experience 
which would make it competent to offer appropriate recommendations related 
to the police. 
The media 
11.14 As noted in Chapter 1, the Committee recognised at an early stage of 
its activities that, arising from the Prime Minister's letter of 8 March 1978, it 
would need to give consideration to the appropriateness of including certain 
classes of persons concerned with the mass media among 'persons holding positions 
of trust in relation to the Commonwealth'. Accordingly, its advertisement inviting 
submissions to the Inquiry listed 'directors, executives, editors and journalists of 
media organisations' among the persons added to the original categories specified 
in the terms of reference. It was recognised that there would be political, and 
possibly Constitutional, difficulties in extension of a uniform system of regulation 
	 97 
of conflicts of interest from public officeholders to all of the major media. In 
particular, there may be difficulties in bringing the print media within the 
Constitutional authority of the Commonwealth. 
11.15 The Joint Committee on Pecuniary Interests of Members of Parliament 
heard evidence from witnesses representing both print and electronic media. Its 
report stated that the press was 'a fundamental and a necessary mechanism in 
the checks and balances of a healthy Parliamentary democracy', and that it 
would be inequitable to impose requirements on one tier of the democratic 
process that were not imposed on others. Its report also stated that the over-
whelming majority of media witnesses before the Joint Committee advocated 
registration of pecuniary interests for themselves and other media, as well as for 
others in the democratic process. The Joint Committee concluded that to have 
done otherwise would have been to advocate an imbalance in the system of checks 
and balances in the body politic.4 
11.16 The Joint Committee went on to recommend that a Media Council should 
be established; and, as an interim measure, the Parliament should require those 
media organisations which are accredited to or enjoy the facilities of Parliament 
House to comply with the same registration requirements that are required of 
Members of Parliament. It envisaged that, in the longer term, the areas of interest 
which might be of concern to the proposed Media Council would include admin-
istering the media register of pecuniary interests; devising a code of conduct for 
the media; acting as a 'tribunal' in all matters relating to the standing of the 
media; and generally guarding media standards.' 
11.17 This Committee, whilst recognising the great influence and political import-
ance of the mass media, believes that such influence does not make the owners 
and employees 'persons holding positions of public trust in relation to the Com-
monwealth'. The Committee has reservations about using a method as roundabout 
as the Parliament's control over the areas occupied by the media in Parliament 
House to extend external regulation into so sensitive an area as the liberty of the 
mass media. 
11.18 One precedent is sometimes cited for the imposition of a requirement for 
disclosure of interests upon journalists. In New South Wales and Victoria the 
Securities Industry Acts 1975, ss. 73-80, require 'financial journalists' to register 
particulars of securities in which they have an interest and any transactions which 
vary those interests, and South Australia has similar legislation in hand. The 
penalty for non-compliance is a fine of $1000 or six months imprisonment. 
11.19 The Committee believes that this requirement may be distinguished from 
any similar requirements proposed for political journalists on two grounds: firstly, 
passage of the Securities Industry Acts followed detailed inquiry by a Parlia-
mentary Committee which disclosed unacceptable practices by certain financial 
journalists, whereas there has been no comparable evidence concerning political 
journalists; secondly, the interests which are required to be registered by financial 
journalists are easily specified and are immediately relevant to possible conflict 
of interest situations which might arise, whereas the pecuniary interests of political 
journalists are much less obviously relevant to their work as journalists. This 
exceptional case does not, in the Committee's opinion, advance the argument for 
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11.20 The Committee is concerned that any proposal to impose a requirement 
for disclosure of interests, or any other form of regulation, upon political jour-
nalists would be seen as an attempt to blunt the teeth of criticism, It fears that 
other proposals for the regulation of conflicts of interest, which are intended to 
enhance public confidence in government institutions, and in particular in the 
parliamentary institution, might well be discredited by their association with inter-
ference with freedom of the press and of the electronic media. The Committee 
noted the New South Wales Government's immediate rejection of the proposal 
by that State's Parliamentary Joint Committee upon Pecuniary Interests that 
political journalists be required to register pecuniary interests, and the omission 
of journalists from similar legislation proposed or in force in other Australian 
States. 
11.21 Recently, Australian media organisations have concerned themselves with 
more effective self-regulation of their standards. In 1976, the Australian Press 
Council was formed to deal with complaints from private citizens against news-
papers, and, from the limited studies the Committee has been able to make of its 
work, the Council appears to be playing an effective role. In 1977, the Australian 
Broadcasting Tribunal reported on self-regulation for the commercial electronic 
media6, and, following this, the Government announced that, except in relation to 
certain areas where minimum standards would be laid down, as a general principle, 
broadcasters would be expected to develop and to police their own industry codes.7 
It may be noted that the Australian Journalists Association has adopted a 'code 
of ethics', although the Committee has been informed that there are problems 
with its enforcement. 
11.22 Elsewhere in this report, the Committee points to the advantages of self-
regulation of codes of conduct by the four major categories of officeholders. Con-
trary to the experience with witnesses before the Joint Parliamentary Committee 
on Pecuniary Interests of Members of Parliament, the general theme of the 
evidence by witnesses before this Committee was that self-regulation was to be 
prefered to government intervention. The Committee concurs with this view. It 
believes that any attempt to regulate conflicts of interest involving the media 
should incorporate this principle. 
11.23 The most recent British Royal Commission on the Press was required to 
consider, amongst other things, 'the interaction of the newspaper and periodical 
interests held by the companies concerned with their other interests and holdings, 
within and outside the communications industry'. The Commission interpreted this 
as implying that it should look at the questions of the degree of restriction over 
the common ownership of press and broadcasting interests that is required by the 
public interest, and whether any damage to the public interest is likely to be 
caused by links of ownership between the press and other business interests which 
the press might be in a position to further and, if so, what measures are required.8  
11.24 In respect of the second of these two questions, the Royal Commission 
saw the objection to the involvement of media organisations in other forms of 
economic activity as resting on a suspicion that editorial comment may be biased. 
It said: 
In its simplest form the fear is that, if a newspaper's proprietors have substantial 
holdings in, say, travel, this may lead to pressure for editorial puffs for a travel 
firm in the same ownership, or alternatively to pressure to ignore or criticise its 
rivals. It may lead, too, to unfair competition through cheap or unpaid 
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and expressed the opinion that public knowledge should extend beyond owner-
ship of other publishing interests to knowledge of the main other business interests 
of groups publishing newspapers and periodicals, and that, in the case of 
companies with press interests, disclosure of beneficial interests is required in the 
interests of readers and of the public generally, whether or not the companies 
are listed.10 
11.25 The recommendations of the Royal Commission included: 
• Every newspaper and periodical (be) obliged to state not merely, as at present, the name 
and address of the publisher, but also, where the publisher is a subsidiary company, 
the name and country of incorporation of its ultimate holding company and, moreover, 
to display both with reasonable prominence. 
• . . . newspapers and periodicals should establish a constant practice of declaring their 
interests when reporting or commenting on the affairs of an associated company or on 
an industry in which the publisher or an associated company has significant financial 
interests directly or indirectly." 
In relation to the first of these, the Commission added the observation that: 
We do not think that it should be necessary in the legislation to prescribe in more detail 
what is meant by 'with reasonable prominence'. In the case of a newspaper, what we 
have in mind is that the information should be stated conspicuously, either beneath the 
masthead or on the leader page, and not, as generally occurs at present, in minute print 
in an obscure position on the back page.12 
11.26 The Committee finds attraction in these recommendations and believes 
they could have useful application in the Australian context. In this connection, 
it may be noted that there are a number of bodies presently concerned with the 
maintenance of standards of conduct in the Australian media, such as the 
Australian Press Council, the Australian Broadcasting Tribunal, and the Feder-
ations of Australian Commercial Television Stations and of Australian Radio 
Broadcasters. The Committee believes that the methods of implementation of 
disclosure of interests, whether in line with the British Royal Commission proposals 
or not, are best left to the group immediately concerned. 
11.27 In relation to the question raised in the Prime Minister's letter of 8 March 
1978, the Committee recommends that no form of government control be introduced to 
regulate conflicts of interest involving the media, but that it be suggested to the bodies 
presently concerned with the maintenance of standards of conduct in the Australian 
media that they should consider adoption, with such modifications as may be necessary, 
of any recommendations of the British Royal Commission on the Press 1977 which are 
relevant to the disclosure of interests. 
Lobbyists 
11.28 The Committee also considered whether it should inquire into the role 
of lobbyists in conflict of interest situations. In the United States of America, 
there is a long tradition of regulation of the activities of lobbyists, especially as to 
disclosure through registration, which extends back into the nineteenth century 
for some States and to 1946 in respect of the federal government.13 In Britain, 
in 1969 the Strauss Committee gave some consideration to the possibility of 
registering those public relations firms which employed Members of Parliament.14 
In 1974, the Wiley Committee, directed to implement the House of Commons 
decision for a register of Members' interests, concluded that any definition of 
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Several persons who made submissions to this Committee raised the possibility 
of including lobbyists within any system for controlling conflict of interest in 
respect of the Commonwealth Government, but without supplying convincing 
evidence as to improper activities by lobbyists. 
11.29 The Committee believes that the phrase 'persons holding positions of public 
trust in relation to the Commonwealth' properly confines its recommendations to 
those persons who hold some variety of public office. The Committee's responsibilities 
do not extend to private persons who, in pursuit of economic or other objectives, seek 
to influence government or public officials unless they intrude upon the 'black' area of 
bribery and corruption or improperly offer gifts or post-separation employment. 
This view is not simply a consequence of the Committee's terms of reference. It is also 
a considered opinion as to what constitutes the proper sphere for government regula-
tion and how far initiatives outside that sphere are likely to prove effective. Although 
the political and constitutional situation in Washington is sufficiently different to 
make any attempt to draw parallels with Canberra most unwise, the difficulties 
encountered in successive attempts to regulate lobbying in Washington suggest the 
unprofitability of starting down that path in Australia. The Committee recommends 
that no special measures be taken in relation to lobbyists. 
11.30 The Committee's terms of reference did not refer to party finance and 
election campaign donations as a potential source of conflicts of interests. The 
Joint Committee on Pecuniary Interests of Members of Parliament had previously 
noted: 
It must be added that no safeguards exist at present in relation to the abuses which might 
be thought to flow from undisclosed political campaign contributions. A number of other 
countries have considered this question in conjunction with the question of a register of 
pecuniary interests. However, the question of contributions to political campaigns is not 
within this Committee's terms of reference.16 
11.3! In the United States control over campaign funding has been closely 
connected to regulation of conflicts of interest. For example, two of the ten items 
in the Code of Conduct adopted by the House of Representatives in 1968 related 
to campaign funds, compared with three relating to conflict of interest. A pecuniary 
benefit given to an elected officeholder's campaign or party funds might, in some 
circumstances, be as likely to influence his conduct as the same benefit given to 
him personally or to a member of his immediate family. It may be as likely to 
create a conflict of interest between his public duty and private interest. However, 
such matters lie beyond the Committee's terms of reference, and, notwithstanding 
some suggestions received from witnesses, it can do no more than note that any 
comprehensive system for avoidance and resolution of conflicts of interest might 
well have to include disclosure of the sources and amounts of political funds. No 
doubt the Commonwealth Government is aware of this. 
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12. Machinery for dealing with 
conflict of interest cases 
12.1 In Chapters 7 to 10, the Committee recommended that responsibility for 
avoiding and resolving conflicts of interest should rest with those persons and bodies 
already responsible for the conduct of particular categories of officeholders. However, 
its terms of reference raised the possibility of the development of special machinery 
or special procedures not previously employed in Australia: 
to recommend whether or not a register under judicial or other supervision should 
be maintained so that, in the event of allegations of impropriety, the allegation may be 
open to judicial investigation and report (emphasis supplied). 
Although the focus is on the maintenance of a register of interests and the use of the 
register in relation to conflicts of interest, the potential scope is much wider. Further, 
in his press statement of 16 December 1977, the Prime Minister stated that the Com-
mittee 'will also be asked to recommend what procedures should be followed to 
determine whether there has been any breach of the high standards which are properly 
required of those in public office' and 'to recommend the method which should be 
used to determine whether there has been a breach'. 
12.2 The Committee, consistently with the philosophy adopted throughout this report, 
believes that ordinary cases involving allegations of conflict between public duty and 
private interest should be resolved through the established machinery for dealing with 
misconduct or misbehaviour on the part of officeholders. It recognises, however, that 
such machinery may be inadequate or inappropriate in exceptional cases where a high 
degree of public concern is involved. It has concluded that special machinery should 
be established to deal with a very limited number of matters. 
Avenues for bringing to notice allegations of conflicts of interest 
12.3 A variety of avenues now exists for the investigation of allegations of conflicts 
of interest on the part of Members, Ministers, public servants and statutory office-
holders. Some of these are formally established by legislation; others do not rely 
upon legislative provision but upon administrative or par1iameitary procedures. In 
recent years, the 'traditional' avenues for the public to question the bases for adminis-
trative decisions, including those involving conflicts of interest, have been expanded 
greatly by the passage of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, the Ombudsman 
Act 1976 and the yet to be proclaimed Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) 
Act 1977. 
12.4 For the aggrieved or concerned citizen, dissatisfied with the correctness of an 
administrative decision, the Member of Parliament has long been, and continues to 
be, an effective channel for the airing of a complaint. The Member is in an unique 
Position by reason of his office as he has available options for action which are not 
available to the citizen himself. He may raise a matter in debate in the Parliament, 
or through questions addressed to the responsible Minister, in the certain knowledge 
that, if it is sufficiently serious, it is likely to receive widespread publicity; he may 
make representations in writing or orally to the Minister, with the full assurance that 
those representations will be seriously considered; he may make approaches to depart-
ments and authorities with a measure of assurance that, with the 'weight' that his 
office carries, his approaches will be dealt with carefully and expeditiously. The 
political impact of any complaint in the Parliament regarding decisions by office-
holders, on the grounds of conflict between public duty and private interest, is con-
siderable, and this in itself can be a sanction of importance. 
123 The citizen can, of course, address his complaint directly to the responsible 
Minister or to the Prime Minister. At this level, it ordinarily receives special attention, 
especially where an allegation of conflict of interest has been made. The fact that a 
complainant who is dissatisfied with an explanation given may have his complaint 
raised in the Parliament provides a substantial assurance than an allegation is properly 
investigated. 
12.6 Similarly, a complaint addressed to the Permanent Head of a department 
regarding the conduct of one of his officers would ordinarily be thoroughly investi-
gated. In such cases, there is not only the political sanction available but there are 
also disciplinary sanctions available under the Public Service Act. 
12.7 The 'traditional' avenues for the person aggrieved by a decision by an office-
holder have, under certain circumstances, included the courts. This is, however, an 
avenue which can sometimes be fraught with difficulty. The Commonwealth Adminis-
trative Review Committee, reporting in 1971, observed that: 
A person aggrieved by a decision of a Commonwealth official or tribunal will generally 
feel that the decision was wrong on the facts or merits of the matter. Sometimes there is 
an appeal on the merits to an administrative tribunal or to the courts, but generally such 
a person has no way of appealing against a decision on the facts or merits. The courts 
are, in most cases, not open to him for this purpose and he is driven, if he wishes to upset 
a decision, to find some way of attacking it in the courts upon legal grounds. The legal 
grounds are, however, limited and the means, or remedies, complicated. He has to select 
his court, his ground of attack, and his procedure or remedy. If, being driven to seek in 
the courts an invalidating judgment, he succeeds in having a decision set aside, he is, in 
effect, in many cases back where he started with the administrative process to be faced 
again before the same administrative officer or body. An attempt is often made to have a 
decision upset, not so much because of the legal flaws involved but because a person 
aggrieved by it thinks that it is wrong on the merits and success in the courts in many 
cases involves the risk of the same decision on the merits being reached, after the previous 
judicial decision has been given, by the same administrative body and by processes which 
can no longer be attacked in the courts.' 
and went on to conclude that: 
It is generally accepted that this complex pattern of rules as to appropriate courts, principles 
and remedies is both unwieldy and unnecessary. The pattern is not fully understood by 
most lawyers; the layman tends to find the technicalities not merely incomprehensible 
but quite absurd. A case can be lost or won on the basis of choice of remedy and the non-
lawyer can never appreciate why this should be so. The basic fault of the entire structure 
is, however, that review cannot, as a general rule, in the absence of special statutory 
provisions, be obtained 'on the merits'—and this is usually what the aggrieved citizen is 
seeking.2 
The courts are not, therefore, always a satisfactory answer for use by the citizen. 
12.8 The Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 provides that, upon application 
by a person or persons whose interests are affected by a decision in designated areas 
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decision. The Tribunal is empowered to affirm, vary or set aside a decision under 
review and, in the last-mentioned case, make a new decision in substitution of the 
original one or remit the matter for reconsideration. There is a right of appeal against 
a decision of the Tribunal to the Federal Court of Australia upon a question of law. 
12.9 The Ombudsman Act 1976 provides for the appointment of a Commonwealth 
Ombudsman with the function of investigating administrative action taken by a 
department or a designated statutory authority, which is either the subject of a 
complaint or is a matter which he considers warrants investigation. The Ombudsman 
is not empowered to review actions by Ministers but may investigate a recommen-
dation made by a department to a Minister. He may not substitute his own decision 
for one under review and may recommend corrective action only where he thinks 
there has been maladministration. 
12.10 The Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act and the Ombudsman Act have 
provided important new channels for the investigation of complaints against adminis-
trative decisions, including those involving conflicts of interest. When the Adminis-
trative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 is proclaimed, this will supplement the 
two Acts by establishing in appropriate cases a single simple form of proceeding in 
the Federal Court of Australia for judicial review of the legal aspects of Common-
wealth administrative actions as an alternative to the present cumbersome and 
technical procedures for legal review which were the subject of comment by the 
Commonwealth Administrative Review Committee (see para. 12.6, above). 
12.11 In the Committee's view, these avenues provide ample opportunity for 
allegations of conflicts of interest involving public officeholders to be brought to 
notice. It is, however, less satisfied about the nature of the machinery available for 
the investigation of such allegations. 
The investigation of allegations of conflicts of interest 
12.12 Within the areas in which they function both the Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal and the Commonwealth Ombudsman have wide powers for obtaining the 
facts relating to cases involving administrative decisions in which conflict of interest 
is alleged to have been an element. Hearings of the Tribunal are required to be in 
public unless the confidentiality of the matters before it leads the Tribunal to decide 
otherwise. Inquiries by the Ombudsman, on the other hand, must be made in privacy. 
12.13 The independent natures of the Tribunal and the Ombudsman ensure that 
cases before them are considered impartially and their decisions and findings, in 
consequence, have a high degree of public acceptability. They are important institu-
tions in the field with which the Committee is concerned. There are limitations on the 
areas in which they are permitted to work, but, nonetheless, the scope for their 
investigations is extensive. 
12.14 For the investigation of allegations against officeholders employed under the 
Public Service Act or in major statutory authorities such as the Commonwealth 
Trading Bank of Australia, the Australian Postal Commission or the Australian 
Broadcasting Commission, there is established internal machinery. This machinery 
has, the Committee believes, operated satisfactorily in the past and no evidence has 
been presented that it requires strengthening. 
12.15 Apart from the Administrative Appeals Tribunal and the Commonwealth 
Ombudsman, there appears to be no established machinery for the investigation of 
allegations against statutory officeholders. No doubt the Minister concerned would 
draw upon the resources of his department to examine and report on any such 
allegations. However, the Committee is aware of no evidence of a need to introduce 
special arrangements to cover the position of statutory officeholders. 
12.16 It is in relation to elected officeholders that the Committee has most concern. 
Allegations of conflict between public duty and private interest concerning Ministers 
and Members are usually raised in the Parliament itself. Each of the Houses of the 
Parliament has its Privileges Committee and, no doubt, allegations could be referred 
to the appropriate Committee by the House to which the Minister or Member 
belonged. But, in practice, Parliamentary Committees are not used for the investigation 
of conflict of interest allegations. The matter is usually handled on a political basis 
which may give satisfaction to no one. It may become a festering sore which poisons 
relations within the Parliament and adds to any public disillusion with 'politicians' 
as a group and with the Parliament as an institution. 
12.17 There appear to be a number of ways in which the inadequacies of the present 
arrangements for the investigation of allegations against Members might be met. 
One is to strengthen and formalise the parliamentary machinery. Another is to create 
a special body outside the Parliament to carry out investigations. A third might 
involve a combination of the preceding two. There are, of course, others such as the 
use of the Ombudsman, Royal Commissions, Committees of Inquiry or even the 
courts to conduct investigations. 
12.18 The Committee has already expressed, in paragraph 3.12 and elsewhere, its 
belief that responsibility for the standards of conduct of officeholders, whether 
elected or appointed, should vest in those responsible for their management. In 
relation to the Parliament, it believes that there are special considerations in that it is 
vital to the continuation of good government that the capacity of Members to manage 
their own affairs should not be impaired. On grounds of principle, therefore, the Com-
mittee would be reluctant to embrace proposals which would involve the use of an 
outside agency for the investigation of allegations of conflict of interest involving 
Members unless there were sound reasons for so doing. 
12.19 The approach which is most in keeping with the Committee's philosophy in 
this area would be to strengthen and formalise the existing parliamentary machinery. 
Many of the difficulties which the Committee has with the present arrangements arise 
from the fact that there is no recognised channel through which allegations of conflict 
of interest concerning Members may be tested. The absence of a channel of this kind 
results in unresolved and unsatisfactory situations. 
12.20 The Committee has noted that, in the British House of Commons and within 
the Congress of the United States of America, the practice is to establish House 
Ethics or similar committees and that proposals for the establishment of committees 
with like functions are before the Canadian Parliament.3 The case for the establish-
ment of such committees was stated in the 1970 report of the Association of the Bar of 
the City of New York Special Committee on Congressional Ethics, in which, referring 
to the United States experience from 1958, the comment was made: 
A skeptic might point to the fact that Congress and the entire Federal service had a code 
starting in 1938 and that its existence had little practical significance. This is probably true, 
but it is largely because no one was charged with the responsibility of enforcing the 1958. 
code. This points up the necessity that ethics codes be coupled with ethics committees. 
If there is a permanent committee, there is someone to whom complaints of individual 
violations can be made and against whom complaint can be made if ethical rules generally 
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12.21 In the context of the British House of Commons, there has been discussion 
on whether the appropriate body to deal with ethics questions was the House Privileges 
Committee (or a subcommittee of it) or a separate Committee. The Strauss Committee 
favoured the former; the Willey Committee the latter.-' The argument advanced by 
the Willey Committee was that: 
Certainly for the first years it is . . . essential to have a separate Committee, not only to 
deal with ad hoc problems or complaints but also to keep under review the whole subject of 
Members' interests and to make recommendations. For this reason it would be advisable 
to make provision for the Committee and the members thereof to be established for the 
duration of a Parliament.6 
12.22 The Committee finds itself attracted to the concept of separate Ethics Com-
mittees, with functions similar to those suggested by the Willey Committee. The 
Privileges Committees of the two Houses do not appear to be appropriate vehicles 
for the investigation of conflict of interest cases and there would be advantage in 
having a continuing committee for each House charged with special responsibilities 
in questions involving the operation of the Code of Conduct in relation to Members 
and, in particular, situations involving conflicts of interest. It would, of course, be 
necessary to evolve machinery for the receipt and investigation of complaints and 
allegations and to determine the extent of the Committees' powers. It is envisaged 
that complaints might be made to the Committee by members of the public. 
12.23 But, irrespective of any strengthening and formalising of the parliamentary 
machinery, there are likely to be a few special cases where investigation by an 'in-
house' committee such as an Ethics Committee would not provide public assurance 
that an allegation has been sufficiently investigated. Investigation by a body outside 
the Parliament may be the only means of providing the necessary reassurance. 
12.24 This problem raises the question whether all investigations of allegations 
against Members should be made by an outside body. The Committee would be 
loath to make a recommendation along these lines as it would be contrary to the 
approach favouring self-regulation which it has adopted throughout this report. 
12.25 Nevertheless, the problem of the special case is one that must be faced. The 
Committee favours a compromise arrangement under which all allegations against 
Members are initially considered by an Ethics Committee from the House to which 
the Member belongs and those cases of sufficient moment to warrant detailed outside 
investigation are referred by the House concerned to a special investigatory body 
after the House has received and considered a recommendation by the Committee. 
The nature of this special investigatory machinery is discussed in the next section of 
this chapter. 
12.26 The Committee recommends that each House of the Parliament be invited to: 
(a) establish a Standing Ethics Committee empowered to: 
(i) report to the House, from time to time, on any changes in the Code of 
Conduct that it deems desirable; and 
(ii) receive, investigate and report upon any complaints of departures by Members 
from the Code of Conduct, and, in particular, upon allegations involving 
conflicts of interest; and 
(b) determine the procedures for the operation of the Committee and the extent of 
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Special investigatory machinery 
12.27 The circumstances in which special machinery would be employed would 
resemble those for which the British Royal Commission on Tribunals of Inquiry of 
1966 thought that inquisitorial procedures would be necessary: 
There are . . . exceptional cases in which such procedures must be used to preserve the 
purity and integrity of our public life without which a successful democracy is impossible. 
It is essential that on the very rare occasions when crises of public confidence occur, the 
evil, if it exists, shall be exposed so that it may be rooted out; or if it does not exist, the 
public shall be satisfied that in reality there is no substance in the prevalent rumours and 
suspicions by which they have been disturbed.7 
12.28 In the context of the present report, the matters for the consideration of which 
the special machinery would be invoked would include: 
• allegations of major breaches of the proposed Code of Conduct by Ministers and 
Members referred to it by the Parliament; 
• allegations of major breaches of the rules governing the public duty and private 
interests of Ministers referred to it by the Prime Minister; 
• allegations of major breaches of the proposed Code of Conduct by public 
servants referred to it by the Chairman of the Public Service Board; and 
• allegations of major breaches of the proposed Code of Conduct by statutory 
officeholders referred to it by the Minister concerned. 
If a requirement for the registration of interests was introduced, allegations of major 
breaches of that requirement might also be matters for reference to the special 
machinery. The Committee would expect that the general run of breaches by statutory 
officeholders and public servants would be dealt with outside the special machinery. 
12.29 It would not be a function of the special machinery to go beyond the stages of 
investigation and report. Subsequent action would be a matter for the authority 
responsible for the conduct of the officeholder. 
Legislation in Britain and the United States 
12.30 Here mention might be made of the special arrangements that have been 
developed in Britain and the United States to deal with serious allegations of 
impropriety in public affairs. 
12.31 In Britain, the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921 provides that a 
Tribunal may be established by the Government, following a resolution of both 
Houses of Parliament which states 'that it is expedient that a tribunal be established 
for inquiring into a definite matter described in the Resolution as of urgent public 
importance'. A Tribunal has the same powers, rights and privileges as are vested in 
the High Court. It can compel the attendance of witnesses and production of 
documents. Failure to attend, to produce documents or to answer questions may be 
punished by the High Court as if it were contempt of the Court itself. Its hearings 
are public unless the Tribunal finds that this is against the public interest. 
12.32 Its functions have been described thus: 
The task of a tribunal of inquiry is to investigate certain allegations or events with a view 
to producing an authoritative and impartial account of the facts, attributing responsibility 
or blame where it is necessary to do so. It is not the duty of tribunals of inquiry to make 
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12.33 In 'the United States, allegations of public misconduct have usually been 
investigated by Congressional committees. On occasion, a Special Prosecutor has 
been appointed to insulate the conduct of the investigation from partisan influences. 
Since Watergate and public concern about possible political influence on the Depart-
ment of Justice, proposals have been made to include provision for the appointment 
of a Special Prosecutor under legislation relating to regulation of conflicts of interest. 
For example, the Senate Select Watergate Committee recommended that Congress 
enact legislation to establish permanently an office of public attorney with jurisdiction 
to prosecute criminal cases in which there is a real or apparent conflict of interest 
within the executive branch.9 
12.34 Provision for the appointment of a Special Prosecutor was eventually included 
in the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, but the Senate's plans for an Office of 
Government Crimes within the Department of Justice, to have jurisdiction in relation 
to prosecution of executive branch officers and breaches of federal laws relating to 
conflict of interest, lobbying and elections, were dropped during passage of the Act. 
The nature of the special machinery 
12.35 As previously noted, the Committee has been required under its terms of 
reference to consider whether, 'in the event of allegations of impropriety, the allega-
tion may be open to judicial investigation and report'. As a preliminary to its 
consideration of the special machinery it would recommend for adoption, the 
Committee examined whether a member of the judiciary should form part of the 
machinery. 
12.36 After careful consideration, the Committee has rejected the idea of appointing 
a judge in active service to supervise a register of interests and to investigate and 
report upon allegations of impropriety. It does not consider that the continuous 
involvement of a serving member of the judiciary with such duties would be 
conducive either to the most effective regulation of conflicts of interest in respect of 
:the Commonwealth Government or to maintaining the proper role of the judiciary 
.outside the political arena. 
12.37 In reaching this conclusion, the Committee was influenced by two factors 
'which it regarded as having special weight. First, particular investigations may call 
for a variety of skills and experience which a single person, whether a judge or not, 
might not possess. Second, the Committee believes that the public expectation of 
objectivity and integrity, which presumably led to the initial suggestion that a judge 
be 
 designated for these responsibilities, could equally be met by the alternative 
arrangements which are described below. 
12.38 The Committee considered, but rejected, the possibility of passing responsi-
'bility for the investigation of allegations of gross misconduct by officeholders to the 
Ombudsman. The Committee has reservations about involving the Commonwealth 
Ombudsman in a quite different and disparate role and subject matter, by giving him 
responsibility for investigating breaches or allegations of breaches of conflict of 
interest rules. Such a role might divert the Ombudsman from his central function, 
that is the investigation of complaints made to him by persons aggrieved by adminis-
trative actions of Commonwealth officials and agencies. In addition, the Ombudsman 
is at present explicitly or implicitly excluded by the Ombudsman Act 1976 from 
investigating the actions of Ministers or Members. He is also excluded from investi-
sating matters of public service employment such as disciplinary matters. To give the 
Ombudsman the responsibility for investigating breaches of conflict of interest rules 
would thus change, and perhaps jeopardise, his relationships with the Parliament and 
the administration. The Committee believes that the complete responsibility should 
be given to some other body. 
12.39 It should be noted that the Ombudsman Act 1976 indicates that where a 
member of the public has a 'sufficient interest' in the matter, he may make a complaint 
to the Ombudsman about an action or decision by a Commonwealth official or 
agency, on the grounds that the action or decision had been tainted by conflict of 
interest. The Ombudsman Act, s. 9 (10), also provides that, if the Ombudsman's 
investigations reveal some misconduct or breach of duty, he may, if he believes the 
circumstances justify his doing so, bring the matter to the attention of the principal 
officer of the department or prescribed authority. If that officer were the one considered 
to be at fault, the notice would go to the responsible Minister. Thus the Ombudsman 
could refer any apparent breaches of conflict of interest rules by Commonwealth 
officials to the relevant Minister, department or statutory authority, which would 
then take whatever action was thought appropriate. 
12.40 At the present time, it is always open to the Government to appoint a Royal 
Commission to investigate allegations of misconduct by officeholders. However, the 
fact that the appointment of a Royal Commission, the selection of its members and 
the determination of its terms of reference will take place after the allegations of 
misconduct have already become a political issue can give a party political flavour 
to the work of the Royal Commission. This may run counter to the main purpose of 
restoring public confidence in the proper working of government institutions. If a 
statutory body, with its members already designated by a process which transcends 
party differences, is already in existence and available to conduct the investigation 
within terms which the body itself sets, the Committee believes that this problem can 
be avoided. 
12.41 The Committee recommends that: 
(a) a statutory body, to be known as the Public Integrity Commission, should be 
created, comprising part-time members appointed by the Prime Minister after 
consultation with the Leader of the Opposition; 
(b) its Chairman should be a retired judge or person likely to be acceptable as of 
sufficient standing and experience; 
(c) there should be a standing panel of five (or seven) members from whom three, one 
of whom might be the Chairman himself, would be selected by the Chairman for 
a particular inquiry; 
(d) a secretariat should be established and located in an administratively convenient 
department or authority. 
12.42 The Committee recommends that the Commission should have the powers of a 
Royal Commission under the Royal Commissions Act 1902, including power to compel 
persons to attend, be sworn and give evidence, and to produce documents. As with that 
Act, penalties should be available for non-compliance with a direction to attend, be 
sworn, give evidence or produce documents, with acts or omissions on different days 
constituting separate offences, and imprisonment for five years for giving false 
testimony. 
12.43 The Committee recommends that the Public Integrity Commission should have: 
(a) power to employ counsel to assist it, with provision for examination of witnesses 
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(b) the same privileges and protection as a Royal Commission; and 
(c) power to take evidence in private when it considers it to be in the public interest 
so to do. 
12.44 The British Royal Commission on Tribunals of Inquiry was concerned at the 
extent to which the safeguards intended to protect the individual, which had been 
developed in ordinary civil or criminal proceedings, could be lost before an inquisi-
torial tribunal where a person against whom an allegation had been made, or a witness 
called in the proceedings, underwent the risk of having his private life exposed and 
baseless allegations made against him. It noted that over the previous thirty years some 
of the safeguards from the ordinary judicial process had been adapted to the inquisi-
torial processes of the tribunals of inquiry, but recognised that problems remained 
because it was 'impossible to eliminate all risk of personal hurt and injustice'. The 
risk could and should be minimised, but in the sort of matters with which such 
Tribunals would be concerned it was vital in the public interest that the truth should 
be established.'° 
12.45 The Royal Commission suggested six principles which, it thought, would 
largely remove the difficulty and injustice which persons involved in an inquiry might 
face: 
• before any person became involved, the tribunal must be satisfied that there were 
circumstances which affected him and which it proposed to investigate; 
• before any person involved was called as a witness, he should be informed of 
any allegations made against him and of the substance of evidence supporting 
the allegations; 
• he should be given an adequate opportunity to prepare his case and of being 
assisted by legal advisers, and his legal expenses should normally be met out of 
public funds; 
• he should have the opportunity of being examined by his own solicitor or counsel 
and of stating his case in public at the inquiry; 
• any material witnesses he wishes called should be heard if reasonably practicable; 
• he should have the opportunity for cross-examination of witnesses giving 
evidence which might affect him." 
This Committee commends those principles for the guidance of the Public Integrity 
Commission. 
12.46 An investigation by the Commission would be conducted as follows. Where 
an allegation was referred to the Commission for investigation, the Chairman would 
nominate members of the Commission to undertake the inquiry. The Commission 
would define the issues to be inquired into and reported upon, and might at any 
subsequent time prior to completing the hearings amend or extend the issues as 
previously defined. It would appoint counsel to assist it at the hearings. After allowing 
sufficient time for the person or persons against whom the allegations had been made 
to prepare his or their case, public hearings would be conducted in such place or 
places as the Commission considered appropriate to the case. Counsel assisting the 
Commission would be able to request the assistance of the Commissioner of the 
Australian Federal Police in securing evidence to be placed before the Commission. 
The proceedings before the Commission would generally resemble those before a 
Royal Commission. The Commission would make its report to the appropriate 
person or body from whom it received the reference. 
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12.47 The Commission's report would state: 
• the allegations that had been made; 
• the nature of the misconduct either alleged or implied; and 
• its findings as to what facts had been established to its satisfaction. 
There should be a statutory requirement that a report concerning a Member or-
Minister should be tabled in the Parliament by the Minister responsible for the 
Public Integrity Commission within, say, five parliamentary sitting days of its receipt.. 
12.48 The existing disciplinary machinery for public servants would need to be-
taken into consideration when providing for the operation of the Public Integrity 
Commission as affecting public servants. The Public Service Act 1922 currently 
establishes machinery for disciplinary proceedings against public servants, initiated 
by the Minister in respect of First Division officers and by the departmental Chief 
Officer in respect of other officers. The Committee recommends that provision be made 
in the Act to the effect that, where the Public Integrity Commission has received a 
request to investigate allegations concerning an officer, any action in progress or to be 
taken under that Act be delayed, pending completion of the Commission's investigation 
and presentation of its finding. 
Conclusion 
12.49 The Committee believes that the proposals just outlined would provide 
reassurance that allegations of major conflict between public duty and private interest 
are fully investigated by an agency of high standing independent of those persons 
and bodies already responsible for the discipline of officeholders. Confidence in the 
arrangements would be enhanced by the fact that the investigational hearings would 
ordinarily be in public. In the case of elected officeholders, for whom there is no 
formal disciplinary machinery, in the event of an adverse finding arising from an 
investigation, findings by the Commission would be tabled in the Parliament with a, 
minimum of delay. 
Action following conclusion of an investigation 
1230 As previously noted, the Committee does not see the proposed Public Integrity 
Commission as a disciplinary body. Its responsibilities would cease with the presenta-
tion of the findings of its investigation and it would be for the bodies concerned with 
discipline to take whatever action is deemed necessary following presentation of the: 
Commission's findings. 
12.51 For Members of Parliament and Ministers, following the passing of the 
Commission's report to the appropriate Presiding Officer and its tabling in the 
Parliament, it would be a matter for the House concerned to decide the next steps.. 
In a case where a Minister was involved, no doubt the Government itself would take 
a position, if it had not already done so. 
12.52 With public servants, the action to be taken would be through the normal 
disciplinary procedures. In the case of a First Division officer this may require a 
recommendation to the Governor-General. 
12.53 In respect of a statutory officeholder, the responsible Minister would determine 
the action. In the event of an adverse finding, he could reprimand the officeholder, or, 
more likely, since the finding would relate to a major conflict of interest, he would 
exercise his own statutory powers of removal from office or recommend removal by 
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Possible extensions to the scope of Public 
Integrity Commission investigations 
12.54 The Committee has argued above that the existing channels for citizens to 
lay complaints against officeholders concerning conflicts of interest are sufficiently 
wide to permit allegations to be brought to public notice, thereby alerting the bodies 
responsible for the discipline of officeholders of a need to take action. The Committee 
has also proposed that the work of the Public Integrity Commission which it has 
recommended should be established should be restricted to the investigation of cases 
of major importance. It may, however, be questioned whether the avenues for com-
plaint are sufficient and whether the Public Integrity Commission should not have a 
role wider than the investigation of the few major cases that are referred to it. It may 
be suggested that it should be a recipient for complaints from the public with a 
responsibility for investigating allegations where other investigatory machinery is 
lacking. 
12.55 To widen the Commission's role in this manner would require a departure' 
at least from the point of initiating investigations, from the principle that responsibility 
for standards of conduct of officeholders should be vested in those responsible for its 
management. Furthermore, it would require the establishment of an organisation with 
.a much larger structure and administrative back-up than the Committee has in mind. 
Procedures would be necessary to sift out the cases of sufficient importance to 
'warrant investigation and to ensure that there was no overlap in the Commission's 
work and that of the disciplinary bodies now in existence. The Committee has no 
evidence that a widening of the scope of the work of the proposed Commission in 
this way is presently necessary. 
12.56 In Chapter 6, the Committee recommended against the introduction of 
registers of officeholders' interests. The point was made, however, that should the 
Government consider that, contrary to the Committee's recommendation, registration 
of officeholders' interests should be introduced, the registration arrangements should 
be along the lines set out in Appendix 6. 
12.57 Should registration of interests be introduced, under the arrangements 
outlined in Appendix 6, the register of Members' interests would appropriately be 
supervised by the proposed Ethics Committee of each House of the Parliament, with 
power to question any apparent deficiencies in the information provided by Members. 
It is possible that detailed examination of the information may be called for and the 
facilities of the Public Integrity Commission could be utilised to undertake investi-
gations. The form and nature of the reference would be a matter for each House to 
decide. 
12.58 In similar fashion, the Public Integrity Commission facilities could be used for 
the investigation of alleged serious defects in the registrations by statutory officeholders 
and public servants. Again, the form and nature of the inquiries would be matters for 
direction by the Minister responsible, in the case of statutory officeholders, and the 
Chairman of the Public Service Board, in the case of public servants. 
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13. Post-separation employment 
13.1 In paras 1.7 and 1.11 it was noted that the Prime Minister had expressed a wish 
publicly that the Committee should consider the desirability of introducing a 
procedure, similar to that operating in Britain, relating to the acceptance of employ-
ment by government employees resigning or retiring from the Public Service, and, 
in particular, the acceptance by government officers of employment with firms which 
have contractual relations with the Government. 
13.2 Post-separation employment (or the employment after resignation, retirement 
or expiry of office) of public servants and others holding positions of public trust 
is recognised in a number of countries as an important area in which conflict between 
public duty and private interest may arise. In Britain, Japan, Canada and the United 
States, attempts have been made to reduce the likelihood of such conflicts occurring. 
Similar issues of principle would seem to arise, not only in relation to public servants 
(upon which most attempts at regulation have focused), but also in relation to members 
of the Defence Force, Ministers and their staffs and statutory officeholders and the 
staff of statutory bodies. Any attempt to regulate certain of these categories may, 
however, in the Committee's opinion, be neither administratively practicablen or 
desirable. 
13.3 This chapter deals broadly with the issues which are created by movements 
between the public sector and the private sector by any category of officeholder. 
Mobility between the public and private sectors 
13.4 The Committee believes that mobility between the public and private sectors is 
in general unobjectionable and even desirable. It goes part of the way to overcoming 
any shortage of managerial and professional talent which a relatively young country 
like Australia can experience in certain areas of business and government. In addition, 
such movement fosters closer relations between business and government, which can 
have the effect of furthering economic efficiency and mutual understanding. 
13.5 Nevertheless, mobility between public and private sectors may raise conflict 
of interest problems in certain cases. In its submission to the Committee, the Public 
Service Board identified the ways in which conflict of interest might arise with the 
movement from the public sector into the private sector: 
• information or knowledge gained officially (possibly including information 
concerning competitors) may be used to the advantage of the employer concerned, 
and to the disadvantage of competitors or the Government; 
• future contacts with officials known during service may lead to preferential 
treatment; 
• the hope of such an appointment may lead to preferential treatment during 
service. 
The Committee agrees that such possibilities might occur, or at least might appear 
to occur. The movement towards earlier retirement might increase the significance 
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13.6 Kowever, on reviewing a considerable number of the cases which had been the 
subject of comment in the Parliament or the press since 1945, when Commonwealth 
public servants, members of the Defence Force, statutory officeholders or the staff of 
Commonwealth statutory authorities entered the private sector on retirement or 
resignation, the Committee found that relatively few conflict of interest problems 
have arisen in Australia in practice.' In most cases, nothing objectionable was 
apparent. 
13.7 The Committee also received evidence regarding the conflicts of interest which 
might arise in relation to the movement of persons from the private sector into the 
public sector. It was mentioned that officials of regulatory agencies, recruited from 
private enterprise falling within their ambit, might have continuing financial or other 
ties with such firms, and thus a vested interest in accommodating them. Or they might 
inherit industry biases or unquestioningly accept industry's point of view on key 
policy issues. Such possibilities cannot be ruled out, although they are considered to 
be remote. The Committee received no evidence alleging misconduct or misuse of 
office in specific cases. 
13.8 The Committee makes no recommendation on movements from the private to 
the public sector. However, it would hope that the possibility of conflicts of interest 
would be one of the factors taken into account by the relevant appointing authority 
in considering the wisdom of particular outside appointments. 
13.9 The Committee also examined the situation in the United States where the 
so-called 'revolving door'—the movement between public and private sectors—has 
given rise to considerable discussion. It concluded that the potential for conflict of 
interest involved in such movement was much less in Australia, because the staffing 
policy of the Public Service is based on the concept of a career service. In the United 
States it is relatively common for persons to spend only a short time in government 
service, and in some cases to move in and out of government service several times in a 
working life. 
13.10 The Committee recognises that staff interchange schemes could also give rise 
to conflict of interest problems, for example the possible misuse of information. In 
practice it does not consider these problems significant.2 As the Royal Commission 
on Australian Government Administration pointed out, the Public Service Board and 
the outside employer should avoid arranging secondments which could lead to a 
conflict of interest, and neither party should expect a seconded person, or place him 
under pressure, to divulge any confidence.3  
13.11 Because mobility from the public to the private sector may occasionally raise 
conflict of interest problems, the Committee believes that there may be a need for a 
time lag before certain classes of officeholder take up certain forms of employment 
after leaving office. Any such restriction should be combined with a formal procedure 
whereby the time period may be reduced. 
The Committee's proposals 
Scope of the proposed restrictions 
13.12 While the Committee was required by the Prime Minister to look specifically 
at public servants, similar principles would appear to apply to Defence Force 
personnel, to most, if not all, full-time statutory officeholders and to the staffs of 
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13.13 Within the Department of Defence, civilian and Defence Force personnel 
work side by side, in particular in the sensitive area of procurement from defence-
related industries. 
13.14 Apart from the Secret Commissions Act 1905, which has some application in 
relation to job offers made as an inducement or reward to persons acting as agents of 
the Commonwealth in relation to contracts, there appears to be no legislative provision 
which regulates the acceptance of business appointments on separation by members 
of the Australian Public Service.4 At present, the only restriction on movement from 
the public sector to the private sector is contained in Regulations applying to the 
Royal Australian Air Force, which specify that officers of and above the rank of Air 
Vice-Marshal, and officers holding posts of 'a special or technical character', are 
required to obtain approval before accepting business appointments within two years 
of retirement or resignation.5 
13.15 With statutory authorities not staffed under the Public Service Act, it is 
recognised that often employees do not identify with their organisation as lifetime 
employees. The small size of some of these statutory authorities necessarily limits 
promotion prospects, especially if staff are recruited directly by the authorities and 
so do not have rights of access to Public Service Act employment. Some of these 
problems are slowly disappearing, however, with current moves towards common 
employment conditions for all Commonwealth employees and greater recognition of 
prior public sector service. 
13.16 The Committee accepts that it would be unreasonable and unrealistic to 
attempt to control the subsequent employment of part-time statutory officeholders. 
However, it recommends that part-time statutory officeholders should be enjoined to 
exercise discretion in taking up subsequent employment which might reflect on the 
previous conduct of their public duties, imply the possibility of their seeking to apply 
influence on their former authorities or give an appearance of their being in a position 
to afford improper advantage to their new employers by reason of their previous service 
as statutory officeholders. 
13.17 The position of those short-term statutory officeholders who are recruited 
from the private sector for their expertise, say, in industry, commerce or business 
activities, and who would expect, on the expiry of their term of office, to return to 
such activities, presents particular problems. There seems a real possibility of conflict, 
yet to subject such persons to restrictions might well deter them from accepting 
office. For this reason, the Committee provides in the recommendations below a 
power for the Prime Minister to exempt certain statutory offices from the proposed 
rules. It should be noted, however, that the possibility of conflicts created by such 
appointments is covered by other recommendations; for example, Chapter 10 suggests 
that the possibility of conflict should be taken into account in making statutory 
appointments and Chapter 14 makes recommendations about misuse of official 
information. 
13.18 The recommendations below are expressed in terms of public servants 'or 
equivalents'; they are to be read as applying equally to members of the Defence Force, 
full-time statutory officeholders (except where exempted), and the staff of statutory 
authorities. The position of elected officeholders is different in certain respects, most 
notably the risk of sudden and enforced removal from office, and the difficulty of 
identifying a suitable authority to approve or disapprove subsequent employment 
arrangements. The subsequent employment of Ministers and their staffs is therefore 
dealt with separately, at the conclusion of this chapter. 
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Form of proposed restrictions 
13.19 In general terms, the recommendations which follow are an adaptation to 
Australian conditions of rules and procedures which operate in Britain, and are 
applied to Crown servants.6 The Committee recommends that: 
(a) Rules be adopted which would require senior public servants, or equivalents, and 
others in sensitive areas of public employment, to obtain official assent if they 
wish to take up employment within two years of resignation or retirement from 
public employment in the following businesses or other bodies: 
. those in, or anticipating, contractual relationships with the Government; 
• those in which the Government is a shareholder; 
• those in receipt of government loans, guarantees or other forms of capital 
assistance; 
• those with which the officer's department is otherwise in a special relationship; 
and 
• those associations whose primary purpose is to lobby Ministers, Members of 
Parliament, and government departments and authorities. 
(b) The rules should apply to all officers in the First and Second Divisions of the 
Australian Public Service, and their equivalents, except such statutory office-
holders as are specifically exempted by the Prime Minister; officers, or classes of 
officers, at lower levels should be included where they are or recently have been 
in a special relationship with prospective employers by virtue of their duties. 
Categories likely to be included would be: 
• those involved in purchasing functions; 
• those involved in the preliminary stages of procurement—identification and 
definition of a requirement—especially when the capability of suppliers 
is closely connected with specifications; 
• those concerned with anticipated contractual relationships; 
• those having a significant discretion in conferring some advantage, for 
example a licence or concession, including a bounty, subsidy cr tariff; 
• those with knowledge of confidential procedures and criteria used within 
departments, which could allow anticipation or manipulation of government 
decisions; 
• those with advance knowledge of government intentions which could confer 
direct pecuniary advantage on those able to anticipate. 
(c) Departments should assume the responsibility for identifying the positions which 
should be included and should keep the resulting list under regular review to allow 
the addition and deletion of designated positions or persons. In the case of 
Defence Force personnel, this would be the responsibility of the Chief of 
Defence Force Staff and the Secretary of the Department of Defence. In the 
case of statutory authorities, this would be the responsibility of the relevant 
authority in consultation with the Public Service Board. 
Junior officers should not be subject to regulation simply because of personal 
acquaintance or friendship with, or obligations to, prospective employers or because 
they have knowledge of the subject matter of the business of the department or other 
body or because of skills acquired while in public service. The Committee expects 
that the numbers of positions designated as 'sensitive' by departments will be 
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13.20 The Committee also recommends that procedures be laid down which would 
require an applicant to obtain the assent of a committee, which would make a recommen-
dation to the applicant's Minister or the Prime Minister as specified below: 
(a) In the case of a First Division officer or equivalent seeking permission to under-
take post-separation employment in commerce or industry of a kind falling 
within the rules, the ultimate decision should lie with the Prime Minister, advised 
by a committee of Permanent Heads chaired by the Chairman of the Public 
Service Board. 
(b) In the case of officers in the Second Division of the Public Service and their 
equivalents and other designated officers, the committee would be chaired by a 
member of the Public Service Board and would ordinarily consist of senior public 
servants. The ultimate decision would lie with the Minister in charge of the losing 
department. Ministers might, however, delegate, for example to Permanent 
Heads or to the Public Service Board, decisions on defined categories of cases. 
(c) Variations might need to be made to the composition of the committees depending 
on the case being dealt with, for example whether it related to a public servant, a 
member of the Defence Force or a statutory officeholder. The committees 
should therefore have power to co-opt, both from within the Commonwealth 
sector and outside, for example an independent business or professional person. 
13.21 The Committee recommends that the Public Service Board should monitor the 
implementation and effectiveness of these rules and procedures in relation to the public 
service and statutory authorities; the Defence Department should do so in relation to 
Defence Force personnel. 
13.22 Centralising responsibility, rather than having it at the departmental level, 
is recommended because of the advantage of uniformity of practice across govern-
ment employment, and because of the need for the matter to be considered at a very 
senior level. The disadvantage of centralisation is unfamiliarity with the work and 
contacts of a department. This can be met by adequate documentation or by 
temporary co-option to the machinery established. 
13.23 The Committee recommends that, having regard to the views of the proposed 
committees on post-separation employment, the responsible Minister or the Prime 
Minister, in the case of a Permanent Head, be empowered to determine that: 
• the two-year bar on taking up employment of a specified nature, or with a named 
employer, apply; 
• the period of the bar be reduced, whether subject or not to conditions; and 
• the bar be waived completely, subject or not to conditions. 
The period of two years has been selected as the maximum period frequently adopted 
in other countries. From the evidence given to the Committee it is apparently accept-
able in Australia. There should be a discretion to reduce it where appropriate, but 
the Committee believes that the full two-year period should be adopted when there 
has been so close a connection between the former public servant's duties and the 
prospective employer that the appearance of impropriety would be strong. The bar 
would only relate to a specific type of employment or to employment with a particular 
employer and so would not amount to a compulsory period of unemployment. 
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13.24 Examples of the type of conditions which might be imposed as an alternative 
to a two-year bar are suggested by the British rules: 
(a) a bar on involvement in dealings between the prospective employer and the 
Government, either absolute or with reference to a stated issue or issues, 
lasting for up to two years, the duration to be determined according to the 
circumstances of the case; 
(b) a bar on involvement in dealings between the prospective employer and a 
named competitor (or competitors), subject to the same conditions of scope 
and duration as those at (a) above; 
(c) a requirement to seek the approval of the prospective employer's competitors 
for the proposed appointment should this not already have been done. 
Similar conditions were suggested by the Public Service Board in its submission. The 
Committee, without seeking in any way to limit the discretion of the proposed com-
mittee(s) on post-separation employment, rejects conditions (b) and (c) above. It 
believes that any problems which could arise where a public servant who had had 
access, as part of his official duties, to trade secrets of one firm and then goes to work 
for its competitor are best met by relying on the Committee's recommendations in 
the next chapter on misuse of official information, rather than on the imposition of 
what could be unfair and unrealistic conditions. 
13.25 Other conditions which might be imposed are derived from the United States 
rules and are not subject to the same problems: 
(d) a bar on acting as a paid lobbyist in dealings with Ministers, Members of 
Parliament or government departments or authorities, lasting for up to two 
years; 
(e) a bar on representing parties in any hearing before or application to a govern-
ment tribunal, lasting for up to two years. 
13.26 The Committee recommends that, in exercising his discretion, the Prime Minister 
or the Minister concerned should consider such factors as the following: 
• the importance and sensitivity of the position most recently held and, if appropriate, 
other positions; 
• the nature of the business appointment and its relationship to the official's former 
position(s) and area(s) of work; 
• the relationship of the firm concerned with the Government, for example if it is a 
regular supplier of services or equipment; and 
• the period during which information gained or contacts made within the public 
service would continue to be of value to the official and his new employer. 
13.27 Specific considerations will arise in particular cases. Take the case of public 
servants who, on retirement, seek immediately to enter the private sector. On the one 
hand, the Prime Minister or the Minister will weigh the fact that to apply the two-year 
rule may rule out any real possibility of post-separation employment. A potential 
employer might regard a person as 'stale' two years after retirement. On the other hand, 
only a few avenues of post-separation employment may be closed, and there is the 
additional fact that such officers will generally retire on substantial superannuation 
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Job offers 
13.28 On consideration, the Committee recommends that there should not be a 
requirement to report all job offers. However, it would be advisable for the Public 
Service Board to insert a caution in its Guidelines on Official Conduct for Common-
wealth Public Servants. The Draft Guidelines contained the tentative formulation: 
Staff contemplating employment with a business organisation after separation from the 
service should, at an early stage, seek guidance from the Permanent Head or the Public 
Service Board, if there is any possibility that questions of propriety could arise.7 
That formulation may allow too high a degree of subjectivity in taking the decision 
whether to report and when. The Committee recommends that, if the officer does not 
reject the suggestion of employment, and it would lie within a 'sensitive' area, reporting 
should be immediate. Even without a formal provision, public servants will recognise 
that it is prudent to report job offers to their supervisors or other senior officers 
designated for the purpose to ensure that they do not provide grounds for allegations 
of impropriety. Similarly, businesses will appreciate that job offers to those in public 
employment can cause unjustified suspicion if not done in an open manner. The Secret 
Commissions Act 1905 may also apply to officers and to businesses negotiating with 
the Government in certain circumstances, and the Committee suggests that the Public 
Service Board draw attention to the relevant provisions in its Guidelines on Official 
Conduct. 
13.29 Once there is a firm intention to move to the private sector, questions of 
propriety clearly may arise if this intention is not disclosed. The Committee recom-
mends that the rules on post-separation employment should require public servants, 
or others covered by the rules, intending to move from the public to the private sector, 
where the public servant is in one of the designated categories and intends to be employed 
in one of the designated areas of private enterprise, to report this fact. 
Enforcement 
13.30 The Committee considered the question of sanctions upon staff or former staff 
to enforce the rules recommended. It concluded that the civil law did not provide a 
firm basis for this purpose. Restraint of trade clauses, for example, if introduced as a 
condition of employment in the public sector, would have the advantages that they 
are known and accepted in the private sector, that they could be tailored to the needs 
of particular departments or bodies, and that action in respect of breaches of the rules 
need be invoked only in important cases. However, it is uncertain, as a matter of law, 
whether restraint of trade clauses are applicable in the public sector and, even if they 
were, there might be unacceptable delays and costs. The Committee would draw 
attention, however, to the civil law duty of confidence, which is breached if former 
public officials disclose to private sector employers confidential information or 
information which was imparted to be used exclusively for the benefit of the public 
service or which would assist outsiders.8 Public servants who move from the public 
to the private sector should bear the duty of confidence in mind, as well as the criminal 
provisions against misuse of information which, the Committee recommends, should 
be added to the Crimes Act 1914 (see paras 14.6-28) and, where relevant, the provisions 
of the Secret Commissions Act. 
13.31 The Committee also examined the question whether sanctions should be 
imposed on business concerns which employ or seek to employ former public servants. 
It notes that, under the Secret Commissions Act 1905, heavy penalties may be imposed 
in certain circumstances upon companies which make job offers to public servants 
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Committee notes the recommendation of the British House of Commons Expenditure 
Committee that there be legal sanctions to penalise companies which appoint ex-civil 
servants from specified jobs without first obtaining the concurrence of the Government, 
if necessary by legislation.9 It also notes the possibility that the Government could 
acquire power to rescind a contract, or not to award future contracts, where a 
company has appointed an ex-public employee in breach of the restrictions. (As a 
matter of principle, it would seem that the Crown or a statutory body could set aside 
any contract tainted with a bribe.) The Committee recalls Recommendation 24 of the 
Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Government Procurement Policy (the Scott 
Committee): that any Purchasing Commission should examine the need to restrict, 
by policy regulation, dealings with companies or firms employing ex-government 
officers whose involvement could endanger fair practice.'° 
13.32 Such action, in the Committee's view, might appear to be arbitrary and 
excessive or unjust for a minor or technical wrongdoing. The Committee received 
evidence which suggests that these disadvantages could be avoided if government 
departments incorporated such considerations informally into their decisions on 
contracts. As a practical matter, it notes that reliance on a contractual relationship 
would not extend to where the employer sought some concession or exercise of 
discretion from government, although an equivalent provision could be built into the 
procedures covering such activities. 
13.33 The Committee, therefore, recommends that no additional legislation or penal 
sanctions be introduced in the post-separation employment area at this stage. 
13.34 It is prepared to rely on the integrity of public officials, both to obtain approval 
and to comply with any decision made as to their post-separation employment. 
Publicity about breaches of the provisions may also be a useful deterrent to ex-
officials who seek to defy the procedures. The matter is one to be kept under review 
in the light of experience as to how the restrictions and the machinery actually operate. 
If the system proves unsatisfactory, legal sanctions may need to be considered. 
13.35 The Committee recommends that, if sanctions are to be imposed to enforce 
decisions in the post-separation employment area, they should be ordinary penal 
sanctions. They should not include, for example, a loss or reduction of an ex-official's 
superannuation pension entitlements. Such a sanction could not be applied to someone 
who took his superannuation as a lump sum without proceedings to recover moneys 
already paid over, and, in any event, the underlying intent of the superannuation 
scheme is that the payments are a right of the contributors. In addition, the Committee 
recommends that any such sanctions should operate against the ex-staff member, not 
against the new employer. Otherwise, prospective private employers might doubt the 
desirability of employing ex-public employees, whether in contravention of the rules 
or not, thus inhibiting beneficial movements from the public to the private sector. 
The Committee also recommends that prosecutions should take place only with the consent 
of the relevant Minister or the Attorney-General. 
13.36 The Committee prefers the approach outlined, which is based on adminis-
trative measures, to that followed in the United States (see Appendix 3), where 
federal legislation provides that, after his employment has ceased, a former official of 
the executive, or of an independent agency, must not knowingly act as agent or 
attorney for anyone in connection with a matter involving specific parties in which 
the Government has an interest and in which he participated personally and sub- 
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ceased, a former official must not appear personally as agent or attorney before any 
court, department or agency in connection with matters in which the Government 
has an interest and which was under his official responsibility for a year prior to 
termination of his job as an official. These provisions involve the blunt instrument of 
the criminal law, whose enforcement authorities might be reluctant to prosecute 
what are comparatively ill-defined offences. 
13.37 The Committee emphasises that its recommendations should not be seen as 
intended to inhibit movement from the public to the private sector. As the Salmon 
Commission remarked of similar provisions in Britain, they are designed 'to regulate, 
and not to prevent, the movement of people with experience of public administration 
in the Crown Service into business and industry'. 12  The number of cases where a 
particular movement will be blocked could be expected to be very small in terms of 
the total number of public officials who retire or resign every year. Even in such 
cases, it may be unnecessary to apply the two-year bar while still attaining the aim, 
as the Salmon Commission put it, of 'reassur(ing) the public and the business com-
munity about the impartiality of state servants'. 
Ministers and their staffs 
13.38 The Committee also considered whether recommendations should be made 
concerning the subsequent employment of Ministers and ministerial staff other than 
public servants. It concluded that this would not be practicable, nor perhaps desirable, 
in the absence of security of tenure for such offices. However, it presumes that former 
Ministers and ministerial staff would give careful consideration before taking up any 
subsequent employment which might reflect on the previous conduct of their public 
duties or imply the possibility of their seeking to apply influence on their former 
departments or give an appearance of their being in a position to afford improper 
advantage to their new employers by reason of their previous position. The Committee 
recommends that the standards expected of them in relation to post-separation employ-
ment should be brought to the attention of Ministers and ministerial staff when they take 
office, and again upon their departure from office. 
1. Australia, Public Service Board, Acceptance of Business Appointments by Public Servants 
on Retirement or Resignation, Public Service Board, Canberra, 1975. 
2. Australia, Advisory Council for Inter-government Relations, Information Paper No. 1: 
Staff Interchange Schemes of the Commonwealth and State Governments, as at February 
1978, AGPS, Canberra, 1978. 
3. Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration (Dr H. C. Coombs, Chair-
man), Report, AGPS, Canberra, 1976, PP.  145-6, especially Recommendation 94 (f) at 
para. 6.3.29. 
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5. Air Force Regulations 12/A/37B, 12/A/37C. 
6. The Rules are set out in Great Britain, Royal Commission on Standards of Conduct in 
Public Life 1974-1976 (Lord Salmon, Chairman), Report, Cmnd. 6524, HMSO, London, 
1976, pp.  192-7. 
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14. Criminal law 
14.1 The principal concern of the Committee has been with the 'grey' area of 
conflict of interest, that is behaviour which the community has not previously treated 
as 'illegal' to the point of warranting the sanctions of the criminal law, and may still 
not wish to treat in this fashion. Although there now appears to be considerable 
agreement that certain behaviour in the 'grey' area is undesirable, and should be 
discouraged or prevented, there is still disagreement about the extent to which the 
criminal law should be brought into play to achieve such ends. In the main, the Com-
mittee has avoided the 'black' area constituted by provisions of criminal law relating 
to bribery and corruption among public officeholders. It believes that this area does 
not lie directly within its terms of reference, and if the existing law is deficient, the 
Committee has received very little evidence to that effect. 
14.2 However, there have been certain matters, peripheral to the 'grey' area, which 
have frequently been raised in submissions and have been considered by similar 
inquiries in this country and elsewhere. They bear so substantially—albeit sometimes 
indirectly—on the questions with which the Committee has dealt that they have to 
be included in its discussion and, when appropriate, in its recommendations. There 
are two subjects in particular which require consideration: 
the provisions of the Crimes Act 1914 concerning bribery of Commonwealth 
officers, that is Ministers, public servants and statutory officeholders; and 
the misuse of official information. 
Bribery 
14.3 Early in its deliberations the Committee decided that bribery had only a limited 
place within its terms of reference. There are some significant differences between 
bribery on the one hand and conflict of interest on the other. For example, a conflict 
of interest situation may exist when it appears that a public official can favour private 
interests, although there is no suggestion that he has done so. 
14.4 The Committee did not seek opinions as to the prevalence of bribery or other 
corrupt offences in government, or on whether the machinery for establishing and 
punishing such offences was adequate for the purpose. However, it noted that pros-
ecutions for such offences in the Public Service were extremely infrequent. It also noted 
the opinion expressed frequently by those with long experience of public life, that 
Australia had been extremely fortunate in this regard. Nevertheless, as part of its 
wide remit, the Committee has examined the existing law relating to bribery, and 
believes that it may be deficient in several respects. 
14.5 The Crimes Act 1914 creates two offences relating to the bribery or attempted 
bribery of a Commonwealth officer. Section 73 (1) provides that any Commonwealth 
officer who obtains or attempts to obtain a bribe is guilty of an offence. Section 73 (2) 
provides that anyone who bribes or attempts to bribe a Commonwealth officer is 
guilty of an offence. In each case, the maximum penalty is two years imprisonment. 
The definition of a bribe is drawn widely. 
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14.6 The Committee received evidence that s. 73 may not cover the situation where 
a Commonwealth officer obtains, or attempts to obtain, a bribe not for himself but 
for a third party, such as a member of his family. It seems advisable that the matter 
be placed beyond doubt by the insertion of appropriate wording in the section, 
perhaps along the lines of the Secret Commissions Act 1905, s. 4 (1). The Committee 
accordingly recommends that s. 73 of the Crimes Act 1914 be amended to cover the 
situation where a Commonwealth officer obtains or attempts to obtain a bribe for a third 
party. The Committee also recommends that the culpability of intermediaries who 
arrange, or attempt to arrange, bribes be clearly expressed in the Crimes Act. 
14.7 The Commonwealth officer who solicits a bribe is caught by the existing section 
but perhaps not the officer who is offered a bribe and agrees or offers to accept it. 
The Committee recommends that there be included within s. 73 of the Crimes Act a 
provision dealing with agreements to accept bribes similar to that in the Secret 
Commissions Act 1905, s. 4 (1). 
Members of Parliament 
14.8 An obvious omission from s. 73 of the Crimes Act is of Members of the 
Commonwealth Parliament. The section applies to 'Commonwealth officers', who are 
defined to include persons who perform services for or on behalf of the Commonwealth, 
a Territory or a public authority under the Commonwealth. Clearly Members who 
are not Ministers cannot be regarded as Commonwealth officers for they stand in an 
independent position vis-a-vis the Commonwealth. On similar reasoning, Parliament-
arians do not serve under the Crown, as required by the Secret Commissions Act. 
However, Ministers would appear to be caught, as was agreed by the then Attorney-
General when the Crimes Act was introduced in 1914.' 
14.9 Although Members of Parliament apparently escape the provisions of the 
Crimes Act, R v. White 2, an old New South Wales case, established that Members 
are public officers for the purposes of the common law offences of misbehaviour 
or breach of trust in public office. That was, and is not, the position in Britain, but 
the decision received the imprimatur of certain High Court judges in R v. Boston. 3  
There the charge against the Member of Parliament was conspiracy, so that the issue 
did not arise directly. Both cases concerned Members of a State Parliament, but there 
is no reason to believe that the precedents would not be held applicable to Members of 
the Commonwealth Parliament as well. Moreover, as one witness put it, 'in so far as 
it regulates the activities of public officials the common law suffers both from obscurity, 
and from uncertainty'. 
14.10 Bribery involving Members of the British House of Commons is a matter of 
privilege which the House deals with itself. Apart from reprimand, the House can 
suspend or expel Members of Parliament and can also commit both them and an 
ordinary individual to prison, although this has not been done in the last century. 
The courts have no jurisdiction since neither statute nor common law applies to the 
bribery or attempted bribery of Members of Parliament in respect of their 
parliamentary duties. 4 
14.11 In R v. Boston,' the High Court held that a Member of Parliament could be 
charged with conspiracy by proof of an agreement that he would use his influence by 
putting pressure on a Minister. The Court assumed that the decision was consistent 
with English common law and, except for Higgins J, failed to advert to the problem 
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o the national Parliament since the Constitution provides that, until otherwise 
declared, the Commonwealth Parliament should have the privileges of the House of 
Commons. 
14.12 In the light of what has been said about the uncertain nature of the law, in 
order to clarify the position, the Committee recommends that s. 73 of the Crimes Act 
be amended to cover Members of Parliament. In making this recommendation, the 
Committee wishes to emphasise that it is motivated solely by the uncertain state of 
the present law and not because it has received any evidence on bribery in the Federal 
Parliament. To the contrary, witnesses before this Committee and, three years 
earlier, before the Joint Committee on Pecuniary Interests of Members of Parliament 
specifically exempted the Federal Parliament from any strictures about bribery in 
Australian public life. 
14.13 For Parliament to introduce bribery legislation for Members and Senators is 
entirely consistent with its privileges. In doing so, Parliament is simply recognising 
that it is better to delegate such matters to the courts, as it has done with disputed 
returns. 
14.14 Moreover, there are bribery provisions for Members of Parliament in the 
Queensland, Tasmanian and Western Australian Criminal Codes.6 The Committee 
notes that the Tasmanian provision is more far reaching than that in Queensland or 
Western Australia, for it covers activity both inside and outside the Parliament. 
Clearly it is desirable that the law should apply to matters such as representations 
by Members to Ministers and public servants, and not simply to voting or speaking 
in the House. The Committee recommends that the relevant provision of the Tasmanian 
Criminal Code be used as a guide for the extension of bribery legislation to Members of 
Parliament so as to cover activity outside the Parliament. 
14.15 The Committee considers that the value of a strong bribery law is in its 
potential as a deterrent. Nevertheless, adequate enforcement machinery is a necessary 
prerequisite to the effective operation of the law. In this respect the Committee wishes 
to endorse remarks made by the Salmon Commission on the need for practical 
measures which make it more likely that well-founded suspicions will result in prompt 
remedial action.7 
Misuse of official information 
14.16 The Committee accepts that the misuse of official information for pecuniary 
gain by persons in public life is at least as serious a potential problem as, for example, 
the possibility of official actions being influenced by private holdings of pecuniary 
interests. In Chapter 4, the Committee proposes a provision to cover misuse of official 
information in the Code of Conduct it recommends for those in public life. The 
possibility of misuse of official information is also a factor in the Committee's 
approach to post-separation employment set out in Chapter 13. In the present section, 
the Committee is concerned with legislative and disciplinary provisions which control 
the misuse of official information for private gain. 
14.17 At the outset, the Committee should explain briefly what it means by the 
misuse of official information for private gain. Essentially, the Committee is con-
cerned with the situation when an officeholder uses official information for the 
purpose of obtaining private gain for himself or any other person, or communicates 
the information to another person so that person or any other person is enabled to 
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obtain private gain." The Committee appreciates that the misuse of official infor-
mation for private gain forms but part of the whole subject of the protection and 
release of official information. The Parliament is giving attention to that larger 
problem in legislation such as the Freedom of Information Bill 1978. However, the 
Committee considers that the misuse of information which it is concerned with is 
sufficiently connected with conflict of interest to fall within its terms of reference. 
14.18 A few examples illustrate the focus of the Committee with respect to the 
misuse of cfficial government information for private gain: 
• buying or selling real property on the basis of official information about proposed 
government actions; 
• speculation on the stock market on the basis of official information about the 
affairs of a business; 
• sale of official information to commercial interests. 
These examples need simply to be described to reveal the gross misbehaviour involved 
and that it is, in effect, a form of corruption. In each case, it is clear that the office-
holder can misuse the information himself, for his own benefit or for that of another 
person, or he can disclose it to someone else—to his spouse, to a member of his 
family, or to a friend—who misuses it for his own benefit or for that of another 
person. 
14.19 The Committee has examined the existing law relating to the misuse of govern-
ment information and is of the view that it contains certain deficiencies. Section 70 
of the Crimes Act 1914, for example, purports to prevent the disclosure of information 
by Commonwealth officers and former Commonwealth officers. The section uses the 
terminology 'publishes or communicates . . . any fact or document', and the Com-
mittee accepts that this does not cover all forms of disclosure. More seriously, the 
section does not extend to situations where an officer, or a former officer, misuses 
government information himself or for his own advantage without disclosing it. 
14.20 The Committee is aware that such behaviour may be caught by the official 
secrets section of the Crimes Act 1914 (s. 79). It is also aware that there are many 
specific Commonwealth Acts imposing prohibitions against disclosure which may be 
relevant. These provisions display a considerable diversity, however, and the Committee 
recommends that the Crimes Act 1914 be amended to include a simple proscription on 
the misuse of government information with a penalty equivalent to that attaching to s. 70 
(two years imprisonment). 
14.21 The Committee is strengthened in its view by the existence of s. 124 of the 
uniform Companies Act, which says simply that an officer of a corporation shall not 
make use of information acquired by virtue of his position to gain directly or in-
directly an advantage for himself or any other person. The penalty for infringement 
of that section is a fine of $2000, but the Committee does not consider imposition of a 
fine sufficient penalty for the misuse of official information.9 
14.22 A consideration in this proposal by the Committee is whether an official 
must be shown to have mens rea or guilty knowledge before he can be convicted of 
the new offence. In Britain, the Franks Committee considered the difficulty for the 
Crown in proving mens rea under s. 2 of the Official Secrets Act 1911 (the official 
disclosure section). Although this difficulty favoured a strict liability offence, the 
Franks Committee thought that it would be wrong for an official to be convicted if 
he believed, with reasonable cause, that he was authorised to make the communication 
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legislation applied.10 Consequently, it recommended that any criminal provision to 
replace s. 2 of the Official Secrets Act 1911 should be a strict liability offence but 
should include carefully defined defences along the lines mentioned. 
14.23 The Committee is attracted to the solution recommended by the Franks 
Committee. However, it recommends that the proposed new offence should require 
mens rea. The nature of and penalty attached to the offence envisaged are so serious 
that otherwise there would be too substantial a departure from the existing principles 
of criminal law. 
14.24 In passing, the Committee notes that an offence of the 'corrupt' misuse of 
official information, along the lines recommended by the Salmon Commission in 
Britain", is not an appropriate way of introducing mens rea into the law. Definition 
of the intention necessary to constitute the crime would be more in keeping with 
Australian drafting practice than addition of an adjective to the name of the crime. 
In reply to criticism that mens rea as an element of the offence would inhibit prose-
cutions, the Committee would emphasise that an offence of this nature derives its 
value more from its character as a general deterrent than from its enforcement in 
particular cases. 
14.25 In keeping with its earlier views on bribery, the Committee recommends that 
Members of Parliament should fall within the proposed prohibition on the misuse of 
official information. The Committee also recommends that the new offence should apply 
to those persons who misuse official information which comes into their hands, provided 
that they have the necessary mens rea, whether or not they are officeholders. Not only 
persons, such as government contractors, who misuse official information which is 
lawfully entrusted to them should be culpable. In addition, these proposals would 
extend criminal sanctions to persons who misuse official information for private gain 
when that information has been disclosed to them by an officeholder, perhaps 
unintentionally. 
14.26 Misuse of official information is also covered in Regulation 34(a) of the Public 
Service Regulations. The Committee recommends that this Regulation be retained 
and similar provisions be adopted for the staff of statutory bodies where these do not 
already exist. A provision such as Regulation 34 has the advantage that the authorities 
can take internal disciplinary action against trivial instances of the misuse of official 
information for private gain without invoking the heavy hand of the criminal law. 
Moreover, such internal discipline may be the only practicable step when difficulties 
of proof rule out criminal proceedings. 
14.27 However, the Committee cannot accept that the misuse of official information 
can always be adequately dealt with by such regulations. Internal sanctions cannot 
operate against former officers of the Public Service and statutory authorities, and 
serious cases are conceivable for which the criminal sanction of imprisonment would 
be entirely appropriate. 
14.28 Similarly, the Committee considers that it would be wrong to rely on the 
duty of confidence owed by employees under the civil law to prevent the misuse of 
official information. The parameters of the duty are still uncertain, and the existing 
case law demonstrates the barriers to establishing a case in all but the most clear-
cut circumstances. In any event, the duty of confidence offers very little in the way of 
deterrence, which is the main aim of the Committee's proposed offence. 
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15. Conclusions and recommendations 
15.1 This Chapter brings together the conclusions the Committee has reached on 
the matters covered by its terms of reference and the recommendations which it 
sees as flowing from its investigations. 
15.2 Paragraph 5 of the terms of reference for the Inquiry, as announced by the 
Prime Minister on 15 February 1978, requires the Committee to regard as being 
covered by the expression 'persons holding positions of public trust in relation to 
the Commonwealth' in paragraph 1 of the terms of reference: 
(a) Ministers; 
(b) Senators and Members of the House of Representatives; 
(c) staff of (a) and (b); 
(d) members of the Australian Public Service; and 
(e) such other persons or classes of persons which in the opinion of the Committee 
ought to be included. 
For the reasons given in Chapter 1 of the report, the Committee has accepted that 
members of the Defence Force, statutory officeholders and staffs of statutory authori-
ties should be regarded as holding positions of public trust in relation to the Com-
monwealth and therefore be covered by item (e) of paragraph 5. In the preceding 
chapters of the report, it has adopted the designation 'officeholders' to describe these 
and the other classes of persons referred to in items (a) to (d) as a group. This same 
convention has been used in the summary of conclusions and recommendations which 
follow, and the summary should be read in that light. 
Conclusions 
15.3 The following are the conclusions reached by the Committee in respect of the 
matters falling within paragraphs 1 to 4 of the terms of reference announced by the 
Prime Minister on 15 February 1978: 
1. To recommend whether a statement of principles can be drawn up on the nature 
of private interests, pecuniary or otherwise, which could conflict with the public 
duty of any or all persons holding positions of public trust in relation to the 
Commonwealth. 
Conclusion: 
The Committee has concluded (para. 2.45) that it would not be possible to 
draw up a completely comprehensive and satisfactory statement of principles 
on the nature of private interest, pecuniary or otherwise, which could conflict 
with the public duty of any or all persons holding positions of public trust in 
relation to the Commonwealth. The difficulties of so doing are especially great 
as regards non-pecuniary private interests. As regards pecuniary private interests, 
definition of principles poses fewer problems, although some of those remaining 
present difficulties of a substantial kind; practical considerations suggest that, 
even where pecuniary private interests which could give rise to conflict with 
public duty are capable of satisfactory definition, it may be desirable to limit 
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2. To recommend whether principles can be defined which would promote the avoid-
ance and if necessary the resolution of any conflicts of interest which the Inquiry 
may, under paragraph (1) above, find to be possible. 
3. In the event of a finding under paragraph (2) above that principles can be defined, 
to recommend what those principles should be. 
Conclusion: 
The Committee has concluded (para. 4.2) that it is possible to define principles 
which would promote the avoidance and if necessary the resolution of conflicts 
of interest. A statement of such principles would constitute a Code of Conduct 
for all persons holding positions of public trust in relation to the Common-
wealth, having special reference to their obligations in respect of conflicts of 
interest. (Note: For the Committee's recommendation regarding what the 
principles should be, see para. 4.9.) 
The Committee has further concluded that generally provisions for the en-
forcement of the Code of Conduct should be built into the existing basic dis-
ciplinary procedures for the various categories of officeholders (para. 4.11) but 
for occasional cases of particular importance special machinery in the form of 
a Public Integrity Commission be established and given the powers described 
in paras 12.42 and 12.43, to carry out investigations and report to the relevant 
disciplinary body. 
The Committee considered whether, individually or in combination, various 
measures which, following studies of overseas and Australian practices, it saw 
as being available to buttress the Code of Conduct should be adopted in respect 
of each of the classes of officeholder with which it has been concerned. Its 
conclusions are reflected in the recommendations made in Chapters 7 to 10. 
4. Without limiting the scope of paragraph (3), above, to recommend whether or not 
a register under judicial or other supervision should be maintained so that, in the 
event of allegations of impropriety, the allegation may be open to judicial inves-
tigation and report. 
Conclusion: 
The Committee has concluded (para. 6.55) that there is insufficient justification 
at the present time to introduce a system of compulsory registration of office-
holders' interests. Instead, reliance should be placed on the Code of Conduct 
recommended for adoption in Chapter 4 of the report, which includes a 
requirement for ad hoc declarations of interest, and on the other measures 
proposed. 
The Committee recognises, however, that this conclusion is based on personal 
judgment, by individual assessment of the relative strengths of the claims of 
public accountability and personal privacy, and that some may disagree. It has, 
therefore, placed on record its views on the type of register which would be 
necessary should it be decided, contrary to its recommendation, to introduce 
compulsory registration of interests for all officeholders. It has concluded that, 
in these circumstances: 
• there should be no requirement for the registration of non-pecuniary 
interests (para. 6.61); 
• the registrable items and administrative arrangements should be those 
set out in Appendix 6 paras 15 to 37; 
• the administrative arrangements could provide for the possible use of the 
Public Integrity Commission to investigate and report on cases of special 
importance (paras 12.56 and 12.58), but responsibility for any conse-
quential action in those cases should continue to remain with the disciplinary 
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15.4 As regards the matter of the post-separation employment of officials leaving 
the Public Service, referred to by the Prime Minister in the House of Representatives 
on 7 March and 2 May 1978 and in his letter to the Committee Chairman dated 
14 March 1978 (see paras 1.7 and 1.11), the Committee has concluded that there 
may be a need for a time lag before certain classes of officeholder take up certain 
forms of employment after leaving office, combined with a formal procedure whereby 
the time period may be reduced (para. 13.11). Chapter 13 discusses this question and 
sets out the Committee's recommendations. 
15.5 As explained in Chapter 9, the Committee has not addressed itself in great 
detail to the question of government employees working in the tendering process, a 
subject mentioned by the Prime Minister on 12 March 1978 as one for examination 
by the Inquiry. It has, however, concluded (para. 9.43) that no special requirements 
additional to those proposed elsewhere in the report for public servants are necessary 
to deal with government employees working in the tendering process, but, should it 
be considered that additional measures are needed to demonstrate the propriety and 
impartiality of the operations of government in this area, the question of the desirability 
of establishing a single Contracts Board, independent of the departments or authorities 
directly concerned, to handle major contracts could be one of those measures to be 
examined. 
15.6 The Committee considered whether any special measures are necessary to 
meet the situation of non-career Heads of Overseas Missions who hold directorships 
in public companies, a matter which was the subject of a Parliamentary Question to 
the Prime Minister on 5 April 1978 (see para. 1.10). It has concluded (para. 9.35) that 
such appointees should be required to observe the Code of Conduct and to make all 
necessary disclosures. 
Recommendations 
15.7 The Committee recommends that: 
1. The Code of Conduct set out at paragraph 4.9 be adopted for general application Para. 4.9 
to all officeholders. 
2. When decisions have been taken on the final text of the Code of Conduct to be Para. 4.13 
adopted for each particular category of officeholder, every effort be made to secure 
the widest possible familiarity with and observance of the document and the ancillary 
rules and guidelines which are necessary to expand and apply its basic provisions. 
3. Subject to what is said in Chapters 8 to 10, no system of compulsory registration Para. 6.55 
of officeholders' interests be instituted. 
In relation to Members of Parliament 
4. The Senate and the House of Representatives be invited to consider: 	 Para. 7.3 
(a) amending their Standing Orders to include new Standing Orders requiring, 
respectively, Senators and Members of the House of Representatives to 
conform to the Code of Conduct; or 
(b) passing a resolution adopting the Code of Conduct; and 
(c) providing that a subsequent breach of the Code of Conduct should con- 
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Para. 7.14 	 5. Sections 44 (iv), (v), and 45 (iii) of the Constitution be reviewed. 
Para. 7.16 	 6. The House of Representatives, in considering the Committee's later recom- 
mendations about declarations by Members, be invited to consider the desirability of 
strengthening Standing Order 196. 
Paras. 7.19 7. The Senate and the House of Representatives be invited to consider adopting, 
to 7.21 	 whether by Standing Order or resolution, requirements along the lines of the 
resolution of the British House of Commons of 22 May 1974: 
That, in any debate or proceeding of the House or its committees or transactions or 
communications which a Member may have with other Members or with Ministers 
or servants of the Crown, he shall disclose any relevant pecuniary interest or benefit 
of whatever nature, whether direct or indirect, that he may have had, may have or 
may be expecting to have. 
Para. 7.22 	 8. The Senate and the House of Representatives be invited to consider including in 
such Standing Order or resolution provisions: 
(a) that a declaration of interest should be made at the earliest opportunity 
when speaking in debate or taking part in committee proceedings; and 
(b) that such declarations should be automatically recorded as part of the 
official record and indexed in Hansard for convenience of reference. 
Para. 7.24 	 9. If the Government of the day should find it necessary to introduce measures for 
registration of Members' interests, then it proceed forthwith to a comprehensive 
register. 
Para. 7.29 	 10. Registration of interests not be extended to Parliamentary candidates. 
Para. 7.35 	 11. The Senate be invited to consider its Standing Order 292 and that the House of 
Representatives be invited to consider its Standing Order 326 to determine whether 
any amendment is required to avoid conflicts of interest in respect of committee 
members. 
Para. 7.37 	 12. Each House consider the adoption of a practice that its Presiding Officer: 
(a) should resign all directorships in public companies and private companies 
which engage in significant trading operations, but may retain directorships 
in private companies which operate family farms, or pastoral holdings or 
investments, but not otherwise; 
(b) should cease to engage in professional practice; and 
(c) should cease to be involved in the daily routine work of any business. 
In relation to the staffs of Members of Parliament 
Para. 7.39 	 13. (a) Responsibility for the proper conduct of the staff of Members of Parliament 
remain with the Member they have been appointed to assist; 
(b) Members of Parliament ensure that their staff are familiar with the Code of 
Conduct and conform to it; 
(c) such staff disclose to their Members any interests which they have that are 
likely, or might reasonably appear likely, to cause conflicts of interest; 
(d) when dealing with officeholders the staff of Members of Parliament declare 
personal interests according to the same rules as apply to their Members; 
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(e) a Member of Parliament instructing a member of his staff to make represen-
tations on his behalf to an officeholder acquaint the member of staff with the 
substance of any declaration of interest he would have been required to make 
had he made the representation himself, and direct that the information be 
communicated to the officeholder when the representation is being made. 
In relation to Ministers 
14. The Code of Conduct be recognised by a letter from the Prime Minister to each Para. 8.4 
of his Ministers. 
15. (a) At meetings of the Cabinet and its committees, a Minister disclose to his Para. 8.6 
colleagues when he has an interest which does, or might reasonably be 
thought likely to, conflict with his public duty as a Minister; 
(b) his declaration be noted in the Cabinet records; and 
(c) the Minister then either indicate that he will not take part in the discussion 
in question or else secure the explicit authorisation of his colleagues for 
taking part. 
16. (a) When directing the business of the department he administers a Minister Para. 8.7 
should inform the Prime Minister of any real or apparent conflict of interest 
that arises; 
(b) the Prime Minister, unless he asks the Minister to divest himself of the 
interest, either arrange for another Minister to deal with the matter or else 
give explicit authorisation to the original Minister to proceed with it; and 
(c) in any event, the Prime Minister have the matter recorded. 
17. (a) Existing guidelines concerning gifts received by Ministers or their families Para. 8.8 
be continued; and 
(b) guidelines concerning acceptance of sponsored overseas travel be drawn up. 
18. (a) The returns of Ministers' disclosures of interests be kept, on a confidential Para. 8.17 
basis, by the Secretary to Cabinet; and 
(b) consideration be given to determining whether a small committee of senior 
Ministers, appointed by the Prime Minister or by Cabinet, be established 
to have immediate responsibility for the register of Ministers' interests, but 
with ultimate responsibility for the register remaining with the Prime 
Minister. 
19. Ministers 	 disclose 	 in 	 their 	 register 	 of 	 interests the 	 following 	 additional Para. 8.18 
information: 
(a) the beneficial interest of the Minister, or a member of his immediate family, 
under any trust, and in any nominee company, with a statement of the 
nature of operations of the trust or company; 
(b) any trust of which the Minister is a trustee, with a statement of the bene-
ficiaries and the nature of the operations of the trust; 
(c) partnership and joint venture interests with a statement of the nature of 
their operations; 
(d) liabilities; and 
(e) shareholdings, under procedures which will disclose the ultimate interest in 
circumstances where private companies are used as a screen to mask holdings 
directly or indirectly in other companies. 
Para. 8.19 	 20. When the Prime Minister or the Cabinet authorises a Minister to continue to 
carry out his Cabinet or ministerial duties in relation to a matter in which he has 
declared an interest, a record of that authorisation be made. 
Para. 8.25 	 21. (a) They resign directorships in public companies; 
(b) they may retain directorships in private companies provided that: 
(i) they make full disclosure under the rules relating to registration of 
interests concerning the assets, liabilities and activities of such com-
panies, 
(ii) such companies operate family farms, pastoral holdings or investments, 
but not otherwise; 
(c) they cease to engage in professional practice; and 
(d) they cease to be involved in the daily routine work of any business. 
Para. 8.26 	 22. A Minister divest his shares and similar interests in any company or business 
involved with his department. 
Para. 8.27 	 23. It be unacceptable for a Minister who is required to divest to transfer his 
interests to certain other persons or bodies, for example to his spouse, to another 
member of his family, or to a nominee company or trust. 
In relation to ministerial staff 
Para. 8.34 
	 24. A ministerial staff member should be subject to requirements similar to those 
applying to Ministers concerning conflicts of interest, namely he be: 
(a) subject to the Code of Conduct; 
(b) required to register similar interests as required for Ministers; 
(c) required to declare his interests when dealing with officeholders, and, on 
instructions by his Minister, to disclose the Minister's interests in situations 
involving other officeholders where the Minister himself would have been 
obliged to declare an interest; and 
(d) required to divest interests if necessary. 
In relation to public servants 
Pam. 9.5 	 25. The Public Service Board issue the Code of Conduct as a General Order or such 
other form of instruction as the Board sees fit. 
Para. 9.6 	 26. The Public Service Board review the Public Service Act 1922 and Regulations to 
ensure that existing provisions dealing with conflicts of interest are not inconsistent 
with the provisions of the Code of Conduct, and seek any necessary amendments. 
Para. 9.7 	 27. The review of the Public Service Act 1922 and Regulations include examination 
of any prohibitions in the legislation to ensure that they are compatible with the 
Code of Conduct. 
Para. 9.9 
	 28. The Public Service Board include in its Guidelines on Official Conduct advice 
that it is undesirable that members of the public servant's immediate family accept 
gifts which would give the appearance of a conflict of interest with his public duty. 
Para. 9.10 	 29. The Public Service Board give consideration to identifying permissible hospitality 
and laying down a requirement to seek authorisation in doubtful cases. 
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30. (a) The obligation to declare and the procedures by which a declaration is Para. 9.11 
recorded be set out in Regulations made under the Public Service Act 1922; 
(b) the particulars of that declaration be noted on the file(s) relating to the 
matter in respect of which the conflict exists, and also centrally recorded in 
the department. 
31. A Permanent Head disclose to his Minister when he has such an interest, and Para. 9.12 
procedures comparable to those for other public servants should then be followed. 
32. It should be the obligation of the appointing authority to question applicants Para. 9.13 
for positions on any potential conflicting interests, especially as regards sensitive 
positions or sensitive assets. 
33. No requirement for the registration of the interests of public servants be intro- Para. 9.21 
duced. 
34. If, contrary to the Committee's recommendation 33, above, a decision is taken Para. 9.21 
to introduce a register for public servants, the registration requirement be along the 
lines set out in Appendix 6. 
35. (a) The Public Service Board draw up general guidelines on authorisation; 	 Para. 9.22 
(b) authorisation always be in writing and filed so as to be retrievable in the 
event of dispute as to whether it has been granted; 
(c) there be provision for withdrawal of authorisation granted, for example 
where the nature of the interest or of the officer's duties changes, or when 
new facts emerge; and 
(d) where the obligation rests on the public servant with the interest to obtain 
authorisation, failure to seek it be a breach of discipline. 
36. (a) Public servants should not possess 'sensitive' interests which are likely to Para. 9.23 
conflict seriously with their official duties; and 
(b) Permanent Heads examine all ad hoc disclosures of interests by officers of 
their departments to identify those which are 'sensitive' and may require 
divestment. 
37. The power to require divestment as a condition of holding certain offices be Para. 9.26 
given only to the Public Service Board, which would consider an application from 
the Permanent Head of the officer concerned and have a discretion whether to issue 
the direction or not; were the officer himself a Permanent Head, then the Board, 
when apprised of the situation by a Minister, be empowered to act on its own initiative. 
38. Consideration be given to the extent to which s. 91 (2) of the Public Service Para. 9.27 
Act 1922 might be modified to allow divestment to be compulsory, with penalties for 
non-compliance, as a condition of holding certain offices. 
39. No compensation be payable for losses suffered as a result of a requirement to Para. 9.28 
divest. 
In relation to members of the Defence Force 
40. (a) Members of the Defence Force, including members of the Reserve Forces, Para. 9.31 
be required to observe requirements regulating conflicts of interest similar 
to those proposed for public servants; 
(b) the Department of Defence ensure that there be as much uniformity as 
possible with the Australian Public Service in the application of the Defence 
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(c) application of the proposed Code of Conduct to the Defence Force be a 
matter for the Chief of the Defence Force Staff in consultation with the 
Secretary of the Department of Defence; 
(d) the regulations and orders applicable to the Defence Force be reviewed to 
ensure that those dealing with conflict of interest conform with the 
provisions of the Code of Conduct, and existing regulations be amended or 
new regulations introduced where this is necessary; and 
(e) breaches of conflict of interest requirements be investigated and penalties 
determined by the disciplinary machinery already existing for the Defence 
Force. 
In relation to staff of the Parliamentary Departments 
Para. 9.32 
	 41. Those of its recommendations which refer to public servants apply to the staff 
of the Parliamentary Departments. 
In relation to consultants 
Para. 9.33 
	 42. (a) The Public Service Board's Consultants and Contractors for Services: 
Guidelines for Departments and Authorities be amended to include provisions 
that departments and authorities proposing to employ consultants examine 
the likelihood of any significant conflict of interest concerning each con-
sultant, and, where appropriate, require any consultant to disclose any 
information which might be material to an actual or potential conflict of 
interest; and 
(b) when a consultancy is likely to operate for some time, it be made a condition 
of the consultancy that the consultant disclose any conflicts of interest which 
might arise during its term. 
In relation to statutory officeholders 
Para. 10.4 
	 43. (a) The Cabinet consider recommending to statutory authorities that the Code 
of Conduct be adopted as the standard to guide the conduct of the members 
of such bodies; 
(b) each statutory authority examine for itself, in consultation with the 
responsible Minister, how the Code of Conduct should be adapted by it for 
its members, and for its staff, and what form measures supplementary to 
the Code should take; and 
(c) each statutory authority resolve formally upon its own implementation of 
the Code. 
Para. 10.6 
	 44. There be a review of provisions in relevant legislation establishing statutory 
authorities to determine whether any existing statutory prohibitions, together with any 
prohibitions that might have been adopted by resolution of the body concerned, 
require alteration in the light of the Committee's views expressed in this report. 
Para. 10.9 	 45. A provision requiring declaration of all relevant pecuniary interests to the 
responsible Minister be standard in all legislation establishing single-member 
authorities. 
Para. 10.10 46. Where a full-time chairman of a statutory authority frequently must make 
decisions under delegations on behalf of the authority, he be required to declare all 
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47. Existing disclosure provisions in statutory authority legislation (including Para. 10.12 
Australian Capital Territory Ordinances) be reviewed, with a view to adopting a 
standard drafting formula which would take into account the points made in para. 10.8. 
48. Where relevant, each statutory authority supplement any statutory disclosure Para. 10.13 
requirements by its own rules, adopted by resolution or otherwise, covering such 
matters as disclosure of relevant non-pecuniary interests. 
49. If a decision is taken to require registration of interests by the members of a Para. 10.17 
statutory authority, the matters referred to in Appendix 6 be taken into account. 
50. (a) Statutory officeholders have any authorisations recorded in the minutes of Para. 10.19 
meetings or other appropriate records of the bodies to which they belong; 
and 
(b) when authorisation relates to suspension of a requirement relating to 
conflict of interest which requires divestment or prohibits holding an 
interest, the responsible Minister be notified forthwith. 
51. (a) A Minister responsible for the appointment of a statutory officeholder should, Para. 10.20 
prior to the appointment, carefully investigate any personal interests likely 
to create, or appear to create, conflicts of interest with the duties of the 
office; 
(b) subject to any legislative provision requiring a statutory officeholder to 
possess specified interests as part of his qualifications for appointment, the 
Minister obtain from the proposed appointee explicit confirmation that he 
does not currently hold such interests and an undertaking to divest himself 
of such interests should he subsequently come into possession of them; and 
(c) when an undertaking has been given to the responsible Minister by a 
statutory officeholder that he will divest himself of certain sorts of interests, 
a sanction be provided in the event of a breach of such an undertaking. 
52. In suitable cases, an approach be adopted which would allow either the Minister Para. 10.25 
or the disinterested members of an authority to determine whether a member should 
be authorised to take part in discussions or vote on a matter in which he has an 
interest. 
53. Consideration be given to removing requirements, whether created by statute Para. 10.26 
or resolution, that would prevent a member of a statutory authority who is a repre-
sentative of a particular group or particular persons from taking part in deliberations 
or voting, provided always that a declaration of interest is made before speaking. 
In relation to the staffs of statutory authorities 
54. (a) Those statutory authorities in statutory relationship with the Public Service Para. 10.29 
Board consider adopting those recommendations in this report which apply to 
public servants, with any necessary modification to fit the circumstances of 
the authority; 
(b) those authorities which have independent staffing powers examine the 
position with respect to their staff, with a view to adopting, by way of 
staff rules or regulations, or otherwise, such of the Committee's recom-
mendations as are appropriate to the public duties of their staff and the 
likelihood of conflicts of interests occurring in respect of such duties, and 
which are not already adequately covered in existing staff rules or regulations; 
and 	 139 
(c) each such statutory authority consider how to ensure that its staff disclose 
any actual or potential conflicts of interest to their superiors or, in the case 
of senior staff, to the members of the statutory authority. 
Para. 10.30 55. If registration of interests is adopted for the Australian Public Service, then 
equivalent registration practices be adopted by each statutory authority for its staff.. 
Para. 10.30 56. The details of any registration practices concerning the staffs of statutory 
authorities, but not the contents of any registers which may be established, be made 
public. 
In relation to certain analogous officeholders 
Para. 10.33 57. The attention of the managements of Commonwealth-owned or controlled 
companies be drawn to the proposed Code of Conduct for possible incorporation in. 
their staff rules, in a modified form if necessary. 
Para. 10.34 58. The attention of joint Commonwealth—State bodies and of bodies established 
under international agreements be drawn to the proposed Code of Conduct for 
consideration, in consultation with the relevant governments, whether the Code 
should be incorporated in their staff rules, in a modified form if necessary. 
In relation to members of tribunals 
Para. 10.37 59. (a) There be no omnibus prohibition embodied in a single statute to avoid bias 
in tribunals; but 
(b) there be as much uniformity as possible through adherence to general rules... 
Para. 10.38 60. An examination be made of the conflict of interest provisions regarding dis-
closure applying to existing statutory and non-statutory tribunals when exercising 
quasi-judicial functions, with a view to introducing provisions along the lines of the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, s. 14, or bringing existing provisions up to 
this standard where appropriate. 
Para. 10.39 61. Consideration be given to deleting the qualification contained in some statutes. 
which restricts interests which must be disclosed to those arising from a 'business 
carried on in Australia'. 
In relation to the media 
Para 11.27 62. No form of government control be introduced to regulate conflicts of interest 
involving the media, but that it be suggested to the bodies presently concerned with 
the maintenance of standards of conduct in the Australian media that they should 
consider adoption, with such modifications as may be necessary, of any recom-
mendations of the British Royal Commission on the Press 1977 which are relevant to 
the disclosure of interests. 
In relation to lobbyists 
Para. 11.29 63. No special measures be taken in relation to lobbyists. 
In relation to the machinery for the regulation of conflicts of interest 
Para. 12.26 64. Each House of the Parliament be invited to: 
(a) establish a Standing Ethics Committee empowered to: 
(i) report to the House, from time to time, on any changes in the Code of 
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(ii) receive, investigate and report upon any complaints of departures by 
Members from the Code of Conduct, and, in particular, upon allegations 
involving conflicts of interest; and 
(b) determine the procedures for the operation of the Committee and the 
extent of its powers. 
65. (a) A statutory body, to be known as the Public Integrity Commission, be Para. 12.4 
created, comprising part-time members appointed by the Prime Minister 
after consultation with the Leader of the Opposition; 
(b) its Chairman be a retired judge or person likely to be acceptable as of 
sufficient standing and experience; 
(c) there be a standing panel of five (or seven) members from whom three, one 
of whom might be the Chairman himself, would be selected by the Chairman 
for a particular inquiry; and 
(d) a secretariat be established and located in an administratively convenient 
department or authority. 
66. The Commission have the powers of a Royal Commission under the Royal Para. 12.4 
Commissions Act 1902, including power to compel persons to attend, be sworn and 
give evidence, and to produce documents. 
67. The Public Integrity Commission have: 	 Para. 12.4 
(a) power to employ counsel to assist it, with provision for examination of 
witnesses by counsel equivalent to s. 6FA of the Royal Commissions Act 
1902; 
(b) the same privileges and protection as a Royal Commission; and 
(c) power to take evidence in private when it considers it to be in the public 
interest so to do. 
68. Provision be made in the Public Service Act 1922 to the effect that, where the Para. 12.4 
Public Integrity Commission has received a request to investigate allegations concern-
ing an officer, any action in progress or to be taken under that Act be delayed, pending 
completion of the Commission's investigation and presentation of its finding. 
In relation to post-separation employment 
69. Part-time statutory officeholders be enjoined to exercise discretion in taking up Para. 13.1 
subsequent employment which might reflect on the previous conduct of their public 
duties, imply the possibility of their seeking to apply influence on their former 
authorities or give an appearance of their being in a position to afford improper 
advantage to their new employers by reason of their previous service as statutory 
officeholders. 
70. (a) Rules be adopted which would require senior public servants, or equivalents, Para. 13.1 
and others in sensitive areas of public employment, to obtain official assent 
if they wish to take up employment within two years of resignation or 
retirement from public employment in the following businesses or other 
bodies: 
• those in, or anticipating, contractual relationships with the Government; 
• those in which the Government is a shareholder; 
. those in receipt of government loans, guarantees or other forms of capital 
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• those with which the officer's department is otherwise in b special relation-
ship; and 
• those associations whose primary purpose is to lobby Ministers, Members 
of Parliament, and government departments and authorities; 
(b) the rules apply to all officers in the First and Second Divisions of the 
Australian Public Service and their equivalents, except such statutory 
officeholders as are specifically exempted by the Prime Minister; officers, 
or classes of officers, at lower levels be included where they are or recently 
have been in a special relationship with prospective employers by virtue of 
their duties; 
(c) departments assume the responsibility for identifying the positions which 
should be included and keep the resulting list under regular review to allow 
the addition and deletion of designated positions or persons. 
Para. 13.20 71. Procedures be laid down which would require an applicant to obtain the assent 
of a committee, which would make a recommendation to the applicant's Minister or 
the Prime Minister as specified below: 
(a) In the case of a First Division officer or equivalent seeking permission to 
undertake post-separation employment in commerce or industry of a kind 
falling within the rules, the ultimate decision should lie with the Prime 
Minister, advised by a committee of Permanent Heads chaired by the 
Chairman of the Public Service Board. 
(b) In the case of officers in the Second Division of the Public Service and their 
equivalents and other designated officers, the committee would be chaired 
by a member of the Public Service Board and would ordinarily consist of 
senior public servants. The ultimate decision would lie with the Minister in 
charge of the losing department. Ministers might, however, delegate, for 
example to Permanent Heads or to the Public Service Board, decisions on 
defined categories of cases. 
(c) Variations might need to be made to the composition of the committees 
depending on the case being dealt with, for example whether it related to a 
public servant, a member of the Defence Force or a statutory officeholder. 
The committees should therefore have power to co-opt, both from within 
the Commonwealth sector and outside, for example an independent business 
or professional person. 
Para. 13.21 72. The Public Service Board monitor the implementation and effectiveness of these 
rules and procedures in relation to the public service and statutory authorities; the 
Defence Department do so in relation to Defence Force personnel. 
Para. 13.23 73. Having regard to the views of the proposed committees on post-separation 
employment, the responsible Minister or the Prime Minister, in the case of a 
Permanent Head, be empowered to determine that: 
• the two-year bar on taking up employment of a specified nature, or with a 
named employer, apply; 
• the period of the bar be reduced, whether subject or not to conditions; and 
• the bar be waived completely, subject or not to conditions. 
Para. 13.26 74. In exercising his discretion the Prime Minister or the Minister concerned consider 
such factors as the following: 
• the importance and sensitivity of the position most recently held and, if 
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• the nature of the business appointment and its relationship to the official's 
former position(s) and area(s) of work; 
• the relationship of the firm concerned with the Government, for example if it 
is a regular supplier of services or equipment; and 
• the period during which information gained or contacts made within the 
public service would continue to be of value to the official and his new 
employer. 
75. There be no requirement to report all job offers. 	 Para. 13.28 
76. If the officer does not reject the suggestion of employment, and it would lie Para. 13.28 
within a 'sensitive' area, reporting be immediate. 
77. The rules on post-separation employment require public servants, or others Para. 13.29 
covered by the rules, intending to move from the public to the private sector, where 
the public servant is in one of the designated categories and intends to be employed 
in one of the designated areas of private enterprise, to report this fact. 
78. No additional legislation or penal sanctions be introduced in the post-separation Para. 13.33 
employment area at this stage. 
79. If sanctions are to be imposed to enforce decisions in the post-separation Para. 13.35 
employment area, they be ordinary penal sanctions. 
80. Any such sanctions operate against the ex-staff member, not against the new Para. 13.35 
employer. 
81. Prosecutions take place only with the consent of the relevant Minister or the Para. 13.35 
Attorney-General. 
82 	 The standards expected of them in relation to post-separation employment be Para. 13.38 
brought to the attention of Ministers and ministerial staff when they take office, and 
again upon their departure from office. 
In relation to the criminal law 
83. Section 73 of the Crimes Act 1914 be amended to cover the situation where a Para. 14.6 
Commonwealth officer obtains, or attempts to obtain, a bribe for a third party. 
84. The culpability of intermediaries who arrange, or attempt to arrange, bribes be Para. 14.6 
clearly expressed in the Crimes Act. 
85. There be included within s.73 of the Crimes Act a provision dealing with Para. 14.7 
agreements to accept bribes similar to that in the Secret Commissions Act 1905, 
s. 4(l). 
86. Section 73 of the Crimes Act be amended to cover Members of Parliament. Para. 14.12 
87. The relevant provision of the Tasmanian Criminal Code be used as a guide for Para. 14.14 
the extension of bribery legislation to Members of Parliament so as to cover activity 
outside the Parliament. 
88. The Crimes Act 1914 be amended to include a simple proscription on the misuse Para. 14.20 
of government information with a penalty equivalent to that attaching to s. 70. 
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Para. 14.23 89. The proposed new offence of misuse of official information require mens rea... 
Para. 14.25 90. Members of Parliament fall within the proposed prohibition on the misuse of 
official information. 
Para. 14.25 91. The new offence of misuse of information apply to those persons who misuse 
official information which comes into their hands, provided that they have the' 
necessary mens rea, whether or not they are officeholders. 
Para. 14.26 92. Public Service Regulation 34 (a) be retained and similar provisions be adopted 
for the staff of statutory bodies where these do not already exist- 
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APPENDIX 1 
Persons or organisations who made written 
submissions to the committee 
Administrative and Clerical Officers' 
Association 
Advertiser Newspapers Limited 
Austarama Television Pty Ltd (ATV 
Channel 0) 
Australia Council 
Australian Apple and Pear Corporation 
Australian Atomic Energy Commission 
Australian Broadcasting Commission 
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal 
Australian Capital Territory Police 
Australian Council of Trade Unions 
Australian Dairy Corporation 
Australian Egg Board 
Australian Greek Welfare Society 
Australian Honey Board 
Australian Parliamentary Labor Party, 
Federal Opposition Parliamentary 
Leaders 
Australian National Airlines Commission 
Australian National Railways Commission 
Australian Postal Commission 
Australian Shipping Commission 
Australian Telecommunications 
Commission 
Australian Tourist Commission 
Australian Wheat Board 
Bailey, Mr P. H., O.B.E. 
Baume, Senator P. E. 
	 . 
Brisbane TV Limited (Channel Seven) 
Brown, Mr N. A., M.P. . 
Cairns, The Hon. K. M., M.P. 
Cameron, The Hon. C. R., M.P. 
Charles, Mr A. E. . 	 . 
Special Adviser on Human Rights, 
Attorney-General's Department 
(appearing in private capacity) 
Senator for New South Wales 
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• Member for Diamond Valley 
Member for Lilley 
Member for Hindmarsh 
Lumea, N.S.W. 
Commonwealth Banking Corporation 
Council of Australian Government 
Employee Organisations 
Customs Agents Federation of Australia 
Davies Brothers Limited 
Davies, The Hon. R., M.L.A. Leader of the Opposition, Parliament 
of Western Australia 
Defence Force, Chief of Defence Force Staff 
and the Chiefs of Staff 
Department of Aboriginal Affairs 
Department of Administrative Services 
Department of Business and Consumer 
Affairs 
Department of Construction 
Department of Defence 
Department of Education 
Department of Employment and Industrial 
Relations 
Department of Environment, Housing and 
Community Development 
Department of Finance 
Department of Foreign Affairs 
Department of Health 
Department of Home Affairs 
Department of the Northern Territory 
Department of Primary Industry 
Department of Trade and Resources 
Department of Transport 
Department of the Treasury 
Department of Veterans' Affairs 
Dowd, Mr J. R. A., M.L.A. . 
	 . 	 . Member for Lane Cove, Legislative 
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Eastman, Mr D. . 
	 . 
Edwards, Mr E. V. 
	 . 
Ellicott, The Hon. R. J., Q.C., M.P.. 
Encel, Professor S. . 
	 . 
Evans, Senator G. J. 
	 . 
Everingham, The Hon. Dr D. N., M.P. 
Everingham, Mr P. A. E., M.L.A. 
Assembly of N.S.W. 	 - 
Mawson, A.C.T. 
• Ainslie, A.C.T. 
• Minister for the Capital Territory and 
Minister for Home Affairs 
School of Sociology, University of 
New South Wales 
• Senator for Victoria 
• Member for Capricornia 
• Chief Minister and Attorney-General, 
Northern Territory Legislative 
Assembly 
Federation of Australian Radio Broadcasters 
Finn, Dr P. D. 
	 . 
Guest, The Hon. J. V. C., M.L.0 
Hamer, The Hon. R. J., E.D., M.L.A. 
Harrison, Mr F. L. 
Hasluck, The Rt Hon. Sir Paul, K.G., 
G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O. 
Herald and Weekly Times Ltd 
Hird, Mr H. J., M.L.A. 
Hoggart, Mr L. 	 . 
Holding, Mr A. C., M.P. 
Hyde, Mr J. M., M.P. 
Institute of Public Affairs (N.S.W.) 
Institute of Public Affairs in Victoria 
Isaacs, Mr J., M.L.A. 	 . 
Jacobi, Mr M. 	 . 	 . 
John Fairfax Limited 
Joint Government Parties of Western 
Australia 
Keeffe, Senator J. B. 	 . 
Kelly, Mrs R. J., M.L.A. 
Kilgariff, Senator B. F. . 
Killen, The Hon. D. J., M.P. 
Leedman, Mr J. W., M.L.A. 
Lindgren, Professor K. E. 
Macdonald, Mr C. R. . 
McMahon, The Rt Hon. Sir William, 
G.C.M.G., C.H., M.P. 
Mason, Mr W. R. . 	 . 
Metherell, Dr T. . 	 . 
Morris, Mr P. F., M.P. . 
Neil, Mr M. J., M.P. 	 . 
New South Wales Privacy Committee 
News Limited 
Palmer, Mr C. V. L. 	 . 
Poulgrain, Mrs A. . 
	 . 
Senior Lecturer in Law, Australian 
National University 
Member for Monash, Legislative 
Council of Victoria 
• Premier of Victoria 
Brisbane, Qld 
Dalkeith, W.A. 
Member, A.C.T. Legislative Assembly 
Yarraville, Vic. 
Member for Melbourne Ports 
Member for Moore 
Leader of the Opposition, Northern 
Territory Legislative Assembly 
Sherwood, Qid 
• Senator for Queensland 
Member, A.C.T. Legislative Assembly 
Senator for the Northern Territory 
Minister for Defence 
• Leader, Liberal Party, A.C.T. 
Legislative Assembly 
Professor of Legal Studies, University 
of Newcastle 
• Managing Director, David Syme and 
Company Limited; Publisher, The 
Age 
Member for Lowe 
Pearce, A.C.T. 
• Office of the Minister for Education 
Member for Shortland 
Member for St George 
Chartered Engineer, Kaleen, A.C.T. 
Cairns, Qid 	 147 
Premier's Department, South Australia 
Public Service Board 
Puplick, Senator C. J. G. 
Pye, Mr T. W. W., M.B.E., M.L.A.. 
Queensland Newspapers Pty Ltd 
Rae, Senator P. E. . 
Reid, Professor G. S. 
Renard, Mr I. A. . 
Rocher, Senator A. C. 
Ruddock, Mr P. M., M.P. 
Scholes, Mr G. G. D., M.P. 
Shack, Mr P. D., M.P. 
Snedden, The Rt Hon. Sir Billy Mackie, 
K.C.M.G., Q.C., M.P. 
Swan Television and Radio Broadcasters 
Limited 
Tonkin, Mr A. R., M.L.A. 
Tonkin, Mr D. 0., M.H.A. 
Tuxworth, Mr I., M.L.A. 
Senator for New South Wales 
Member, A.C.T. Legislative Assembly 
• 	 Senator for Tasmania 
• Department of Politics, University of 
Western Australia 
Adviser to the Prime Minister 
Senator for Western Australia 
Member for Dundas 
• Member for Corio 
• Member for Tangney 
Speaker of the House of 
Representatives 
• Member for Morley, Parliament of 
Western Australia 
Leader of the Opposition, South 
Australia 
Cabinet Member for Resources and 
Health, Northern Territory 
Legislative Assembly 
United Telecasters Sydney Limited 
Webster, Senator the Hon. J. J. 
	 • 	 . Minister for Science 
Whitlam, The Hon. E. G., A.C., Q.C. . Visiting Fellow, Australian National 
University 
Wran, The Hon. N. K., Q.C., M.L.A. 	 . Premier of New South Wales 
Yates, Mr W., M.P. 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 . Member for Holt 
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APPENDIX 2 
Persons who appeared before the committee 
to give oral evidence 
Bailey, Mr P. H., O.B.E. 
Besley, Mr M. A. . 
Boulton, Mr A. J. . 
Bowen, The Hon. L. F., M.P. 
Button, Senator J. N. 
Cairns, The Hon. K. M., M.P. 
Cameron, The Hon. C. R., M.P. 
Cameron, Mr J. R. A. 
Christie, Mr V. T. . 
Cole, Mr R. W. 
Collins, Mr F. M. 
• Special Adviser on Human Rights, 
Attorney-General's Department 
(appearing in private capacity) 
• Secretary, Department of Business and 
Consumer Affairs 
• Lecturer in Law, Australian National 
University (appearing on behalf of 
the Australian Council of Trade 
Unions) 
Deputy Leader of the Opposition 
Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the 
Senate 
• Member for Lilley 
• Member for Hindmarsh 
• General Manager, Australia Council 
Deputy Managing Director, Common-
wealth Banking Corporation 
• Secretary, Department of Finance 
First Assistant Secretary, Wool 
Division, Department of Primary 
Industry 
• Chairman, Commonwealth Banking 
Corporation 
Secretary, Department of the Capital 
Territory 
• Leader of the Opposition, Western 
Australia 
• Secretary, Australian Shipping 
Commission 
• Member for Lane Cove, Legislative 
Assembly of N.S.W. 
• Senior Legal Officer, Attorney-
General's Department, South 
Australia 
• Senior Research Officer, Administrative 
and Clerical Officers Association 
• General Manager, Australian 
Broadcasting Commission 
Crisp, Professor L. F. 
Daniels, Mr L. J., O.B.E. 
Davies, The Hon. R., M.L.A. 
Davis, Mr L. G. . 
Dowd, Mr J. R. A., M.L.A. 
Doyle, Ms M. 
	 . 
Doyle, Mr R. S. . 
Duckmanton, Mr T. S., C.B.E. 
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Dyason, Mr V. H., M.B.E. 
Evans, Senator G. J. 
Finn, Dr P. D. 
	 . 
Foster, Mr D. L. . 
Fraser, The Rt Hon. J. M., C.H., M.P 
George, Professor D. W., A.O. 
Gordon, Mr H. 	 . 
Gradwell, Mr R. L. 
General Manager, Australian National 
Railways Commission 
Senator for Victoria 
Senior Lecturer in Law, Australian 
National University 
Federal Director, Federation of 
Australian Radio Broadcasters 
Prime Minister of Australia 
Chairman, Australian Atomic Energy 
Commission 
Executive Editor, Herald and Weekly 
Times 
Federal Secretary, Council of 
Australian Government Employee 
Organisations 
Member for Monash, Legislative 
Council of Victoria 
Chairman, Australian Broadcasting 
Tribunal 
Secretary, Department of Transport 
Privacy Commissioner, Canadian 
Human Rights Commission 
Dalkeith, W.A. 
Editor, The Mercury, Hobart 
Leader of the Opposition 
Member for Denison 
Member for Melbourne Ports 
Member for Moore 
Chairman, Australian Shipping 
Commission 
Secretary, Department of Education 
Senator for Queensland 
Minister for Defence 
Director-General, Department of 
Social Security 
Secretary, Department of Environment, 
Housing and Community 
Development 
Secretary, Department of 
Administrative Services 
Leader, Liberal Party, A.C.T. 
Legislative Assembly 
• Assistant Secretary, Department of 
Administrative Services 
Secretary, Joint Government Parties of 
Western Australia 
Guest, The Hon. J. V. C., M.L.C. 
Gyngell, Mr B. 
Halton, Mr C. C. . 
Hansen, Ms I. 	 . 
Hasluck, The Rt. Hon. Sir Paul, K.G., 
G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O. 
Hawker, Mr D. N. 
Hayden, The Hon. W. G., M.P. 
Hodgman, Mr W. M., M.P. 
Holding, Mr A. C., M.P. 
Hyde, Mr J. M., M.P. 
Jenner, Mr N. G. . 
Jones, Mr K. N., C.B.E. 
Keeffe, Senator J. B. 
Killen, The Hon. D. J., M.P. 
Lanigan, Mr P. J., O.B.E. 
Lansdown, Mr R. B., C.B.E. 
Lawler, Mr P. J., O.B.E. 
Leedman, Mr J. W., M.L.A. 
Lenihan, Mr D. M. 
Lewis, The Hon. A. A., M.L.C. 
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Low, Mr G. A. 	 . 	 . 
Lynch, The Rt Hon. P. R., M.P. 
McCubbin, Mr G. 
	 . 
MacDonald, General Sir Arthur, K.B.E., 
C.B., O.B.E. 
Macdonald, Mr C. R. . 
MacDonald, Mr H. B. . 
MacDonald, Mr K. A. . 
McKenzie, Mr K. C. 	 . 
McLelland, Mr A . 
	 . 
McLeod, Mr. R. N. 	 . 
McMahon, The Rt Hon. Sir William, 
G.C.M.G., C.H., M.P. 
McMichael, Dr D. F. . 
McMillan, Mr J. . 	 . 
First Assistant Secretary, Purchasing 
Division, Department of 
Administrative Services 
Minister for Industry and Commerce 
Assistant Director, Personnel 
Management, Department of Trade 
and Resources 
Chief of Defence Force Staff 
Managing Director, David Syme and 
Company Limited; Publisher, The 
Age 
First Assistant Secretary, Department 
of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 
General Manager, Australian Tourist 
Commission 
Secretary, Department of Employment 
and Industrial Relations 
Vice-President, Institute of Public 
Affairs (N.S.W.) 
Secretary, Public Service Board 
Member for Lowe 
Secretary, Department of Home Affairs 
Pamela Coward and Associates, 
representing Ms R. Kelly, M.L.A. 
Acting Managing Director, Australian 
Postal Commission 
Chairman, Public Service Board of 
South Australia 
• Director, Institute of Public Affairs in 
Victoria 
• Member for St George 
Minister for Transport 
• Chairman, Australian Broadcasting 
Commission 
• Executive Member, N.S.W. Privacy 
Committee 
Assistant Secretary, Department of 
Construction 
• Principal Executive Officer, 
Department of Construction 
• Chairman, Australian Wheat Board 
Senator for New South Wales 
• Adviser to the Prime Minister 
• Commonwealth Ombudsman 
Minister for Finance 
McQuitty, Mr D. G. 
Mercer, Mr D. 	 . 
Neave, Mr R. 	 . 
Neil, Mr M. J., M.P. 	 . 
Nixon, The Hon. P. J., M.P. 
Norgard, Mr J. D. . 
Orme, Mr. W. J. . 
Pearce, Mr J. W. . 
Pitt, Mr R. G. 	 . 
Price, Sir Leslie, K. B., O.B.E. 
Puplick, Senator C. J. G. 
Renard, Mr I. A. 
Richardson, Professor J. E. 
Robinson, The Hon. E. L., M.P. 
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Rocher, Senator A. C. 
	 . 	 . . 	 Senator for Western Australia 
Ryan, Mr D. M. 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 . . 	 Policy Division, Premier's Department, 
South Australia 
Scully, Mr J. 
	 . 	 . 	 . 	 . . 	 Secretary, Department of Trade and 
Resources and Department of the 
Special Trade Representative 
Smith, Mr I. H. 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 . . 	 Deputy Secretary, Department of 
Primary Industry 
Smith, Mr W. J. 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 . . 	 Executive Officer, Council of Australian 
Government Employee Organisations 
Snedden, The Rt Hon. Sir Billy Mackie, Speaker of the House of 
K.C.M.G., Q.C., M.P. Representatives 
Somervaille, Mr R. D. 
	 . 	 . 	 . . 	 Chairman, Australian 
Telecommunications Commission 
and Overseas Telecommunications 
Commission 
Spiller, Ms J. 
	 . 	 . 	 . 	 . . 	 Acting General Manager, Corporate 
Affairs Department, Australian 
Postal Commission 
Stone, Mr J. 0. 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 . Deputy Secretary, Department of the 
Treasury 
Tange, Sir Arthur, A.C., C.B.E. 	 . 	 . Secretary, Department of Defence 
Taylor, Mr J. C. 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 . Acting Chairman, Public Service Board 
Tonkin, Mr A. R., M.L.A. 	 . 	 . 	 . Member for Morley, Legislative 
Assembly of Western Australia 
Tonkin, Mr D. 0. 
	 . 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 . Leader of the Opposition, South 
Australia 
Tune, Mr J. M. L. . 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 . Partner in Duffield, Hastwell, 
Tune and Co. 
Vallee, Mr R. P., M.L.A. 	 . 	 . 	 . Leader, Australian Labor Party, A.C.T. 
Legislative Assembly 
Vial, Sir Kenneth, C.B.E. 	 . 	 . 	 . Chairman, Australian National 
Airlines Commission 
Wallace, Mr D. 
	 . 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 . Senior Inspector, Public Service Board 
Webster, Mr A. A. S. 
	 . 	 . 	 . 	 . Chairman, Australian Dairy 
Corporation 
Webster, Senator the Hon. J. J. 
	 . 	 . Minister for Science 
Whitlam, The Hon. E. G., A.C., Q.C. 
	
. Visiting Fellow, Australian National 
University 
Wilcox, The Hon. V. F., C.B.E., Q.C. 	 . Carwoola, Alexandria, Vic. 
Wriedt, Senator the Hon. K. S. 	 . 	 . Leader of the Opposition in the Senate 
Yates, Mr W., M.P. 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 . Member for Holt 
Yeend, Mr G. J., C.B.E. 	 . 	 . Secretary, Department of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet 
Young, Mr R. J. 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 . 	 . Commissioner, Public Service Board 
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APPENDIX 3 
Recent overseas measures for the 
regulation of conflicts of interest 
1. This appendix surveys some recent overseas measures for the regulation of 
conflicts of interest amongst officeholders. It deals in particular with action taken 
in Britain, Canada and the United States of America, but makes reference to measures 
in a number of other countries. In some instances it has been found desirable to look 
back in time to trace the antecedents of arrangements which are still operative, but the 
appendix does not purport to attempt to set down a detailed history of measures to 
regulate conflicts of interest. 
2. For convenience of reference, the material presented has been broken down into 
sections corresponding to the categorisation of measures for resolving or avoiding 
conflict used in the main report. Additional information on overseas practices in 
relation to the registration of officeholders' private interests is to be found in Appendix 
6.  
Introduction 
3. Measures for the regulation of conflicts of interest amongst officeholders have 
a long history in many countries. In Britain they date from at least the seventeenth 
century, when the House of Commons adopted resolutions concerning the conduct 
of Members within the Parliament, and in the United States of America there have 
been statutes regulating conflicts of interest of officeholders since the Civil War 
period.' 
Britain 
4. Two periods can be distinguished in Britain, the first covering the years up to the 
middle of the nineteenth century, and the second the years since. The first period 
saw three main developments—exclusion of government contractors from the House 
in 1782, formulation of the rule relating to disallowance of votes in 1811, and a require-
ment for declaration of disinterestedness from members of railway Bill committees 
in 1855. The second period saw the development of the custom of ad hoc declaration 
of interests in the first half of the twentieth century and the movement for the establish-
ment of a register of interests which emerged in the 1960s. This period saw the establish-
ment of a code of conduct for Ministers and the establishment of inquiries to investigate 
breaches of conflict of interest provisions in the local government area and the civil 
service. Parliamentary Committees also investigated allegations of misconduct 
amongst Members. 
Canada 
5. The survey of Canadian measures for the regulation of conflict of interest situations 
is confined to the period of the 1960s and 1970s. It begins with the introduction of 
rules of conduct for Ministers in 1964, and covers the moves to implement the principles 
outlined in a 1973 green paper on Members of Parliament and conflict of interest and 
guidelines for public servants, and concludes with reference to the provisions of the 
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United States of America 
6. In the United States of America, attempts to regulate conflicts of interest have led 
to an elaborate system of statutes, primarily dating from 1872 but given new impetus 
by scandals at various times up to the present day. Scandals in the Federal Government 
in the immediate post-World War II years produced one of the first recognitions of the 
need for codes of government ethics.2 
7. In the decade of the 1960s, renewed Congressional concern with the ethics of the 
three branches of government became apparent. Cases of misconduct involving a 
Senator, a Congressman and a Senate aide led to the establishment of a Senate Ethics 
Committee in 1964, a House of Representatives Committee on Members' Conduct 
in 1968 and the adoption of ethics codes for both Houses in 1968. Regulation of the 
conduct of the executive branch was strengthened in the Kennedy and Johnson Admin-
istrations by a series of executive orders, the final one in 1965 requiring separate codes 
of conduct for each department and agency of the executive branch.4 
. Moves to tighten the existing codes of ethics for members of the judiciary followed 
in the wake of the resignation of a Supreme Court judge and the rejection by the Senate 
of the nomination of his replacement.' The Watergate scandal early in the present 
decade and more recent cases of Congressional misconduct led to moves to tighten the 
existing codes and practices. Both Chambers extended their ethics codes in 1977 and 
more recent Bills and supplementary measures have aimed at requiring public financial 
disclosure by legislators, members of the executive branch of the Administration and 
the judiciary. 
9. Congress passed an Ethics in Government Act in 1978 requiring public disclosure 
of interests by the legis1atie, executive and judicial branches, with machinery for 
enforcement of the requirement including an Office of Government Ethics. New 
restrictions were placed on the 'revolving door' between government and private 
enterprise. In addition, procedures were laid down for investigations of allegations of 
wrong-doing by a President or high officials of the executive branch. 
A code of conduct 
Britain 
10. In Britain, the first systematic attempt to formulate an extensive set of rules for 
officeholders came from the Redcliffe-Maud Committee on Local Government Rules 
of Conduct in 1974. The Committee recommended a national code of conduct to 
supplement statutes and standing orders for elected local government councillors 
(Attachment 1). That Committee expressed the hope that the code would be extended 
to local government employees, through the negotiation by the relevant bodies of 
changes to the standard conditions of service for employees. The proposed code 
comprised nine articles drafted in accordance with the Redcliffe-Maud criterion that 
'it should be a short, simple, and lucid statement of principles and of their practical 
application. . . of such length and format as to enable the user to carry it about with 
him easily'.6 With minor modifications, it was promulgated in 1975 for local govern-
ment councillors, and was subsequently endorsed by the Salmon Commission as 
'an admirable document that gives local councillors an unambiguous description of the 
standards of conduct that are expected of them'.' 
11. There already existed in Britain a code of conduct for Ministers, which had 
evolved gradually during the twentieth century under several Prime Ministers, begin-
ning with Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's prohibition on the retention of director- 
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statement on Ministers' pecuniary interests in 1913, and Mr Chamberlain's statement 
on private practice by solicitor Ministers in 1937 and his extension of the prohibition 
on the holding of directorships by Ministers to cover certain types of private company 
in 1939. This code was consolidated by Mr Churchill in 1952 in a statement incorpor-
ated in Hansard (Attachment 2). 
12. Its text influenced the basic principles on Ministers' private interests adopted in 
New Zealand in 1956, following investigation by a Select Committee of that country's 
House of Representatives.8 These, in turn, were recommended for adoption almost 
verbatim by the Qualifications Committee of the Victorian Parliament in 1974, and 
eventually endorsed in the Code of Conduct for Members of Parliament laid down in 
the Members of Parliament (Register of Interests) Act 1978, s. 3. (See Appendix 5, 
Attachment 1). The Churchill statement has also been adopted by Fiji as the basis for 
its code of Ministerial conduct. 
Canada 
13. In Canada in 1964, the then Prime Minister laid down rules of conduct for 
Ministers and ministerial staff. In 1973, his successor prescribed guidelines as standards 
of conduct for Ministers.9 The 1973 green paper, Members of Parliament and Conflict 
of Interest, outlined eight basic principles but did not suggest they constitute a code: 
No proposal is intended to flow directly from any particular principle; rather, these 
principles are designed as a framework for reform and an attempt to delineate some 
basic moral and theoretical guidelines to follow in approaching the conflict of interest 
problem as it applies to Members of Parliament.10 
That same year, the Canadian Federal Government issued Guidelines to be Observed 
by Public Servants Concerning Conflict of Interest Situations, and the Prime Minister 
made a statement to the House of Commons explaining their underlying principles." 
14. Certain of the Canadian provinces have also laid down codes of conduct for their 
public servants. These have taken various forms, such as a regulation made under the 
Public Service Act defining classes of conflict of interest situations (Ontario), an 
Order-in-Council formulating the duties of the public service (Quebec) and, more 
recently, a comprehensive code of conduct and ethics (Alberta). 
United States of America 
15. In the United States, the idea of a Commission on Ethics to recommend 
standards of conduct to both the executive and the legislative branches was raised 
as early as 1951.12 
 A code of ethics for government employees was set out in a 1958 
Joint Resolution of the House of Representatives and Senate.13 In 1965, the President 
issued an Executive Order which prescribed standards for regular public servants and 
special employees, such as consultants and advisers, and also made detailed provision 
for registration of interests. 
16. In 1968, both Houses of Congress adopted rules relating to financial disclosure 
by their members and the House of Representatives introduced a code of official 
conduct. In 1977, the House amended its code slightly, but the Senate left its equivalent 
provisions unchanged. Presidential guidelines for White House staff were issued in 
1975. In 1977, the Comptroller General's report, Action Needed o Make the Executive 
Branch Financial Disclosure System Effective, revived proposals for an Office of 
Ethics within the executive branch to lay down uniform and clearly stated standards 
of conduct.14 The Office of Government Ethics was established within the Office of 
Personnel Management by the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. 
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Papua New Guinea 
17. In Papua New Guinea, a comprehensive Code of Conduct has been adopted 
for national leaders, including all important officeholders. The Parliamentary Integrity 
Ordinance 1971 had imposed obligations on Members of the House of Assembly to 
declare and to register interests, and, if a Ministerial Member or holder of parliamen-
tary office, not to act as director of a company. The final report of the Constitutional 
Planning Committee in 1974 suggested a Leadership Code, later incorporated in the 
Constitution, comprising a number of general items, additional items relating to 
Ministers, and further items relating to specified officeholders." The Organic Law on 
the Duties and Responsibilities of Leadership 1975 was made under those Constitutional 
provisions. In 1978, alterations were proposed to the Constitution to extend the 
prohibitions of the Leadership Code but the proposals were subsequently withdrawn. 
Prohibition 
Britain 
18. An early use of prohibitions to regulate the conduct of officeholders is to be 
found in the disqualification of holders of offices of profit and government contractors 
from membership of the House of Commons in Britain, discussed at paras 7.8-9 of 
the main report. 
19. In addition, a ruling by Mr Speaker Abbott given in the House of Commons 
on 17 July 1811 confirmed an earlier rule that a Member whose pecuniary interest 
would be affected by the result of a vote should not participate in that vote and 
expressed the view that: 
this interest . . . must be a direct pecuniary interest, and separately belonging to the 
persons whose votes were questioned, and not in common with the rest of his Majesty's 
subjects, or on a matter of state policyJ°  
20. Similar formulations have been adopted by other legislatures patterned upon the 
House of Commons, including those of the Australian States. (See Appendix 5, 
paras 3-6.) In Canada, although the language of what is now Standing Order 11 of 
their House of Commons omits any phrase such as 'and not in common with the 
rest of his Majesty's subjects', since the nineteenth century it has been given the 
same restrictive meaning by Speakers, who relied on the British rulings. 
21. Each phrase of Mr Speaker Abbott's ruling has been glossed by later Speakers so 
as to limit the effect of the prohibition. Thus the qualification 'and not in common 
with the rest of his Majesty's subjects' has been held to mean that membership of a 
class or group which stands to benefit financially from a measure does not prevent a 
Member from voting for it. For example, Members may vote to increase their own 
salaries, because the personal private gain is only incidental to the public or general 
benefit. Votes on private Bills, because they do not concern matters of state policy, 
are not covered.'7 
Canada 
22. In Canada, the Independence of Parliament Bill 1978, introduced while this 
Committee was conducting its inquiry, would prohibit Members of Parliament 
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United States of America 
23. In the United States, both the Code of Ethics of the Senate and the Code of 
Official Conduct of the House of Representatives contain prohibitions against 
acceptance by a Member, officer or employee of the Senate or the House of Represent-
atives, as the case may be, of compensation the receipt of which would occur by virtue 
of influence improperly exerted from his position in the Congress. There is also a 
prohibition on the holding by a Federal Government employee of any direct or 
indirect financial interest that conflicts, or appears to conflict, substantially with his 
government duties and responsibilities, and on engaging in, directly or indirectly, a 
financial transaction on the basis of information obtained through his government 
employment. Employees are also subject to statutory prohibitions, such as that 
requiring them to refrain from participating personally and substantially in their 
governmental capacity in any matter in which they, their spouses, minor children or 
outside business associates have a financial interest. The Constitutional requirement 
for the Senate to consent to any executive branch (and judicial) appointments led a 
variation on prohibition in the 1950s whereby consent to such an appointment would 
be withheld unless the appointee complied with divestment requirements tailored to 
his official duties. 
24. In both Britain and the United States, the use of prohibition appears to have 
had a limited impact on conflict of interest situations. The British prohibitions have 
narrow ambits. The American statutes carry severe penalties, but there appears to 
have been a reluctance to invoke them. For example, the effect of legislation passed 
in 1944 as an attempt to tighten up controls in relation to post-separation employment 
was restricted in its scope by a decision of the Supreme Court.18 
Declaration 
25. The custom of declaring a pecuniary interest during debate appears to have 
taken shape in the British House of Commons only in the twentieth century.19 No 
such custom developed in the United States Congress, whilst in Canada the green 
paper of 1973 could say only: 'While a very uncertain tradition of verbal disclosure 
may exist in Canada, a review of Parliamentary precedents indicates no consistent 
adherence to this custom.120  
Britain 
26. Mr Speaker Morrison (later Viscount Dunrossil) in 1953 explained the develop-
ment of a custom, rather than a rule, where Members of the House of Commons 
'frequently' declared any interest they had when they spoke in debate: 
I think myself that (it) has grown up as a matter of custom, because hon. Members desire 
to be frank with their fellow Members, and it is sometimes a matter of prudence, in case 
an hon. Member should be suspected of unavowed motives.2' 
27. The Strauss Committee recommended in 1969 that existing practice in the House 
of Commons be clarified and the area of declaration enlarged to 'achieve the main 
object of declaration which is that a Member's outside interests should be made 
known to the House whenever they touch his duty and activity as a Member of the 
House'.22 However, no action was then taken on the Committee's recommendation. 
It was not until 22 May 1974, simultaneously with the adoption in principle of a 
register of interests, that the House of Commons resolved that disclosure should be 
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Papua New Guiwa 
28. Before the House of Commons voted to regularise its custom, at least two other 
legislatures had taken the practice a stage further by imposing the obligation to make 
ad hoc declarations by statute. One has been noted, the Papua New Guinea Parliament-
ary Integrity Ordinance 1971, which required that any Member who had 'a direct or 
indirect financial interest' in a matter before the House of Assembly or one of its 
committees should disclose 'the nature of his interest in the matter' before speaking 
(s. 29). If asked to do so, he should give 'reasonable particulars' of the interest. The 
disclosure should be recorded in the minutes of proceedings, and any alleged failure 
to comply with the requirement should be reported to the House by the Speaker. 
Canada 
29. The other instance occurred in the Canadian province of Newfoundland. Its 
Conflict of Interest Act 1973 extended the obligation to make ad hoc declarations to 
both Members of the House of Assembly and members of statutory bodies with more 
than one member. The Act prohibited their speaking on any matter unless at the 
commencement of the speech any conflicting interest of the Member, his spouse or 
minor children had been stated. 
30. A requirement for a declaration of interest in non-parliamentary contexts may 
be expressed in less explicit terms; for example, the 1973 Canadian Public Service 
Guidelines concerning conflict of interest situations require all public servants to 
disclose to their superiors 'all business, commercial or financial interest where such 
interest might conceivably be construed as being in actual or potential conflict with 
their official duties'.24 Similarly, the 1978 Alberta Code of Conduct for public servants 
requires written disclosure 'where the business or financial interests of employees, 
their spouses or of their children under the age of eighteen, are affected or appear to 
be affected by actions taken or decisions made in the course of their public service 
employment'. Such formulations cover both declaration and registration. 
Registration 
United States of America 
31. In 1965, President Johnson issued Executive Order 11222 which required senior 
public servants and full-time presidential nominees to committees, boards or com-
missions to lodge statements with the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission dis-
closing their own interests and those of their spouses, minor children and other 
members of their immediate households. The statements were to show: 
• company, partnership and other organisational connections, whether as a director, 
officer, employee, or otherwise, or where the officeholder had a continuing 
financial interest; 
• names of creditors, other than for a home mortgage or ordinary household 
expenses; and 
• real property interests, other than a personal residence. 
Information on organisations not conducted as a business, such as professional, 
religious or social bodies, was not required. 
32. In the same year, the Civil Service Commission issued instructions requiring 
agencies to make regulations establishing a system of registration for certain of their 
employees and published a model financial disclosure form. About 30 000 persons 
were thus covered by registration requirements, most of whom were employees 
engaged in sensitive posts such as contracting, procurement, and making grants or 
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33. In addition to the registration requirements of the Federal Government, the 
great majority of American States eventually imposed on some public officials some 
form of registration. 
34. Registration by Members of Congress followed in 1968, when the House of 
Representatives and the Senate introduced registration requirements. These differed 
in their emphasis. The Senate Rule required the disclosure of more information, 
including a copy of the Senator's income tax return, but on the basis that this and 
certain other disclosures would be kept in a sealed envelope by the Comptroller 
General and examined only on a resolution of the Senate's Select Committee on 
Standards and Conduct. The House required Members and staff to provide less 
information, for example sources of income but not amount, but allowed public access 
to the information collected except details of amounts and values, which were listed 
in a separate disclosure kept under seal. The House requirements were extended 
slightly in 1970 to identify major creditors and sources of honoraria. 
35. From the early 1970s, there was pressure on Congress to establish more uniform 
and extensive registration requirements. 15  Impetus was provided by the 1977 Comp-
troller General's report, Action Needed to Make the Executive Branch Financial 
Disclosure System Effective, which was highly critical of existing arrangements, and 
by the Commission on Administrative Review Financial Ethics Report of the same 
year. 26 
36. In March 1977, the House of Representatives adopted a new version of the 
relevant Rule, to require more extensive disclosure, including information on items 
of income from a single source aggregating $100 or more, with value of items to be 
indicated on a five-category scale. The Senate followed suit with a similar Rule a 
month later. 
37. During 1977 and 1978, Congress considered a variety of Bills which would put the 
House and Senate provisions on a statutory basis. These included one initiated by the 
President. Following negotiations and compromise on the various proposals in the 
Bills, Congress approved the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, which was signed by 
the President on 26 October 1978.27 
38. The new Act laid down a uniform system of annual registration of private 
interests, with provision for public access, for the three branches of government. 
Its principal effects were: 
• to give statutory form to the financial disclosure provisions of the ethics codes 
adopted by the Senate and the House of Representatives in 1977; 
• to apply disclosure requirements to the President, the Vice-President, high level 
executive branch officials, Supreme Court justices, federal judges and other 
employees of the judicial branch and candidates for federal office; 
• to provide civil, but not criminal, penalties for violations of the disclosure 
requirements; 
• to establish an Office of Government Ethics to develop rules on government 
conflicts of interest and other ethical problems and to monitor and investigate 
federal ethics laws; 
• to place restrictions on the post-employment activities of federal workers leaving 
government service; and 
• to set up a mechanism for the court appointment of a special prosecutor to 
investigate criminal allegations against high level government officials. 	 159 
Its provisions thus went wider than formalising and expanding the existing disclosure 
requirements in that they established elaborate machinery for enforcement. The Act 
did not overtake entirely the Senate disclosure requirements, which are in certain 
respects more detailed than those in the Act, and the Senate Rule continues to apply 
with respect to Senators and Senate employees in conjunction with the Act. 
39. Details of the disclosure requirements under the new Act are discussed in Appendix 
6 to this report. 
Canada 
40. The Canadian experience may be described more briefly. The Newfoundland 
Conflict of Interest Act 1973 required registration of the financial interests of Members 
of the House of Assembly and members of statutory bodies, their spouses and minor 
children, in companies or firms doing business with the provincial government. The 
same year, the Federal Government's green paper, Members of Parliament and 
Conflict of Interest, recommended that Members of Parliament should be required 
annually to register interests in companies with government contracts, and that the 
public should be given access to that information. 
41. In 1974, British Columbia passed the Public Officials and Employees Disclosure 
Act, which required registration by Members of the provincial Parliament, public 
servants, local government officials, both elected and appointed, and candidates for 
elected office at both the provincial and local government levels. The interests to be 
registered were those of the officeholder himself, and, in the disclosure, shareholdings, 
sources of remuneration, creditors and real property were to be identified. Information 
relating to elected officeholders would be accessible to the public. 
42. In October 1978, following publication of an earlier version, the Canadian 
Government introduced into the Federal Parliament a Bill for an Independence of 
Parliament Act to establish rules and guidelines to govern Senators and Members of 
the House of Commons in conflict of interest situations. The Bill, which was seen as 
the culmination of the process of review and study by committees of the Parliament 
of the Government's 1973 green paper, proposed, amongst other things, that Parliamen-
tarians would be required to disclose publicly each year details in respect of: 
• certain government contracts and grants; 
• outside employment; 
• gifts received by the Parliamentarian or his spouse of a value greater than $100; 
• honoraria; 
• sponsored travel of the Parliamentarian or his spouse outside Canada; 
• shares and bonds of the Parliamentarian or his spouse; 
• unsecured debts over $5000; and 
• other sources of income worth more than $1000. 
The Bill also made provision for the appointment of a Registrar for each House of 
Parliament to maintain a register of disclosures filed, to provide for public access to 
the disclosures and to advise Members of their obligations under the legislation. 
Failure to comply with the disclosure requirements could result in imposition of a fine 
or possible disqualification from sitting in the Parliament. 
43. At the time of completion of the Committee's report, the Independence of 
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Britain 
44. In Britain, a statutory basis was given to registration at the local government 
level by the Local Government Act 1933. The current Act, which has substantially the 
same provisions, imposes an obligation on a councillor to declare a pecuniary 
interest held by himself or his spouse in a contract or other matter before the council, 
and prohibits the councillor's speaking or voting on a subject on which he has made 
a declaration. The obligation to declare is waived if the councillor has lodged a general 
notice of his interests in named companies and other bodies with the clerk. Under the 
legislation, all disclosures and general notices are required to be recorded in a book to 
to which any member of the local authority has access. Failure to disclose an interest 
attracts a fine on summary conviction.28 
45. In the parliamentary area, demand for registration of Members' interests 
emerged gradually after World War H, when concern developed as to the adequacy 
of existing practices on disclosure of private interests in debate. Questions arose 
regarding contractual arrangements involving Members of the House of Commons, 
trade union sponsorships, the employment by private enterprise of former Ministers, 
the retention of shareholdings by members of the Ministry, and newspaper con-
sultancies held by Members. 
46. In 1965, Mr W. Hamilton, M.P., in a Parliamentary Question, raised the possi-
bility of legislation to establish a public register of financial interests of Members of 
both Houses.29 In May 1967, he sought leave to introduce a Bill to that effect.30 
Mr Hamilton's register would have shown all company directorships, shareholdings 
in excess of £500, and income sources in excess of £500 from an outside body. 
His motion failed, but in the following month the Liberal Party initiated a register 
for its own Members of Parliament. 31 
47. When Mr Hamilton raised the subject again in March 1969, the idea was taken 
up by leading journals of opinion. 32  It was revealed about this time that a Member of 
the House of Commons was employed by a public relations firm retained by an 
overseas government then unpopular in Britain. A Select Committee of the House of 
Commons, the Strauss Committee, was appointed to report on the matter. It reported 
in December 1969 in favour of extending the practice of ad hoc declaration, and 
suggested two new Standing Orders to extend the existing restriction on professional 
advocacy to new forms of activity such as public relations. However, the Strauss 
Committee, after weighing the arguments for and against, came down against 
compulsory registration of Members' interests. It commented that: 
The public scrutiny of the whole range of a Member's financial interest may be a proper 
activity for journalists, compilers of reference books and academics; it is not essential to 
the way in which the House conducts its business.33  
48. The report of the Strauss Committee was not brought up for debate. The 1970 
general election intervened, and then, early in 1971, the new Leader of the House of 
Commons indicated that the Committee's proposals for changes to Standing Orders 
had been abandoned. In July 1972, the first disclosure of the Poulson affair, involving 
widespread corruption in respect of public construction, reopened the question of 
conflicts of interest. Further scandals in 1973 added to concern. The idea of a register 
was revived, and was endorsed, first by the Scottish Council of the Labour Party and 
then by the Parliamentary Labour Party. Discussions began between the main 
parties in the House of Commons. In the meantime a Royal Commission under 
Lord Redcliffe-Maud investigated conflicts of interest at the local government level, 
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49. Immediately before the Redcliffe-Maud Report was issued, the House of 
Commons debated several motions by which it adopted the wider principles for 
declaration of interest formulated by the Strauss Committee. In May 1974, the House 
of Commons, contrary to the recommendations of the Strauss Committee, decided to 
adopt compulsory registration of Members' interests and appointed a new Select 
Committee to recommend how a register could be conducted. That Select Committee, 
the Willey Committee, reported in December of the same year. The introduction of a 
register was justified on the following grounds: 
• it was additional to, and not a replacement of, the obligation to declare interests; 
• its purpose was to provide information on a Member's pecuniary interests or any 
other material benefit he might receive which might be thought to affect his 
conduct as a Member; 
• the proposed limitation on the disclosures required recognised that the Member 
was also a private individual and entitled to a proper degree of privacy; 
• the register balanced what should be publicly known about a Member of Parlia-
ment with the proper right of that Member to some privacy. 
The Willey Committee specified nine classes of 'pecuniary interest or other benefit' to 
be registered. 34  Its report was debated in June 1975, when the House of Commons 
agreed to establish a register. 
50. Since 1975, two parliamentary papers setting out details of the interests registered 
have been published. However, the refusal of one Member to provide information led 
the Select Committee charged with responsibility for oversight of the register to 
decline to continue to publish it until the House made compliance mandatory. 35 This 
has not happened, and the register has not been published since May 1976, although 
many Members have continued to update their own entries. 
Papua New Guinea 
51. The Leadership Code of Papua New Guinea is set out in the Organic Law on 
the Duties and Responsibilities of Leadership 1975. Leaders, that is national elected 
officeholders and the more senior appointed officeholders, are required to submit to 
the Ombudsman Commission a very full statement of total assets and sources of 
income (see Appendix 6, para. 13) for themselves, their spouses and children under 18. 
Jamaica 
52. In 1969, the Leader of the Opposition in the Jamaican House of Representatives 
proposed legislation to require disclosure of Members' assets and liabilities. A Select 
Committee was appointed by the House to consider the proposal, but had not reported 
when the 1972 general election led to a change of government. A non-parliamentary 
committee then investigated the matter, and its recommendations were embodied in 
the Parliament (Integrity of Members) Act 1973, which requires extensive disclosure 
of Members' interests (see Appendix 6, para. 13) and established an Integrity Com-
mission to receive, examine and, as it sees fit, investigate disclosures. Enforcement of 
the disclosure requirements is through the courts. 
Authorisation 
Britain 
53. Authorisation, as a means of overcoming conflict of interest situations, is not 
very well documented. Explicit authorisation appears to arise most often in a public 
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advise any officer who has doubts about accepting gifts to consult his Establishment 
Officer. The British rules about shareholdings illustrate the close interconnection 
between disclosure and authorisation: 
Shareholdings by civil servants. There is no objection to civil servants holding private 
investments. But, if a shareholding might raise a question of possible conflict with the 
interests of the officer's department, the officer should consult his Establishment Officer 
about the desirability of acquiring or retaining it. 
Responsibility for deciding the appropriate action in cases of this kind rests with the 
Permanent Head of the Department, but the Civil Service Department should be consulted 
in advance wherever it is proposed to allow the acquisition or retention of a controlling 
shareholding.37 
The rules relating to acceptance of outside business appointments by former civil 
servants provide another British example. Those considering applications may 
recommend refusal, or unqualified approval, or approval subject to conditions which 
are suggested in the rules. 38 
United States of America 
54. Public negotiations conducted in the United States between presidential 
nominees and Congressional committees scrutinising their appointments provide an 
example where authorisation is only conditional. Thus, the Armed Services Committee 
authorised a nominee for Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr David Packard, to retain 
his substantial block of shares in the Hewlett-Packard Company subject to conditions 
about the disposition of income, capital gains and retirement rights. 39 
Canada 
55. A non-public-service example of authorisation is provided by the Canadian 
Independence of Parliament Bill. Clause 3 prohibits Members from participating in 
government contracts or government-regulated activities. However, Clause 10 allows 
either House or a designated committee of that House to authorise one of its Members 
to engage in activities otherwise prohibited under Clause 3, where it 'considers it just 
and equitable to do so'. However, a record of the authorisation must be placed on the 
register of Members' interests and the Member concerned must give details of any 
such activities in his disclosure. 
56. The extent to which authorisation interacts with other measures is illustrated by 
the Manual of Administration of the province of Ontario, which requires public 
servants to disclose to their departmental heads any possible conflict of interest, even 
though marginal. It gives the departmental head authority to determine the course of 
action required to resolve any conflict disclosed to him. The options which may be 
exercised by him are an instruction to the public servant to divest the outside interest, 
or transfer it to 'a neutral third party'; transfer of the public servant; publicising the 
potential conflict; temporary removal of the public servant in question; having the 
the public servant's decisions checked by a superior; accepting the resignation of the 
public servant; or deciding that there is no conflict with the 'best interests of the 
Crown'. 40 
Divestment 
United States of America 
57. Divestment of assets has developed mainly in North America. In the United 
States, the starting point has been that the holding of sensitive assets by government 
employees may be prohibited. But, apart from this restriction, employees are free to 
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engage in lawful financial transactions to the same extent as private citizens. Agencies 
may, however, further restrict such transactions in the light of the special circumstances 
of their individual responsibilities. 41 
58. The practice of requiring divestment by presidential nominees begins with the 
first appointment to President Eisenhower's administration.42 In recent years the 
emphasis in the United States has shifted from divestment to disclosure, at least 
partly, it appears, as a result of fears that certain able people would not be prepared to 
accept public office it they were required to divest. 
60. In North America, the blind trust has also been advanced as a mechanism for 
resolving conflict of interest problems. Suitable persons will not be dissuaded from 
public office, it is said, if there is no need for them to dispose permanently of their 
interests. Once in office, if their interests are in a blind trust, they will not have to 
excuse themselves from considering matters in which they have an interest. Moreover, 
when they act there cannot be accusations that they have done so in a conflict of 
interest situation. 
61. The first reference to blind trusts in the United States appears to have been in 
1958, when Mr John McCone was nominated as Chairman of the Atomic Energy 
Commission.43 In 1961, Mr Robert McNamara's nomination as Secretary of State 
for Defense was accepted on the basis that he sell some shares and set up a blind 
trust for the remainder. Similarly, when Mr David Packard was nominated as Deputy 
Secretary of Defense in 1969, the Senate Armed Services Committee approved the 
nomination on the basis that he establish a trust. The Committee apparently accepted 
that, if he divested himself of his large shareholding in the firm he co-founded, the 
market would have been depressed and financial hardship to others would have 
resulted. 
62. However, there was considerable criticism of this decision on the basis that, for 
twenty years, the Senate Armed Services Committee had invariably demanded that 
high Pentagon officials must divest themselves of stock in any company doing more 
than $10 000 worth of business with the Department if they were to be confirmed. 
For this reason, Mr Charles Wilson, Secretary of Defense in the Eisenhower 
Administration, was forced to sell $2.7m worth of shares in General Motors, and 
McNamara sold $1.1m worth of Ford shares. In other words, the accusation in the 
Packard case was that Packard was being treated more leniently than others; clearly 
a blind trust is less onerous than being required to dispose of an interest. Moreover, 
it was said that the trust was not really 'blind'—the trustee was not expected to sell 
the $300m worth of shares Packard had in Hewlett-Packard. " 
63. Apart from members of the executive, a few members of the Congress have 
established blind trusts. 45  
64. The rules for divestment announced by President Carter on his assumption 
of office were quite elaborate. Persons nominated to senior posts were required to 
divest financial interests which, under section 208 of Title 18 of the United States 
Code, would disqualify them 'more than rarely' from acting. That section prohibits 
an officer or employee from participating 'personally and substantially' in a decision 
or rendering advice in a matter in which he, his immediate family or an organisation 
with which he has a connection has a financial interest, unless either the interest has 
been disclosed, and authorisation granted, on the ground that the interest is not so 
substantial as to be likely to affect his integrity, or there is a general rule exempting 
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required to divest assets or liabilities which might 'be broadly affected by govern-
mental monetary and budgetary policies', except for realty, government securities and 
diversified holdings, for example a holding of less than 1 per cent in a well-diversified 
mutual fund, or diversified assets of a total approximate value of not more than 
$500 000. Persons nominated for less senior posts should divest if the disqualification 
would 'seriously impair the capability of the officer to perform the duties of the office 
to which nominated'. A blind trust would constitute sufficient divestment. 45  
65. Aspects of the Carter Administration's policy on divestment and blind trusts 
are incorporated in the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. The current Congressional 
rules, which appear to have been only partially superseded by the Ethics in Govern-
ment Act, are directed towards disclosure rather than divestment. 
66. The 1977 Obey report held that far more serious conflicts of interest arose for 
legislators from business and professional connections than from asset holdings. 
These lead, it said, to practices ranging from overt attempts to curry favour by private 
groups to subtle distortions in the judgment of Members on particular issues. It 
continued: 
For example, if a Member receives $10 000 from stock dividends from a company, there 
is far less of a potential conflict of interest than if a company pays a Member $10 000 as 
a director's fee or in the form of honoraria over a period of years.47 
67. Following the recommendations of the Obey Commission, the House of 
Representatives adopted a Resolution that no Member can have outside earned 
income which exceeds 15 per cent of aggregate salary. The definition of outside 
earned, as opposed to unearned, income was wide. In the case of a Member engaged 
in a trade or business in which the Member or his family held a controlling interest 
and in which both personal services and capital were income-producing factors, the 
definition did not include 'any amount received by such Member so long as the 
personal services actually rendered by the Member in the trade or business do not 
generate a significant amount of income'. 48  
68. The Senate adopted a similar 15 per cent limit on outside income, although the 
exemption for family enterprises applied only if the services provided did not consume 
significant amounts of time when the Senate was in session, and were necessary to 
protect the Senator's interests in the enterprise. 49 
69. As stated in paragraph 64, public servants are prohibited by statute from 
participating personally and substantially in a matter in which they know that they 
have a financial interest unless they make full disclosure of the interest beforehand 
and receive written authorisation from a supervisor. Clearly a public servant would 
divest if he was constantly obliged to disqualify himself, although the words 'to his 
knowledge' in the statute appear to imply that a blind trust avoids infringement of 
the legislation. 50 
70. Legislation applying to particular agencies may contain prohibitions on the 
ownership of shares. For example, members of the Civil Aeronautics Board must not 
have any pecuniary interest in or own shares or bonds in any civil aeronautics 
enterprise. 51  Similar provisions apply to certain staff of the Department of Agriculture 
and to the directors and members of the United States Geological Survey. 52  Employees 
of the Federal Reserve Board are forbidden, under Federal Reserve regulations, to 
hold shares in a bank, a bank affiliate or a government security dealer, and must not 
engage in speculative dealings (as distinguished from investments) in securities, 
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Canada 
71. In 1973, the Canadian Prime Minister announced in Parliament that he had 
laid down guidelines offering his Ministers the choice between divesting and placing in 
trust their business holdings, especially those which could be directly affected in 
value by government decisions. Either a blind trust or a frozen trust was acceptable 
but Ministers were urged to select a trustee who could be seen to be at arm's length 
from the Minister in the management of the trust. A further option, disclosure to a 
registrar, with public access to disclosures, might be used for property not easily 
affected by government decisions, such as real property. 54 
Disqualification 
Britain 
72. Disqualification as a means of resolving conflict of interest situations is illus-
trated by an extract from the British rules relating to the handling of government 
contracts: 
An officer who comes into official contact with any matter concerning a business organ-
isation in which he has an interest must disclose his interest to the Permanent Head of 
Department and ask that some other officer may deal with the matter.55  
73. Apart from such formal requirements, the Committee has had little opportunity 
to appraise how such provisions work in other countries, but it expects that the 
simplicity and obviousness of the option renders comparative material less valuable 
than for other options. 
Machinery for dealing with conflict of interest cases 
Britain 
74. In a number of countries, various special arrangements have been developed to 
deal with serious allegations of impropriety in public affairs. The British experience 
was discussed in 1966 by the Royal Commission on Tribunals of Inquiry. 56  The 
Royal Commission contrasted the general public dissatisfaction with the inquiry into 
the Marconi Affair by a Select Committee of Parliament, which divided on party 
lines, with the high regard in which the earlier Parnell Commission had been held. 
That Commission had been constituted under its own legislation, the Special Com-
mission Act 1888, which provided the precedent for the Tribunals of Inquiry 
(Evidence) Act 1921. 
75. The latter Act was passed to provide for, in the first instance, an investigation of 
allegations made by a Member of Parliament against officials of the Ministry of 
Munitions. The nature, powers and functions of Tribunals established under the Act 
are summarised in paragraphs 12.31 and 12.32 of the Committee's report. 
76. The special importance of tribunals set up under the provisions of the Act is 
demonstrated by the sparing use made of them. From 1921 to 1977 only twenty 
tribunals were appointed. Four of these investigations resembled the conflict of 
interest situations with which this Committee has been concerned: 
• 1936—leak of Budget secrets; 
• 1948—bribery of Ministers and civil servants; 
• 1957—disclosure of information relating to the raising of the Bank Rate; 
• 1971—leak of official information about an insurance company and the circum- 
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United States of America 
77. The use in the United States of Congressional committees to investigate 
allegations of public misconduct has been referred to in paragraphs 12.33 and 12.34 of 
the Committee's report. In this connection, it may be noted that several members of 
Congress were charged with unethical or illegal behaviour during 1978. Some of these 
charges resulted from the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct investi-
gation of official misconduct involving cash contributions from South Korean agents. 
Three Members were charged with a violation of the House Code of Conduct and 
were reprimanded by the House of Representatives. 58 
India 
78. In India, the Lokpal Bill 1977 proposed creation of the office of the Lokpal 'to 
inquire into allegations of misconduct against public men', to be appointed by the 
President after consultation with the Chief Justice and the two Presiding Officers of 
Parliament. The Lokpal would be authorised to receive complaints, conduct a pre-
liminary scrutiny of complaints and conduct inquiries, with the powers of a civil court 
to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents. The Bill was 
referred to a Parliamentary committee, which, it appears, has not yet reported. 
Papua New Guinea 
79. In Papua New Guinea, the Ombudsman Commission has the power to declare, 
in relation to a person or persons or a class of persons to whom the Leadership Code 
applies, and in relation to any associate of such persons, that certain interests, benefits 
or property are prohibited interests. A leader who seeks or obtains any prohibited 
interest is guilty of misconduct in office, unless he has obtained the approval of the 
Ombudsman Commission. Should the Ombudsman Commission be satisfied that a 
prima facie case of misconduct in office has been made out against a leader, and that 
that misconduct merits prosecution, it is required to put the matter before the Public 
Prosecutor, who decides whether to lay charges against the leader. 
80. If the Public Prosecutor lays charges, they are heard by a Tribunal set up for the 
purpose. The composition of the tribunal varies according to the office held by the 
leader. In general, the tribunal would consist of either three judges, or alternatively a 
judge and two senior magistrates. Should the Public Prosecutor decline to refer a 
matter to a tribunal, or if the Commission considers that he has not acted quickly 
enough, then the Commission has the right to refer the matter directly to a tribunal. 
Where a case is referred to a tribunal, the law provides that the leader concerned is 
suspended from duty on full pay. 59 
Post-separation employment 
81. The Public Service Board's background paper Acceptance of Business Appoint-
ments by Public Servants on Retirement or Resignation, submitted to the Royal 
Commission on Australian Government Administration in 1975, included a 
description of the then practice of overseas public services in relation to the acceptance 
of business appointments on retirement or resignation .60 The British practice has 
subsequently been amended and in March 1977 the President proposed some minor 
changes to the United States rules, which were incorporated in the Ethics in Govern-
ment Act of 1978. 
82. In its submission to this Committee, the Board noted that essentially only two 
countries surveyed in the background paper, Britain and Japan, rely on adminis- 
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public servants. The United States relies on legislative sanctions to regulate the 
conduct of former officials in some areas after separation, but does not seek to 
monitor acceptance of appointments in advance. Other countries surveyed, Canada, 
New Zealand, Republic of Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland, rely on tradition and 
convention in much the same way as is currently the case in the Commonwealth and 
State public services in Australia. 
Britain 
83. In summary, the British rules require that all officials, civil and military, above 
specified levels or ranks should obtain prior approval from the Government before 
accepting a business appointment with specified categories of firms or agencies up to 
two years from retirement or resignation. A decision on the acceptance of a given 
appointment may be made by the Prime Minister after report by an advisory com-
mittee, or by the Minister in charge of the officer's department. Ministers may delegate 
decisions to departmental heads in specified categories of cases. 
84. The Eleventh Report from the House of Commons Expenditure Committee 
1976-77 noted that there was no legal sanction whatsoever to enforce the existing 
rules on post-separation employment. That Committee suggested that there should be 
a contractual relationship requiring individuals to abide by the rules or, if necessary, 
legislation which might penalise companies which appoint ex-civil-servants from 
specified jobs without obtaining the concurrence of the Government.6' 
85. The 1978 British white paper on the Civil Service subsequently noted that: 
The Government are advised that agreements which restrict the right of an individual to 
take up employment are normally invalid as being in restraint of trade, and that it cannot 
be said that a contractual condition requiring a civil servant to obtain the Government's 
assent before taking up new employment falls within any of the recognised exceptions. 
Furthermore, even if it did, enforcement would often be impracticable if the person 
concerned had already entered into a contract of employment with a new employer. 
Legislation would therefore seem to be necessary before an effective legal obligation could 
be imposed on an officer to obtain such assent.62 
86. On 20 November 1962, the then Prime Minister, Mr Macmillan, was asked if 
he would consider introducing legislation prohibiting Ministers from moving to 
executive positions in industry and commerce during a specified period. In replying 
to this and a related Question he said: 
I do not think that such legislation would be wise or necessary . . . I think that it is 
desirable and beneficial to the country that men of considerable experience should be 
available, when they leave the Government, to the service of industry and commerce.63 
87. On 20 June 1968, the then Prime Minister, Mr Wilson, when asked whether he 
would seek to require a minimum period of four years to elapse before Ministers 
took up appointments in commercial concerns with which they or their departments 
had had administrative relations, replied: 
No. I think that these matters are better left to the discretion and good sense of the 
individuals concerned. 64 
Japan 
88. Practice in Japan is described in the Public Service Board's background paper 
168 	 to the Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration. In summary, 
the Japanese National Personnel Authority is responsible for administering Article 
103 of the National Public Service Law, which states that: 
Personnel are hereby prohibited for a period of two years after leaving the service from 
accepting or serving in a position with a profit-making enterprise which involves a close 
connection with any agency of the State defined by rule of the Authority with which such 
persons were formerly employed within five years prior to separation from the Service. 
The Personnel Authority has discretion to determine the relevance of previous 
employment history in the Public Service in such cases, and is required to report to 
the Diet and the Cabinet on cases in which it has approved acceptance of a business 
appointment by an ex-public servant on separation. 
United States of America 
89. In 1872, legislation was introduced by Representative Garfield (later President) 
which forbade an employee of an executive department from acting as counsel, 
attorney or agent in the prosecution of claims pending in his former department 
while he was in office, for a period of two years after he had left. However no penalty 
was attached.65  
90. In 1944, new legislation (subsequently incorporated in the federal criminal code 
in 1948) repeated the two-year prohibition, but covered all agencies, not merely 
departments, extended past 'pending' claims to any case where there was a relationship 
between the officer's duties and the claim, and introduced a criminal penalty.66 Its 
scope was restricted by a United States Federal Court in United States v. Bergson 
(1954) to claims seeking recovery of money or property from the government.67 
91. The 1951 Report of the United States Senate Sub-Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare (Chairman, Senator P. H. Douglas) discussed the matter of public 
employees accepting business appointments upon retirement or resignation. The 
report, Ethical Standards in Government, viewed the possibility of compromise of 
impartiality as highly undesirable and made a number of recommendations, including 
a two-year time lapse between leaving government employment and taking up work 
in a firm with which the person has had dealings as a public employee.68 
92. In 1962, the relevant sections of the United States Code were substantially 
revised. Section 207 of Title 18, which replaced the earlier provisions, contained 
restrictions on the post-separation activities of former officers or employees of the 
executive branch, the independent agencies or the District of Columbia.69 In summary, 
these provided: 
• a former official of the executive or an independent agency might not knowingly 
act as agent or attorney for anyone in connection with any judicial or other 
proceeding, application, contract, claim or other matter involving specific parties 
in which the government had an interest and in which he participated personally 
and substantially when an official; 
• for one year after leaving the government, a former official might not appear 
personally as agent or attorney before any court, department or agency in 
connection with any such matter in which the government had an interest and 
which was under his official responsibility within the year prior to his leaving 
government; and 
• former partners of someone who was then an official could not act as agent or 
attorney in connection with any matter in which the government had an interest 
and in which the official had participated personally and substantially or which 
was the subject of his official responsibility. 
93. In March 1977, the President proposed that the one-year prohibition should be 
extended to two years and that the type and extent of prohibited contacts with an 
official's former department should be extended. The Ethics in Government Act of 
1978 amended the rules relating to post-separation employment. These provisions, 
which are due to come into force from 1 July 1979: 
• prohibit former executive branch, independent agency or District of Columbia 
employees from representing anyone before their former agencies in connection 
with any proceeding, investigation or other matter that the former employees 
personally and substantially participated in while working for the government; 
• prohibit former government employees from appearing before a federal agency 
for two years on matters that were under their official responsibility before 
leaving the government; 
• prohibit former officials above a specified status who have significant decision-
making or supervisory authority and high ranking military officers from rep-
resenting anyone, formally or informally, in any matter pending before their 
former agency for one year after leaving government; 
• authorise the director of the Office of Government Ethics to apply the one-year 
ban to other former officials not covered by the Act; 
• set the maximum penalties for violation of the permanent, one- and two-year 
bans at $10 000 and two years in prison; 
• provide that former employees may provide information to their former agencies 
about an area in which they have special knowledge, as long as they receive no 
compensation other than that normally paid to witnesses; 
• provide that, in lieu of criminal penalties against a former employee who viol-
ates any of the bans on contact, a department or agency head may take disci-
plinary action against him, including barring any business communication 
between the former employee and the agency for five years; and 
• exempt from the conflict of interest provisions persons who left government 
prior to 1 July 1979. 0 
94. In addition to the provisions described in paragraph 92, there are specific 
provisions in other legislation. For example, under the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Act, members of the Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
are restricted from immediately joining the banks they have regulated. 71 
Canada 
95. Until 1976, there were no legislative provisions or formal rules on this matter 
applicable to Canadian public officeholders. In 1976, the Canadian Government 
adopted rules respecting the commercial activities of public officeholders designed 
to counter post-employment practices considered by the Government to be 
undesirable. 
96. The rules or guidelines applied to all officeholders including Ministers, Parlia-
mentary Secretaries, Governor-in-Council appointees, public servants and exempt 
staff at the executive equivalent level or above. Junior officials in sensitive positions 
were also required to comply with the guidelines. 
97. In 1977, the guidelines were amended to correct minor weaknesses which had 
come to notice. Modifications were made to the guidelines applying to employment 
and commercial activities of former holders of public office. In summary, the guide- 
170 	 lines, which came into effect on 1 January 1978, require current and former holders 
of public office to observe certain principles to ensure that their actions do not cast 
doubt on the objectivity and impartiality of government service; that current office-
holders should not allow themselves to be influenced by plans for, or offers of, outside 
employment; that officeholders should disclose all serious offers of positions outside 
government service and any job offer under serious consideration or accepted. 
98. Former officeholders are requested not to engage in outside employment of 
certain kinds for a 'cooling off' period of two years to six months, depending on the 
nature of public office and of the type of subsequent employment. Advisory com-
mittees were established to determine the application of the guidelines in particular 
cases or for particular categories of officeholder and to grant exemptions where 
desirable. 
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Attachment 1 
Redcliffe-Maud proposed local government 
rules of conduct (1974) 
The National Code of Local Government Conduct 
This Code is an authoritative guide for all councillors elected or co-opted to local authorities 
in England, Wales and Scotland. It supplements both the law enacted by Parliament and 
the standing orders made by individual councils. 
1. Law, Standing Orders and National Code 
Make sure that you fully understand the rules of conduct which the law, standing orders 
and the national code require you to follow. It is your personal responsibility to apply their 
requirements on every relevant occasion. Seek any advice about them that you need from 
your council's senior officer. 
2. Public duty and private interest 
(i) Your over-riding duty as a councillor is to the whole local community. 
(ii) You have a special duty to your own constituents, including those who did not vote 
for you. 
(iii) Whenever you have a private or personal interest in any question which councillors 
have to decide, you must not do anything to let that interest influence the decision. 
(iv) Do nothing as a councillor which you could not justify if it became public. 
(v) The reputation of your council, and of your party if you belong to one, depends on 
your conduct and what the public believes about your conduct. 
3. Disclosure of pecuniary and other interests 
(i) The law makes specific provision requiring you to disclose pecuniary interests, direct 
and indirect. But interests which are not pecuniary can be just as important. Kinship, 
friendship, membership of an association, society, or trade union, trusteeship and 
many other kinds of relationship can sometimes influence your judgment or give the 
impression that they might do so. A good test is to ask yourself whether others would 
think the interest close enough to influence someone in your position. If you think 
they would, or if you are in doubt, treat the interest as if it were a pecuniary one, 
disclose it and withdraw from the meeting. 
(ii) You must follow the principles about disclosure of interest in your unofficial relations 
with other councillors—at party group meetings, or other informal occasions and in 
casual conversation—no less scrupulously than at formal meetings of the council, 
its committees and sub-committees. 
4. Membership and Chairmanship of Council Committees and Sub-committees 
(i) You, or some firm or body with which you are personally connected, may have 
professional business or personal interests within the area for which the council is 
responsible, and such interests may be closely related to the work of one or more of 
the council's committees or sub-committees, concerned (say) with planning or 
developing land, council housing or the letting of contracts for supplies, services or 
works. Before seeking or accepting membership of any such committee or sub-
committee, you should seriously consider whether your membership would involve 
you (a) in disclosing an interest so often that you could be of little value to the 
committee or sub-committee, or (b) in weakening public confidence in the impartiality 
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(ii) You should not seek or accept the chairmanship of a committee or sub-committee 
whose business is closely related to a personal interest of yourself or of any body 
with which you are associated. 
5. Councillors and officers 
(i) Both councillors and officers are servants of the public, and they are indispensable to 
one another. But their responsibilities are distinct. Councillors are responsible to the 
electorate and serve only so long as their term of office lasts. Officers are responsible 
to the council and are permanently appointed. An officer's job is to give advice to 
councillors and to carry out the council's work under the direction and control of 
councillors. 
(ii) Mutual respect between councillors and officers is essential to good local government. 
Close personal familiarity between individual councillor and officer can damage this 
relationship and prove embarrassing to other councillors and officers. 
(iii) If you are called upon to take part in appointing an officer, the only question you 
should consider is which candidate would best serve the whole council. You should 
not let your personal or political preferences influence your judgment. You should 
not canvass the support of colleagues for any candidate and you should resist any 
attempt by others to canvass yours. 
6. Use of confidential information 
As a councillor you necessarily acquire much information that has not yet been made 
public. You should not normally reveal such information to anyone outside the council's 
membership or staff. It is a grave betrayal of trust to use confidential information for the 
personal advantage of yourself or of anyone known to you. 
7. Gifts and hospitality 
Treat with extreme caution any offer or gift, favour or hospitality that is made to you 
personally by any person or organisation that is doing or seeking to do business with the 
council or is applying to the council for any planning or other kind of decision. Working 
lunches and other social occasions arranged or authorised by the council or by one of its 
committees or sub-committees may be a proper way of doing business, provided that no 
extravagance is involved. Nor can there be any hard and fast rule about acceptance or 
refusal of tokens of good will on special occasions. But you are personally responsible for 
all such decisions and for avoiding the risk of damage to public confidence in local govern-
ment. 
8. Use of allowances 
Observe scrupulously the rules entitling you to claim 
(a) allowances for performing 'approved duty' as a councillor and 
(b) repayment of expenses incurred for travel and subsistence while doing business on 
the council's behalf. 
9. Use of council facilities 
Make sure that any facilities—such as transport, stationery, or secretarial services—
provided by the council for your use in your official duties are used strictly for those duties 
and for no other purpose. 
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Attachment 2 
Churchill ministerial code (1952) 
(1) It is a principle of public life that Ministers must so order their affairs that no conflict 
arises, or appears to arise, between their private interests and their public duties. 
(2) Such a conflict may arise if a Minister takes an active part in any undertaking which 
may have contractual or other relations with a Government Department, more parti-
cularly with his own Department. It may arise, not only if the Minister has a financial 
interest in such an undertaking, but also if he is actively associated with any body, even 
of a philanthropic character, which might have negotiations or other dealings with the 
Government or be involved in disputes with it. Furthermore Ministers should be free to 
give full attention to their official duties, and they should not engage in other activities 
which might be thought to distract their attention from those duties. 
(3) Each Minister must decide for himself how these principles apply to him. Over much of 
the field, as is shown below, there are established precedents; but in any case of doubt 
the Prime Minister of the day must be the final judge, and Ministers should submit any 
such case to him for his direction. 
(4) Where it is proper for a Minister to retain any private interest, it is the rule that he 
should declare that interest to his colleagues if they have to discuss public business in 
any way affecting it, and that he should entirely detach himself from the consideration 
of that business. 
(5) Ministers include all members of the Government except unpaid Assistant Government 
Whips. 
Directorships 
(6) Ministers must on assuming office resign any directorships which they may hold, whether 
in public or in private companies and whether the directorship carries remuneration or 
is honorary. The only exception to this rule is that directorships in private companies 
established for the maintenance of private family estates, and only incidentally concerned 
in trading, may be retained subject to this reservation—that if at any time the Minister 
feels that conflict is likely to arise between this private interest and his public duty, he 
should even in those cases divest himself of his directorship. Directorships or offices 
held in connection with philanthropic undertakings should also be resigned if there is 
any risk of conflict arising between the interests of the undertakings and the Government. 
Shareholdings 
(7) Ministers cannot be expected, on assuming office, to dispose of all their investments. 
But if a Minister holds a controlling interest in any company considerations arise which 
are not unlike those governing the holding of directorships and, if there is any danger of 
a conflict of interest, the right course is for the Minister to divest himself of his con-
trolling interest in the company. There may also be exceptional cases where, even though 
no controlling interest is involved, the actual holding of particular shares in concerns 
closely associated with a Minister's own Department may create the danger of a conflict 
of interest. Where a Minister considers this to be the case, he should divest himself of the 
holding. 
(8) Ministers should scrupulously avoid speculative investments in securities about which 
they have, or may be thought to have, early or confidential information likely to affect 
the price of those securities. 
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APPENDIX 4 
Recent Australian experience at the 
Commonwealth level in regulating 
conflicts of interest 
1. This appendix provides a brief survey of the steps which have been made in 
Australia at the Commonwealth level to regulate conflict of interest. It sets out both 
an outline of current practice, which does not seek to be exhaustive, and details of 
significant recent developments or proposals. 
Members of Parliament 
Constitutional provisions 
2. The Constitutional provisions relating to Members of the Commonwealth 
Parliament holding offices of profit, s. 44 (iv), being government contractors, s. 44 (v), 
or taking fees or honoraria for services rendered to the Commonwealth or in Parlia-
ment, s. 45 (iii), were discussed extensively in Chapter 7•1 
Parliamentary Standing Orders 
3. In addition to the above Constitutional provisions, the pecuniary interests of 
Members of the House of Representatives are governed by precedent and practice 
evolved under Standing Orders 196 and 326 and the practice of the British House of 
Commons as provided in House of Representatives Standing Order 1. 
4. Standing Order 196, the text of which was set out at para. 5.17 and which was 
discussed in Chapter 7, prohibits a Member of the House from voting 'in any division 
upon a question in which he has a direct pecuniary interest not held in common with 
the rest of the subjects of the Crown'. This Standing Order follows the rule of the 
House of Commons, which derives from a ruling by Mr Speaker Abbott on 17 July 
1811 (see Appendix 3, paras 19 to 21). 
5. There have been several challenges to the right of individual Members to vote 
in the House of Representatives on the ground of pecuniary interest and, in each case, 
the motion was negatived or ruled out of order. The positions taken by various 
Speakers of the House of Representatives in interpreting the provisions of the Standing 
Order may be summarised: 
• the Standing Order does not apply to questions of public policy or to public 
questions at a112 ; 
• the inclusion in the Standing Order of the words 'not held in common with the 
rest of the subjects of the Crown' determines the issue whether Members are in 
order in recording a vote if they may benefit from the distribution of money 
raised under the relevant legislation 3 ; 
• the interest held must be personal and immediate, not merely general and remote; 
if a Member is simply one of a class holding an interest, his vote would not be 
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• a financial interest in the ownership of a commercial enterprise held jointly and 
severally with other persons does not affect the entitlement of a Member to vote 
on a related measure before the House5; 
• a Member who is financially interested in a Bill, other than as a shareholder in 
the concern under discussion, should declare his interest6 ; 
• the Speaker cannot have a knowledge of the private business of Members and 
therefore cannot know whether certain Members have or have not an interest 
in a Bill'; and 
• the practice of both the Australian and the British Parliaments is that the Speaker 
should not rule on whether a Member's vote in a division should be disqualified 
or disallowed, although the Speaker may participate in debate to set out the 
precedents involved. Rather, such questions are for the House to determine, 
as a matter of privilege, on a substantive motion by the Member who raises the 
issue." 
There is no comparable Standing Order of the Senate under which the right of a 
Senator to vote may be challenged on the ground of pecuniary interest.9 
6. Standing Order 326 of the House of Representatives and the equivalent Senate 
Standing Order, 292, which deal with the committee service of Members who have 
a 'personal interest' in the committee's work, were discussed in Chapter 7 of the main 
report. 
7. Other than the above, there appear to be no requirements in relation to conflict 
of interest matters applying to ordinary Members. For example, there is no bar 
on Members undertaking private employment, such as continuing to practise as 
lawyers, in addition to carrying out their parliamentary duties. Nor are there any 
rules in relation to the acceptance of gifts, hospitality or travel, nor to post-separation 
employment. As discussed in Chapter 14, the law in relation to bribery by Members 
of Parliament is also unclear. 
Recent developments 
8. There have been several important recent developments relating to the regulation 
of conflict of interest involving Members of the Commonwealth Parliament. 
9. In 1973, the Australian Labor Party adopted a new item in its platform that all 
Ministers and Members should table statutory declarations in their Parliaments 
stating the directorships and shares they held in companies, including shares held 
in trust for them.'° 
10. Following the inclusion of this item in the Labor platform, the then Special 
Minister of State introduced a motion in the House of Representatives on 1 August 
1974 that the House be of the opinion that: 
(a) in any debate or proceeding of the House or its committees or transactions or 
communications which a Member may have with other Members or with 
Ministers or servants of the Crown, he should disclose any relevant pecuniary 
interest or benefit of whatever nature, whether direct or indirect, that he may 
have had, may have or may be expecting to have; 
(b) every Member of the House of Representatives should furnish to the Clerk of 
the House of Representatives such particulars of his pecuniary interests, 
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the Clerk any alterations which may occur therein, and the Clerk shall cause 
these particulars to be entered in a Register of Members' Interests which shall 
be available for inspection by the public; and 
(c) a Joint Committee be appointed to inquire into and report on what arrange-
ments need to be made to give effect to the above principles. 11  
Debate on the resolution was adjourned and the resolution subsequently lapsed. 
11. On 31 October 1974, by a separate resolution, the Joint Committee on Pecuniary 
Interests of Members of Parliament was established, under the chairmanship of the 
Hon. J. M. Riordan, M.P. The Joint Committee was required, by its terms of reference: 
to inquire into and report whether arrangements should be made relative to the declaration 
of the interests of the Members of Parliament and the registration thereof, and, in 
particular: 
(a) what classes of pecuniary interest or other benefit are to be disclosed; 
(b) how the register should be compiled and maintained and what arrangements should 
be made for public access thereto; and 
(c) what classes of person (if any) other than Members of the Parliament ought to be 
required to register; and to make recommendations upon these and any other matters 
which are relevant to the implementation of the said resolution.12 
The Committee's report, which was tabled on 30 September 1975, covered Members of 
Parliament, Ministers, ministerial staff, the media, public servants and employees of 
statutory instrumentalities. 
12. Notice of motion was given in the House of Representatives on 6 November 
1975 of a resolution seeking to implement by Joint Standing Orders those recommend-
ations relating to the establishment of a register for Members, the holding of shares 
and directorships by Ministers, disclosure by staff of Ministers and shadow Ministers, 
and the media. It also proposed the setting up of a Joint Standing Committee on 
Pecuniary Interests, with power to supervise generally the operation of the register of 
pecuniary interests, the media register and to modify, on the authority of both Houses 
of the Parliament, the disclosure requirements set out in the resolution. In addition, 
the Committee was to have power: 
(a) to draft a Code of Conduct based on standing orders, conventions, practices 
and rulings of the Presiding Officers of the Australian and United Kingdom 
Parliaments and such other guidelines as it may consider appropriate; 
(b) to supervise the Code of Conduct agreed to by both Houses of the Parliament; 
and 
(c) to act during recess, and to send for persons, papers and records. 13  
The notice of motion lapsed upon the dissolution of both Houses on 11 November 
1975. A similar motion was placed on notice on 18 February 1976, but lapsed upon 
the dissolution of the House of Representatives in 1977.' 
13. On 18 February 1976, Prime Minister Fraser told the House of Representatives 
that the Government had not finally determined its attitude on the report of the Joint 
Committee on Pecuniary Interests of Members of Parliament. However, all Ministers 
had been asked to make declarations to him, and recommendations of the Committee 
were taken into account in formulating that requirement.15 Similar requirements 
had also been imposed on ministerial staff. Subsequently, on 16 August 1977, he tabled 
the text of the letter to Ministers in which he had set out those requirements, and 
stated that an interdepartmental committee was considering the recommendations of 
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registration of interests by public servants, along with those of the Joint Parliamentary 
Committee, to see to what extent they were compatible'. . . so that the Government 
may be in a position to make a decision on the overall question of pecuniary interests 
in relation not only to parliamentarians but also to public servants'.16 It is understood, 
however, that the committee lapsed on the establishment by the Government of this 
Committee of Inquiry. 
14. The background to and details of the establishment of this Committee of Inquiry 
were set out in Chapter 1. 
Ministers 
15. The prohibition upon holding offices of profit under the Crown which applies 
to Members is removed for Ministers by ss. 44 and 66 of the Constitution and the 
successive Ministers of State Acts. Section 44 specifically limits the scope of the 
relevant prohibition by excluding from its scope 'the office of any of the Queen's 
Ministers of State for the Commonwealth'. Section 66 provides for the payment of 
Ministers from Consolidated Revenue, and the successive Ministers of State Acts 
have provided the means whereby the Parliament has appropriated moneys for the 
payment of salaries and allowances of Ministers. 
16. Evidence available to the Committee on Ministerial practice in Australia focuses 
on three main issues: 
• the holding of directorships by Ministers; 
• the right of Ministers to hold shares and engage in share transactions; and 
• declaration by Ministers, either of directorships, where permitted, and significant 
shareholdings to the Prime Minister, or ad hoc disclosure of relevant interests, 
to the Cabinet or to the Prime Minister prior to a Cabinet meeting. 
Other themes have been outside employment by Ministers, for example the holding 
of retainers from outside organisations or acceptance of fees for newspaper articles, 
subsequent employment of former Ministers, and acceptance of gifts. 
Holding of directorships by Ministers 
17. The practice in relation to the holding of directorships by Ministers is both 
most clear cut and best documented. There was reference in Parliamentary debates 
in 1913 to the fact that the then Postmaster-General had resigned his directorship 
of a private bank on becoming a Minister.17 
18. On 3 November 1938, another Postmaster-General resigned from the Ministry 
following a question on the House of Representatives Notice Paper concerning his 
activities as a director of a company which had contracts with his department.18 The 
Prime Minister, Mr Lyons, accepted his resignation and on 9 November 1938 made 
a statement on the issue of the holding of seats on boards of directors by Ministers 
in those cases not covered by s. 44 of the Constitution. 
19. The Prime Minister ruled out any total prohibition upon the holding of director- 
ships by Ministers and went on to distinguish companies which had direct dealings 
with the Government, whether by way of the sale of goods or the provision of services, 
from companies which had no business dealings with the Government at all. In the 
first case, 'it would appear that, prima facie, no Minister should be a director of such 
a company'. The rule did not apply to arrangements which were technically contracts, 
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as the slightest element of judgment or choice was involved in the placing of govern-
ment business, no Minister should be a director of a company which was the recipient 
of that business. In the second case, he did not regard the holding of a directorship 
as inconsistent with membership of Cabinet.19 
20. In 1949, all members of the Menzies Ministry were required to submit to the 
Prime Minister a list of directorships held in any company, public or private. There 
is some evidence that not all Ministers complied, in that one Minister was subsequently 
revealed to have held a non-active unremunerated directorship while in office. 
21. In 1950, the Prime Minister indicated, in reply to a parliamentary question, that 
he had not required Ministers to surrender any directorships held, but that, to his 
knowledge, no member of the Cabinet was at that time a director of a public company, 
although 'one or two' Ministers who had private family investments carried on their 
activities in connection with these. 20 
22. Evidence given by former members of Menzies Ministries to the Joint Commit-
tee on Pecuniary Interests indicates that there was an understanding that a Minister 
should not be a director or a partner in a company or a private concern. 21  Ministers 
were expected to divest themselves of any involvement in any public company that 
stood in any prospect whatsoever of dealing with the Government.22 
23. Practice under the Holt Government was stated by the Prime Minister in answer 
to a parliamentary question in 1967. In his experience, very few directorships were 
held by Ministers of the Crown and each Minister acted in accordance with his own 
sense of judgment and responsibility in such matters.23  
24. Under the Gorton Ministries, the Cabinet recognised the convention that 
Ministers should not hold directorships in public companies; directorships in private 
companies were in a different category and not subject to prohibition, except in so 
far as a prohibition arose under s. 44 of the Constitution. Ministers gave verbal 
assurances that they held no directorships in public companies. 
25. In 1969, the Prime Minister stated, in reply to a question, that he had been 
assured by all the members of the Ministry that none of them held any directorships 
in any public company. Some Ministers held directorships in private pastoral com-
panies or small businesses but none of these companies had any dealing with any 
government department or instrumentality.24 
26. Later, an interpretation was given to Ministers that directorships could be 
retained in private companies which were principally family companies but not in 
private companies which were in their operations more akin to public companies, 
nor in any companies having dealings with the Government or its instrumentalities. 
In cases of doubt, Ministers were to discuss the matter with the Prime Minister. 
27. Under the McMahon Ministry, Ministers were referred to s. 44 of the Consti-
tution; they were to resign directorships in public companies; directorships in private 
companies, principally family concerns, might be retained unless akin to public 
companies, when they must be resigned. All Ministers were asked to provide written 
confirmation that they held no directorships contrary to the above. As new members 
were appointed to the Ministry, they were also asked for written confirmation. 
28. Under the Whitlam Ministries, the approach taken on this and other conflict 
of interest issues was in line with that of the McMahon Ministry.25  
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29. The conventions previously agreed to by the McMahon and Whitlam Ministries 
have also been followed by the Fraser Ministry. These requirements were restated 
in a letter sent by the Prime Minister to all Ministers on 13 January 1976, which was 
subsequently tabled in the House of Representatives on 16 August 1977. (Another 
part of this letter was quoted at para. 8.10 of the main report.) 
Shareholdings by Ministers 
30. Evidence given to the Joint Committee on Pecuniary Interests by a former 
Minister indicated that, under the Menzies Ministries, the matter of shareholdings 
by individual Ministers was left in general to the 'common sense and the integrity' 
of individual Ministers. If a Minister intended to engage in a sensitive transaction, 
such as the purchase of mining shares, it was seen as desirable that he let the Prime 
Minister know, and the Prime Minister might then object if he wished. However, the 
rule was that no Minister should buy shares at all when he had access to privileged 
information not available generally to members of the public. 26 There is evidence that 
at least one of Prime Minister Menzies's Ministers and his wife were asked to establish 
blind trusts for their holdings. 
31. Under the Gorton Ministries, the issue of shareholdings by Ministers came up 
several times and a number of principles was established. Firstly, in 1958, in reply to a 
parliamentary question, the Prime Minister said there was nothing improper in 
Ministers investing in companies in the ordinary way, and referred to his own small 
holdings in the Broken Hill Proprietary Company Limited and Canberra Television 
Pty Ltd. 27 
 Secondly, Ministers should exercise care in relation to shareholdings which 
had some relationship to their portfolio. On 4 March 1969, the Prime Minister replied 
to another parliamentary question, on whether Ministers were permitted to own 
shares in oil or mineral companies, that there was no prohibition but that the Minister 
for National Development had divested himself of such shares at great personal 
sacrifice, because he felt it improper to hold them and remain in that particular 
portfolio. 28 Thirdly, Ministers should not take up offers of shares which were made on 
terms more advantageous than those available to members of the public. During the 
Gorton Ministries, there was a specific offer of shares to Ministers and public servants. 
It was agreed that Ministers should not take up the offer. In 1970, the Prime Minister 
stated, in reply to a parliamentary question, that the Government did not believe that 
offers of shares which might have a capital appreciation as a result of their being 
taken up ought properly to be taken up by Ministers. Nor should a Minister, when the 
Government was engaged in particular arrangements with a business, have share-
holdings in that business or accept offers which could lead to a capital profit.29 
32. Under the McMahon Ministry, Ministers were not precluded from operations on 
the stock market, but were required not to operate as traders and were to exercise 
discretion; they were not to purchase or hold shares where this could expose them to 
challenge. Any Minister in any doubt about his position was to discuss it with the 
Prime Minister. 
33. Under the Whitlam Ministries the same approach was taken as under the 
McMahon Ministry. 30 
 In 1973, in answer to a parliamentary question, the Prime 
Minister indicated that he would be disturbed if it was thought that any Ministers 
avoided the understandings in relation to shareholdings by holding shares in nominee 
companies or by adopting the device of transferring them to their wives or dependent 
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34. The Fraser Government has again followed the conventions agreed to by the 
McMahon and Whitlam Ministries, and these were restated in the letter by Mr Fraser 
to Ministers referred to above. 
Disclosure of interests by Ministers 
35. The existence of a practice of ad hoc disclosure in relation to matters coming 
before the Cabinet was revealed by Prime Minister Holt in an answer to a question 
without notice in 1967. He stated that, in his experience, when any question arose in 
the Cabinet and a Minister had a shareholding in a company which could be involved, 
the practice was for the Minister to declare that to be the case and for the Prime 
Minister then to be invited to decide whether the shareholding was so substantial 
or of such a relevant nature that the Minister should withdraw from the discussion.32 
36. A specific requirement to declare ahead of Cabinet discussion a private interest 
that might give rise to conflict with public duty was adopted by the McMahon 
Ministry. On 26 April 1972, the Prime Minister was asked in the Parliament whether 
he would request members of Cabinet to disclose the shareholdings of themselves 
and their families in big firms which had enjoyed subsidies, tariff protection or other 
government support. The Prime Minister replied that, while no Minister should be 
unreasonably debarred from ordinary rights of ownership of shares or other property 
by virtue of his position as Minister, it was the practice of Ministers to disclose to 
Cabinet colleagues any interests likely to colour their judgments. 33  
37. Several examples where ad hoc disclosure had occurred at or prior to Cabinet 
meetings were given in evidence and submissions by Ministers and former Ministers 
to the Joint Committee on Pecuniary Interests and to this Committee of Inquiry.34 
38. Under the Whitlam Ministries, the approach taken was in line with that of the 
McMahon Ministry. It appears that the Prime Minister required his Ministers both 
to inform him of any shareholdings and also to make ad hoc disclosures ahead of any 
relevant Cabinet discussions. In 1974, the Prime Minister stated, in reply to a parlia-
mentary question, that Ministers had been made aware that it was incumbent upon 
them, ahead of Cabinet discussions, to declare a private interest that might reasonably 
be held to give rise to conflict with their public duty. In addition, he indicated in 
evidence to the Joint Committee on Pecuniary Interests that, in accordance with 
what he believed was the practice beforehand, he had required all his Ministers to 
let him know any shareholdings they had. 36  It appears, from a reply supplied by the 
Prime Minister to a further question, that this requirement took the form of a letter 
but that an oral declaration of private interests was sufficient. 31 
39. The Fraser Ministries have followed the practices adopted by the McMahon 
and Whitlam Ministries on this matter. In his letter to Ministers of 13 January 1976, 
the Prime Minister laid down both a requirement for ad hoc disclosure ahead of 
Cabinet meetings and set down detailed requirements for the written disclosure of 
the pecuniary interests of Ministers. The relevant extract from this letter was set 
out at Chapter 8. 
Outside employment or income and Ministers 
40. Debate as to the propriety of Ministers who were lawyers accepting briefs 
against the Crown antedates Federation. In 1905, Sir Joseph Cook raised in the 
Parliament the fact that the Government of South Australia had retained Isaac 
Isaacs, Attorney-General in the Deakin Ministry, and Josiah Symon, who was 
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the use of the waters of the Murray River. Isaacs, in reply, stated that the Common-
wealth was unlikely to be involved in this case, but if it were he certainly would with-
draw, nor would he give advice which reflected on the position of the Commonwealth. 38 
41. In 1913, a case arose concerning an admission by the Attorney-General that he 
had accepted a retainer from a company that was in litigation with the Commonwealth. 
A motion was moved that Ministers of the Crown should not violate the code of rules 
laid down by the British Prime Minister, Mr Asquith (see Appendix 3). These rules 
related to the possible conflict of private pecuniary interest and public duty and the 
acceptance of favours from those negotiating with the Government. However, the 
39 motion was not carried. 
42. On 19 August 1971, the question was raised in the House of Representatives 
whether payments to Ministers of the Crown for writing newspaper articles were in 
order. In reply, Prime Minister McMahon stated that, in his own case, he had passed 
on any such payments to his departmental social club or to social organisations in his 
electorate. His attitude to the retention of payments by Ministers was that he did not 
like the idea and would not countenance it himself. 40 
43. The Committee is aware of no evidence as to a specific instruction on outside 
employment or income by Ministers prior to Prime Minister Fraser's letter to Ministers 
of 13 January 1976. This stated that 'Ministers may not accept retainers or income 
from personal exertion other than that laid down as their remuneration as Ministers 
and Members of Parliament'. The letter also required written confirmation by Ministers 
that they observed this policy. 
Acceptance of gifts,  hospitality and travel 
44. Prime Minister Whitlam, in answer to a parliamentary question on 6 November 
1975, stated that practice under his Government, which was in line with that of 
previous Governments, was that Ministers or their wives might retain personal gifts 
they were given in the course of overseas visits. He indicated that no record was kept 
of such personal gifts. 41 
45. The current rules relating to the acceptance of gifts by Ministers were stated in 
the previously mentioned letter by Prime Minister Fraser to Ministers. This letter 
provided: 
Ministers should not accept gifts other than of a token nature. Gifts received on overseas 
visits are to be declared to the Prime Minister on return. If they are of more than token 
value they will be valued and Ministers will be given the opportunity to purchase. 
In addition, it asked that details be provided of sponsored travel. 
46. Further particulars concerning the rules were provided in answers given by the 
Prime Minister to two Questions on Notice on 8 June 1978. 
47. Firstly, in reply to a question as to whether these rules applied to acceptance of 
offers of overseas travels by a Minister's family, the Prime Minister stated that the 
guidelines governing the acceptance of gifts by Ministers and their families did not 
specificially mention offers of free overseas travel. However, it was expected that a 
Minister would not accept for himself or his family offers of free overseas travel from 
commercial sources, whether the commercial activities involved were connected 
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48. He replied to a second question, seeking details of the number and value of gifts 
received and observance of the guidelines, by referring to previous practice, as stated 
by his predecessor in office. He went on to say that, when his Government came to 
office, new procedures were instituted in relation to gifts. Under these guidelines, 
significant gifts received by Ministers or their families in the course of their official 
duties are declared and valued. Where a gift presented by another government is 
valued at $250 or a gift from any other source is valued at more than $100, the gift 
is surrendered unless the recipient pays the determined valuation. On the matter of 
disclosing the value of individual gifts or lists of gifts, he stated that he believed that 
such a practice would breach the rules of courtesy, and that this was also the view 
of previous governments.43 
Post-separation employment of Ministers 
49. The Committee is not aware of any guidelines or practices, past or present, 
concerning the employment of Ministers on ceasing to hold office. 
Public servants 
50. The Public Service Act 1922 and regulations contain a number of provisions 
designed to eliminate the possibility of conflict of interest. These cover such topics 
as the solicitation or acceptance of gifts (regulation 37), acceptance of fees (s. 91A and 
regulation 38), outside employment and the holding of directorships (s. 91), borrowing 
between officers (regulation 39), and misuse or unauthorised disclosure of official 
information (regulations 34 (a) and 35). Breach of these provisions constitutes mis-
conduct and is subject to disciplinary action under the relevant provisions of the 
Public Service Act. 
51. These legal requirements are supplemented by Public Service General Orders 
and Public Service Board Circulars which set out in more detail Public Service Board 
policy or instructions in several areas directly relevant to conflict of interest, for 
example General Order 14/D—Performance of Outside Work. 
52. In addition to the general provisions applying to all public servants, departments 
may issue supplementary instructions on particular issues. For example, the Depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs has laid down detailed instructions in relation to the acceptance 
of gifts, hospitality and travel, including inaugural flights, and on the ownership of 
property in foreign countries. 
53. As discussed at Chapter 14, Ministers, public servants and statutory officeholders 
and the staff of statutory bodies are Commonwealth officers for the purposes of Part 
VT of the Crimes Act 1914 and are therefore subject to its provisions relating to 
disclosure of official information, s. 70, and bribery, s. 73. 
54. The Secret Commissions Act 1905 is of particular relevance to officers acting as 
agents of the Commonwealth or for a department or an authority or an officer of the 
Commonwealth in arranging contracts. Section 4 relates to the offering and acceptance 
of gifts or inducements intended as bribes. Section 6 has particular application to 
public servants involved in Commonwealth procurement who are at the same time 
shareholders in companies dealing with the Commonwealth. This section provides 
substantial penalties where an agent engages in a transaction on behalf of his principal 
(in this case, the Commonwealth or the agent's department) in which he has a personal 
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55. In addition to those recommendations of the Joint Committee on Pecuniary 
Interests which relate to public servants, there have been several recent developments 
which relate specifically to public servants. 
56. Recommendations in relation to possible conflict of official and personal interests 
in relation to public servants were made by the Royal Commission on Australian 
Government Administration, which reported in July 1976. The Royal Commission 
recommended that a system of registration of declarations of direct and indirect 
pecuniary interests be developed. It also suggested, as part of a recommendation that 
the duties of public servants be set out in statute, that such a statute should specifically 
require that: 
(d) a person employed shall so regulate personal interests and dealings of a kind 
involving financial gain that they do not conflict or appear to conflict with his 
or her public duty; 
(e) unless specifically exempted by the minister, a person employed and classified 
at or above a specified level shall declare any direct or indirect financial interest 
in a register held by his head of department or statutory authority or, in the 
case of head of department or statutory authority, held by the Board. The 
minister shall have access to such a register. 44 
It expressed the view that the establishment of such a register would not make less 
important the obligation to draw attention to an actual or an apparent conflict when 
it in fact emerged. 
57. Following on the recommendations of the Royal Commission, a subcommittee 
of the Joint Council of the Australian Public Service, a joint staff—management 
consultative body established under the Public Service Act, was set up in December 
1976 to examine the relationship between official and personal interests and, in 
particular, current rules relating to outside employment, the acceptance of fees, the 
holding of offices in public corporations and the holding of paid office in connection 
with commercial businesses. 45  
58. Subsequently, in 1977, the Government requested the Public Service Board to 
draw up a set of guidelines on official conduct for Commonwealth public servants and 
the Board issued a Discussion Paper, Draft Guidelines on Official Conduct of Common-
wealth Public Servants, in March 1978. 41 This set out in a single document the legal 
requirements and conventions in areas where public servants may encounter ethical 
problems in relation to their employment. The document also offered guidelines to 
appropriate conduct in situations not covered by existing provisions. For example, 
the Draft Guidelines suggested that public servants had a clear responsibility to make 
ad hoc disclosures of any actual or potential conflict of interest to their Permanent 
Head. There is no existing legal provision or instruction applying to officers generally 
which required such disclosure, although the Secret Commissions Act 1905 may apply 
in certain circumstances and some departments have internal instructions requiring 
disclosure, especially in relation to senior officers. 
59. The Joint Council Sub-committee is currently inactive, pending the Government's 
consideration of a later version of the Draft Guidelines, revised in the light of comments 
received. 
60. It is also understood that the law on corruption as it relates to Commonwealth 
officials is currently under review by the Attorney-General's Department. The review 
covers the Secret Commissions Act 1905 and those provisions of the Crimes Act, 
Public Service Act and Regulations, Electoral Act and common law which relate to 
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Statutory officeholders 
61. The conduct of statutory office holders in relation to conflict of interest is 
governed by specific statutory provisions in the legislation establishing such offices, by 
rules and practices voluntarily adopted by statutory authorities and, to some extent, 
the common law applying to public officeholders. 
62. Most, but not all, the legislation establishing statutory authorities which the 
Committee has examined contains specific provisions relating to conflict of interest. 
The form such provisions take varies widely. Such provisions may include prohibitions 
upon the appointment of persons holding certain interests as members, or upon 
members of the authority entering into contracts with the authority, requirements to 
declare interests in contracts or in matters under discussion at meetings of the authority, 
requirements to declare all interests in writing to the Minister; and, in the case of 
full-time officeholders, restrictions upon engaging in outside employment. One reason 
for the diversity of provisions appears to be differences in drafting approach at 
different periods. 
63. At the time of the Twenty-first and Twenty-second Reports of the Joint Com-
mittee of Public Accounts on the Australian Aluminium Production Commission, 
in 1955, the legislation establishing a number of Commonwealth statutory corpor-
ations contained prohibitions upon entering into or participating in any benefit from 
contracts with the authority, on pain of removal from office .41 The Joint Committee 
gave as an example s. 5 (4) of the Coal Industry Act 1946, which is still current (see 
Attachment 1).48  However, such provisions were not standard in legislation estab-
lishing Commonwealth statutory corporations. 49 
64. The Joint Committee stated that it had been informed that the stringent require-
ments in existing legislation such as the Coal Industry Act: 
have made it difficult always to appoint suitable persons to the boards in question. Men 
of the calibre and experience required, acting with the scrupulousness that is properly 
demanded of people in positions of public trust, have been unwilling to accept appoint-
ments to boards because of their difficulties in regard to the 'financial interest' provision. 50 
It noted that the Australian National Airlines Act 1945 had been amended in 1952 for 
this reason. 
65. The Solicitor-General, in an Opinion provided to the Joint Committee dated 
11 February 1955, drew attention to s. 5 of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy 
Authority Act 1954. This provision, which he stated was 'probably based on the rules 
applicable in ordinary companies', required disclosure of interests in contracts or 
proposed contracts, followed by disqualification from consideration of that contract. 51 
66. The Committee went on to recommend that consideration be given to stan-
dardising the provision for the disqualification of members of boards on account of 
financial interest: 
If some statutory provision is considered necessary, then a provision along the lines of the 
United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority Act 1954, the most satisfactory of the 
statutory provisions brought to our notice, should be adopted for all boards.52 
67. The Sixty-seventh Report of the Joint Committee sets out a Treasury Minute 
dated 20 April 1964, indicating the action which was taken following on the Com-
mittee's findings. The Minute stated that the practice at that point was to include a pro-
hibition upon having any interest in or benefiting from any contract with the authority, 
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setting up authorities consisting of full-time members. In cases where members were 
not all full time, the practice was to include a provision requiring declaration of 
interests in contracts, combined with disqualification. 5 3A current example of the 
latter type of provision, which became standard in legislation establishing authorities 
which conduct meetings, is s. 13 of the Atomic Energy Act 1953 (see attachment 1). 
68. There is some evidence in recent years of the replacement of earlier provisions 
prohibiting interests in contracts with the authority by requirements for disclosure 
of interests in contracts. For example, a provision prohibiting interests in contracts 
or agreements with the authority, which existed in the Australian National Railways 
Act 1917, was replaced in 1975 by a provision requiring declaration of interests in 
contracts followed by disqualification.54 
69. A change in drafting approach during 1975 has led to a widening of the disclosure 
requirement inserted in legislation establishing authorities which conduct meetings, 
to require disclosure of any direct or indirect pecuniary interest in a matter under 
consideration by the authority. A recent example is s. 18 of the Commonwealth Legal 
Aid Commission Act 1977, the text of which is at Attachment 1. Failure to comply with 
this provision may lead to removal from office, by virtue of s. 12 (2) (b) of that Act. 
70. There exist a large number of variations of the older and newer types of 'standard' 
disclosure clause quoted above. These appear to be the result both of variations in 
and progressive refinements of drafting approach over the years and of variations 
requested to meet the circumstances of particular authorities. For example, s. 14 (4) 
of the Australian National Airlines Act 1945 exempts from the general disclosure 
requirement contracts 'between a Commissioner and the Commission for the carriage 
of a Commissioner or another person or of any goods'. 
71. The same factors may explain the occurrence, in a few Acts, of a number of 
other forms of pecuniary interest clause, for example the prohibition upon the appoint-
ment to the authority of persons holding relevant positions or interests in s. 12 (2) of 
the Insurance Acts 1973 and the prohibition upon entering into any contract with 
Australia found in s. 15 (2) of the Public Service Act 1922. 
72. In addition to such legislative requirements, some statutory authorities have 
adopted their own rules or procedures relating to conflict of interest. For example, 
the Australia Council has adopted by resolution a policy statement on conflict of 
interests. This deals with such matters as receipt of grants by members of the Council 
or its various Boards, Advisory Panels and Committees and members of staff. The 
Council is one of several authorities which indicated that it maintained or was estab-
lishing an internal register of the relevant interests of its members (see para. 10.15 of 
the main report). 
73. In addition to specific statutory requirements, it appears that statutory office-
holders may be subject to the common law offence of misbehaviour in public office. 
This embraces a wide variety of misconduct, including acts done with a dishonest, 
oppressive or corrupt motive. The Report of the British Royal Commission on 
Standards of Conduct in Public Life concluded 'that the common law offence has a 
useful, though small, part to play in the battery of criminal sanctions against mal-
practice in public life, and that it should be retained'.55  
74. The types of provisions which exist for the staff of statutory authorities were 
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75. Apart from the developments in drafting practice mentioned above, there have 
been few significant developments in relation to the conflict of interest provisions 
applying to statutory officeholders since the 1955 and 1964 Reports of the Joint 
Committee on Public Accounts. The Joint Committee on Pecuniary Interests of 
Members of Parliament did not make any recommendations in relation to statutory 
officeholders, but envisaged that 'employees of statutory instrumentalities' should be 
under 'no lesser obligation in respect of declarations of interest than are others 
located in other key constituent parts of the decision-making process of parliamentary 
democracy'. 56  Heads of statutory authorities were, however, included by the Royal 
Commission on Australian Government Administration in its recommendations in 
relation to registration. 
76. There has occasionally been parliamentary comment on the drafting of such 
provisions when legislation establishing statutory authorities has been debated .57  
The Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Government Operations is currently 
examining questions relating to statutory authorities of the Commonwealth. 58 
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Attachment 1 
Examples of conflict of interest provisions 
in statutory authority legislation 
(a) Coal Industry Act 1946 
5. (4) A member of the Board shall be deemed to have vacated his office if— 
(d) he becomes in any way (otherwise than as a member of the Board) concerned or 
interested in any contract or agreement entered into by or on behalf of the Board 
or in any way (otherwise than as a member of the Board) participates or claims 
to be entitled to participate in the profit thereof, or in any benefit or emolument 
arising therefrom; 
(b) Atomic Energy Act 1953 
13. (1) If—. 
(d) a member of the Commission fails to comply with his obligations under the next 
succeeding sub-section, 
the Governor-General shall, by notice in the Gazette, declare that the office of the member 
is vacant, and thereupon the office shall be deemed to be vacant. 
(2) A member of the Commission who is directly or indirectly interested in a contract 
made or proposed to be made by the Commission, otherwise than as a member, and in 
common with the other members, of an incorporated company consisting of not less than 
twenty-five persons, shall, as soon as possible after the relevant facts have come to his 
knowledge, disclose the nature of his interest at a meeting of the Commission. 
(3) A disclosure under the last preceding sub-section shall be recorded in the minutes 
of the Commission, and the member of the Commission— 
(a) shall not take part after the disclosure in any deliberation or decision of the 
Commission with respect to that contract; and 
(b) shall be disregarded for the purpose of constituting a quorum of the Commission 
for any such deliberation or decision. 
(c) Commonwealth Legal Aid Commission Act 1977 
18. (1) A Commissioner who has a direct or indirect pecuniary interest in a matter 
being considered or about to be considered by the Commission, otherwise than as a 
member of, and in common with the other members of, an incorporated company which 
consists of more than 25 persons and of which he is not a director, shall, as soon as 
possible after the relevant facts have come to his knowledge, disclose the nature of his 
interest at a meeting of the Commission. 
(2) A disclosure under sub-section (1) shall be recorded in the minutes of the meeting 
of the Commission and the Commissioner shall not be present during any deliberation of 
the Commission with respect to that matter. 
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Appendix 5 
Recent practice and developments at 
Australian State and Local Government level 
in regulating conflicts of interest 
1. This appendix outlines the types of provisions which exist in the various States 
and Territories in relation to conflicts of interest and details of those recent develop-
ments of which the Committee is aware. It focuses particularly on the position of 
Members of Parliament and Ministers, although some material is also included on 
provisions affecting public servants and statutory officeholders. Because it is an area 
with relatively long-standing and detailed conflict of interest provisions, material on 
the statutory requirements in relation to members and staff of local government 
authorities is also included. 
Members of Parliament and Ministers 
2. As at the Commonwealth level, the two principal types of provision which 
currently apply to State Members of Parliament are Constitutional provisions relating 
to parliamentary disqualification in respect of conflicts of interest, and Standing 
Orders, similar to those of the House of Representatives, relating to voting by 
Members on matters in which they have a pecuniary interest and to participation in 
committees. However, in addition, there have been recent moves in several States 
towards the development of codes of conduct for Ministers and Members and the 
introduction of registration of pecuniary interests. 
Constitutional provisions 
3. Each of the State Constitutions contains provisions relating to disqualification 
of persons holding offices of profit under, or having contracts with, the Crown from 
being Members of Parliament. The relevant provisions are: 
New South Wales 	 . Constitution Act, 1902, ss. 13, 13B, 14. 
Victoria . 	 . 	 . Constitution Act 1975, ss. 49-61. 
Constitution Act Amendment Act 1958, ss. 21, 22, 30. 
Queensland 	 . 	 . Constitution Act 1867-1978, ss. 6, 7, 7A. 
Constitution Act and Another Act Amendment Act 1977 
s. 5. 
Legislative Assembly Act 1867-1978, ss. 7A-7D. 
Legislative Assembly Act and Another Act Amendment Act 
1978. 
Officials in Parliament Act 1896, ss. 5, 6. 
South Australia 	 . Constitution Act, 1934-1978, ss. 45-54a. 
Western Australia 	 . Constitution Act, 1889, s. 6. 
Constitution Act Amendment Act, 1889-1977, ss. 31-49. 
Tasmania . 	 . 	 . Constitution Act 1934, ss. 32, 33, 35. 	 197 
In addition, s. 21 of the Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act 1978 lays down 
similar provisions with respect to qualification for membership of the Northern 
Territory Legislative Assembly. There is evidence of dissatisfaction with these pro-
visions in at least four States. 
4. In 1971, the Western Australian Law Reform Committee produced a report, 
Disqualification for Membership of Parliament: Offices of Profit under the Crown and 
Government Contracts.' This drew attention to defects in the present legislation, both 
of obscurity and of rigidity, and made a number of recommendations for changes. 
In 1975, this issue was again examined by a Joint Committee of the Parliament but, 
because of the withdrawal of Opposition Members in October 1976, the Committee 
never reported. On 17 November 1976, the Premier of Western Australia stated, in 
reply to a parliamentary question, his desire 'that there should be a code clearly 
setting out—preferably on an Australia-wide basis—what should be done so that all 
Members of Parliament will know not only what they should declare about their 
interests, but also to overcome the vexed question which arises when a Member of 
Parliament gets involved in an office of profit under the Crown. • ' 2 
5. In evidence before this Committee of Inquiry, the Joint Government Parties of 
Western Australia raised what were seen as the difficulties caused by the current 
provisions for Members who own businesses upon entering Parliament. 
6. In 1972, the Victorian Parliament legislated to establish a Joint Select Committee 
'to inquire into and report on the existing law relating to Parliamentary disqualifi-
cations and to make such recommendations as it thinks necessary to improve and 
simplify such laws'. In introducing this legislation, the then Attorney-General 
referred to the lack of precision in the existing provisions which 'has led to many 
suggestions that certain transactions that have taken or are taking place without 
the knowledge of a Member may lead to that Member's disqualification from 
membership of the Parliament'.3 The Interim Report of the Joint Select Committee, 
the Qualifications Committee, which was tabled in April 1973, contained Appendixes 
by the Solicitor-General and Chief Parliamentary Counsel which suggested that 
amendments of the relevant provisions were desirable .4  Since this report, the Victorian 
Constitution Act has been re-enacted and some of the suggestions made have been 
taken up, for example abolition of the 'common informer' provision.,' 
7. In 1978, the New South Wales Joint Committee upon Pecuniary Interests com-
mented that it found the relevant provisions of the New South Wales Constitution 
Act, 1902 'inadequate and did not overcome the problem of declaration of interests', 
but made no recommendations specifically in relation to amending them.6 
8. In May 1978, the qualifications of a Queensland Minister and a backbench 
Member to retain their seats in the Queensland Legislative Assembly came into 
question as a result of their holding or being appointed to positions, in one case as a 
members of a grammar school board of trustees, in the other case to the Board of a 
statutory authority, contrary to 1977 amendments to the Constitution Act and the 
Legislative Assembly Act.' This legislation, the Constitution Act and Another Act 
Amendment Act 1977, provided that a Member of the Legislative Assembly was 
ineligible to accept Ministerial or Governor in Council appointments to any authority, 
corporation, board or other body, and that, in the case of such an appointment, the 
Member's seat would become vacant.8 
9. In May 1978, the Parliament passed the Legislative Assembly Act and Another Act 
Amendment Act 1978, which retrospectively provided that a Member's seat was not 
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under the Crown and that, where an office or appointment was held and could cause 
a Member's seat to become vacant, the position would terminate upon the adoption 
of the Act. In introducing the Act, the Premier stated that he would recommend that 
the Queensland Parliament establish a Select Committee to decide those Crown 
positions to which Members of Parliament might be appointed.9 However, to date, 
such a Committee has not been established. 
Standing Orders 
10. The Standing Orders of most State Houses of Parliament and of the Australian 
Capital Territory Legislative Assembly provide that a Member is not entitled to vote 
on a matter in which he has a 'direct pecuniary interest' and that the vote of such a 
Member either 'shall', or 'may' on a motion of the relevant House, be disallowed. 
The exact form of such Standing Orders varies. For instance, the interests to which 
such a Standing Order applies may be restricted to those which are 'immediate and 
personal, and not merely of a general or remote description' or 'not held in common 
with the rest of the subjects of the Crown', or it may be expressly stated that the Stand-
ing Order does not apply to motions or public Bills which involve questions of 
state policy.10 
11. There is also a provision in the Standing Orders of most of the State Houses of 
Parliament and of the Territorial Assemblies that no Member may sit on a select 
committee if he is personally interested in an inquiry before the committee, although, 
again, the precise form of such Standing Orders may vary.1' 
12. In 1978, the Report of the New South Wales Joint Committee upon Pecuniary 
Interests concluded, in relation to the relevant New South Wales Standing Orders, 
that the existing safeguards within the parliamentary institution were not adequate 
as regards the declaration of pecuniary interest or other benefit. It recommended 
that a Joint Standing Committee upon Pecuniary Interests should recommend to the 
Standing Orders Committee in order to ensure that the relevant Standing Orders were 
interpreted in a way 'that takes cognizance of relevant factors contained in this 
Report' 12 
Codes of conduct for Members and Ministers 
13. In April 1974, the Qualifications Joint Select Committee of the Victorian 
Parliament (referred to above) made a Progress Report setting out a proposed code of 
conduct for Members of Parliament, which was supplemented by 'a more stringent 
series of principles for Ministers of the Crown'.13  
14. In December 1978, a code of conduct for Members, with additional provisions 
applying to Ministers, was enacted by the Victorian Parliament as Part I of the 
Members of Parliament (Register of Interests) Act 1978—see Attachment 1. The Code 
is based on that recommended by the Joint Select Committee, with important dif-
ferences. 
15. Firstly, whereas the Joint Select Committee proposed that a Member should 
make full disclosure only of any direct pecuniary interest that he has in relation to 
any matter upon which he speaks in the Parliament, the Act requires him also to 
disclose the name of any trade or professional organisation of which he is a member 
which has an interest in a matter upon which he is speaking and any other relevant 
material interest, whether of a pecuniary nature or not. Secondly, whereas the Joint 
Select Committee proposed a voluntary code, breach of the Code set out in the Act 
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16. In the case of Ministers, the Act sets out only the broad principles that Ministers 
should avoid real or apparent conflicts of interest and that they should devote their 
time and energy to the carrying out of their public duties. However, s. 3 (2) of the Act 
requires that regard should be had in the application and interpretation of the code 
to the Joint Select Committee's Report. This gave certain elaborations of the principles 
set out in the code in relation to Ministers. The principal of these were: 
• A Minister should, on assuming office, resign any directorship in a public or 
private company where conflict between his public duty and his private interests 
exists or appears to exist, or where the directorship would give rise to distraction 
from the carrying out of the duties of his office. 
• A Minister is entitled to retain shares held by him in incorporated companies on 
assuming office or to invest in shares while a Minister. He should dispose of 
shares in any company where the basic principle of conflict of interest applies. 
• A Minister should avoid speculative investments in securities where he has, or 
may be thought to have, early or confidential information likely to affect the 
price of those shares. 
• A Minister who, prior to assuming office under the Crown, was engaged in 
professional practice or in the conduct of his own business, whether alone, in 
partnership or as an incorporated company, should cease to carry on the daily 
routine work or take active part in its ordinary business. Subject to the application 
of the basic principles governing conflicts of interest in Ministers, he should not 
be required to dispose of his business or to dissolve his partnership, nor should 
he be precluded from continuing to advise in matters of family trusts, guardian-
ships and similar matters of a personal nature. 
• A private or personal interest properly retained should be disclosed in Cabinet 
if any matter of public business coming up for consideration impinges upon it 
and the Minister should not take part in the discussion or be a party to the 
decision on that matter. 
17. Although the terms of reference of the New South Wales Joint Committee upon 
Pecuniary Interests required it to report specifically upon the disclosure and registration 
of Members' interests, its report included the following conclusion. 
It is considered that a flexible and well-drawn up code of conduct, when allied with an 
effective registration system, would reflect the Committee's desire to instigate proposals 
that would safeguard and enhance the public standing of members without making 
unjustified inroads into their existing rights of privacy.14 
18. Some important observations upon the standard of conduct required of Ministers 
are found in the Report of a Royal Commission of Inquiry (the Hon. Mr Justice 
L. J. Herron) concerning a former New South Wales Minister for Housing.,, r3 
It should be steadily kept in mind that a Minister should carefully avoid all trans-
actions which could give colour or countenance to the belief that he is doing anything 
which the rules of obligation forbid. 
when exercising Ministerial power a Minister must avoid situations which may give 
rise to incompatibility between public duty and private gain, and not only must the 
conduct of the Minister be proper in substance but it must also be proper in form. In 
other words, it must have the appearance of propriety. 
• . in view of the dignity and high public position of a Minister, discretion requires that a 
Minister must not only act in the correct way in substance but that he also take every 
reasonable precaution to see that his acts appear to be proper in form. 
On the other hand, Ministers are not expected to lead cloistered lives and it is essential 
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problems with which they have to deal. There is no objection to a Minister of the Govern-
ment retaining other employment, provided that employment can be carried on without 
prejudice to the Queen's Service—which has the paramount claim. 
Accordingly, there is no objection to a Minister retaining a position as a member of a 
firm of solicitors provided that he does not allow himself to be brought into a position 
where his interests in the affairs of his client conflict with his duties as a Minister of State. 
In the interests of sound administration a Minister should undertake no professional 
engagements which might interfere with complete regard for his duties, and he should 
avoid professional engagements of a kind which give rise to the suggestion that he is 
preferring personal advantage to State interest. 
On this subject, it appears to me that it would be unreasonable to require that a solicitor, 
on becoming a member of the Cabinet, should dissolve his partnership or should allow 
his annual Practising Certificate to lapse. On the other hand, he should cease to carry on 
daily routine work of the firm, or take an active part in its ordinary business, although he 
should not be precluded from continuing to advise in matters of family trusts, guardian-
ships, and similar cases. A certain amount of discretion must, of course, be allowed, since 
it is impossible to cover every conceivable case in any rule. 
When a Minister is acting in his Ministerial capacity he must not exercise his powers 
for the purpose of private gain either to himself or to his firm, relations and friends. 
Registration of interests 
19. In the last few years, five of the Australian States and the Northern Territory 
have displayed interest in establishing registers of the interests of Members of 
Parliament. In 1973, the Federal Conference of the Australian Labor Party adopted 
declaration of directorships and shares by Ministers and Members as a matter of 
constitutional policy. 
20. In September 1974, a Private Member's Bill was introduced in the South 
Australian House of Assembly to require Members of the State Parliament to disclose 
annually all sources of income in excess of $500 received by themselves, their spouses 
and their infant children.1-8 The Bill lapsed. 
21. The South Australian Government introduced a Bill on 30 November 1977 to 
establish a register of information relating to the sources of income and financial 
interests of Members of Parliament and their immediate families, which subsequently 
passed the House of Assembly in March 1978 but lapsed at the end of the session.17 
On 22 August 1978, the South Australian Government reintroduced the Bill in a 
modified form as the Members of Parliament (Disclosure of Interests) Bill.18 The Bill 
was passed by the House of Assembly in November 1978 but was laid aside in 
February 1979 after amendments sought by the Legislative Council proved unaccept-
able to the House of Assembly and a conference of both Houses was unable to 
resolve the issue.19 The Legislative Council then passed a resolution seeking the 
establishment of a joint committee to inquire into declaration of interests by Members 
of Parliament and 'other persons serving in any public office' and, in particular, to 
examine who should be required to declare, what interests should be disclosed, 
access to any register of interests, and the need to amend relevant provisions in the 
Constitution Act and Standing Orders .20 At the time of writing, the House of 
Assembly had not considered this resolution. 
22. In August 1975, a Private Member's Bill was introduced into the Western 
Australian Legislative Assembly requiring the disclosure by Members of information 
relating to certain sources of income received by them .21 A Committee was sub-
sequently formed to examine the desirability and form of a register for Members 
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mentioned above, the Committee met on several occasions until October 1976 but, 
following withdrawal of Opposition Members, the Committee did not produce a 
report. 
23. In the meantime, in 1976, the Tasmanian Government had introduced the 
Constitution (Members' Interests) Bill which provided for a register of declarations 
of certain pecuniary interests by Members of Parliament. This Bill reached the 
Committee stage but lapsed on prorogation of the Parliament. 
24. The New South Wales Parliament appointed a Joint Committee upon Pecuniary 
Interests in September 1976. The Joint Committee reported in April 1978 in favour 
of registration of interests by Members of Parliament, ministerial staff, senior public 
servants, statutory officeholders, members of the media, and local government 
councillors and officials. 22 
25. The Premier of New South Wales subsequently announced on 11 March 1979 
that his Government intended to introduce legislation in the forthcoming session of 
Parliament to establish a public register of the pecuniary interests of all Members of 
Parliament and their immediate families. He stated that this register would cover all 
sources of income, shareholdings including foreign shareholdings, directorships, 
partnerships, trusts and trusteeships, real estate and such matters as sponsored travel, 
substantial gifts and overseas transactions.23  
26. In Victoria, in June 1976, the State Conference of the Australian Labor Party 
resolved that, pending implementation of its policy for registration by all Members 
of Parliament, its own Members would register 'those income-producing business 
enterprises in which Members or their immediate families have a financial interest'. 
A publicly accessible register was established under that resolution in November 1976. 
27. On 2 August 1978, the Legislative Assembly of the Northern Territory became 
the first Australian legislature to adopt registration when it adopted, by resolution, 
a system of registration of Members' financial affairs. This requires the disclosure of: 
e nature and value of assets, including money due other than by way of salary; 
• particulars of any trust; 
• location of any realty; 
• nature and amounts of liabilities; 
• each item of expenditure and source of income, not involved in the ordinary 
course of business or incidental to the Member's duty as a Member—but in-
cluding sponsored travel—exceeding $2000 in the reporting year; and 
• nature of involvement in any company, whether private or public and whether 
as a shareholder or otherwise; 
in respect of the Member, his spouse and dependent children below the age of 18 
(excepting company interests for children). Any changes involving assets or money 
in excess of $2000 must be reported within three calendar months. The register is 
kept by the Clerk of the Legislative Assembly, who may make it available to any 
bona fide inquirer, after informing the Member concerned of the request and the name 
of the inquirer and his interest in the information. 
28. The same resolution also requires Ministers to resign as directors of public 
companies within thirty days of their appointment, and requires Ministers and the 
Leader of the Opposition to secure from their staff members statutory declarations 
containing the information required from Members of the Legislative Assembly in 
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29. The only other legislature in Australia, at the time of writing, to adopt regist-
ration requirements is the Victorian Parliament, which passed the Members of 
Parliament (Register of Interests) Act 1978 in December 1978. In addition to providing 
for a code of conduct for Members and Ministers, this establishes a register of 
Members' interests maintained by the Clerk of the Parliaments, with sanctions, which 
might be imposed by the House to which the Member belongs, in the event of failure 
to observe the code or the registration requirements. 
30. Part II of the Act sets out the details of the register of Members' interests. The 
interests required to be registered cover income sources in excess of $500; the names 
of all companies, partnerships, associations or other bodies in which a Member has a 
beneficial interest exceeding $500 in value; directorships and other company offices 
held, past and present; the name of any political party, body or association or trade 
or professional organisation of which the Member is or has been a member; a concise 
description of any trust in which a Member holds a beneficial interest, or of which the 
Member is trustee and a member of his family has a beneficial interest; the location of 
any real estate in which a Member has a beneficial interest, but not its size or value; 
sources of significant contributions towards the Member's travel outside the State; 
gifts of $500 or more in value received from other than relatives; and any other 
substantial interest, whether of a pecuniary nature or not, of the Member or of a 
member of his family of which the Member is aware and which the Member considers 
might appear to raise a material conflict of interest. For registration purposes, 'family' 
is defined to include a spouse and any child of the Member who is under the age of 
18 years and normally resides with the Member. 
31. Details of each Member's statement of interests will be kept confidential but a 
summary will be prepared by the Clerk and tabled in the Parliament and published 
as part of a Parliamentary Paper. Added protection for the Member will be provided 
by a stipulation that information derived from the Parliamentary Paper shall not be 
published unless it constitutes a fair and accurate summary of the information and no 
comment is made unless it is fair and published in the public interest and without 
malice. The actual form of the register and of the summaries are not set out in the 
Act but are left for prescription by regulation. 
32. Sanctions in the event of failure to comply with the requirements of the Act 
will be for the House concerned to impose. Failure to comply will be treated as con-
tempt of the Parliament and a fine of up to $2000 may be imposed. Default of pay-
ment of a fine within the time ordered by the House will result in forfeiture of the 
Member's seat. The Act makes no provision relating to the procedures for the handling 
of complaints against Members or others who transgress against the legislation. 
33. The Committee is not aware of any developments at State government level in 
Queensland in relation to registration of Members' interests. The Premier stated in 
the Legislative Assembly on 23 November 1978 that there was nothing to prevent any 
Member of the House from declaring his private interests at any stage. He went on 
implicitly to reject the idea of legislation requiring declaration, saying that it 'sounds 
good but achieves little'.25  
Public servants 
34. The Committee received evidence on current practice and recent developments 
in relation to public servants in New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia and the 
Northern Territory. In each of these States, there are existing provisions in the 	 203 
relevant Public Service Act and Regulations or procedures relating to such topics as 
the acceptance of gifts and rewards, outside employment, misuse and unauthorised 
disclosure of official information, rights to hold municipal office and the holding of 
directorships or shares. Similar restrictions appear to apply, to a more limited degree, 
to other State government employees, such as the staff of statutory authorities. 
35. The only existing formal provisions which require the avoidance of conflict or 
the disclosure of pecuniary interests by public servants appear to be in South Australia 
and the Northern Territory. Section 121 of the South Australian Public Service Act, 
1967-1977 requires that: 
Where an Officer becomes in any way interested whether financially or otherwise, other-
wise than in the course of his duty, in any contract or agreement made by or on behalf of 
the State he shall make full disclosure of that interest to the Board. 
36. The South Australian Public Service Board has also determined, when acting 
in its role as disciplinary tribunal under the Public Service Act, that officers who 
place themselves in situations where there was actual or potential conflict of interests 
have committed the offence of 'improper conduct'. In a March 1975 determination, 
the Board stated: 
An officer who places himself in a position where his private interests conflict with the 
inherent duties of his office is guilty of improper conduct, even though no situation may 
arise or may be unlikely to arise where he can take advantage of his office to benefit his 
private interest. Of course if an officer does take advantage of his official position to 
advance his private interests, he has not only placed himself in a position of conflict of 
interest, but he has abused his official position. 
It is understood that the South Australian Government is currently considering the 
inclusion of provisions relating to the private interests of public servants as part of 
wider amendments to the Public Service Act. 
37. General obligations to avoid conflicts of interest and to declare any conflict 
that arose were imposed in the Northern Territory in October 1978 when the Public 
Service Commission issued a General Order on the declaration of pecuniary interests. 
This imposed on employees: 
• an obligation at all times to regulate their private financial interests so that they 
do not conflict or appear to conflict with their public duty; 
• an obligation to inform their Chief Executive Officers or their delegates, of 
'any direct or indirect pecuniary interests that might conflict or appear to con-
flict with [their] public duty in relation to a matter under consideration, or likely 
to come under consideration' by them—in which case the Chief Executive Officer 
or his delegate should choose between between authorisation, divestment 
and disqualification; 
• an obligation not to engage in private dealings where they might be influenced, 
or might be seen to be influenced, by possession of official information, and to 
inform the Chief Executive Officer or his delegate of any contemplated acquisi-
tion or disposal of assets which might be influenced by knowledge of official 
information or appear so; and 
• an obligation to pay special attention to private pecuniary interests when taking 
up duties, to ensure that interests held are not incompatible with the duties. 
Chief Executive Officers and the heads of prescribed authorities were required to make 
their declarations to their Ministers. Failure to comply with the General Order would 
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38. Both Victoria and New South Wales have considered the provisions relating to 
conflict of interest and public servants in recent years but, to the date of writing, no 
amendments to the current provisions have resulted. 
39. In May 1974, the Victorian Parliament passed the Public Servants Ethical Con-
duct (Joint Select Committee) Act 1974. The function of the Committee appointed 
under that Act was to study existing law and practice relating to the legal and ethical 
duties of public servants where their private interests conflict or might appear to 
conflict with their public duty, and to make recommendations to ensure proper con-
duct on the part of public servants where the existing law or practice was inadequate. 
The Committee reported in mid 1976. Its major recommendation was that the responsi-
bilities and obligations of officers, where their private interests conflict with their 
public duties, should be provided for in a specific statute dealing with conflicts of 
interest and have general application to all public servants. Appendix D to the 
Report included a draft set of Guidelines of Conduct prepared and submitted to the 
Committee by a Subcommittee of the Permanent Heads Conference in Victoria.27 
40. Following the tabling of the Joint Select Committee Report, further represen-
tations were received by the Victorian Government from the Public Service Board 
and the Permanent Heads' Conference. The Public Service Board and the Permanent 
Heads argued against the Committee's recommendation for a special statute, on the 
grounds that they did not believe these matters should be embodied in legislation. 
They recommended, instead, that the Government issue a statement of standards of 
practice to regulate the conduct of public officials, referring to existing legislation 
such as the Public Service Act and establishing guidelines for situations not adequately 
covered in existing legislation. It is understood that a draft 'Code of Conduct', pre-
pared by the Public Service Board, is under consideration. It is further understood 
that the Victorian Government intends to examine the possible extension of the new 
pecuniary interest legislation for Members of Parliament to senior public servants.28  
41. The New South Wales Joint Committee upon Pecuniary Interests made a number 
of recommendations in relation to public servants and staff of statutory authorities. 
Firstly, it proposed that similar registration requirements to those recommended 
for Members also be applied to Permanent Heads, chairmen of statutory authorities 
and officers at or above a certain salary range. The registers would be held by the 
relevant Minister, in the case of Permanent Heads and chairmen of statutory authori-
ties, and by the relevant Permanent Head or chairman, in the case of all other officers. 
Permanent Heads would also be able to designate officers below the relevant salary 
range who should also be required to register. Special provisions should apply to 
outside consultants. Secondly, it commented on the 'degree of confusion' relating 
to the relevant provisions of the Public Service Act and Regulations, and recommended 
the formulation of a code of conduct for public servants and employees of statutory 
authorities. Thirdly, it recommended that the obligation to register be regarded as 
additional to a requirement to make written ad hoc declarations of any conflicts 
which arose.29 
Statutory officeholders 
42. While the Committee did not carry out any survey of State legislation and 
practice relating to statutory officeholders, its attention was drawn to several relevant 
provisions. Sections 134 and 135 of the Victorian Water Act 1958 specify in consider-
able detail conditions under which a commissioner of a waterworks trust can no 
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cannot vote on or discuss any matter before the trust. The Committee was informed 
that similar provisions relating to the appointment and conduct of sewerage board 
members are contained in the Sewerage Districts Act 1958. 
43. A number of New South Wales statutory authorities gave details of the statutory 
provisions which apply to their members and staff in evidence to the Joint Committee 
upon Pecuniary Interests. These took a variety of forms, ranging through prohibitions 
upon the appointment of persons holding certain interests as members or as officers30, 
prohibitions upon holding concessions granted by the authority31, or having interests 
in contracts32, and prohibitions upon outside employment33, or holding certain 
offices34, to declaration requirements35 and prohibitions upon the misuse of official 
information for personal advantage.38 
44. There is a practice of the Totalizator Agency Board of New South Wales, 
which has a number of members who are nominated by various groups which have 
'a keen interest in the outcome of the Board's operations', of drawing to the attention 
of newly appointed Board members the judgment in the case of Bennetts v. The 
Board of Fire Commissioners of New South Wales and Others. 37 In this judgment, 
Mr Justice Street stated that, on Boards where the members owe their membership 
to a particular interested group: 
a member will be derelict in his duty if he uses his membership as a means to promote 
the particular interests of the group which chose him . . . the predominating element 
which each individual must constantly bear in mind is the promotion of the interests of 
the Board itself. In particular a Board member must not allow himself to be compromised 
by looking to the interests of the group which appointed him rather than to the interests 
for which the Board exists.38 
Local Government 
45. In contrast to most other categories of officeholders, the members, and in some 
cases the staff, of local government authorities are subject in all States and the 
Northern Territory to detailed and long-standing statutory provisions in relation to 
conflict of interest, under their respective Local Government Acts. 39 
Provisions applying to members 
46. The main types of provision found in such legislation are: 
• disqualification from office as mayor or member of a local government authority 
of any persons holding an office of profit under or in the gift of the authority 
(New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, Western Australia) or other forms of 
disqualification from office on conflict of interest grounds40 ; and 
• requirements for the disclosure of any pecuniary interest in any contract or 
proposed contract or any other matter under consideration by the authority, 
combined with disqualification from discussions or voting in relation to that 
matter (New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, Western Australia, 
Tasmania)41 ; or 
• simple prohibitions upon taking part in discussions or on voting in relation to 
matters related to contracts or other matters in which a member has a direct or 
indirect pecuniary interest, without any requirement to declare such an interest 
(South Australia, Northern Territory). 
47. In addition, a range of other types of provision applying to members is found in 
the local government legislation of one or more States: 
• provisions relating to bribery and other forms of malpractice in relation to 
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• misuse of office for personal advantage or for the advantage of relatives43 ; 
• misuse of official information for pecuniary gain or to disadvantage the 
authority44 ; 
. misuse of property of the authority. 45  
48. The provisions requiring disclosure of pecuniary interests, found in five States, 
all broadly follow the pattern of ss. 94 to 98 and 105 of the British Local Government 
Act 1972, the provisions of which are derived from earlier provisions dating from 
between 1815 and 1894 and have been substantially in their present form since 
193346. 
49. The basic pattern of such provisions is illustrated by s.14 (4) of the Queensland 
Local Government Act 1936-1978. Briefly, this provides that a member of a local 
authority who has a pecuniary interest, direct or indirect, in any contract, proposed 
contract or other matter which is before the authority must at any meeting where 
the matter is under consideration disclose his interest (except in certain cases where 
he has given a general written notice) and thereafter refrain from speaking or voting 
on the matter. Any member breaching this provision is liable upon summary con-
viction to a fine of up to $200, unless the member proves that he did not know that 
the matter concerned was under consideration at the meeting. A member's interest 
includes that of his spouse where it is known to him. An indirect interest arises from 
the member's connection, as director, shareholder, partner or employee, with a body 
or person having a direct interest. 
50. The Minister for Local Government has power to remove the disqualification 
from speaking or voting, subject to such conditions as he sees fit: 
in any case in which the number of members of the Local Authority so disabled at any one 
time would be so great a proportion of the whole as to impede the transaction of business, 
or in any other case in which it appears to the Minister that it is in the interests of the 
electors or inhabitants of the Area that the disability should be removed. 
51. The member must disclose his interest as soon as practicable after the start 
of the meeting at which the matter concerned is under consideration. Alternatively, 
where his interest arises because he or his spouse is a member, partner or employee 
in a company or business which has dealings with the authority, he may give a general 
written notice of the interest; he need not then make oral disclosure at the meeting. 
A record of such notices, and of disclosures made at meetings, is to be kept by the 
clerk of the authority and the book in which such records are kept must be open 
'at all reasonable hours' to the inspection of any member of the local authority. The 
requirement to disclose does not apply to interests which a member has as an elector 
or inhabitant of that local government area, or as an ordinary user or consumer of 
gas, electricity or other such publicly available service. 
52. While the other States mentioned follow the same pattern, there are signi-
ficant variations: 
• The New South Wales and Victorian provisions both exempt from the dec-
laration requirement interests held in contracts as a result of holding shares, 
where the total nominal value of shares held is less than $1000 or less than one-
hundredth of the total share capital of the relevant company or body. 
• The Tasmanian and Victorian provisions allow interested members to vote on 
the payment of accounts. The difficulties which can arise through the lack of 
such a provision were mentioned by the N.S.W. Joint Committee upon Pecu- 
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• The records of disclosures are open only to members of the authority in Queens-
land and Tasmania, but are open to any ratepayer or elector in New South Wales, 
Victoria and Western Australia. 
• The Western Australian Act provides for an interested member to be authorised 
to speak and vote in a meeting where the person presiding determines the interest 
to be so remote or trivial that, if the interested member was to take part, he could 
not reasonably be regarded as likely to be influenced by that interest. An in-
terested member may also be authorised to speak but not vote by a vote of the 
majority of the disinterested members. Details of such authorisations are required 
to be recorded in the minutes. 
• The consequences of a breach of such a provision (or of the equivalent South 
Australian and Northern Territory prohibitions upon taking part in discussions 
or voting) vary widely, from fines of up to $160 (Tasmania) to fines of up to 
$500 (Victoria), with the additional possibility that a member guilty of a breach 
of such a provision may be disqualified from holding office as a member of the 
authority for up to seven years (New South Wales, Victoria) or indefinitely 
(Northern Territory). 
• As a result of a 1973 amendment, the Tasmanian provision has been extended to 
apply to those members of committees set up under the Act who are not members 
of the authority. 411 
53. The statutory provisions in the various Local Government Acts may be supple-
mented by subordinate legislation, and standing orders or other types of measures 
adopted by individual local government authorities. For example, clauses 32 and 33 of 
the New South Wales Local Government Ordinance No. 1 specify when members are 
disqualified from voting at meetings or committee meetings or being present or taking 
part in discussions in which they or their relatives are interested, and set out in detail 
the degree of relationship and nature of the interest necessary to create such a 
disqualification. The City of Sydney Council has supplemented the legislative require-
ments by a standing order requiring declaration of an interest in a matter under 
discussion, even if a member who is present at a meeting removes himself from the 
Chamber while that matter is under consideration. 49 
54. A detailed code of ethics for members, supplementing the relevant standing 
orders and statutory provisions, was adopted on 11 December 1978 by the Melbourne 
City Council. This requires councillors to disclose annually a number of categories of 
pecuniary interest in a register open to inspection by other councillors. In addition, 
the code requires ad hoc disclosure of pecuniary or relevant non-pecuniary interests, 
such as kinship, friendship or club membership, both at meetings and in unofficial 
relations with other councillors. The code also covers such topics as participation of 
interested members on committees as chairmen or members, misuse of confidential 
and private information for personal advantage, relationships with Council staff, and 
gifts and hospitality. The code will be administered by an Ethics Committee which will 
deal with alleged breaches of the code, and which will have power to recommend 
disciplinary action, such as admonition, against an offending councillor.5° 
Provisions applying to staff of local government authorities 
55. While the various Local Government Acts generally do not specify in detail the 
terms and conditions of employment of staff, in most States they contain one or more 
conflict of interest provisions in relation to staff. The New South Wales, Victorian, 
Queensland and Tasmanian Acts contain provisions relating to the acceptance or 
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offering of bribes to local government staff is also an offence. 51  Victoria prohibits staff 
from having interests in contracts with the authority and Queensland requires the 
disclosure of any interests in contracts.52 The New South Wales and Western 
Australian Acts contain provisions in relation to outside employment. 53 
 The New 
South Wales Act makes former elected members ineligible to be appointed to the staff 
of the authority until six months after they cease to hold office.54 In Tasmania, staff 
are liable to a general offence of misuse of office for personal advantage or for the 
advantage of relatives. .15 
 In the Northern Territory, members of the Authority, 
holders of any other office of profit and contractors with the authority are disqualified 
from acting as the auditor to an authority.56 
56. In addition to such statutory provisions, local government staff may be subject 
to rules laid down by the local government authority by which they are employed. 
For example, the Melbourne City Council announced in February 1979 that it would 
require staff 'intimately associated with decision making' to register their pecuniary 
interests with the Town Clerk and that it would impose a code of conduct as a con-
dition of employment upon all staff. The code would cover a range of issues, including 
ad hoc disclosure of pecuniary or other interests, participation in Council elections, 
relationships with councillors, misuse of official information for personal gain and 
acceptance of gifts and hospitality. The code would be applied through the individual 
contracts of employment of staff members. The Council Staff Board would investigate 
any alleged breaches of the code and recommend on penalties, including whether 
dismissal should occur. 51  
57. The New South Wales Joint Committee upon Pecuniary Interests examined the 
provisions which apply in that State to members and staff of local government 
authorities, and recommended that the Local Government Act be amended to require 
registration by elected members and senior staff. 58  It is understood that the provisions 
of the Local Government Act regarding declaration of pecuniary interests of members 
of councils are under review. 
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Attachment 1 
Relevant extracts, Victorian members of Parliament 
(register of interests) Act 1978 
(NO. 9223 OF 1978) 
PART 1.—CODE OF CONDUCT. 
3. (1) It is hereby declared that a Member of the Parliament is bound by the following 
code of conduct:- 
(a) Members shall- 
(i) accept that their prime responsibility is to the performance of their public 
duty and therefore ensure that this aim is not endangered or subordinated by 
involvement in conflicting private interests; 
(ii) ensure that their conduct as Members must not be such as to bring discredit 
upon the Parliament; 
(b) Members shall not advance their private interests by use of confidential information 
gained in the performance of their public duty; 
(c) A Member shall not receive any fee, payment, retainer or reward, nor shall he permit 
any compensation to accrue to his beneficial interest for or on account of, or as a 
result of the use of, his position as a Member; 
(d) A Member shall make full disclosure to the Parliament of- 
(i) any direct pecuniary interest that he has; 
(ii) the name of any trade or professional organization of which he is a member 
which has an interest; 
(iii) any other material interest whether of a pecuniary nature or not that he has—
in or in relation to any matter upon which he speaks in the Parliament; 
(e) A Member who is a Minister shall ensure that no conflict exists, or appears to exist, 
between his public duty and his private interests; 
(f) A Member who is a Minister is expected to devote his time and his talents to the 
carrying out of his public duties. 
(2) Without limiting the generality of the foregoing in the application and interpretation 
of the code regard shall be had to the recommendation of the Joint Select Committee of the 
Victorian Parliament appointed pursuant to The Constitution Act Amendment (Qualifications 
Joint Select Committee) Act 1973 presented to the Legislative Assembly on the 23rd day of 
April, 1974 (D.14/1973-74) contained in paragraph 12 of that report. 
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I . Western Australia, Law Reform Committee, Disqualification for Membership of Parliament: 
Offices of Profit under the Crown and Government Contracts: Report (Project No. 14), 
mimeo, Perth, 1971. 
2.  Western Australia, Legislative Assembly, Debates, 17 November 1976, p. 4083. 
3.  Victoria, Legislative Assembly, Debates 1972-73, 29 November 1972, p. 2700. 
4.  Victoria, Parliament, Interim Report from the Qualifications  Committee upon the Law Relating 
to Parliamentary Disqualification in Respect of Conflicts of Interest, Government Printer, 
Melbourne, 1973. 
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Australia, Legislative Council, Standing Order 379: Tasmania, Legislative Council, Standing 
Order 230. The Victorian, Queensland and Tasmanian Legislative Assemblies have no 
Standing Orders preventing interested Members from serving on select committees, but 
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12.  New South Wales, Parliament, Report from  the Joint Committee of the Legislative Council 
and Legislative Assembly upon Pecuniary Interests, together with the Minutes of Proceedings 
and Evidence (Keith O'Connell, Chairman), Government Printer, Sydney, 1978, para. 2.31, 
p. 19 and Recommendation 10, p. 20. 
13.  Victoria, Parliament, Progress Report from the Qualifications  Committee upon the Question 
of Conflicts of Interest of Members of Parliament and Ministers of the Crown (V. F. Wilcox, 
Chairman), Government Printer, Melbourne, 1974. 
14.  New South Wales, Report from the Joint Committee upon Pecuniary Interests, para. 2.32, 
P. 19. 
15.  New South Wales, Parliament, Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry (The Honourable 
Mr Justice L. J. Herron) into Statements Made by the Auditor General in his Annual Report 
for the year ended 30 June 1958, concerning the Minister for Housing, the Hon. Abram Landa, 
New South Wales Parl. Paper No. 53, 1958, vol .1, pp.  191-218 at pp. 211-12. 
16.  South Australia, Members of Parliament (Disclosure of Interests) Bill, 1974, introduced by 
Mr P. Duncan, First reading, 25 September 1974. 
17.  South Australia, House of Assembly, Debates, 30 November 1977, p.  1133. 
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21.  Western Australia, Legislative Assembly, Members of Parliament (Disclosure of Interests) 
Bill, 1975, introduced by Mr A. R. Tonkin, First reading, 27 August 1975. 
22.  New South Wales, Report from the Joint Committee upon Pecuniary Interests. 
23.  Speech by the Premier, the Hon. N. K. Wran, Q.C., M.P., to the New South Wales State 
Council of the Australian Labor Party, 11 March 1979. 
24.  Northern Territory, Legislative Assembly, Minutes of Proceedings, 2 August 1978. 
25.  Queensland, Legislative Assembly, Debates, 23 November 1978, p.  2861. 
26.  Northern Territory, Public Service Commissioner, Northern Territory Public Service General 
Orders, Section 4—Declaration of Pecuniary Interests (Notified by Public Service Com- 
missioner Circular 1978/33, 31 October 1978). 
27.  Victoria, Parliament, Report of the Public Servants Ethical Conduct Committee on Conflicts 
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29. New South Wales, Report from the Joint Committee upon Pecuniary Interests, pp. 30-1. 
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31. ibid., p.  98. 
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41. New South Wales, Local Government Act, 1919, s. 30A, and Local Government Ordinance 
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Report No. 84, Document No. 43 GP., December 1978: id., Memorandum on Establishment 
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APPENDIX 6 
Registration of interests 
1. A brief survey of the events leading to the adoption, or proposals for adoption, 
of registration of interests by officeholders in Britain, Canada, the United States of 
America, Papua New Guinea and Jamaica is contained in Appendix 3. The present 
appendix sets out, in summary form, the categories of register that are operating or 
are proposed in these countries. The Committee also sets out in this appendix its 
views on the form of registration which would be desirable in respect of Members 
of Parliament, public servants and statutory officeholders, in the event that it is 
decided, contrary to the Committee's recommendations, to institute registration of 
officeholders' interests. 
Types of registers 
2. A variety of forms of register has been implemented or proposed overseas and 
in Australia. Perhaps the most important dimension in which they vary is in the amount 
of information which is required to be disclosed. For convenience of discussion, the 
Committee has divided such proposed or existing registers into three categories, 
'limited', 'middle range' and 'extensive', according to the range of interests required 
to be registered. 
'Limited' registers 
3. The debate about registration of Members' interests, first in Britain, then in 
Australia, has tended to focus on what might be called 'limited' scope registers, that 
is registers in which only a select number of pecuniary interests are disclosed and 
which may or may not be publicly accessible. The amount of information which is 
typically required to be disclosed in a limited register is illustrated by the categories 
of pecuniary interests required to be disclosed by the proposals in the Willey Com-
mittee report, subsequently implemented by the British House of Commons, and the 
proposals in the report of the Joint Committee on Pecuniary Interests of Members 
of Parliament (Riordan Committee).' 
4. The nine specific types of interest which Members of the British House of 
Commons are required to register are: 
(1) remunerated directorships of companies, public or private; 
(2) remunerated employments or offices; 
(3) remunerated trades, professions or vocations; 
(4) the names of clients when the interests referred to above include personal 
services by the Member which arise out of or are related in any manner to his 
membership of the House; 
(5) financial sponsorships, (a) as a parliamentary candidate where, to the know-
ledge of the Member, the sponsorship in any case exceeds 25 per cent of the 
candidate's election expenses, or (b) as a Member of Parliament, by any person 
or organisation, stating whether any such sponsorship includes any payment to 
the Member or any material benefit or advantage direct or indirect; 
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(6) overseas visits relating to or arising out of membership of the House, where the 
cost of any such visit has not been wholly borne by the Member or by public 
funds; 
(7) any payments or any material benefits or advantages received from or on behalf 
of foreign Governments, organisations or persons;. 
(8) land and property of substantial value or from which a substantial income is 
derived; 
(9) the names of companies or other bodies in which the Member has, to his 
knowledge, either himself or with or on behalf of his spouse or infant children, 
a beneficial interest in shareholdings of a nominal value greater than one-
hundredth of the issued share capital.2 
5. The Riordan Committee's conclusions in respect of registration of interests by 
Members of Parliament included: 
• the filing of a copy of a Member's income tax return would constitute neither an 
adequate nor an appropriate form of registration of pecuniary interests; 
• Members of Parliament should disclose the names of all companies in which they 
have a beneficial interest in shareholdings, no matter how insignificant, whether 
as an individual member of another company, or partnership, or through a 
trust; 
• it should be left to the discretion of individual Members of Parliament as to 
whether or not they should register the actual value of any shareholdings; 
• Members of Parliament should disclose the location of any realty in which they 
have a beneficial interest; 
• Members of Parliament should declare the names of all companies of which 
they are directors, even if the directorship is unremunerated; and 
• Members of Parliament should declare any sponsored travel .3  
6. It is at once apparent that in both cases many important categories of interest 
are not required to be disclosed. Nor is very much detail required in respect of those 
interests which are listed for disclosure. Furthermore, while the British register is 
accessible to the public, subject to an appointment being made at least forty-eight 
hours in advance and to the applicant identifying himself, the Australian proposal 
was that the applicant would have to establish to the satisfaction of the Registrar 
that there was a bona fide reason for seeking access, and the application might be 
resisted by the Member of Parliament concerned. 
7. Section 45 (iii) of the Australian Constitution may have obviated the need to 
identify clients of Australian Members of Parliament, although, as noted elsewhere, 
it is uncertain how far the concept of services rendered in the Parliament extends.4 
8. Leaving this aspect aside, the House of Commons register still appears marginally 
more extensive than the one the Joint Committee proposed for the Commonwealth 
Parliament. However, the restriction of company holdings to instances where the 
Member's interest is at least I per cent of issued share capital would omit identification 
of quite substantial interests in large corporations. Disclosure of gifts, hospitality 
and travel is directed towards showing foreign influences, which had been a particular 
cause of concern in Britain. The requirement recommended by the Riordan Committee 
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'Middle-range' registers 
9. Examples of what might be called 'middle-range' registers, again which may or 
may not be publicly accessible, are provided by the Canadian Independence of 
Parliament Bill introduced in October 1978 and the United States Ethics in Govern-
ment Act of 1978. 
10. Under the Canadian proposals, Members of Parliament will be required by 
clause 8 (1) of the Bill to disclose annually details of: 
• participation in certain government contracts and grants or subsidies from the 
Crown; 
• outside employment, including directorships and any leave arrangements; 
• gifts received by the Parliamentarian or his spouse of a value greater than $100; 
• honoraria for speaking or writing; 
• sponsored travel of the Parliamentarian or his spouse outside Canada; 
• real property of the Parliamentarian or his spouse, except home or recreational 
home; 
• shares and bonds of the Parliamentarian or his spouse and the company name if 
the holding is worth $1000 or more; 
• unsecured debts over $5000; 
• other sources of income worth more than $1000; and 
• any trust of which the Parliamentarian is the beneficiary. 
11. In the United States of America, the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 applied 
disclosure requirements to the President, the Vice-President and senior executive 
branch officers, the Congress including candidates, and the judiciary. Members of 
Congress are required to disclose: 
(i) The source, type and amount of earned income from any source (other than 
their government salaries) and the source, date and amount of honoraria 
received during the preceding calendar year and aggregating $100 or more 
in value. 
(ii) The source and type of unearned income received from dividends, interest, 
rent and capital gains received during the preceding calendar year and 
aggregating $100 or more in value. 
Each item of unearned income in one of the following categories: not more 
than $1000, greater than $1000 but not more than $2500, greater than $2500 
but not more than $5000, greater than $5000 but not more than $15 000, 
greater than $15 000 but not more than $50 000, greater than $50 000 but 
not more than $100 000 or greater than $100 000. 
(iii) The source and a brief description of any gifts of transportation, lodging, 
food or entertainment aggregating $250 or more in value received from any 
source other than a relative during the preceding calendar year. (Gifts of food, 
lodging or entertainment received as personal hospitality are exempted from 
the reporting requirements.) 
(iv) The source, a brief description and estimated value of all gifts (other than 
transportation, lodging, food or entertainment) aggregating $100 or more in 
value received from a source other than a relative during the preceding 
calendar year. (Gifts with a fair market value of $35 or less are exempted 
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(v) The source and a brief description of reimbursements from a single source 
aggregating $250 or more in the preceding calendar year. 
(vi) The identity and category of value of any interest in property held in a trade 
or business, or for investment or production of income, with a fair market 
value over $1000 at the close of the preceding calendar year. (Personal 
liabilities owed by relatives to the reporting individual or any deposit of 
$5000 or less in a personal savings account are exempted from the reporting 
requirements.) 
(vii) The identity and category of value of the total liabilities owed to any creditor 
(other than a relative) exceeding $10 000 at any time during the preceding 
calendar year, not including a mortgage on the individual's personal residence 
or loans for cars, household furniture or appliances. (Outstanding liabilities 
on revolving charge accounts are exempted from the reporting requirement 
unless the liability was more than $10 000 at the close of the preceding 
calendar year.) 
(viii) A brief description, the date and category of value of real property (other 
than personal residence) or stocks, bonds or other securities purchased, sold 
or exchanged in the preceding calendar year, if the amount involved exceeded 
$1000. (Any transaction solely between the reporting individual and his 
spouse or dependent children is exempted from the reporting requirement.) 
(ix) Any positions held during the current calendar year with businesses, non-
profit organisations, labour groups or other institutions, except for religious, 
social, fraternal or political groups. 
(x) The terms of agreement about any future employment planned by the re-
porting individual. 
(xi) The following information about a spouse's finances: 
source of any earned income over $1000; source and type of unearned 
income received from dividends, interest, rent and capital gains received 
during the preceding calendar year and aggregating $100 or more in value; 
source and brief description or estimated value of any gift or reimbursement 
which is not received totally independent of the spouse's relationship to the 
reporting individual; certain assets, liabilities and transactions of the spouse 
(unless the reporting individual certified that he had no control over them and 
would not receive any economic benefit from these interests); unearned 
income of dependent children, their assets, liabilities and transactions, unless 
the individual certifies that he had no control over them and did not receive 
any economic benefit from them. (A spouse permanently separated from the 
reporting individual is exempted from the reporting requirement.) 
(xii) Where an individual has holdings in a 'qualified blind trust', the category of 
the amount of income received by the individual, the individual's spouse or 
dependent children, but not the holdings or source of income.5  
12. In the 'middle-range' registers, category of value is required for many items. In 
the United States and the Canadian proposals, disclosure of gifts, hospitality and 
travel is much more extensive than in the limited registers discussed above. The 
requirements to disclose income sources are more demanding than the requirement 
to disclose remunerated employment in the limited registers, and liabilities are 
included. 
'Extensive' registers 
13. The third class of registers might properly be regarded as extensive in their 
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Members) Act 1973 and by the Papua New Guinea Leadership Code, laid down in the 
Organic Law on the Duties and Responsibilities of Leadership, 1975. The registrable 
items for these registers are: 
• companies: directorships and other company offices (Papua New Guinea); 
directorships, if a source of income (Jamaica); shareholdings would be caught in 
Papua New Guinea by requirements to disclose total assets and total income, 
business connections and all business transactions, and, in Jamaica, their face 
value and other particulars must be disclosed; 
• realty: to be disclosed among total assets (Papua New Guinea); description, 
location and purchase price (Jamaica); 
• gifts, travel and hospitality: gifts, except from relatives (Papua New Guinea); 
substantial gifts might be caught as 'property acquired' (Jamaica); travel and 
hospitality as a 'business connexion' (Papua New Guinea); 
• liabilities: description and amount (Jamaica); liabilities incurred and discharged 
in the reporting period (Papua New Guirea); 
• other: total assets including money and personal property (Papua New Guinea); 
bank accounts, cash in excess of $J200 not in a bank, money invested in mortgages, 
motor vehicles owned or on hire, contents of safety deposit boxes, insurance 
policies with value and identifying particulars (Jamaica); any assets acquired in 
the reporting period, business transactions (Papua New Guinea); any property 
acquired or disposed of in the preceding twelve months, and any other property 
in trust or otherwise (Jamaica). 
14. With these registers, disclosure of personal interests is nearly as complete as 
rules can make it. However, the idea of public access to the resulting register has 
disappeared. While the Jamaican Member of Parliament is required to disclose in 
considerable detail all pecuniary interests of himself, his spouse and children, unless 
over 21 and not living with him, including any trusts from which any of them benefit, 
the information is confidential to the Integrity Commission. The Commission members 
and staff are liable to fines and imprisonment for communicating disclosed infor-
mation to unauthorised persons, while any person who knowingly receives such 
illegally communicated information is liable to severe penalties. In Papua New Guinea, 
Leaders' disclosures are made confidentially to the Ombudsman Commission. 
Suggested ingredients for a register of interests 
for Commonwealth officeholders 
15. In Chapter 6 of the Committee's report, the view was expressed that, should a 
decision be taken to require officeholders to register their pecuniary interests, the 
register should be as comprehensive as practicable. For the reasons now outlined, a 
comprehensive register of interests should, in the Committee's opinion, include the 
following ingredients: 
(a) Disclosure of interests of the officeholder and members of his immediate family 
for whom he has responsibility. For the purposes of this requirement, the 
definition of immediate family is to be regarded as the same as that appearing 
in item 5 of the proposed Code of Conduct recommended in Chapter 4. It could 
thus cover defacto spouses, dependent children of whatever age, and any other 
dependent relatives whose affairs were so closely connected with those of 
the officeholder that a benefit to them might flow on to a significant extent to 
the officeholder. 	 219 
(b) Disclosure of pecuniary interests as to identity, nature and amount as follows: 
(i) Directorships of companies, both public and private and whether the 
directorship is remunerated or not. As a director, duties are accepted 
to the company and its shareholders which may come into conflict 
with the public duty of an officeholder. It is not necessary to postulate 
a clash between public duty and private interest, for the possibility of 
conflict between two duties is sufficient to require disclosure. 
(ii) Shareholdings. The Committee does not think that meaningful thres-
holds can be established, whether in relation to the face value of the 
holding, its proportion of the total capital of the company, or its 
relation to the total wealth of the holder. An interest, however small, 
may create a conflict of interest or it may reasonably be thought to do 
so. In the absence of any logical or universal cut-off point, complete 
disclosure appears the only acceptable course, even though it will 
frequently reveal trifles. The Committee is concerned to ensure that the 
procedures for registration prevent private companies being used as a 
screen to mask holdings in other companies which may be, or are, 
akin to public companies. When the company in which the shares are 
held is a private holding company, its investment portfolio and its 
subsidiary companies, the extent of ownership of such companies and 
the nature of the business activities of all should be included in the 
disclosure. 
(iii) Realty. All real property should be described sufficiently by location 
and such other specifications as to leave no uncertainty as to its identity. 
It would not be right to exempt the principal residence or a holiday 
home from disclosure. 
Realty is capable of raising conflicts of interest in respect of govern-
ment action, and its financing has considerable potential for abuse if 
improper advantages are being secured. However, there appears to be 
no advantage in providing a notional capital value for particular pieces 
of realty in annual returns, provided that any income derived was 
shown under 'sources of income' and capital gains when they were 
realised were also included. 
(iv) Trusts. It should not be possible to avoid the obligation to disclose 
an interest, whether by registration or by declaration, through conceal-
ment in a trust arrangement. An interest in certain assets or income 
might be established by the officeholder being the beneficiary of a trust, 
a member of his immediate household being the beneficiary of a trust, 
the officeholder being a trustee with duties under the trust which might 
conflict with his public duty, or the officeholders having created the 
trust for the benefit of some other person apart from members of his 
immediate family or of some cause or object, in which case he might be 
expected to continue to be favourably disposed to the assets held in 
that trust. The Committee believes that all these sorts of interests should 
be registered. Such disclosure should cover not only the existence of 
the trust, but the nature of the trust property and its principal activities. 
(v) Other assets. The purpose of a register should be to disclose potential 
conflicts of interest, but a register is a blunt instrument by which to 
reveal unexpected or suspicious accretions of wealth or income that 
might indicate misconduct. The list of assets which may create a conflict 
of interest is open ended. Rather than attempt to label all possible sorts 
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assets not otherwise listed which have been acquired primarily for their 
income or capital gain potential. 
(vi) Liabilities. It appears to the Committee that the exclusion of liabilities 
from some 'limited' registers is one of their greatest failings. A simple 
listing of assets, without any offsetting liabilities, could lead to grossly 
misleading comparisons being made and to the situations of particular 
persons being quite misunderstood. Moreover, the terms under which 
liabilities are created and operated may be manipulated to constitute 
inducements as direct and substantial as any transfer of asset, or gift 
or favour. Full particulars of liabilities will need to be listed to meet 
this possibility. 
(vii) Gifts, travel and hospitality. If there is to be a register, there would be 
obvious convenience in having such items included in its pages. Gifts 
subject to rules applicable to the category of officeholder in excess of 
$100 or $250, as appropriate, in value received other than from relatives, 
and provision of, or reimbursement for, travel whether within Australia 
or overseas unless paid for directly from Australian government funds, 
should be registered. 
(viii) Sources of income. Requiring registration of all sources of payments 
by way of salaries, wages, fees, honoraria or otherwise should not 
impose an excessive burden on officeholders. On the other hand, there 
could be many transactions, such as forms of trading operations on 
the stock market or in foreign exchange, that could not be identified 
by any other requirement in items (i) to (vii), above, for registration of 
interests and yet would be extremely significant in respect of conflicts 
of interest. This might be one of the rare cases where setting a threshold 
is appropriate. For example, when an officeholder engages in trans-
actions which are speculative in nature, and have a total gross value 
during the reporting period in excess of, say, $1000, descriptions of all 
transactions of this sort should be disclosed whether or not income was 
received from them during the period. 
After careful consideration, the Committee doubts that it would be 
practicable to require registration of the indirect sources of income 
channelled through a professional practice, partnership or business 
enterprise. Accordingly, an officeholder who is a Member of Parliament 
or a part-time statutory officeholder who was, say, a practising solicitor 
or accountant would register the income from that practice without 
identifying particular clients. He would, of course, be obliged to 
identify the client when declaring an interest that the professional 
relationship had created in relation to a particular discharge of his 
public duty. 
(c) The required information should be lodged annually and updated regularly to 
show major changes in an officeholder's interests. 
It was suggested to the Committee that registration of interests should 
operate retrospectively, for a period as long as five or seven years. In other 
words, officeholders should be required to register interests which they no 
longer possessed and transactions in which they had previously engaged, to 
provide a more comprehensive disclosure of the influences which might have 
affected, or might still affect, the discharge of their public duties. The Com-
mittee does not agree with such a proposal. The purpose of disclosure, whether 
made ad hoc or by periodic registration, is to inform those currently having 
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example when there was previously a professional relationship with a client, 
when it would be appropriate to declare that interest. The same might apply 
to a former directorship with a company. But the Committee considers it 
unlikely that such previous connections, much less previous ownership of 
shares or realty, could exercise sufficient influence on an officeholder's conduct 
to warrant their inclusion in a register of his interests. 
The Committee notes the argument that any register should be retrospective 
to the date of the announcement that it would be introduced. This would 
prevent officeholders from anticipating the introduction of a register by 
rearranging their affairs so that they would not be registrable, by capturing a 
picture of their affairs as they were before being rearranged. 
The Committee does not agree with the suggestion put forward by the Joint 
Committee on Pecuniary Interests of Members of Parliament that disclosures 
take the form of a statutory declaration, a proposal that was also contained 
in submissions received. The possible intervention of the courts in respect of 
a breach of the Statutory Declarations Act 1959 would be an unwarranted 
intrusion into an area which should be left to self-regulation. 
(d) For elected officeholders, the registers of interests should be publicly accessible; 
for appointed officeholders, the registers should be kept confidential. 
It is possible to distinguish between Members of Parliament and the other 
three major categories of officeholders in respect of registration of interest on 
two counts. One is that Members of Parliament (apart from those holding 
ministerial office) are less likely to have access to confidential information in 
the course of their official duties, nor are they in a position to make binding 
decisions unilaterally. The second is that the public accountability of Members 
of Parliament derives from their election by the public whom they represent. 
The other three categories of officeholder (apart from some elected) are 
appointed by someone else. Thus, one can accept that their accountability 
to the public may be channelled through a third party who can scrutinise their 
conduct on behalf of the public. 
The first count suggests the conclusion that Members of Parliament might 
not need to register when other categories of officeholders did. The second point 
suggests that a register of the interests of Members of Parliament, if established, 
should be open to the public, whereas registers of the interests of other cate-
gories of officeholders need not be, provided that they are examined by someone 
acting on behalf of the public. 
Special considerations applying to the registration of interests by 
the different categories of officeholders 
16. Because of the different situations of the various categories of officeholders, any 
system of registration of pecuniary interests would need to be adapted to take into 
account the differences. In the following paragraphs, the Committee sets out what it 
would regard as necessary adaptations. 
Members of Parliament 
17. In relation to Members of Parliament, the Committee considers that the following 
arrangements should form part of the registration system: 
• Responsibility for ensuring that disclosure by registration requirements are 
complied with should rest with the Parliament itself, with each Chamber in respect 
of its own Members. Whether that responsibility should be discharged in the first 
instance by Ethics Committees such as recommended in Chapter 12 or by the 
existing Committees of Privileges or a Joint Committee is a matter which the 
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• A breach of the rules, whether by failing to lodge a return or lodging an incomplete 
or inaccurate return, should be considered by Parliament as breach of privilege 
with the attendant sanctions available. The experience of the British House of 
Commons, where no sanction for non-compliance has been provided, proves the 
necessity for some sanction. 
• The information contained in the register should be published annually as a 
Parliamentary Paper. This would ensure that any member of the Australian 
public who wishes to consult it may do so with a minimum of inconvenience. 
Given the size of this country and the scatter of its population, access to a register 
kept only in Canberra or even with copies available in the other capital cities 
would totally fail to meet real needs. Even if one copy was kept in each electoral 
division, for example at the electoral office, it could be hundreds of kilometres 
from some members of the public, whose right to examine its contents would be 
nugatory in such circumstances. Annual publication of the register would not rule 
out public access to the information in the register between publication dates. 
• Maintenance of the register be the responsibility of one or more Registrars, who 
would be officers of the Parliament. The Registrars should be empowered to receive 
submissions from any persons claiming that entries in the register were incomplete 
or defective, and, acting on such submissions or on their own volition, they should 
be able to ask Members of Parliament to reconsider disclosures they have lodged. 
All such communications should be submitted subsequently to the Standing 
Committee or Committees responsible for the register to consider what further 
action, if any, was required. 
18. These arrangements would not preclude reference of an allegation concerning 
non-compliance with a requirement from being referred to the Public Integrity 
Commission which the Committee has recommended in Chapter 12 should be 
established. It would be a matter for determination by the Parliament itself as to 
whether such an allegation should be referred for investigation by the Public Integrity 
Commission or dealt with within the Parliament. 
Ministers 
19. With the institution of a system of registration applicable to Members of Parlia-
ment generally, the need for the maintenance of a separate register for Ministers 
would disappear. The only additional requirement which the Committee foresees 
would be for routine reporting to the Prime Minister, as Chairman of the Cabinet, 
of changes in particulars of their interests registered by Ministers so that the Cabinet 
may be aware of any interests which may conceivably affect their attitudes in matters 
coming before the Cabinet or for which they have administrative responsibility. 
Public servants 
20. In addition to the general features outlined earlier in this appendix, the Com-
mittee believes that a system of registration of interests for public servants should 
have the following features: 
(a) registers should be established within each department, covering all First and 
Second Division officers and those in the Third and Fourth Divisions who have 
been designated by the Permanent Head to be occupying 'sensitive' posts or 
discharging 'sensitive' duties; 
(b) decisions on the extent of coverage of departmental registers should be made 
in consultation with the Public Service Board; 
(c) imposition of the duty to register, or discharge from the duty, should be 
conveyed in writing to the officer concerned; 
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(d) when a particular officer is required to register because of 'sensitive' duties, a 
reasonable period should be defined within which the obligation would 
continue; 
(e) the public should not have access to any registers of public servants' interests; 
(f) each departmental register should be formally in the custody of the Permanent 
Head, who should have authority to designate a senior officer of the department 
to maintain the register on his behalf, and to grant access on a 'need to know' 
basis for particular entries to senior officers responsible for the allocation of 
duties within the department, provided that State branches may need to keep 
copies of relevant portions of the departmental register in their offices in the 
State capitals; 
(g) the appropriate authorities should develop their own rules to deal with the 
situations of staff involved in security and intelligence operations; 
(h) in each department, in the event of allegations of conflict of interest, the 
Minister should have access to the register so as to satisfy himself as to the 
facts, confidentiality being protected by designating one senior member of the 
Minister's staff to receive any papers in connection with such a matter; 
(i) the disclosures supplied by Permanent Heads should be lodged with the 
Chairman of the Public Service Board, with access being available to both the 
Permanent Head's Minister and the Prime Minister; 
(j) the Chairman of the Public Service Board should lodge his disclosure with the 
Secretary of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet; 
(k) in the case of Acting Permanent Heads, a disclosure of interests should be 
lodged at the time an officer is first appointed as Acting Permanent Head, and 
be updated each time he is reappointed Acting Permanent Head. 
21. With regard to the selection of classes of officers to be subject to registration 
requirements, the Committee notes that officers in the First and Second Divisions are 
more likely to be in positions of real or apparent conflict of interest, because of the 
breadth and importance of their duties. An unknown number of Third and, in certain 
cases, Fourth Division officers discharge responsibilities in 'sensitive' areas such as 
purchasing, so that their inclusion in any system applied to First and Second Division 
officers would be appropriate. 
22. While it might be possible to identify a minority of Second Division officers who 
could be exempted from registration requirements on the ground that their duties 
could not in any forseeable circumstances lead to a significant conflict of interest 
situation, the Committee thinks, on balance, that inclusion of all officers of the First 
and Second Divisions is appropriate, in recognition of universality of the obligation 
to avoid and resolve conflicts of interest. Similarly, the Committee prefers the 
designation of certain officers in the Third and Fourth Divisions because they occupy 
'sensitive' posts or discharge 'sensitive' duties to taking an automatic cut-off point 
within the Third Division, such as the Clerk Class 8 level or equivalent, with a power 
to exempt officers. It should be necessary for departments to show that a Third or 
Fourth Division office need be included within the registration system. 
23. The aim of providing for designation for reasonable periods is to ensure that 
registrable information is disclosed for the entire period during which 'sensitive' duties 
are discharged, and that the duty to register ceases after such an officer's duties are 
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to ensure the maximum possible uniformity of practice across the Australian Public 
Service. Communicating the imposition of the duty to register in writing should 
avoid any chance of misunderstanding as to an officer's obligations. 
24. The maintenance of registered disclosures on a confidential basis within depart-
ments should mitigate the intrusion upon privacy to which exception is taken. The 
Committee can see no justification for public access to registers of public servants' 
interests at the present time. It was not persuaded by the fact that, as a consequence 
of recent legislation, the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, senior public servants in 
the American Federal Government have been required to disclose a wide range of 
personal and family pecuniary interests in a public access register. This, the Committee 
believes, is a consequence of a crisis in public confidence in governmental institutions 
which has not been paralleled in Australia. It also noted a reported proposal that 
access to registers of public servants' interests be given to Members of Parliament, 
both Government and Opposition, in an Australian State. The Committee has grave 
doubts whether confidentiality could be preserved under such a system. 
25. The ingredients of the register system outlined in this appendix would generally 
be suitable for public servants. Those items, such as company directorships, income 
earned from outside employment, or gifts, the holding or receipt of which is sub-
stantially regulated within the Public Service should still be required to be regulated 
where permitted. Up to the present time, it appears that departmental disclosure 
practices, where they exist, have tended to concentrate on interests which have a direct 
connection with the department's functions. 
26. Whilst it would be possible to continue such an approach with only interests in 
the area of a department's responsibilities being registrable, the Committee believes 
that, because of the circulation of information and personnel between various func-
tional areas, it would be preferable to require a wider disclosure. It would still be 
possible for officers of a particular department to be brought under more stringent 
requirements in respect of interests which are sensitive for their own department, and 
be liable to prohibition or divestment rules. 
27. The Committee considered, and rejected, the possibility that all public servants' 
registration disclosures should be assembled in a single register maintained by a 
special agency or some existing body such as the Public Service Board. The Com-
mittee believes that responsibility for dealing with conflicts of interest in the Australian 
Public Service should rest primarily at the departmental level, and with the Permanent 
Head for each department. 
28. Departmental registers would be needed in any case, if a register was to be 
made use of in the allocation of tasks in the light of information about possible 
conflicts of interest. The choice is really between a system of decentralised registers 
held at the departmental level and one which adds a central register duplicating all 
the departmental registers. 
Statutory officeholders 
29. The following points should be taken into account in any registration system 
for statutory officeholders: 
• the member of a single-member statutory authority should lodge his disclosure 
by way of registration with the responsible Minister; 
• the members of a multi-member statutory authority should lodge their register 
disclosures with the Secretary of that body; 
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o ordinarily all members of a multi-member statutory authority should have 
access to all disclosures held, including the chairman's, but there may be 
exceptional circumstances where for reasons of commercial confidentiality this 
general rule might have to be modified by the responsible Minister; 
• the Minister should have access o the registers of all statutory authorities 
within his area of responsibility; and 
• there should be no right of public access to such a register. 
30. Registration practices similar to those outlined for public servants could be 
applied to the staff of statutory authorities, with any necessary adaption to the 
circumstances of the authority. 
Parliamentary candidates 
31. In Chapter 7 of the Report, the Committee recommended that any requirement 
for the registration of interests not be extended to parliamentary candidates. The 
Committee has been informed by the Australian Electoral Office that should, however, 
a decision to be taken to extend any registration system to parliamentary candidates, 
and legislation to this effect passed, it is unlikely there would be any substantial 
administrative problems created. 
32. Certain practical considerations arising out of existing electoral legislation may 
impinge upon the feasibility of any pecuniary interest registration requirement 
as a condition for candidature. 
33. Firstly, it would seem appropriate that such registration forms as are required be 
lodged in the first instance with the Divisional Returning Officer (for elections to the 
House of Representatives) or the Australian Electoral Officer for the State (for Senate 
elections) at the time a candidate gives his formal consent to be nominated (Commom-
wealth Electoral Act 1918, ss. 73 and 74). 
34. Existing legislation provides that this consent may be withdrawn at any time 
prior to 12 o'clock noon on the day of nomination (s. 80). It would be inappropriate, 
therefore, for any officer of the Australian Electoral Office to disclose information 
pertaining to any nomination prior to the actual declaration of nominations. 
35. Consequently, the earliest appropriate date for the details of candidates' pecuniary 
interests to be forwarded to the Registrar of Members' Interests would be the date of 
nomination fixed by the writ for election (ss. 59 and 62). 
36. Existing legislation provides that the date of the poll may be seven to thirty 
days after the date of nomination (s. 63). In the event that an election were held as 
early as seven days from the date of nomination, it is likely that there would be 
insufficient time available for the publication of details of candidates' pecuniary 
interests in many, especially remote, electoral Divisions prior to polling day. This 
possible difficulty gives rise to questions whether: 
(a) details of the pecuniary interests of some candidates might be published 
(those whose proximity to the Registrar's office would make publication 
feasible) and not those of others (candidates too remote); 
(b) in Senate elections, a situation could be contemplated in which urban electors 
might have access to the published statements of candidates' pecuniary 
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(c) it should be possible for postal voters, even in close proximity to the office 
of the Registrar of Members' Interests, to vote prior to the publication of 
details of candidates' pecuniary interests (as would be permitted under existing 
legislation which provides that postal voting may take place at any time between 
the declaration of nominations and the close of the poll—Part XII of the 
Commonwealth Electoral Act). 
Clearly, any decision to introduce compulsory registration of candidates' interests 
would give rise to a need to review provisions touching on these issues. 
37. Further matters which would need consideration would include whether failure 
to comply with the registrative requirements would disqualify a candidate from 
election and the consequences of misstatements in the details submitted by candidates 
for registration. 
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